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ABSTRACT 
This study deals wi th four grour,s that seemed typical 
of the Dutch New Left in its originality as weIl as its 
continuity with the Dast: the Pacifist Socialist Party, 
which renewed the old tradition of Revolutionary Socialism; 
Provo, which revived a form of Anarchism; Nieuw Links (IINew 
Lef til) in the Labour Party which combined Social Democratie 
ideas with others; and the Political Party of Radicals, which 
recreated a Christian Left in a secular spirit. These brouPS 
shared some basic ideas, concerning democratisation of society, 
a strategy of direct action at the grass roots combined with 
legislative action, and a cultural revolution. They were 
of ten inspired by similar groups in France and Germanysuch 
as the Part i Socialiste Unifié (United Socialist Party) and 
the Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (Socialist Germun 
Student League). The projects of all these groups suffered 
from certain ambiguities and specifically from a certain 
tension between elitism and populism. These ambiguities could 
be attributed to the new petty bourgeois class base of the 
New Left. However, the New Left was more than a new petty 
bourgeois ideology; it could also be seen as a response to 
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The New Left is dead, people say. It had lived for only 
10 or 15 years, perhaps somewhere between 1960 and 1975. It 
died of an infantile disease. Or perhaps it never really 
lived, but only haunted the minds of old left bureaucrats 
and right-wing capitalists. It is time for historians and 
social scientists to try to understand this strange phenomenon. 
The New Left appears to have had the greatest impact in 
the United states of America. At least, American scholars 
have written searching and possibly definitive studies on 
the American New Left. l In Europe only the French and to 
some extent the German and Italian New Left have attracted 
sufficient scholarly attention. 2 The New Left in smaller 
countries has been virtually neglected, at least by English-
wr1ting scholars. In some of the smaller countries it may 
have played a neglig1ble role, but in others the neglect can 
only be attributed to linguistic barriers or a scarcity of 
scholarly resources. The Netherlands fall into the second 
1 For instance, 1. Unger, The Movement, a History of the 
American New Left, 1959-1972 (New York, 1974); a more jour-
nalistic but serious and detailed study is K. Sale, SDS (New 
York, 1973); for an analysis of the ideas of the American 
New Left see L. Sargent, New Left Thought (Homewood, 111., 
1972). 
2This is an impressionistic judgment, which applies only 
to pub1ications in English, French, German and Dutch. 
1 
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category. In fact, one Dutch scholar has argued that the 
Dutch New Left had a greater impact on Dutch polities than 
the American New Left had on American pOlitics. 3 This study 
will focus on the Dutch New Left, referring to its French and 
German counterparts for comparison. 
The Dutch New Left has been neglected but not totally 
ignored by Dutch and foreign scholars. Several social scien-
tists have tried to describe and explain it, or rather parts 
and aspects of it. They have taken two different approaches. 
On the one hand, they have written case studies or histories 
of particular New Left groups in particular periods. On the 
other hand, they have studied the general impact of the Dutch 
New Left on the political system of the Netherlands. Both 
approaches suffer from certain weaknesses which will be 
discussed briefly here. 
The best example of the first approach is probably 
Kroes's comparative study of the New Left in the United States, 
Britain and the Netherlands. 4 It is presented as an inter-
pretative analysis of strategies, based on a Michelsian model 
of "oligarchisation" and "democratisation waves." Though it 
offers many perceptive insights and useful descriptions, it 
cannot quite bridge the gap between the rather abstract 
interpretative model and the historical description of parti-
cular New Left groups. In the first place, although Kroes 
3 R • Kroes, New Left, Nieuw Links, New Left (Alphen aan 
de Rijn, 1975), p. 109. 
4Ibid • 
3 
gives a broad definition of "New Left," which applies also to 
Anarchist and Marxist groups, he concentrates on only one 
Dutch group, Nieuw Links ("New Left") within the Dutch Labour 
Party--a group that could be considered the extreme right 
wing of the international New Left. The historical develop-
ment of the Dutch New Left as a whole remains somewhat obscure. 
Continuities between the Old and the New Left are insuffi-
ciently clarified, partly because Nieuw Links was a rather 
unique group in the history of the Dutch Left, unlike other 
Dutch New Left groups. In the second place, Kroes conceives 
of the New Left as a movement for democratisation, but 
describes the history of Nieuw Links in terms of a "changing 
of the guards" and a "conquest of power" within the Dutch 
Labour Party. He does not solve this contradiction satis-
factorily by concluding that Nieuw Links "activated the 
social base" of the party and proved that it was still the 
party that emancipated the working class. 5 These conclusions 
imply a class analysis which is absent in the book. It will 
be argued below that Nieuw Links de-activated the old, more 
or Ie ss working-class base of the Labour Party, and activated 
or even created a new social base among elements of the new 
petty bourgeoisie. 
Boivin, Hazelhoff, Middel and Molenaar describe the 
history of Nieuw Links in similar terms, but avoid Kroes' 
5Ibid ., p. 70 and p. 109 in particular; cf. the critique 
of B. Tromp, "Een beweging beweegt niet zonder politieke 
analyse," Vrij Nederland, 1 Ivlay 1976. 
4 
6 theoretical dilemma by leaving out the theory. They neglect 
the international context and the ideas of the Nieuw Links 
group, but provide a great deal of useful sociological and 
historical information. Quite similar histories have been 
written of other Dutch New Left groups such as the Pacifist 
Socialist Party, Provo, and the Political Party of Hadicals. 
Most of them were written as masters' theses, and are useful 
but limited sources of information. Van der Land's doctoral 
dissertation about the foundation of the Pacifist Socialist 
Party is the only study with a theoretical framework--or at 
least the beginning of a theoretical framework. 7 Van der Land 
sees the party as allpressure group for peace" which later 
grew into a real political party because it began to express 
feelings of discontent among large sectors of Dutch society.8 
As he does not elaborate on this explanation, it does not 
seem very enlightenint~. Moreover, it does not take into 
account the historical context of the Pacifist Socialist Party 
and its similarity with earlier revolutionary or leftist 
9 socialist parties in the Netherlands. 
While the first approach could be considered historical-
6B• Boivin, H. Hazelhoff, B. Middel, and B. Molenaar, 
Een verjongingskuur voor de Partij van de Arbeid (Deventer, 
1978). 
7 L. Van der Land, Het ontstaan van de Pacifistisch 
Socialistische Partij (Amsterdam, 1962). 
8Ibid ., Chapter 7. 
9For a similar criticism see I. Cornelissen's review in 
Vrij Nederland, 27 October 1962. 
5 
descriptive and rather atheoretical, the second approach tends 
to be more systematic, analytical and abstract. Ideas are 
seen as important, insofar as the New Left is of ten defined 
as a "neo-democratic ideology." Thus Lijphart conceives of 
the "neo-democratic ideology" of Nieuw Links and other groups 
as one of the factors that caused the break-down of the 
10 
consociational system. However, he shows little interest 
in this ideology. For him it is probably an independent 
variabIe which can be taken as "given ll in order to explain 
his dependent variabIe; the stability or instability of the 
Dutch political system. To alesser extent this applies 
also to Daalder, who takes a more historical approach to the 
same problem. Daalder links the New Left ideology to the 
growing importance of television and the emergence of a new 
political elite of academies, students and social or cultural 
workers. ll 
Daalder's insight has proved quite fruitful. It may 
help to solve Kroes' dilemma of how New Left groups like Nieuw 
Links could strive for democratisation and activate the social 
base of the Left while trying to concentrate power in their 
own hands. In fact, Daalder argues, or at least implies, the 
new political elite has activated people mostly for its own 
10A. Lijphart, Verzuiling, pacificatie en kentering in 
de Nederlandse politiek, 3rd ed. (Amsterdam, 1979), pp. 206-
207; this is a revised edition of A. Lijphart, The Polities 
of Accommodation, Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands 
(I3erkeley, 1975) (1968). 
IlH. Daalder, Politisering en lijdelijkheid in de 
Nederlandse politiek (Assen, 1974), pp. 62-66. 
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benefit. Thus the notion "neo-democratic ideo1ogy" gains a 
critica1, a1most a Marxist dimension: ideas that disguise 
t " 1 1 "t t " 1 "t t 12 par ~cu ar c ass ~n eres s as un~versa ~n eres s. Unfor-
tunately the notion has not been developed or analysed further 
by Daalder or by other authors who borrowed it from hirn. 'rhe 
origin, function and social context of the new elite, the 
"new liberated ones" (a poor translation of the equally 
monstrous Dutch term "nieuwe vrijgestelden"), have not been 
analysed in any depth either. 'rhe ease and frequency with 
which the term "nieuwe vrijgestelden" is used in Dutch books 
and magazines might even raise some suspicion; perhaps it is 
part of another ideology or counter-ideology, the "neo-
technocratie ideology of the New Right?,,13 
In these studies, the notion of a neo-democratic ideology 
remains abstract and vague, an ideal type rarely confronted 
with empirical reality. It is not based on a concrete analysis 
of party platforms, manifestos or other publications of New 
Left groups or individuals. Nuances between different groups 
or tendencies are usually neglected. Hence, when authors like 
Van den Berg and Molleman criticise the neo-democratic ideology, 
12 Almost, but not quite: a Marxist would analyse the 
socio-economie context of the new elite, which Daalder does 
not do; cf. K. Ivlarx and F. Engels, "Die deutsche Ideologie," 
Marx-Engels Werke, vol. 3 (Berlin, 1958). 
13For instanee, H. Vuijsje, Nieuwe Vrijgestelden (Baarn, 
1977); J. Van den Berg and H. Molleman, Crisis in de Neder-
landse politiek (Alphen aan de Rijn, 1975); several artieles 
in Haagse Post, Hollands Maandblad, etc. For a brief Marxist 
critique of the counter-ideology see S. stuurman, Kapitalisme 
en burgerlijke staat (Amsterdam, 1978), pp. 181-183. 
14 they attack a man of straw--their own "ideal type." 
A different approach wi11 be followed here, to avoid 
7 
the weaknesses of the two approaches discussed above but also 
to make use of their strong points. This study wil1 focus 
on ideas, as expressed by New Left groups in party platforms, 
manifestos and journaIs. These ideas will be analysed "in 
their own right," as serious attempts to solve prob1ems and 
to interpret the wor1d; but also in their social and historical 
context, as expressions of socio-economie and political inter-
ests. This approach has been inspired by Habermas's 'recon-
struction of historical materialism" and, more specifically, 
by Pierre Ansart's analysis of political ideo1ogies. 15 
The first chapter of the book deals with the pre-history 
of the Dutch New Left. In order to de fine and analyse the 
New Left one has to understand the Old Left. Too of ten the 
differences between the two have been exaggerated, particu1arly 
by New Leftists. Even a short and fragmentary description of 
01d Left groups in the Netherlands between 1870 and 1960 will 
confirm the suspicion that the New Left of the 1960s and 
1970s was far from new in many respects. lts ideas differed 
from the ideologica1 mainstream of the Social Democratie and 
14 See Van den Berg and Mol1eman, op. cit., pp. 95-107; 
as the authors do not discuss their methodo1ogy at all, it is 
not c1ear if they actua11y intend to construct an ideal type 
in the Weberian sense, or genera1ise from unspecified data. 
15See J. Habermas, Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen 
Materialismus (Frankfurt am Main, 1976), especial1y Chapters 
1 and 2; P. Ansart, Les idéo1ogies po1itigues (Paris, 1974). 
Of course, inspiration does not imply complete agreement. 
8 
Communist Old Left of the 1930s or 1950s, but of ten resembled 
the ideas of more marginal Anarchist or Christian Socialist 
groups of the 1920s and 1910s, as well as those of earlier 
Socialist groups. 
Of course this can become clear only af ter an historical 
overview of New Left groups and their main ideas, which is the 
subject of Chapter Two. four groups that seem typical of the 
Dutch New Left in its originality as well as its continuity 
with the past will be described: the Pacifist Socialist Party, 
which renewed the old tradition of Revolutionary Socialism 
established by the Social Democratie League of the l880s; 
Provo, which revived a form of Anarchism; Nieuw Links in the 
Labour Party, which resembied older Social Democratie factions 
of the left in only a few aspects but took most of its ideas 
from elsewhere; and the Political Party of Radicals, which 
recreated a Christian Left with many new and secular ideas. 
All of these groups have been labelled "New Lef til by their 
16 leading members and by outside observers. The Pacifist 
Socialist Party was founded in 1957, the other groups came 
into existence between 1965 and 1968. Their history will be 
j.Jursued until 1977--an éî.rti trary date, but an eventful year 
in Dutch polities in which ths first ~overnment with some 
New Left mernbers fe11 anc! wus replaced by a Llors conservative 
one. 
16 for example in Kroes, op. cit., pp. 45, 47, 50; Van Duijn 
in Provo 7 (25 Fe bruary 1966); Coppes in PPRAK 32 (March 1972); 
Interviews 1, 3, 9. 
9 
As "New Left" is not aregistered trademark, other groups 
could claim it apart from the four mentioned above. Van den 
Berg and Molleman refer to Democrats' 66, for instance, in 
their discussion of the "neo-democratic ideology," though they 
conclude that it was a neo-liberal rather than a neo-democratic 
17 
or New Left party. Whether Democrats' 66 belongs or belonged 
to the Dutch Left remains an open question. l8 It all depends 
on one's definition of "Left," of course. This controversia1 
term willbe used rather loosely here, to refer to movements 
or groups that strive for a more egalitarian and more liber-
tarian society; or, more specifically, to Socialist, anarchist 
and communist groups. Like most other definitions, this one 
creates more problems than it solves. It may exclude Democrats' 
66--though not unambiguously--but does it include Marxist-
Leninist groups that fight for equa1ity but not necessarily 
for liberty? For the purpose of this study Marxist-Leninist 
groups wi11 be regarded as "Left" but not "New Left," even 
if they were founded af ter 1960. This--somewhat arbitrary--
decision seems to reflect the way these Marxist-Leninist 
groups defined themse1ves: in terms of a return to the 
"roots" of f-1arx, Lenin, Trotsky or Stal in • 19 
Furthermore, New Left ideas may have been expressed by 
17 Van den Berg and Molleman, op. cit., p. 118. 
l8Founding members of Democrats' 66 tended to reject any 
"Left-Right thinking" and refused to classify their party--see 
De geschiedenis van D'66 (n.p., n.d.), pp. 53-55 for instancej 
see also I. Lipschits, Links en rechts in de politiek (Meppel, 
1969 ). 
19 See below, Chapter 2.2, footnote 115 for references. 
10 
a wide variety of formalor informal action committees and 
interest groups of students, feminists, soldiers, trade-
unionists, musicians, actors, school teachers, painters and 
so forth. In the 1960s the Netherlands was buzzing with 
dozens, if not hundreds of these groups. However, this study 
will focus on political groups in the strict sense, i.e. 
groups presenting a more or less complete project or programme 
for society as a whole--or in Eastonian terms: groups trying 
to control the authoritative allocation of values in society.20 
Again, the decision is somewhat arbitrary. One could argue 
that the Dutch Student Trade Union (Studenten Vakbeweging) 
and feminist groups like Man-Vrouw-Maatschappij ("I1an-Woman-
Society") should have been included; on the other hand, 
representatives of these groups were able to play an active 
part in the New Left groups under study, so one might argue 
also that the former do not require separate treatment. In 
other words, the Dutch party system is open to ideas and 
demands from interest groups, even radical and highly politi-
cised ones. This cannotbe said, it seems, of the German party 
system; hence an interest group like the German Socialist 
League could develop a complete project for German society in 
the late 1960s without exercising any qignificant influence 
on any poli tical party •. ~l 
20See D. Easton, The Political System (New York, 1953), 
pp. 126-128. 
21See below, Chapter 3.2; in the process the Socialist 
Student League changed from an interest group (in a loose 
sense: representing the mostly intellectual interests of 
socialist students) into a political party or quasi-party, to 
use Van der Land's terms. 
11 
The working definition on the basis of which these four 
groups of the New Left were selected will be replaced by a 
more theoretical definition at the end of Chapter Two. The 
four groups differed in many ways, but they shared three 
basic ideas that could be considered the core of the New Left 
ideology in the Netherlands: (I) Dutch society is controlled 
by managers, technocrats and bureaucrats with or without 
capital; it needs a fundamental democratisation, aimed at 
self-management in industry, education and other sectors of 
society; (11) society should be changed "from below" as 
weIl as "from above," i.e. through direct action at the i~rass 
roots as weIl as through le~islation and elections; (111) not 
only structural change is called for but also a "cultural 
revolution,1I which the Old Left neglected; a new culture 
should be created, based on creativity, self-expression and 
peaceful cooperation rather than on consumption of material 
goods, work, achievement and competition. 
This definition is applied to French and German New 
Left groups in Chapter Three. Many groups of the Nouvelle 
Gauche and the Neue Linke seem to fit the Dutch definition 
of New Left, though they tended to differ in emphasis and in 
degrees of moderation. Dutch New Leftists expressed more 
confidence in parliamentary action and elections, more inter-
est in cultural and religious questions,and Ie ss interest in 
Marxist theory or theory in general. Yet the similarities 
seem sufficient to justify a few tentative generalisations 
about the European--or to be more precise, West European--
12 
New Left. 
New Left ideas were expressed initially by very small 
and marginal anarchistic groups of intellectuals, the New 
Ultra-left or "gauchistes." In a second stage the ideas 
"contaminated" larger socialist organisations led by intellec-
tuals, but supported also by fractions of other classes. In 
a third stage, similar though more moderate ideas penetrated 
the dominant mass organisations of the Left through informal 
groups of young activists. They inspired the programmes of 
the Dutch Labour Party and of the French Socialist Party, 
but to a much lesser extent the programmes of the German 
Social Democratic Party in the 1970s. 
The ideas are analysed in more detail in Chapter Four. 
While in Chapters Two and Three they are presented as fragments 
or slogans, culled from different party platforms, manifestos 
and journals, here they are reconstructed into more or less 
coherent theories. Given the lack of theoretical sophistica-
tion among Dutch New Left groups, this reconstruction draws 
of ten upon French or German sources in order to throw li~ht 
on the project of the Dutch New Left. The project is seen as 
an attempt to understand the world and to change it. More 
specifically, it contains theories about the role of science 
and the new or old working class, the relative autonomy of 
the state and of culture, a new conception of nature, and a 
critique of economism and determinisme 
With some difficulty, the New Left theories about these 
subjects could be se en as part of a single New Left project. 
Thou,~h re Ju ti ve 1y cohe rent, the 1 'ru J 8C t i 2. not free fron 
iiIllL'i"llÏ tie:c3 ; nel inconsis terlCies. 
hi s to rica 1 eon \.;8 xt o:C the i:e'\: Lr:.: ft. 
<.] ::';0 ~',,:; strcn .,th::;. r I. J G v,j:1 1 
.] (V,' tJl t thC' 
culturéll su;,jectivist:" :lc-::e it (](l ;,tt(,;,(:ti\',.~ Lleol0,';Y :Cor 
but used here in é.: more nClrro\V sense. As the theoretical 
uebate atout this notion stiJl continues, ;:,ncl thi:3 ~iuthor 
cloes not 1'eel (.uémifiec.l to contrii ute to i t, he uses a ::ültl,le 
workins ,definition: the rH"VÎ petty r)our~;eoisie con'.üst,c3 
of intellcctué!.ls, ei\ il servi.Jnts ;'.nd e:;\I;loyec;3 of tllG 
~ ~) 
services. Jhin" to the concentr,",ti')l\ of c,~llj-ti'l, 
,) " 
, c ~ r 'l.· l' .- , ' , " T' , ' , 1 " , " , ., . . "'l "1 ' l\. lOLI ,II1L.L'JlL.), _JC~:.) (. __ l.-',\...).~)C ,_::l ;~UCll; LC:J ~l: rl;::J . (~ c;-~J.~)J.. "(,;'. 1.;:'1~ 
~~'~·ujour('hui (Pari:3, 1974); :'L"o ,'c. liunt, Cl!., Clds,cS :;n,,' 
Cl~,ss ~~tl'ucturc (Lonclon, J')77). P'cTh:tl.:3 th(~ 'y.'Jl'.:in~ >..u;i'ir.i-
tion con,e~3 c10:3<.;[' \::0 tbc conc81Jtion of C. ,3:,u,'81ot, il. E,,=,ci.'.I)J.c:!l;, 
éllld J. ;,i,:!leI:lort, Lél. .,ctitcIJouI',,;,eoisit.: 0'1 l'1'~U"lC2 (l);,;.ri;c" 1~7[::'); 
hO\[,2Ver, rriO:3t of the se author:3 sec th,=; 11(:;'\,/ l-·et ty LourucoL,;;i c 
as éJ fraction or lurt of ;1 clas:3 ce.thcr than E'S ;:"l cl8.ss. Cf. 
J.i(, LinclsGj-, "The Conccl_Jtualization of Soci21 Cliè~SS," in 
StudieG in Politicé\l Econorny 3 (Sj;Jrin:..:; 1930). AJl of the::;2 
èefini tions, includin:s the one used here, Gui'fer fror~! i!il1Jo1' -
Lanl. :3hortco!1in,~s; ::we belo\';, Ch~),utC:.~r Six. 
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factors, this class ~rew rapitily aftar the Second NorIa War. 
Until the 18 GOs i t reJi~iJined loy;ü to the bourgeoisie anci the 
state, on which 1t was economically, politically anel ieleolo-
i~ieaIIy cle[.Jenuent. Yet \'Ihen the clétsS struggle oetween the 
bour~eoisie anel the working class intensified in the 1960s 
and 1970s, an important fraction of the new petty bourt~eoisie 
turned towards the [.lew Left in search of an alliance with the 
latter ; a somewha t lar:~er fraction m.ay 
23 the New Right. 
have turned towards 
This is not an attempt to explain the New Left as merely 
the ideology of the new petty bourgeoisie. In the first place, 
other soeial classes, particuIarly the working class, also 
expressed support for New Left ideas on many occasions. In 
the second place, the New Left project is more than "id.eology." 
24 I t cannot be reelueed sirnl.Jly to c lass interest. Whi Ie 
expressin .. ; the interests of (a fraetion of) the new petty 
lJourgeoisie, i t also nrticulated ne\'! po 1i ticL:cl issues and 
revived older L:;;sues which "Che Oid Left hael neglected. l"iore-
over, it ean alse be seen as the result of the precess of 
secularisation that has affected Western or European culture 
over the last 500 years or so. Now not only the relationship 
23The latter hypothesis goes beyond the scope of this 
study. 
24This "class reductionism" which seems to have tempted 
Poulantzas and many other lIlarxists, is cri ticised et'feeti vely 
by E. Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London, 
1977), pp. 81 1'1'.; of course a similar criticism could be 
made of non-Marxist social scientists who see the New Left 
as an ideology of the new political elite of nieuwe vrij-
gestelden, as discusseel above. 
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between man and himself, his (and even more, her) identity 
or self-expression are secularised and politicised, in other 
words, perceived as m~n-made and changeable rather than God-
given. 
These rather hazardous speculations are elaborated in 
Chapter Six. They can be supported only to a limited extent 
by the analysis of four New Left groups in the Netherlands, 
supplemented with secondary analysis of a few New Left groups 
and theories in France and Germany. The analysis is based 
primarily on publications of these groups in the period 1960-
1977. All issues of the main theoretical journals of the four 
groups, Bevrijding (Liberation) and Radikaal of the Pacifist 
Socialist Party, Provo of the Provo ~roup, Socialisme en 
Democratie (Socialism and Democracy) of the Labour Party, 
and Radikalenkrant or PPRAK (Radical Paper or Action Paper) 
of the Political Party of Radicals, published in this perioct, 
were read. To complement these data, interviews were held 
with 10 Dutch politicians and(then) important members of the 
four sroups, and with four members of French or German ~roups--
many of them social scientists who provided general insights 
as weIl as direct information. 25 Survey data about voters, 
members or leaders of New Left groups have been used as 
illustration rather than evidence for the hypotheses about 
the social base of the New Left; too aften, the surveys were 
based on smallor biased samples and on different conceptual 
frameworks. Further research is especially needed in this 
area. The new petty bour",eoisic h2cS only just startecl to 
! l ' '[T'· 'i) ~- ene :1;: ' .1 J fn r' 
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become conscious of its ovm existence--hopefully, this study 
contributes a little to this process! 
CHAP'l'EH. 1 
THE OLD LEFT IN THE NETHERLANDS (187U-1960) 
Introduction 
This chapter presents a brief history of the Old Left in 
the Netherlanas; or to be more ~recise, a survey of Socialist, 
Anarchist, Communist, Social Democratie anti 1eftist Christian 
groups in the period 1870-1960. lts purpose is to show the 
continuities as weIl as the differences between the 01d 
Left and the New Left in the Netherlands. The New Left has 
been defined in the introduction in terms of three basic 
ideasi fundamental democratisation or self-management, a dual 
strategy of change from "above" as v/ell as "below" , and 
cultural revolution. These ideas are not really new, as 
will be demonstrated below, but they played a modest role in 
the Old Left. 
The oldest organisations of the Dutch Left, which could 
be classified roughly as "Hevolutionary Socialist," generally 
fought for fundamental democratisation of state and society, 
and of ten specifically for workers' self-management. Their 
strategy combined direct action with parliamentary action, 
but the former was usually considered more important. The 
term "cultural revolution" was not used, it seems, but many 
Revolutionary Socialists aspired to a new culture. However, 
17 
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af ter 1920 these groups dec1ined in numbers or disappeared 
completely. The Hevolutionary Socialist tradition was con-
tinued by the Communist Party and its offshoots, with more 
emphasis on short term economie issues but not much interest 
in a new culture. This will be shown in Section 1.2 below. 
Section 1.3 deals with the Anarchist Left which differen-
tiated itself from the Revolutionary Socialist Left around 
the turn of the century. Most Anarchists seemed to strive 
for some form of workers' self-management and for a new 
culture, however ill-defined, but few of them expected any 
positive change "from above." Whereas the Anarchist Lef't 
enjoyed considerable support among the working class in the 
1890s and early 1900s, af ter 1920 it became a marginal affair 
of intellectuals and "lumpen-proletarians." 
The Social Democratie Left developed in the opposite 
directlon, from a marginal group of intellectuals to a mass 
movement of the working class. On the other hand its concern 
wlth fundamental democratisation, workers' self-management, 
direct aetion,and new farms of eultur~ beeame marginal within 
the movement compared to its concern with economie planning, 
socia1 securlty and parliamentarism. This development will 
be sketched in Section 1.4. 
Until the 1960s very few Dutch Christians supported the 
Left. Some of them joined the groups deseribed above, others 
founded parties with an explicit Christian orientation. 
Section 1.5 will focus on one of those especially, the League 
of Christian Socialis~s, tecause it and its offshoots 
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anticipated the New Left perhaps more than any other Old Left 
group did. However, it did not last very long. 
A history of the Dutch Left, even a fragmentary and selec-
tive one like the one presented here, should take into account 
the context of Dutch society and polities in the period under 
study. Hence Section 1.1 will offer a brief survey of Dutch 
society and polities between 1870 and 1960. Like the rest of 
this chapter it will rely on secondary sourees. 
1.1 Dutch society and polities (1870-1960) 
In spite of the early decline of feudalism and the growth 
of commercial capitalism in the 16th and 17th century, Dutch 
society remained predominantly agrarian until the secona half 
1 
of the 19th century. Af ter 1850 the textile industry, which 
had been in decline since 1700, was modernised and expanded 
in the East (Twente) and the South (Brabant). Heavy industry 
developed only slowly, partly due to a lack of raw materials 
2 
and of a large market. Ship-building and shipping, co1onia1 
trade and commercial agriculture were modernised and began to 
develop around 1870. 3 
The modernisation process was initiated by Libera1 
entrepreneurs and pOliticians in the economie sphere as weIl 
as in polities and culture. lletween 1848 and 188& the Libera1s 
IJ. Romein, De La~e Landen bij de zee (Amsterdam, 1973), 
Chapter 22. 
2 F.E. Huggett, The Moaern Netherlands (London, 1971), 
p. 59. 
3Romein, op. cit., Chapter 22. 
20 
modernised municipal and provincial administration, wrested 
control over the national government and its budget from the 
King and his Conservative supporters, expanded the franchise 
(from 5% to 14% of the adult population) and introduced 
compulsory education, conscription and very modest social 
legislation. Liberals also organised the first national 
federation of trade unions, the General Netherlands Working-
men's Association, in 1871. 4 The modernisation pOlicy of the 
Liberals met with growing oPPosition, particularly in the 
sphere of education. Catholics ws weIl as Calvinists, both 
substantial minorities in the Dutch population, insisted on 
having their own confessional schools. They resented the 
decision of the Liberal government to subsidise only neutral, 
non-confessional schoOls. 5 
The struggle over school subsidies and the expansion of 
the electorate changed the political system. From a two-party-
system of loosely organised caucus parties--Protestant Conser-
vatives opposing an alliance of Liberals and Catholics--it 
turned into a multi-party-system of tight1y organised mass 
6 parties. Catholics and Ca1vinists opposed a gradual1y 
disintegrating Liberal party, which was attacked on the Left 
4G• Harmsen and B. Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding van de 
arbeid (Nijmegen, 1~75), pp. 44-45. 
5Romein, op. cit., Chapter 24. 
6 The terms "caucus party" and "mass 
party" are used in the way defined by M. 
Parties Their OrJanisation and Activit 
London, 1964 , pp. 17-27. 
party" or "branch 
Duverger, Political 
in the Modern State 
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by a growing Socialist movement. The Anti-Revolutionary Party 
(ARP), founded by the Calvinist theologian Dr. Abraham Kuyper 
in 1879, became the first modern mass party or branch party 
in the Netherlands. Through its tight organisation, its 
ideological cohesion, and its ties with the new Reformed 
Church--founded by the same Abraham Kuyper--the Anti-
Revolutionary Party struck deep roots in the traditional 
petty bourgeoisie and the Protestant working class; the latter 
was organised in Protestant trade unions separated from the 
General Netherlands Working-menls Association. 7 
In the same period, the Socialists also left the General 
Netherlands Working-menls Association because of its policy 
of cooperation between classes. At first they founded a 
political party, the Social Democratie League, then a new 
federation of trade unions, the National Labour Secretariat 
(Nationaal Arbeids Secretariaat, NAS). lts federal structure, 
which allowed the local and industrial branches considerable 
autonomy, seemed to fit in well with the revolutionary syn-
dicalist tendency that soon dominated the NAS. 8 
The Catholics, who had been treated as second class 
citizens in the Dutch Republic (1588-1795) and to some extent 
also under the monarchy throughout the.nineteenth century, 
were the last to organise their own trade uni ons and a mass 
7Harmsen and Reinalda, op. cit., pp. 51-53; about the 
Anti-Revolutionary Party see, I. Libschits, De protestants-
christelijke stroming tot 1940 (Deventer, 1977), pp. 17-31. 
8Harmsen and Reinalda, op. cit., pp. 70-73. 
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party, under close supervision of the bishops. The process 
was not completed until the 1920s. Catholic members of 
parliament had formed a caucus in the 1890s and supported 
the Calvinist Anti-Revolutionaries in the struggle over 
school SUbsidies. 9 
Confessional, i.e. Calvinist-Catholic, and Liberal 
coalitions alternated between 1888 and 1913. Socialists 
played only a minor role in this period due to their sma11 
numbers and internal conflicts. Hevolutionary Socialists 
and Anarchists clashed with reformist and parliamentarian 
Socia1 Democrats, both within the Social Democratie League 
and within the National Labour Secretariat. The League feIl 
apart in 1894, while the trade unions began to split a little 
later. The conflict was deepened by a fai1ed general strike 
in 1903. In 1905 most Social Democratie or reformist trade 
unions joined a new federation, the Nederlands Verbond van 
Vakverenigingen (NVV: Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions) 
which had a more centralised structure. 10 
The Socia1 Democratie Workers Party, estab1ished in 
1894 by refo~nists who had left the Social Democratie League, 
had grown into a mass party of 25,000 members and 144,000 
voters (16% of the electorate) by 1913. In that year the 
party was invited by the Liberals to join them in a coalition 
9Ibid ., pp. 102-103, 158-ltiO; see also I. Lipschits, 
Politieke stromingen in Nederland (Deventer, 1978), pp. 27-32 
about the Catholic Party. 
10Harmsen and Reinalda, op. cit., pp. 88-95. 
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government, but decided af ter some internal debate to lend a 
Li b 1 t 1 . t . 1 . t 11 era governmen on y pass1ve suppor 1n par 1amen • 
A Liberal minority government held office until 1918, 
and managed not only to keep the country out of the war, but 
also to bring the struggle over school subsidies to a peaceful 
end. Af ter consultation with all major parties--the Pacifica-
tion of 1917--it granted confessional and neutral schools 
equal state subsidies; but it also introduced universal 
suffrage and proportional representation in order to please 
the Social Democrats and the (progressive) Liberals. This 
package deal had been negotiated by the leaders of the major 
parties in a way that qualified Dutch polities as "the polities 
of accommodation.,,12 Accommodation between elites entrenched 
in regional and religious segments of society, or "consocia-
tional democracy," was far from unusual in Dutch history, as 
Daalder points out, but it was only af ter 1913 that it was 
effectively institutionalised. 13 The religious segments 
developed into "pillars" (zuilen) of sub-societies, each with 
its own political parties, trade unions, university, schools, 
social clubs, etc. 
The process of "pillarisation" and accomrnodation has 
11 W. KendalI, The Labour Movement in Europe (London, 
1975), pp. 379, 397. 
12LijPhart, Polities of Accornrnodation (1~68), particularly 
pp. 104-112. 
13H• Daalder, "The Netherlands, Opposition in a segwented 
society," in H. Dahl, ed., Political Opposition in Western 
Democracies (New Haven, 1966), pp. 188-236, 417-425. 
been interpreted by many observers as the emancipation of 
the "kleine luyclen," the Dutch petty bourgeoisie of small 
businessmen, artisans, farmers anel clerks that constituted 
the active core of the Calvinist Heformed Church and, to a 
lesser extent, of the Catholic Church. l4 Hecently some 
24 
scholars have drawn attention to the benefits that the Uutch 
bourgeoisie may have derived from ~illarisation: by dividing 
the working class and integrating a fraction of religious 
workers with petty bourgeois and bourgeois groups, it prevented 
the development of a militant and united but large working 
15 
class movement. Perhaps the Pacification of 1917 can be 
seen as an "historical compromise" between the petty bourgeoisie 
16 
and the bourgeoisie in the Netherlands. 
At any rate, the working class benefitted least from the 
process of pillarisation. lts political representatives, 
primnrily the Social Democrats and the Communists, won only 
24% of the popular vote in 19113 anel not much more in subsequenc; 
elections until 1940. They remained isolated in the opposition 
14J • Goudsblom, Dutch Society (New York, 19(7), lP. 31-
33; P. Kraemer, The Societal State (Meppel, 1966), pp. 92-102. 
15Harmsen and Heinalda, op. cit., pp. 51, 102 inter aHa; 
H. Fennema, "Professor Lijphart en de Nederlélndse politie~ 
Acta Politica XI:l (1976): 54-77. 
16professor Goldman suggests this "speculative generali-
zation " in hi spaper: P. Goldman , "The ideological legi tima tion 
of segregation: Neo-Calvinism in the Netherlands and South 
Africa," a paper presented to the Joint CPSA/lsrael Workshop 
on Political Cleavages, Jerusalem, 1978. 
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until 1939, when the Social Democratie party was invited to 
join a National Unity government in the face of World War 11. 17 
The Social Democratie Federation of Trade Unions grew faster--
from 160,000 members in 1918 to 300,000 in 1939--and proved 
more influential than the party, perhaps because it could be 
more easily integrated into the quasi-corporatist system of 
labour relations established by the ruling coalition of Cal-
vinists and Catholics. 18 
Corporatist ideas about class cooperation, social harmony, 
and a "public organisation of production" to reconcile free 
enterprise with central planning, gained wide-spread ~opularity 
in the 1920s and 1930s, not only among Calvinists and Catholics 
but to some extent also among Social Democrats. 19 These ideas 
did not prevent Dutch entrepreneurs from accumulating and 
centralising capital, establishing multinational corporations--
Hoyal Dutch Shell and Unilever, both in cooperation with 
British businessmen--eliminating small enterprises,and firing 
20 or locking out workers in times of trouble. 
Both Calvinists and Catholics advocated a liberal form 
of corporatism, rather than an authoritarian or "statist" form. 
17 
Daalder, in Dahl, op. cit., p. 424. 
18J • Windmuller, Labor Re1ations in the Netherlands 
(Ithaca, 1969), particularly pp. 63-77. 
19M• Broekmeyer and I. Cornelissen, Arbeidersraad of 
ondernemersstaat (Amsterdam, 1969), pp. 105-137; see also the 
forthcoming dissertation of I. Scholten about the ideological 
convergence of the Dutch "pil1ars." 
20Huggett, op. cit., particu1arly p. 171. 
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Even during the Depression of the 1930s they tried to maintain 
free trade, the gold standard and a balanced budget, at the 
expense of wages, jobs and social expenditure. Their pOlicy 
met with little opposition from the Liberal bOurgeOisie. 21 
The state should protect and correct, but not change or 
control society, according to the Calvinist theory of "sover-
eignty in one's own sphere" (soevereiniteit in eigen kring) 
and the Catholic theory of "subsidiari ty" (subsidiari tei t) 
of the state. 22 
Nevertheless the state apparatus was expanded considerably 
under both Liberal and Confessional governments. As in other 
European countries, the Dutch state intervened more and more 
in society to correct social defects as well as to reconstruct 
or regulate parts of society; in fact this distinction was 
23 far from clear cut. 
World War 11 and its aftermath accelerated this process. 
This time the Dutch government failed to keep the country 
out of the war: the German army and air force invaded the 
Netherlands in May 1940, and kept the country occupied until 
May 1945. All political parties were abolished, except the 
21 Romein, op. cit., Chapter 24. 
220n the Calvinist theory, see the summary in H. Leih, 
Kaart van politiek Nederland (Kampen, 19b2), pp. 115, 135 ff. 
On the Catholic theory see A. Cornelissen, Beginselen der 
Nederlandse politieke partijen (Nijmegen, 1935), Chapter 11. 
23Cf • Kraemer, op. cit., pp. 43-58. 
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small National Socialist League. All trade unions were 
forced to join the Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions, 
which was put under a National Socialist trustee. Partly as 
a result of, and partly as areaction against the German 
measures, national unity ~rew stronger. Leaders of the major 
parties met in exile in London or in Dutch prison camps, while 
union leaders met with employers in a clandestine organisation, 
the Foundation of Labour (Stichting van ~ Arbeid).25 At 
the rank and file level, workers united in protest strikes 
against the German authorities in 1941, 1943 and 1944. 
Communist workers played a major role in these actions. 26 
Af ter the liberation of the Netherlands by the Allied 
Forces, both Communists and Social Democrats tried to continue 
and institutionalise the unity achieved during the war, but 
in different ways. The Communists tried to organise all 
workers in a Unity Trade Union Centre. The Social Democrats, 
however, hoped to preserve their own trade unions, but also 
to unite progressive Protestants, Catholics and secular people 
of different classes in one political or~anisation, the Dutch 
People's Movement, which soon became the Partij ~ de Arbeid 
(Labour Party).27 Both efforts began successfully but turned 
24In 1935 the National Socialist League had won 8% of the 
popular vote, but by 1937 its electorate had dwindled to 4%--
small, but not insignificant (see Daalder', in Dahl, op. cit., 
p. 234). 
25WindmUller, op. cit., pp. 108-116. 
26 Harmsen and Reinalda, op. cit., pp. 208-216, 221-227, 238. 
27 On the Unity Trade Union Centre, see ibid., pp. 252-255 
and 266 ff. On the Social Democratic efforts see J. Hoek, 
r 28 
into failures within a [ew yeurs. Pre-war traditions and 
or/;ani sa tions rE:él.sse rteu thelll:c>e 1 ves. 'rhe Uni ty Trade Union 
Centre was pushed astoe ai.',ain oy the three "official" trade 
union centre::> , and the new Labour Party won only slii~,htly 
more votes than the pre-war Social Democratie Workers Party, 
28 but fewer than the Catholie Party. 
Cor~oratist iJeas and institutions did not only survive 
World War 11 but became stron~er and more effective af ter 
1~45. 'l'he three "official" trade unions , the employers' 
or~anisations, and the government were represented e4ually 
in the new Socio-Economie Council, which was to advise the 
government on economie policies. Having heard the Council's 
adviee, the Minister of Social Affairs would issue general 
wa~e direetives. A board of ~overnment Mediators was to 
&pply these Jirectives to the wage agreements negotiated by 
employers and trade union leaders within the Foundation of 
Labour, which had been legalised af ter the war. The Board 
had the right to cancel collective contracts or to decIare 
them bindinrl on all workers in a particular industry. Govern-
ment intervention affecteJ not only wae:,es but also other 
working eonditions. All hiring ana firinG of workers had to 
be approvea by regional Labour Offices. Strikes were ae-
nouneed by all "social partners," by trad", unions as Ï've 11 as 
employers, as "outdated." As strikes were only supported by 
Politieke geschiedenis van Nederland (Leiden, 1~70), Chapters 
6 and 7. 




"unofficial" unions , like the Corrmluni st Uni ty 1'rade Union 
Centre or its syndicalist offshoot, the Independent Federa-
tion of Trade Unions, they could be crushed easily with court 
injunctions or police actions.2~ 
The Socio-Economie Council was to top a ~yramid of 
corporatist institutions, reaching down to the VJorks Councils 
(Ondernemingsraden)at the shop level. A Works Council was 
to be elected by all employees of an enterprise--over a certain 
size--to "con tri bute i ts utmost to the best possi bIe 1'unc-
tioning of the enterprise ••• with due recognition of the 
30 
autonomous function of the employer." The employer or 
manager presided over the council and heard its auvice--about 
work regulations, holiday schedules or individual grievances. 
The system did not fulfill all expectation~ and remained 
incomplete at the shop level and, even more at the level 01' 
industrial branches,which were to be organised in PUblic 
Industrial Organisations (Publiekrechtelijke Bedrijfsorgani-
saties). Nevertheless, it may have contributed to the decrease 
of strikes and the increase in apathy among workers in the 
1~50s. While most important decisions were taken at the 
national level, trade unions became more and more centralised 
d t t t t b t h fl . t· t· h· d 31 an s ronger a he op, u s op oor organ1sa 10n a rop 1e • 
2~Harmsen and Reinalda, op. cit., pp. 338-347; cf. 
WindrnulIer , op. ei t. for a more detai led and less cri tical 
description. 
30Windmuller, op. cit., p. 412; see also Kendal, op. cit., 
pp. 274-276. 
3lHarmsen and Reinalda, op. cit., pp. 314-324; see also 
M. Van der Vall, De vakbewegin[k in de welvaartsstaat (Meppel, 
I ~ 63) • 
, 
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The 1950s were characterised not only by corporatism 
and apparent class harmony, but also by economie recovery and 
accelerated inctustrialisation, motivated partly by the loss 
of the Indonesian colony. In 194~ agriculture employed 19.3% 
of the active population, whi1e industry, mining and construc-
ti on employed 33.3% and transport, commerce and services 
40.7%; by 1960 these sectors provided work for 10.7%, 42.2% 
32 
and 46.6% respectively. At the same time the traditional 
petty bourgeoisie of independent farmers, artisans, and small 
businessmen diminished from about 30% to about 20% of the 
active population, no doubt due to eoncentration and centrali-
ti f Ot 1 33 sa on 0 cap~ a • 
The socio-economie changes of the 1950s found no parallels 
in the spheres of polities and culture. Duteh polities were 
affected by international events, especially the Cold War and 
the integration of West Europe through the Common Market, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and other organisations; 
but there was little endogenous change. The three major 
confessional parties--the Anti-Revolutionary Party, the 
moderate Protestant Christian Historical Union,and the Catholic 
Party--retained a majority at elections and dominated all 
coalition governments af ter 1946. 34 From 1946 to 1958 they 
32 Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1957 and 1966 respectively. 
33Ibid • 
34In 1945-1946 the government was dominated by members 
of the Dutch People's Movement and the future Labour Party; 
from 1946 to 1958 the Cath01ic Party governed with the Labour 
Party, joined in 1948 by the Christian Historieal Union and 
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governed with the Labour Party, but in 1959 a new coalition 
was set up with the Liberal Party af ter a conflict between 
Catholics and Social Democrats over economie poliey. The 
Christian pillars stood firm also in the sphere of e~ucation, 
where eonfessional schools enrolled 71% of all pupils of 
I~rimary and secondary schools in 1947 and the same lJrolJortion 
in 1960. 35 . 36 Church membership did not dec1ine e1ther. 
'l'hou"h there were atternpts at innovation, especially in the 
arts, the ~oetry ano ~aintings of Lueebert, Appel and other 
"Vijftigers" (1950 (;eneration), lJutch culture remained on the 
who1e rather traditiona1. 37 
1.2 The Hevolutionary Socialist Left 
The groups discussed under this headin~ carrieu different 
names but all strove for a socialist revolution. rl'he most 
important groups in this eatei-~ory were the Soeial Democratie 
Leal~ue and the Communi st Party; however, gi ven the purpose of 
this chapter, a few smaller groups that may have antieipated 
in 1952 by the Anti-Hevolutionary Party. The three eonfessiona1 
tJarties won to)~ether 54.3% of the popular vote in 194b and 
52.05~ in 1959; see Daalder, in Dahl, op. cit., pp. 424-425 
in particuhtr. 
35 J. Kruyt, "'1'he Influence of lJenominatianalism on Social 
Life and Or, ,ani sa tiona1 Pa tterns," in K. I'icHae, ed., Con-
sociational Uemocrac Poli tical Acconlmo(iation in Se,ri'iiënted 
:";ocieties 'l'oranto, 1~J'/4 , fl1J. L:'é)-130; see also Da:::.lder, in 
lJah 1, 0 p. ei t . 
iLid. 
3ti1n 1('47 ~ 8U.l% of the adult population, in 1950 79.5%, 
37See K. Fens, "Vrij na de breuk-met gisteren," in 
A. J.lanning et al., Onze Jaren 45-70 (Amsterdam, 1~:i75), 
pp. 1081-1083.---
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the New Left will receive as much attention as those two 
parties. 
'l'he first Hevol.utionary :.:>ocialist organisé:i.tion in the 
Netherlands--probably also the very first leftist group--
m8y have been the Dutch Section of the First International 
Workin~ Menls Association. It was founded in 1869 but dis-
38 
appeared again af ter a few years. About ten years later a 
second attempt was maae, partly by the same people; in the 
meantime, they had joined the General Netherlands Workingmenls 
Association, but objected to its a-political and conservative 
strategy. Starting as alocal association in Amsterdrun, the 
new organisation became the nation-wide Social Democratie 
League (Sociaal-Democratische Bond) in 1882. lts national 
tJrogramme resembIed the Gotha Programme of the German Social 
Democratie Party, delllanding universal suffra,~e, direct lCijis-
lation by the people, universal conscription and education, 
progressive inheritance and incoll1e tax, and state support for 
3~ productive associations. 
In 1885 the Social Democratie League published a more 
elaoorate, but also more utopian programme "On the future 
organisation of society, or how to arrive at a new society 
38G• Harmsen, Historisch overzicht van socialisme en 
arbeidersbeweging in Nederland, vol. 1 (Nijmegen, 1971), 
pp. 10-15; see also J. G1ele, De eerste Internationale in 
Nederland (Nijmegen, 1973). 
39 Ibid .; the proi:;ramme is reprinted in A. Brummelkamp, 
et al., Onze politieke partijen (Baarn, 1918), p. 208. 
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40 from the old one." Rejecting both "anarchist" workers' 
self-management--which would result in new monopolies and 
neglect of less profitable public services--and a centralised 
state, it argued for a federalist position. Municipalities 
and trade unions should run most public services and inuustries, 
while a national government would take care of public services 
like transport and mail. A world government was to undertake 
large public works like the fertilisation of the Sahara 
desert, to "recreate the earth into a great garden, makin::~ 
41 
man the ••• sovereign of the planet." Money would disappear; 
people would receive goods and services according to their 
needs. Workers would elect their managers and take turns in 
fUlfilling judicial and police duties. 
The second part of the manifesto is less clear than the 
first one. A reformist strategy was consiaerea possible, 
onee workers had the right to vote; on the other hand, the 
proletariat of the big cities eould "speed up economie reforllls" 
by taking over the state as weIl as the large factories, 
mines and railways. A privileged vanguard was neeessary, 
42 
sinee the masses were still too weak. Many of these ideas 
will return in later publicutions of socialist groups anti 
especially New Left grou~s, but in a slightly less utopian 
40Toekomsti e Inriehtin der kaatscha) i· of Hoe men uit de 
oude Maatschappij kan komen tot de nieuwe Hague, 1885 • 
41 Ibid ., p. 12 (in JJutch: "de geheele aarde herscheppen 
in een grooten tuin, de menschheid in het bezit brengen van 
de planeet ••• de mensch souverein van den aardbol •••. "). 
42Ibid ., p. 20. 
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and more coherent form. 
In spite of its theoretica1 weaknesses the Socia1 
Democratie League began to grow rapid1y. This cou1d be 
attributed to the strong personal, even charismatic 1eader-
ship of Ferdinand Vome1a Nieuwenhuis, a former Lutheran 
minister who was of ten pictured by followers as well as 
enemies, in the image of Christ. 43 Initia1ly he considered 
himself a Marxist, but gradua1ly he evolved into an anarchist. 
His experience as a member of parliament from 1888 to 1891, 
and as a delegate at meetin~s of the Second International, 
made him question the use of parliamentary action and of 
b . tO 44 ureaucrat1C mass par 1es. 
While anarchist tendencies grew stronger within the 
Social Democratie League--not on1y due to Vomela Nieuwenhuis's 
influence--its membership became more pro1etarian and more 
rurale In 1886 it counted about 4000 members, most of them 
skilled or semi-skilled workers and--to alesser extent--
intellectuals in urban centres like Amsterdam, The Haguc and 
45 
the Zaan area. By 1893 these branches had declined, 
whereas the provincial branches of Groningen and Frisia, the 
most agrarian varts of the Netherlands, com~rised almost half 
43 Harmsen, op. cit., p. 25. 
44F • Domela Nieuwenhuis, Van Christen tot Anarchist 
(Utrecht, 1971) (1910), pp. 50-58, 84. 
45p • Van Horssen and D. Rietveld, "De Sociaal Democratische 
Bond," Ti °dschrift voor Sociale Geschiendenis 1 (1975): 5-71; 
see also J. Saks P. Wiedijk , Kritische herinneringen 
(Nijmegen, 1977) (1929). 
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of the total membership. The rural labourers in these 
areas suffered from a severe depression and exploitation; 
hence they may have appreciated the revolutionary strategy 
of the League and its anarchist tenaency. 
The intellectuals and skilled workers in the League 
showed less enthusiasm about its anarchist trend. Some of 
them left the League in 1894 and established a new party, 
the Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij (Social Democratie 
47 Workers Party). Modelling itself on the German Social 
Democratie Party, the Social Democratie Workers Party devoted 
more attention to theoretical study--partieularly of Marx, 
but also of the British Fabians--than the Soeial Democratie 
League. In 1896 a group of young intellectuals joined the 
new party and began to publish a theoretical journal, De 
Nieuwe Tijd (The New Age). The journal criticised anarchist 
and syndicalist ideas, but also the reformist tendeneies of 
Social Democrats. These tendencies became stronger with the 
growth of the party and its eleetoral success. 48 
The conflicts within the Social Democratie Workers Party 
became sharper with the foundation of another leftist journal, 
De Tribune, published by younger members, and full of volemics 
46 Ibid.; of the 5000 members 1100 lived in Frisia, 1300 
in the Province of Groningen, but only 600 in Amsterdam; in 
1886 the League counted only 50 members in Groningen, 50 in 
Frisia and 1000 in Amsterdam. 
47 Harmsen, op. cit., pp. 27-29; see also Saks, op. cit., 
pp. 39 ff. 
48Harmsen, op. cit., pp. 46-52; see also H. Roland Holst, 
Kapitaal en Arbeid in Nederland (Nijmegen, 1971) (1932), ~art 
2, pp. 83 ff. 
36 
rather than theoretical arguments. In 1909 the editors of 
the new journal were expelled from the party af ter a personal 
attack on its parliamentary leader, who had refused to organise 
demonstrations against rising unemployment. With 400 
supporters, the three editors founded a new party, the Sociaal 
Uemocratische Partij (Social Democratie Party).4Y Of the 
group around De Nieuwe Tijd, the poet Herman Gorter joined 
the new party, whereas his colleague Henriette Roland Holst 
decided to "stay with the masses," i.e. the 10,000 members 
50 
of the Social Democratie Workers Party. 
The Social Democratie Party remained a small but 
tightly knit band of Marxist intellectuals until 1916. lts 
programme resembied that of the Social Democratie Workers 
Party, but lent more emphasis to the stru!;gle élgainst imper-
ia1ism and militarism, demanding immediate independenee for 
Indonesia. It also advocated forms of direct democracy like 
th f d d 11 f t t · 51 e re eren urn an reca 0 represen a lves. both the 
Social Democratie Workers Party and ttle Social Democratie 
Party were affiliated with the Second International, ana 
maintained close ties with the German Social ücmocréltic 
Party--the former especially with the leadership, the latter 
49Harmsen, op. cit., lJ. 56; see also D. \'lijnl<.Oop, "De 
S.D.P., Haar geschieuenis en haar beginselen," in 13rummelkamp 
et al., op. cit., pp. 175-206. 
50 Harmsen, op. cit., p. 56; Roland Holst, 0;. cit., 
pp. 85-99. 
51See WijnkOOp, op. cit., pp. 175 ff.; also, Parlement 
en kiezer, 1918, pp. 133-135. 
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with the left-wing around Hosa Luxemburg. 
While the Social Democratie Workers Party became more 
involved in loc al government and less interested in extra-
parliamentary actions, the Social Democratie Party gave 
priority to the latter. At first it proved rather ineffective 
and failed to win the support from the Social Democratie 
trade unions. During the First World War, however, food 
shortages, price rises and unemployment drove many workers 
away from the Social Democrats who supported the government. 
The Social Democratie Party succeeded in mObilising many of 
these workers for demonstrations and other mass actions, in 
cooperation with the militant National Labour Secretariat. 
Nany former anarchists and syndicalists must have joined the 
party.53 So did a group of left-wing Social Democrats, leu 
by the poet and De Nieuwe Tijd-editor Henriette Roland Holst, 
who had finally left the Social Democratie Workers Party 
because of its support for the Liberal government and for 
. l' ti' t' d' t 54 ffil l ary mob llsa lon ere l s. 
The group around Henriette Holand Holst had existed as 
an independent organisation for about a year. Under the name 
"Hevolutionary Socialist Association" (Hevolutionair Socialis-
tisch Verbond), it had published a platform that could be 
52 In particular through Gorter; see H. De Liagre BBhl, 
Herman Gorter (Nijmegen, 1973), Chapter 3. 
53A• De Jonge, Het Communisme in Nederland de 'eschiedenis 
van een politieke partij The Hague, 1972 , pp. 36-37. 
54Roland Holst had left the partyalready in 1911; see 
J.P. Van Praag, Henriette Roland Holst, Wezen en Werk (Amsterdam, 
1946), p. 22. 
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regarded as "New Leftist" in two aspects. In the first place, 
it advocated a "dual strategy" of direct action and parlia-
mentary action, both aimed at the conquest of state power. 
In the second place, it stressed cultural values like "moral 
grandeur," sacrifice and "proletarian community," as weIl as 
55 1deolo!~ical development in general. On the other hand, the 
cultural values pursued by the New Left differed somewhat in 
content, as will be shown below. 5G 
While the Social Democratic Party i!,rew, i t lost i ts 
homogeneity. Already in 1917 international issues divided 
the party. l'he leaders around Hijnkoop expressed sympathy 
for the Entente and Kerensky, whereas the left-wing around 
Gorter showed more confidence in Germany, where Gorter expected 
a revolution, and in the Bolsheviks. By 1919 the positions 
had been almost reversed: Wijnkoop came to accept the Bolshe-
vik regime while Gorter wrote a rather critical "Open Letter 
to Comrade Lenin.,,57 'rhe theoretical differences behind this 
disa~reement became clear within a few years. In 1921 Gorter 
and his supporters broke away and founded the Communist Workers 
Party of the Netherlands (Kommunistische Arbeiders Partij 
55wat wil het Revolutionair Socialistisch Verbond? 
(Amsterdam, 1915). 
56 See Chapters 2 and 4; New Leftists would not insist 
on "~randeur," nor on "sacrifice" and rarelyon "proletarian" 
community. 
57H• Gorter, Offener Brief an den Genossen Lenin. Eine 
Antwort auf Lenins Broschüre: Der Radikalismus eine Kinder-
krankhe1t des Kommunismus (Derlin, 1920); quoted at length 
in De Liagre BÖhl, op. cit., pp. 251-258. 
58 Neder land) • 
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Though the Communist Workers Party has had a negligible 
impact on Dutch politics--it gathered at best 200 members and 
feIl apart fairly soon--its theorists deserve some attention 
here. These theorists, Herman Gorter and Anton Pannekoek, 
can be considered the leaders of the "Dutch Marxist School," 
perhaps together with Henriette Roland Holst. Denouncea by 
Lenin as "infantile communism," the ideas of the School 
appealed only to maruinal groups of intellectuals and a few 
"lumpenproletarians" in the 1920s and 1930s. However, rnany 
of thern seem to have inspired the New Left of the 1960s. 59 
Lenin's hostility towards the School seerns understandable 
in view of the sharp critique of the Soviet regime by Gorter 
and Pannekoek. The latter, an astronomer and instructor at 
the party school of the German Social Dernocracy between 1~106 
and 1914, saw Lenin as the leader of a bourgeois rather than 
a proletarian revolution. Like so many other bourgeois 
revolutionaries, Lenin had used the illusion of universality 
to rnanipulate other classes; in his case, the illusion of a 
proletarian revolution which had brou,J,ht him the support of 
the Russian workers. In fact, Pannekoek argued, Lenin's 
58 De Jonge, op. cit., p. 30; De Liagre BÖhl, op. cit., 
Chapter 7. 
5YFor a good overview see the introduction of H. Bock, 
"Zur Geschichte und Theorie der ho11ändischen I,Iarxistischen 
Schu1e," in A. Pannekoek and H. Gorter, Organisation uncj 
Taktik der proletarischen Hevolution (Frankfurt am Main, 
1969), pp. 7-48; cf. W. Lenin, "Left-wing" Communism, an 
Infantile Disorder (New York, 1969) (1920). 
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theory was based on bourgeois materialism rather than histori-
cal materialisme Hence it proved 
the right doctrine for the Russian intellectuals who, 
now that natural science and technics formed the 
basis of a rapidly developin~ production system under 
their direction, s~w the fut ure open up before them 
as the ruling class of an immense empire. bO 
'l'he new rulinJ~ cl::l.[js h:jrl crnu~eul'Áte(l th<ö: \'lorv.ers I counci]::; 
set up during the revolutionary years of 1917 and 1918. ~ith 
rigorous party discipline, manipulation, and coereion, it 
extracted surplus value from the workers throu,\;h the state 
apparatus. This system of state eapitalism differed not much 
from capi talism in the VJest, which also eame to depend more 
and more on state intervention. Pannekoek eonelucted that in 
both parts of the world intellectuuls tried to win power by 
ol 
manipulating workers • 
The working class eould be manipulateJ due to its 
ideo1ogica1 weakness, in partieular its suseeptibility to 
bour,'seois ideas about nationa1ism and individualisme Social 
Democratie parties and trade unions had always given priority 
to socio-economie and organisational questions, while negleeting 
the deve10pment of a pro1etarian ideology. A proletarian 
ideo1ogy shou1d include a new morality, based on class soli-
darity, personal sacrifice, independenee and internationalism. 
It required a new kind of politieal party, decentralised and 
bO A. Pannekoek, Lenin as a Philosopher (1938) (London, 
1975), p. 100. 
61 Ibid., PP. 101-109; see also A. Pannekoek, Partij, 
raden, revolutie (Amsterdam, 1972), pp. 143-156. 
41 
oriented towards ideological discussion and propaganda, 
rather than parliamentary action and elections. The party 
should help the workers educate themselves, especially throu~h 
discussion and direct action at the work-place. It should 
encourage but never dominate workers' councils, which 
Pannekoek conceived of as both the best organisations for 
, 62 the class strurlgle and the embryos of a socialist soc1ety. 
On most of these C,J,uestions Pannekoek and his supporters 
could agree with anarchists, in theory as weIl as in practice. 
On the other hand, Pannekoek remained a rather orthodox 
Marxist in his materialist analysis of ideologies, and in 
his deterministic statements atout the "death crisis" of 
'3 
capitalism and the final victory of the working masses.o 
His supporters, organised in the Group of International 
Communists from 1926 to 1940, and a~ain in Daad en Gedachte 
(Action and Thought) from 19G5 onward, did not deviate much 
f th ' f th' , ()4 rom 1S way 0 1nk1ng. In the 19bOs,they would criticize 
62 A. Pannekoek, De Arbeidersraden (Amsterdam, 194b), 
passim. 
63E • g • Pannekoek, De Arbeidersraden, pp. 276-277: 
'~apitalism will be more powerful than ever af ter this war. 
Uut more powerful will become the stru~gle of the working 
masses, sooner or later" (ivly translation of the Dutch text: 
"!>lachtiger dan ooit zal zich na de oorlog het kapitalisme 
verheffen. lvIaar sterker zal daar tegenover, langzamer of 
sneller, de strijd van de arbeidende massaas opkomen"); see 
also H. Bock, op. cit., pp. 7-48. 
64 Except perhaps with respect to the determinist ideas, 
see, for instance, Daad en Gedachte 1:11 (1965) and 3:2 (1967); 
however, Pannekoek seems to have rnodified some of his own 
ideas as weIl; see also H. Gombin, Les origines du gauchisme 
(Paris, 1971), pp. 114-125. 
r 
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New Leftists as "petty bourl!,eois idealists," even if they 
shared the Nevi Left ideals of workers ' self-manal~ement, direct 
05 
action and a new culture. 
While Pannekoek retained at least a small following in 
both Germany and the Netherlands, the other leaders of the 
Duteh Marxist School ceased to play a significant role in 
polities. Gorter, who had split with Pannekoek in 1926, feIl 
66 i11 and died soon afterwards. Henriette Ho land Holst had 
never joined the Communist Workers Party but stayed--again 
"wi th the masses"--in the Social Democratie P~:l.rty, whieh 
ehani~ed i ts name into "Communist L'arty in the Netherlands" 
(CPN) (Communistische Partij in Nederland) in 1918. L7 Uefore 
lonl~ I however, she lJegan to olJpose the party line as we 11. 
The party line of the CPN chan~ed somewhat durin~ toe 
lY20s, In 1921 the Communists argued for a proletarian 
clellloeraey, "self-mana!~ement through councils of workers , 
solcliers and pOOI' farmers," and could still expect a revolu-
ti on in v/estern Europe. 68 A few years later proletarian 
democracy had heen suppresse.d completely in the Soviet Union, 
65 However, their ideas atout the new culture differed 
somewhat, as will become clear in Chapter 2; for criticisms 
of New Left Broups see Daad en Gedachte 2 (1966): 2:2 on 
the PSP; 2:4 on Provo; and 2:10 and 2:12 about the ûroup 
Nieuw Links in the Labour Party. 
Gb De Liagre Döhl, op. ei t., IJP. 25B-2CA, 
EJ7 De J . t On.,8, op. Cl" pp. 31-32; sec also Van Praa'.'>J 
0IJ. cit., Pij. 21, 29-34. 
6B G• Sterrin)ja, \'iat willen de Cor:1muni:~ten? (Amstercléllfl, 
l~Ljl); my tr8nslation from the Uutch "prolct~lrische dcmoe ré:.cie, 
d. \"I.Z. een ste lse 1 van ze lfbestuur in r::lC1cn V[lD artei \iers, 
so1daten en arme boeren." 
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and dropped from the platform of the Communist Party in the 
Netherlands. The revolution had faileu in Germany nnd Italy, 
and never started in the Netherlands • The Cl-'lJ was in disé.Lrra~ 
for many yeé-;.rs, sufferin,'; serious sI-ili ts, internal fi;:,hts--
including fist fiir,hts--and sever<1.l chan'jes of leadership • 
Around 1~30 the party be;',an to recover • A new é.md more 
proletarian, but also more Stalinist leadership establisheCi 
f1rm control over the party and adopted a militant but rather 
69 defensive programme. Given the economie depression and the 
rise of fascism, defense of estaolished rights, wa~es and 
jobs seemed a realistic approach; the party grew rapidly in 
70 terms of members as weIl as votes. 
The new 11ne had oeen opposed by many older members, 
espec1ally inte11ectuals like Roland Holst but also workers 
and trade unionists like Henk Sneevliet. Sneevliet, a former 
railway elfllJloyee who heul helpecl to or)~anise the Communist 
party in Indonesia nnd China oefore he w~s elected president 
of the National Labour Secretariat, had met Trotsky in i·IOSCO ... , 
and a,;reeu with his criticisrn of ~t<L1in. On the other h:cmd, 
he disa,:,reecl v/i th 'l'rotsky I s stra teL~y of "entrism," i. e. 
6~see Ue Jonge, op. cit., ]JIJ. 4:)-~~; the election pÜJ.'LforJ,: 
of 1933 called for shorter working hours, paia holiuays, 
freedom of assembly for soliders and sailors, subsidies for 
poor farmers, and oppo::;eà wage cub; anel sal,:'!s taxes and the like 
(Parlement en Kiezer (1934), lJp. 82-84. 
701n l':::l2~ two factions of the Communist Party }JresenteG 
separate lists at the elections anci together recei ved 1. ~:S 
of the popular vote. 1hc re-united ~arty won 3.2% in 1933; 
membership increased even faster, from 1100 in 1930 to 5500 
in 1933 anti alrnost 10,000 by 1~3g (De Jonge, op. cit., 
PP. 49,54,57, L:>4). 
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internal Ol-Jvosi tion in Socia1 Democratie or Communist or,~},ani-
sa cions, ~m" Ijl'eferre<J to rnaintain an inuelJenuent traàe union, 
~In'l to foun,; ~" ne\'; in,iqen<Jen t iJoli tical l.Jarty. This l->arty, 
t;hc Hevolutiûllary 0oci~li:::; l; l)arty (Hevolutionair Socialistische 
l'artij, n:.Jp) , \'1ou1d coolJer;:ltc closely wi th the National Labour 
:';ccretal'iat and cOlilbine extra-parliamentary action \'li th agi ta-
tion in parliament. 1ven in a non-revolutionary period, 
revolutionary vanguards should take an a).<;gressi ve approach, 
accordinl~ to Sneevliet • As trade union leader he succeeded 
in expanding the National Labour Secretariat from 13,000 to 
23,000 members between 1924 and 1933; as leader of the 
Hevolutionnry Socialist Party he managed to win a sent in 
IJarliament. 71 
Revolutionary hopes rose a~ain in 1934. Riots broke 
out in Amsterdam when the ijovernment announced areduction 
of unemployrnent benefits. Left-wing Social Democrats joined 
Hevolutionary Socialists and Communists in the riots and tried 
to or~anisc a ~eneral s~rike. A~a1n the revolution did not 
th 't t ,) b 'l't f 72 COllie i e rl.O s were pu uown'y ml. l. ary orces. Efforts 
to maintain uni ty amon~), the revolutionaries foundered on 
tllC intrallé:;i ccnce 0 f the Communist Party. Only a smal1 group 
of left-win[~ Socia1 lJemocrats, who had 1eft the Socia1 
711;1. Perthus, Henl.:: Sneevliet (Ni jmegen, 1976), Chapters 
14 and 15; see also Hnrmsen and Reinalda, op. cit., pp. 155-
158 and 430-432. 
72perthus, op. cit.., pp. 3G5-3G7; liarillsen and Heinalda, 
op. cit., pp. 17g-182; for a slightly different view see 
J. Ue Kadt, Politieke herinnerin~en van een randfiguur 
(Amsterdam, 1976), Chapter IV. 
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Democratie Workers Party in 1932, proved willing to merge 
with the Revolutionary Socialist Party in 1935. The new 
Revolutionary Socialist Workers Party (Revolutionair 
Socialistische Arbeiders Partij, HSAP) started with 4200 
members and one seat in parliament--still held by Sneevliet, 
who became leader of the party. Yet within a few years it 
I t h lf it b h · 11 th t' l' t 73 os a s mem ers 1p as we as e sea 1n par 1amen . 
lts militant programme of a revolutionary class front, sociali-
sation and workers' control, national disarmament, and "free 
development of a new anti-bourt.;eois culture," appealed to 
74 few workers • It would be taken up a;"ain in a uifferent 
form by the New Left. 
While the Communist Party became stronger but also more 
moderate in the late 1930s, the Revolutionary Socialist 
Workers Party declined and suffered from a spli t bet"\'1een 
loyal Trotskyites and supporters of Sneevliet. 75 In 1940 both 
purties went underground. 'l'he Revolutionary Socialist \'Jorkers 
Party continued as a small resistance l;roup under the name 
"Spartacus League" (Spartacusbond), while the Communist Party 
joined the resistance a little later--after the German attack 
on Russia. The Russian invasion of Poland and Finland led 
Sneevliet to question the proletarian nature of the Russian 
73 Perthus, op. cit., Chapter 18. 
74"verkiezingsprOgram van de Hevolutionair-Socia1istische 
I\roeiders Partij," in Parlement en Kiezer (1935): 105-113. 
75perthus, op. cit., p. 403; cf. P. Frank, La Quatri~me 
Internationale (Paris, 1973), pp. 37-3U. 
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state. Some of his comrades, however, agreed with Trotsky 
that the Soviet Union remained a workers' state, even if a 
de,~enerate one, which had to be defended against imperialist 
attacks. The debate had only just started when most of its 
participants were arresteLi and imprisoned or shot. Sneevliet 
kept his faith in a proletarian victory even at the moment 
of h " , th 7b loS uea • 
The Spartucus League survived the Second World War and 
became a small study group of ultra-leftists in the Dutch 
l'larxist tradi tion. 77 I·lost of i ts Trotskyi te rnembers left the 
Lea<~ue during or af ter the war anti established a Dutch section 
of the F'ourth International. Under the name "Revolutionétry 
Communist Party," the section took part in the elections 
of 1948 and won 0.1% of the popular vote. In 1952 the party 
dissolved, while many of its members joined thc lJutch Labour 
Party. 78 
'rhe Communist Party survived the war in much bettcr 
shape. lts important role in the resistance against the 
7G Sneevliet's last \'lords were "Ik heb de strijd gestreden 
en het geloof behouden. Het geloof in de zaak van de Inter-
na tionale. Er moet nOL', veel gestreden Vlorden , maar de 
toekomst is aan ons." RouGhly translated into English: "I 
have fought the struggle and preserved my faith, the faith 
in the cause of the International. The struggle Vlill be a 
long one, but the future is ours." wuoted in Perthus, op. 
cit., p. 467. 
77G• MerRner, ed., Uie Gru e Internationale Kommunisten 
1101lands (Heinuek lJei lla.mburg,1971 , p. 12. 
73 I. Corne li ssen, "PAL VU. Di j de honc.ierdste ver jUél.rdaL:, 
van Leo 'l'rotski," Vri j Nederland 40 (l~ovember 3, 1971); at 
the same time the Fourth International turned a~ain to 
"entrism," see Frank, op. cit., pp. 7G-80. 
47 
Germans and the increased ~restiKe of its model, the Soviet 
Union, contributed to a big jump in votes and members. In 
1946 the party could boast 502, 963 voters--10~i of the po})ular 
7':) 
vote--and 53,000 members. Horeover, partyme!ilbers held most 
important positions in the new Unity Trade Union Centre, which 
countecl 17C,000 Illernbers in 1948. !loV/ever, internal conflicts 
and external pressure--the Cold War ra1ed also in the Nether-
landS--destroyed the Unity Trade Union Centre within a few 
years and reduced the Communist Party ai_;ain to an isoléitcd 
80 
"sect" of lJerhalJs 15,000 rnembers anli 144,000 voters. 
The Communist Party pursued a mOderate strateGY af ter 
the \'mr, lJut opposed the growing corpora tisrn in Dutch létbour 
relations, and SUlJlJorted or or.,~anised several "wild-CClt" 
strikes. As in the late 1':J30s, the lJarty strove for a broad 
national alliance of workers, intellectuals, farmers, artisans, 
small businessmen and civil servants against Big Capital. The 
alliance would be led by the proletaria t, representeci by the 
COlllmunist Party. The party claimed the heri taé~e of l,iarx, 
Lenin and Stalin, but also of Erasmus, Spinoza, Uomela 
Nieuwenl1uis and Gorter. The party platform no longer mentionec.i 
workers ' counci Is, but praised "scientific mana,sement" as 
weIl as workers' co-determination. It'also demanded tax cuts 
79 Kendali, op. cit., pp. 3~7, 397; see also De Jonge, 
op. cit., p. ':JI. 
80 Kenctall, ibid.; De Jonge, op. cit., Chapters 8 and ':J. 
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Ol 
for :,iilnll bu:':~ine:::;,;r,let1 anc; new l;:tnd for sfllDll fariilel'é~. c>.! 
Thc denunc ÜI tion of S tét1i n in thc 2)ovi et Union :' \lC'; Uw 
revol t in IIun~ary c:'l.used qui te d shocÄ. in the Dutch Communist 
Party. I\n opposition zroutJ that had emerged at the end of 
with tlw l,rl rty. In i t too~: ()art in thc;:enc~r:ll 
(: ll~c ti on~) and \!On (). 6',0 of thc vo te, unde r the name "r.r1~S;Toei''' 
It~'i p1 él tfor.'! 
:Jnion, it cl'iLicizcd thc r.'ure,';ucr'dtisation and thc luck of 
" f,ocialist <lemocracy" in Hussia. It rejectecJ both the refornüsld 
of the Dutch Lnbour P,,'rty, a.nd the dogmnti:,:~rn and sectdrianism 
Pt2 
of the COlllillunist Party.·· i,Io~,t memüers of the party seem to 
h:we joined thc Pacifist Socialié3t Party in tbe 19üOs--not 
surpri3in,11y, in vievr of their "new Leftish" lJlatform. 
Thc Socialist \'!or:<ers Party was the last Hevolutionary 
;,ocinli st ï':Irty es"cabl j shed in the period uncler s tudy; the 
1:'1st filcmber of ;_, fami ly that be féln lvi th the Soc ial DeJI10C ra tic 
Ll"!ar'ue "nrl conti nued throll.r~h tlle ~oc iJ.l l'ci11ocrél tjc Party or 
8 ~ "De~) n~j01 verK 1,H'i n;"T, V;J.n de COL1Jauni ::.ot i sche Fè;l'ti j van 
, : c ,4 e r 1 ct n cl ," P ; J r 1 e 11',8 n t (; n Kie z c r (l Y 5 1 ) : 1 () 0 -1 04; " Eis en" 
( ': 1 IJ C ti 0 n Tl h·. t f 0 r i I i), : ) iJ. 1 () :; - J 117 • 
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Communist Party, the Communist Workers P<:'trty ancJ. the ltevolu-
tionary Socialist Party. They shared a concern for working 
class interests and [.Jarticular1y workers I self-mana;;ement as 
weIl us a ncw culture of ~roletarian solidarity, sacrifice 
~nti co~nunity. Their strate~y was usually ill-tiefined but 
oriente<l tO\'lé!.rds direct action rather than election campai~;ns 
;,ml ~éJ.rlialllentary <:.tc tion. Both the ends anel the means were 
clarifiec.l somewhat in later years. However, the number of 
~evolutionary Socialists dwindled in later years, especially 
af ter 1920. On1y the Communist Party retaineû a rnass ljélSe--
and continued to grow until 194b--but it movea Hway from the 
j{evolutionnry Socialist tradi tion by adoptin,:; more limi ted, 
short-term economie goals and Ie ss revolutionary means. 
1.3 The Anarchist Left 
The Anarchist Left in the Netherlands is almost as old 
~s the Hevolutionary ~ocialist Left. In [act the cJ.ifference 
\'/.:,s far frou\ clear in the early years of the first International 
:mci tlle ~ocial lJemocr:itic Lca~~ue. In 18<3;3 a journal was 
faun jOl c',11e1 "'fhe J\nr,.rchist" (De Im<:.crchi:::;t). 83 It may have 
c;~crciscu 301;,C influence on Social lJelilocrats. At any rate, 
;, stron.~ An~,rchist tenuency emer:~eu wi thin the League. In 
1;;93 i ts Annual Con,~re:::>s clecidecl by a narrow Jilajori ty "not 
to participate in parliamentary elections under any circumstances, 
83 11 • i{amaer, eLl., De pi ramicie' der tirannie (Arnsteruam, 
lY77), ~p. 15-17; see also J. Nieuwenhuis, Uit den Tijd der 
Voortrekkers (Amsterdam, 1927), p. 14. 
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( t) f th f" t t· ,,84 no even or e ~urposc 0 a~l a lon. Several Social 
Democrats left the );.jarty, which \'las rename(; "Socialist League," 
and switched its attention from campail',ns for universal 
suffraue to direct action and trade union or~2nisation.85 
While the LeaKue helped to found the National Labour 
Secretariat and ~rovided many of its leaders, some Anarchists 
within the Leac;ue c.lenounced all trade unions as "mere bandages 
on the wounds of capitalism. 1I8G They preferred direct action 
by unorganised Workers. Domela Nieuwenhuis, the leader of 
the League, carne close to this anti-organisational position. 
Though he did not object to trade unions as such, he could 
not see them as agents of an anarchist or socialist revolution. 
de bei;an to doutJt if any or,~anisation could perforrn that 
role; in 1898 he even left the Socialist Lea!~ue he had helj.Jed 
to builc.l and devoted thc rest of his life to peJa,:,ol~ic and 
. t' t·· t' (37 prof.Ja!~an(..lls lC ac 1 Vl les. J·lost Anarchists hrtci deserteci 
84 In Outch: "onuer ,;cen enke Ie ornstancii glwi u, ook niet 
als nKitatiemidJel, aan de verkiezin~en Geel te nemen ll ; quoted 
in O. \\/ansink, Het socialisme op de tvleespron:;; (Haarlem, 1939), 
p. 121. 
8t> The name had to be chanr;ed because the government hau 
barmed the Social LJemocratic Lea"ue when it resolveû to strive 
for a socialist revolution "by all means, lcgal or i 1 1 e:::,a 1 N; 
the name "Socialist" appealed to Loth Anarchists and Revolution-
ary Socialists in the Lea,~ue (see Harmsen, op. ci t., p. 29). 
86 Ramaer, op. cit., p. 75. 
8700mela Nieuwenhuis, op. cit., p. 101; he justified his 
step in a way one rnight expect from a Protestant minister: 
"1 would stand by myself with a clear conscience rather than 
tJe carried by popular favour at the expense of myself ahd my 
conscience" (lo1y translation from the LJutch "liever stond ik 
o.lleen met mijn i~eweten in het reine dan dat ik L,edra.':en werel 
door de volks);unst, maar ten koste wm mijzelf en mijn c~eweten"). 
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the League by l8~8, leavin~ it in the hands of the "parlia-
mentarist" minority which decided to merge with the Social 
Democratie V:orl<ers Party in 1899. 88 
While the Anarchist lIlovernent Lroke up into several 
smaller groups, it remained an important political force at 
least until 1920. Some Anarchists tried to restore some 
unity ty setting up an Anarchist FOderation, but that never 
attracted large numbers. Other Anarchists devoted their 
attention to the National Labour Secretariat, the International 
Anti-Militarist Association or the Association for Collective 
Landownership (Gemeenschappelijk GrOndbezit).89 
'fhe Association for Collective Landownership was set up 
by Frederik van Eeden, a famous Dutch novelist and psychiatrist, 
in order to develop a network of productive associations of 
farmers and artisans. This network was to grow into an 
a~~rarian socia1i st society wi thout c 1ass stru(~i~le or violence. 
In each productive association people would worK and live 
to,;ether, holdint~ most property in common anu taking uecisions 
to{;ether in a general meetinó • Van Eeuen had founded the fi rst 
productive association on a piece of land not very far from 
Amsterdam in 1898; inspired by the American philosopher, 
'fhoreau, he had named i t "Walden • .. ~W hletween 1900 and 1905 
88 By 1898 the Leal~ue had been reduced from about 5500 to 
less than 600 members; only 200 would end up as members of 
the Social Democratie Workers Party; see Harmsen, op. cit., p. 30. 
89 Ibid ., pp. 42-44; see also F. Ueckers and J. Frieswijk, 
lJeJrijven in eigen beheer (IHjmegen, 1976). 
90Beckers and Frieswijk, op. cit., Chapter 1; see also 
Iblrluer, op. cit., IJp. 2~-~W. 
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several other associations came into being. They were of ten 
joined by anarchist or syndicalist workers who had lost their 
jobs af ter a strike, and who regarded the associations as 
defensive stronuholds in the class struggle rather than ~erms 
of n new society. These workers clashed fre4uently with 
nrtists and intellectuals like Van Eeden. Af ter 1905 there 
was an ebb in thc class strul:;g1e as \'Ieli as in thc iJ;rov/th of 
~roducti ve nssocia tions. JJetween 1918 and 1924 Goth flouri:JliCd 
a;~ain, but durin~ the Depression most associations c10seu 
down or went bankrupt. The Association for Col1ective Land-
ownership still existed in 197b, bu"t its number of memLer 
associations had been reduced from 102 to 5. 'I'he survivin" 
associations hnd adapted thenlselves to the capitalist society 
they were supposed to rep1ace; \'lorkers' self-managemen~ had 
91 Leen rejJlaced by professional management. 
Af ter the First 'I/orld 'war anti the l{ussian Hevolution, 
the Anarchist rnovement be,~an to uec1ine. The Hussian l{evolu-
tion wiueneu disa)~reement amonL~ Anarchists. Some of them, 
or.,anised in a Feuerûtion of :.:>ocia1 Anc.\rchists, l~rlt SUt.-IJort 
to the 1.l0lshevik;3 ;:mu endeci Uj) as laefilLers of the COI;!lIluni~;t 
92 jJarty. Others, like Domela lJieuv/enhuis, conuen,ncd the 
ijolshevik re,;ir;le from the beginning • A thirc.l tendency, more 
syndicalist than anarchL3t, \'lilntec.l to coüperate \'/i th COflliflunist 
or:;unisations while rnaintainin); i ts own independence. Harm 
91ueckers ilnQ Frieswijk, op. cit., pp. 300-313. 
92, 
lülrnaer, OIJ. cit., Pij. 33-3S; see 0.1so G. Harmsen, lJaan 
Goulooze (Utrecht, 1907), Chapter 1. 
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Kolthek, the president of the National Labour Secretariat 
from 1908 till H:!l4, founded the Socialist Party to provide 
anarchist or syndicalist voters with an alternative to the 
Communist Party; yet when elected to parliament he tried to 
93 
cooperate closely with the latter. In the National Labour 
Secretariat, Communists and Social Anarchists fou~ht for 
affiliation with the Red Trade Union International. When 
they won the fight in 1~23, the anti-communist minority 
broke away and founded the Netherlands Syndicalist Tratie 
Union Con1'ederation. ~4 Both or:~anisa tions were (lissol ved in 
lY4U. The former returned af ter the war in a different form 
when syndicali st anel independent sociali st v/orkers spli t 
from the Communist-led Uni ty Trade Union Centre to set uf) an 
Independent Federation of Trade Unions in 1948. 95 The Syn-
dicalist Confederation survived the war as a propaganda and 
. ,,90 
study I;roup unt~l 1~i.)7. 
While the overwhelming majori ty of the Dutcl. workin.i~ 
class 1'ol10wed Communist, Social Democratie or Christian 
or~anisations in the 1920s élncl 1930s, é:.i. few youn": workers 
93Hamaer, op. cit., p. 43; Harlllsen and Reinalda, op. cit., 
iJ. 1:::4; see also Ue Socialistische l-'artij, Haar ontstaan, 
!Joel en Streven (n.p., n.d.). 
94Harmsen and Reinalda, op. cit., p. 150. 
95Ibid ., pp. 291-293; the Independent Federation (Onaf-
hanl<elijk Verbond van üedrijfsor;:,anis(\ties) still existeU in 
the 19tiOs and 1970s, long af ter the Unity Trade Union Centre 
had disalJpeared. 
96 See H. De Joni~, "Over m~Jn vé.,der Altert de Joni~ (1891-
1970)," Hededelin~enblad NVSG 39 (1971): 16-62; the mernbershijJ 
of this study l~roup could be cOlllbincd \';i th th2i.t of the Indepen-
dent Fcderation. 
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turned to more extreme forms of anarchism. One group roamed 
the countryside in communal groups, sleeping in cabins or 
barges, living off theft and the sales of their journal, "The 
Sledbehammer" (De Moker); "all \'lork is criminal," they dec lared, 
"Work destroys life," the "r;reat pure cosmie Life" which 
should he free and creative. 97 Another group took to direct 
individual action, either terrorism or simply "Take and eat," 
the direct satisfaction of basic needs. Kooyman, an advocate 
of this posi tion, ar~~ued that only individual action could 
change a technologically advanced but socially repressive 
society, since the workin:~ class hau lost i ts revolutionary 
98 ~otential. Uoth groups coula be seen as predecessors of New 
Left groups like Provo and i ts offshoot "Bastard." 
\'lhile the workinl.~ c lass generally turned away frof,l Anarchi sm, 
small groups of nliddle class--to te more exact, new petty 
bour~eois--intellectuals established new anarchist groups. 
They of ten differed from the proletarian anarchists in their 
ideas, especially about ethics and culture. Instead of 
self-discipline, monogamy and personal sacrifice they tended 
to advocate free love, a "free cult of the boliy" (vrije 
97Ramaer, op. cit., PIJ. 137-141; the 4uotation is from 
the work of Herman Schuurman, Werken is misdaad (1924); the 
IJutch text: "Werken is Iilisebad •.. werken is levensvijanuii::', 
••. werken is intens levensleed"; "SchelJpen is intense 
levensvreugd," "Dan is er slechts Leven--groot zuiver 
kosmisch leven •.. ". 
~8See P. Kooijman, "De vooruitzichten van de arbeiders-
beweging," first published in Bevrijding (1935); partly also 
in Ramaer, op. cit., lJIJ. 165-170. 
liehaaIrl:5kul tuur) In this resLJcct 
they ~mticilJé.l. tell IJaw Loft idea:5 uLout i.:l cull.:;ural revo lution, 
Lllc Le~:.,.lle ui' ;(eli .. ,iüu3 An~trclli:5t-CofliIllunists, foun::ied by 
Arw,rehist .:.ioei;üists (lJond van Anurcho-Socialisten) in 1931. 
I t Lei~a.n as a rather heterol:cneous t',rouJ.-J of 'l'olstoian Christians, 
l'antheists and 'l'heosolJhists, led liy é.l Protestant theoloLian, 
Lart ue Li.'~t.lOl lts lJroGramme callcd for él. "total ::>ocial, 
economie and reliGious revolution" to brin" about a society 
Lased on common pro~erty in the means of production, mana~e-
Inent by workers I counci ls and e4uali ty of income; but also a 
ncw world culture based on cosmie soliclarity and unity of man, 
nature und the invisiLle world. Socio-economie change had 
!Jriori ty, but siJiri tuul and cul tural chanl,;e was seen as the 
ultirll:1te ,'.oé.tl. Chan;;e had to be pcaceful, violence and dictator-
:;;lli!J \'Ie1'e rejected a::> "tJourl~eois errors"; a dictatorshiiJ of 
9 ~ (' . . (' 1 10 57 d' t 
.,ce llurrnsen, JJarln ,-,ou ooze, Pl'. - ; an ln grea er 
GctéÜl, (~. Ilarrnsen ULIU\'/C en rOGe jeu,;d (Assen, 19u1), 
j.J((l'ticuL~rly Ch~ti)tcr 'I. 
lOU . , Even "1rec love" VlaS usually seen as LJart of "clean 
11 vin,'," anJ not only as "fun" in the Hl20s or 193Us; alcohol, 
toLacco <..nu l.leu t \'IC re of ten avoiLied as "unc lean" or immoral 
10lFor a brief history of the Lea~ue of Christian 
~ocialists, of which De Ligt led the left-wing, see below, 
Section l.S. Atout De Li,~t see lJ. De Lil;t, Naar een vrije 
orde (Arnhem, 1~51); in particular the bioGraphical introduc-
tIOi1 by his wife, j,j. Ue ligt-van Kossem, PiJ. 7-29. 
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the proletariat would not result in the Kingdom of God which 
the Heligious Anarchist-Communists hoped to build. 102 
Operating in a secular environment, the group seemed to 
lose its religious inspiration. The writings of Tolstoi and 
Krlshnamurti were replaced by those of Wilhelm Heich anc the 
Frankfurt School. In lY31 the LeaÄue dropped the attribute 
"Heliglous" and became thc Leal~ue of Anarchist Socialistt>. 
It published a theoretical journal, Levrijding (Liberation), 
whlch attracted contributions from different currents of 
thout;ht--for instance from Ilenriette Roland Holst, who h:Hl 
turned to religious socialism but still considered herself a 
"council-communist" in the Dutch Harxist tradition. 103 
While the League renounced its reli 6 ion, it conceived 
of soclallsm as a reli~ious hope for a bet ter future or an 
lrrational and utopian belief. It rejected thc Marxist con-
ception of scientific socialism as a positivist and bourgeois 
111usion. In this respect it agreed with thc ilelclian revision-
lat De Man; but it also rejected his reformist and nationalist 
alternatlve to Hn.rxism as a wo.y to "state capitalism, worse 
than that in Russia.,,104 It showed more sympathy for \Jilhelrn 
Heieh, who tried to fi 11 the "psychological vacuum" in j'larxi sm 
wlth Freudian psycho-analysis in theory as weIl as practice. 
Soclal1sm required liberation of sub-consciousness from Oedipal 
102 J. Giesen, Reli,,;ieus Anarcho-Comrnunisme (Leiden, n.d.). 
103 Ramaer, op. cit., pp. 2b-28; Van Praag, op. cit., 
pp. 37-3Yj later she came to reject l·iarxism alto ,ether. 
l04A• storm, "Sociale :,rondsla :en, 11 Het Vri j -Socialisti sch 
Pro,~rn.rn (Loosdrecht, 1~3S), Ijl). I-lb. 
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fixation on authorities throu,~ self-education and direct 
105 
action. Self-liberation and personal development were the 
ultimate Loals of socialism. 
'1'he League agreed with Pannekoek's critique that :::>ocial 
Oemocratic and Communist ~arties or trade unions tended to 
manipulate the workers as objects instead of emanciIJatin;·, 
them as subjects. It also considered the spiritual or 1<1eolo-
;,ic<.11 strug;;le to be more important than the stru:.;gle for 
material interests such as wa:~es. Informal shop commi ttees 
~.(nd, eventually, workers ' councils were to wa;;;e both for'Dls of 
stru,\~i;le ,and to take over all enterprises and other insti tu-
tions like hosIJi tals or schools. The Leai~ue <lid not share 
Pannekoek's <1istrust of intellectuals; it expectell them to 
iJlay an imlJortant role in the ideolo~~ical stru;~gle. Intellec-
tuals should educate themselves and take the initiative in 
settinl~ up sholJ cOJ.lnüttees in their O\'!Il areas, é~S \'lell as in 
other arens where they coulli create Cl "core" of conscious 
\'Jorl<er~ to lead the c0ll1m1 ttces. ThoUi~h cri tical of all 
authority, the Lea!~ue <1id not reject the "lea<lershiIJ principle" 
alto~ether but aimed at a synthesis between leadership nna 
indiviJual independence. Leaders should follow their own 
convictions, not the masses. Uoth collectivism and indivi-
llu:llislll had to be avoided, but society should become an or,sanic 
105 J. !Je Haas, "IJsycholo[;ische Grondslagen," Het Vrij-
~ocialistisch Prouram, ~~. 17-~5. !Je Ligt seemetl to preter 
Adler to Freud, but reco(;nised th;:.;. t the Illé1SSeS were dri ven 
tJy economic and sexual n,oti ves; see for instance !Je Li!.t, 
OjJ. cit., IJlJ. 8(.;-103. 
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uni ty, preferably at a global level. I·laterialisrn and class-
consciousness should give way to "mankind-consciousness," a 
lOl,) 
new culture and a new personality. Thus the League of 
Anarchist Socialists would fit our definition of New Left 
almost perfectly--it only missed the second le~ of the dunl 
strategy; in other words, it did not combine direct action 
107 
with parliamentary action. 
Like most anarchist t',roups, the Len.l~ue of Anarchist 
Socialists did not survive the Second World ~ar. A few 
anarchists startecl a Uutch Lea-;ue of Free Socialists in 1~45, 
but this orl~anisation never played an important role. lOS by 
1900, the Anarchist Left had prac tica1ly disaPl)e~red fror:! the 
Uutch scene; only Ue Vrije Socialist (The Free Socialist), the 
journal founded by DomeIn. Nieuwenhuis in lH~S, continued its 
publication. 
1.4 The Soci[(1 Democratie Left 
'l'hou{!h Domela Hieuwenhuis und the LeaGue he led \'Iere the 
first to call themselves Social lJemocrats, Uutch 50cial 
UCllIocrats touay tend to trace thcir 1inea~e no further L<~ck 
than the foundation of the Social lJewocratic '\'iorkers Party 
in 18!J4. 'rhis party adopteu the structure and prot,ramme of 
106 1,1. Van Praag, "De zclf-orhonisatie van de revolutie," 
liet Vrij-Socialistisch Program, IJp. 3~-57; see also De Ligt, 
op. cit., passim. 
107 However, quite a few groups of the German Neue Linke 
or the French Nouvelle Gauche uid not enJuge in electora1 or 
j,arliamentary action ei ther; see oe10\'l, Chapters 3 and 4.1-4.2. 
lOS Hamaer, op. cit., JJ. GO; cf. L. Got, Heuer1and in de 
mi st (n. p., n. ct. ) • 
the German Social Democracy and committed itself to parlia-
mentary democracy--even if its founding father Troelstra 
cherished some doubts about its usefulness.lO~ The ~arty 
grew slowly, first winning support only in rural areas and 
amon~~ skilied urban workers like the diarnond-cutters in 
Amsterdam. Only in 1904 did it break the record of the Social 
uemocratic League and register its 6000th member. lts prowth 
did not slow down when its revolutionary left-wing broke 
away in 1909; the party won 7% of the popular vote in the 
same year and doubled i ts vote in the elections of 1913. 110 
By 1913 the Social Democratie Workers Party seerned weIl 
inte~rated in the Dutch political system. The Liberal 
~overnnlent appointed one of i ts members as hurgomaster in a 
fairly lar~e tO'offi, Zaandam, and invi ted the })arty to appoint 
three ministers. 111 Party Con~ress declined the invitation, 
but by a narrow majority. The year before, it had revised 
its declaration of ~rinciples, adding a moral condemnation 
of capitalism to its Harxist analysis of capito.l concentra-
tion and imperialism, as weIl as an appeal to the emer,;ing 
"new middle classes" of technicians and clerical workers to 
realise their common interests with the proletariat. The 
109 Harmsen, Historisch overzicht ••• , pp. 29 ff; cf. 
Van Leeuwen, "De Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij," in 
Druminelkamp et al., op. ei t., pp ~ 143-174; on 'l'roelstra, 
see also Broë'kmeyer and Corneli ssen, op. ci t., pp. 105-117. 
110Harmsen, Historisch overzicht •.• , ~~. 46, 65; Kendali, 
op. cit., pp. 384, 397. 
lllHarmsen, Historisch overzicht ••• , pp. 66-67. 
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party would endorse any reforms that would improve conàitions 
for the working class, provilied they also contributeà to its 
class-consciousness and political power. 112 
During the First World \'lar, the Social Democratie 'vlorkers 
Party coopernted with the Liberal government and its successful 
efforts to solve the burning questions of confessional school 
subsidies and of universal suffraKe. However, in 1918 Troelstra, 
the party leader, spoilt all the goodwill earneei during the 
\'lar by announcing in a public speech that the Hevolution had 
started in Germany and would not stol) at the Uutch border. 
The speech shockeli the reformist majority of the party, which 
disavowed Troelstra openly. It alarmed and enraged the 
confessiona1 Right, which began to Iilobilise Catholic and 
C 1 i i t 1 t f t 1 t · . l' t' 113 a v n s vo un eers or a coun er-revo u ~onary rn~ ~ ~[.t. 
'rhe HiL;ht won the elections of 1918, in spi te of--or rather 
because of?--the uni versal suffra,~~e which i t had resisted 
for so lon;~. 'l'he Social Democratie \1orkers Party won only 
114 
of the lJojJu1ar vote. 
Effectively isolated in ~arliament, but unwillin~ to 
pursue a revolutionary l...trate;;y, the party enterecl a period 
of stu)~nation anu crisis. Lookin,~ 1'01' ne\'/ issues anti ne':! 
112Van Leeuwen, op. cit., lJp. 143-174; the declaration 
of principles (lIcginsellJrol~ramrna) of 1::J 12 is reprinted in 
the AplJendix of the same volume. 
113 I. Cornelissen et al., De taaie rooie rakkers, een 
documentaire over het sociilisme tussen de oorlogen (Utrecht, 
1~u5), lJp. 15-40. 
114 KendalI, op. cit., p. 3Y7; the percenta~e rose to 
24~ó in 1925 but feIl again to 22 in 1933. 
r i 
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voters, the party produced several e1aborate plans for reforms. 
In the 1920s it developed a scheme for socialisation of mono-
pOlistic industries and for participation of workers in the 
management of private enterprise • 'l'l1rou L:;h personnel councils 
or \'Iorl<s counci1s, the workers wou1d play all advisory ancl 
zupervisory role, but never a doruin~lting one. Any form of 
workers' self-management was tlenounced by Social Democrats as 
"syndicalisrn" and dangerous inefficiency.115 '1'he scher;lC did 
not tliffer much from corporatist proposals of Catholic theorc-
ticiuns, but this affinity did not resu1t in cooperation oetween 
lIG the two parties, nor in ililp1ementation of the plans. 
Slight1y more successful VlaS a caffilJéüi;n of the Social 
Uemocratie party anJ trnde uni ons 0.i;rlinst a ~overnrilent lJror-;osc.l 
to inerease the defense budl~et in order to eX!Jancl the fleet. 
I·iass uemonstrations and the collection of a mi11ion si(4natures 
may have persuaded enough Catholic members of parliament to 
vote with Soeial lJemoerats, Communists and Liberal Del,lOcrats 
80 that the bill was defeated. 117 
115urOekmeyer and Corne1issen, op. cit., pp. 113-137; 
see liet Socialisatievrna 'stuk Ha) ,ort ui t'febracht door de 
Commissie aangewezen uit de SDAP Amsterdam, 1920 ; Bearij-
fsor'anisatie en Hedezef!.Kenscha) Ha ort uituebracht door 
de kommissie ingesteld door NVV en SlJAP Amsterdam, 1923 . 
See also the debate between Bon.'~er and ·\'Iibaut in De Socialis-
tische Gids 8 (1923): 101b-101U, 1143-1154, 1154-1104. 
116urOekmeyer nnd Cornelissen, ibid.; see a1so Iiarmsen 
and Heinalda, op. ei t., PI"', 142-145. 
llG Cornelissen et al., OiJ. cit., pp. 110-115. 
ö2 
'fhe left-wins of the Social Democratie \lorkers Party 
wanted more extra-parliamentary actions of this kinel, in 
combination wi th action in parliament. Stenhuis , the r~resident 
of thc Nctherlands Feeleration of Trade Uni ons since lY19 and 
momber of the Executivc Cornmittee of the Social Democrntic 
',;orkers Party, approvecl of tlü:;; "dual strate~y," anu wished 
ta streni~then the ties bet\'/een the trade unions and the party. 
Instead of w~itinG for another invitation to join the ~overn-
ment, he feIt the party should take a more active and militant 
approach. He predictecl a major econor.1ic crisis arouncl 1~30 
and feared the Social Democrats would be unable to benefit 
from i t un1ess theYchan,'~ed ~ir stratei',Y. Events proved him 
r1ght; but before that, Stenhuis Vlas forced to resign from 
his positions in the party as weIl as the trade union federa-
tion. 118 
~/hi Ie Stenhuis anticipa ted a New Left "dual stra te,~y" 
and a revolutionary form of reformism, the Marxist win~ of 
the Social Democratie party still expected a real revolution. 
'1'he Depression raised i ts hopes, expressed in the slo;,an 
"::';ocia1islil I~o\'l!". \·;h8n the revolutionaries bei~an to publish 
their o\"m jourrml anel to strive for a COll1mOn front of Social 
Dcrnocrats, Cor.ununists and Syndicalists, they were e::qJelleu 
froll1 the party anll founJed the Inelel-'cndent Socialist Party 
(Onafhankelijke Socialistische partij).119 Thou~h fairly 
11811 • F • Cohen, Ülil de vcrnieuwinL; van het socialisme (Leidcn, 
1974), PP. 83-158; see also Harmsen and Heinalda, op. cit., 
pp. 164-lGG. 
119cohen, OIJ. cit., pp. 159-175; ::;oe also the autobio!~raphy 
of De Kadt, op. cit., Chapter 111. 
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small--counting nbout 7000 members in 1932, its first year--
the new party was ~uite heterogeneous. lts right-wing, led 
by the former Communist De Kadt, remained Social Democratie 
and vabue in its ideas about the revolution; De Kadt saw the 
party as a theoretical van~uard of intellectuals. 120 The 
left-wing lenned towards Uevolutionnry Socialist ideas, and 
wished to merge with the Hevolutionary Socialist Party led by 
Sneevliet • Af ter the riots of 1!:l34 , in which the left-'.1in,; 
tooI< nn active !)[lrt, most Social Deraocrats ].Je:J.Ln to lc~~vc 
thc Inuependent Soci~list P~~rty. Heduced to 300CJ lIlembcrs, 
tI t d · t 1 t· 1i t' . 1'" - L ~ 1 . lC par y mcr:~e Wl. 11 uneev C S ,;roup l.n ;;J.) ~. 
riot all l·iarxists in the Socia1 Democ ra tic Workers Party 
lH_lJ joined thc Independent Socialist Party in 1~]2. 122 
lJonethcless thc Social lJelllocratic lJarty veered further to 
tbe ri;'.ht af ter 1932. In 1!:l34 i t produceli another ,~ranC: 
reform scheme, the Plan for Labour, which containcu a iJroi~rarllIne 
of public works and economie plannin:.:. that ,'/ou1d create 
12J 
el;liJloyment as weIl as conSUlller ucmand.· In 1 ~j 7 the I..Jurty 
drOPl.Jed i ts cOllllTli tfilcnt to lliso.rrdamcnt, and adoiJteLl a new 
120Ibid .; De l~adt left the ncw party in 1~34 to found 0. 
small theoretical journal, De Nicuwe l(crn (Thc Hew Core). 
121 See abovc, Section 1.2. 
1;;:2Th - it' t <, lJ ., lff' l' . t e Harx s econOTlll.S ..lam e .,0 , or l.ns ancc, 
re . ..;arded the lJepression as a serious but not a fa tal cri~;i s 
of capi talism, anü uenounccJ the Inucl/cndent Socic.tlists ;.:..; 
pseu<lo-raLlico.ls; see S. Lc i':olff, Voor het l;,nd v;·n be lof te 
(Llusswn, 1954), jJp. 2S3-2~A. 
123" li tI' . ",orne ssen, C • : .• , Ol'. Cl.-"., 
and Heinalda, Ol). cit., IJl. l~~-l~~. 
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;';~'Áin::;t 1'l.sci::.;ts Oonel COLlr,llmists ,;~~in8el priori ty over thc 
1 t 1 1~4 c ass s rU",G e. 
Thou,~ the majority of the party in the late 1930s coulc.l 
be tlescribed as "riGht-\'lin,';," this does not mean i t shared a 
common ideoloHY. Marxist ideas of ten co-existed with Christian 
. , . 125 Social1sm, and romantic iliealisrn with technocratl.c reiorml.Srl1. 
Ue Han's ideas about the need for a socialist "ethos" and 
culture inspired qui te Q few JJutch Social Democrats, eSi1ecially 
l2Ei youn~er ones. Thc youth organisation of the party, the 
ArLeiuers Jeui~el Centrale ('.'Jorkers Youth Centre), was reorganised 
uy i':ees Vorrink, ~l youn: teacher, in thc spirit of De îI&n's 
idea~. 'l'hc Centre Wr.S to lJecomc a "~roletarian eli te" and a 
"lire cor;ir:Junity" (levcnsi~emeenschap) that woulà practise a 
SOci~1ist ethos in evcryday life and educate the masses. The 
socialist ethos \'las elefined in terms of sOlidarity, self-
discijJline and natural simplici ty. Clad in colourful dresses 
1241n lJutch:" nu de arbeiders een plaats in de 
nationale volksgemeenschap hebben verworven," "tSeestelijke 
vrijheid en parlementaire democratie"; "lJeginselprogram van 
de Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiders Partij," Parlement en 
Kiezer (1938). 
l2Sn• Kuyper, Het socialisme. de hoofdarbeiders en de 
komende cultuur (Amsterdam, 1926); the author describes 
hlmself as a poai ti vist and idealist l'larxist, while his 
opponent Bonger could Le cal led a technocratic reformist; 
see also below, note 134. 
126 Cohen, 
Be ond l·larxi sm 
lIa,,:ue, 19(;(; • 
op. cit., p. 224; about De Uan see P. Dodge, 
the Fai th Oonel \Vorks of Hendrik de r-lan (The 
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or shirts and shorts, wearing sandals, the boys and girls 
marched through \'loods and heath; they camped outdoors, played 
the ~uitar and joined in folk dancing. The folk dances and 
folk son~s of ten borrowed themes from ancient Germanic pagan 
myths. HelationshirJs between the boys ana ,:;irls were expectecl 
to be open and "comraclely" but not intimate • They v/ere to 
avoid "stadium and cinerao, ci;:sarettes, alcoho 1 and flirtation." 12 7 
Thouish the Workers Youth Centre attracted no more than 
7ÜÜU members, mostly youn,~ clerical or skilied manual workers , 
i t had a stronr~ ilTlp~ct on the party. Thus Vorrink was e lee ted 
party president in 1934. 128 However, not all Social Democrats 
a,\;reed wi th his aPiJronch. Older mcmbers of ten Hlockeci the 
attempt lito create a neVl culture by carnpin,', on the heath"and 
jJointeu out the similari ties between the Workers Youth Centre 
and the reactionary, petty-bour~eois youth movement in 
129 Germany. Instead of trying to create a new culture and a 
proletarian elite, they feIt the party should preserve the 
best from the old bourGeois culture and recruit intellectuals 
t 'ct th . 1 130 ou S1 e e work1n~ c ass. 
Uoth the Workers Youth Centre and its critics agreed, 
however, that the Social DClilocro..tic Horkers Party should 
127 Kuyper, op. cit., ij. 24; sec also Harmsen, Daan Goulooze, 
Chaptcr VIII, 2 anc! Cohen, op. ei t., PiJ. 211-~~27. 
128 Cohen, op. cit., pp. 22~-244. 
129 Ibid.; cf. \'J. lJoni,;er, "Intellectuelen en socialisme," 
Ue Socialistische Gids 10 (1925): 993-1012. 
130 I3on)~er, op. cito 
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devote more attention to eultural issues antl eombat the 
l;rowing materialism in lJuteh soeiet~·. 'l'here were different 
wnys to do this. Apart froM the Workers Youth Centre, there 
\"ere workers ehoi 1"5, workers sportin.~', clubS, a Vlorkers Eduea-
tion Insti tu te and c. broadeastin~~ [wsoeiation, the Assoeia tion 
of i'!orkers Hadio Amateurs (Vereni,~~in.; Y§!! Arbeiders Hadio 
Amateurs, VAHA). 'rhe lat ter was foundetl in 1926 and eounteu 
140,000 members by 1933, almost tv/iee as many as the Soeial 
Democratie party. The Assoeiation broke the monopoly of the 
General (i. e. Li beral) JJroadeastin:., Assoeia tion élnd was 
t · 1). 1 t" t" " I'" 0 131 ,ran "eo equa uro::\( e[lS l.n:; l.rne l.n ;:>0 • It v/ould broacl-
cast Soeial Democratie eomrnentaries, songs and plays as \'lell 
as 1ess political shows. 
Thc interest in culturnl issues began to vane again 
under the impact of the Seeond World War and its aftermath. 
L1Lerat1on from the German oeeupation and economie reeonstrue-
ti on required most attention. Soeial Demoeraey overearne its 
1so1at1on nnd sta.\;nation, but iJaid ,l }Jriee for i t: in 1946 
the Social Democratie \Jorkers Party Jisbanded, i ts members 
jo1ned the ne\'! Labour Party (Partij ~ de Arbeid) together 
with pro.:;ressive LiIJerals, Catholics and Protestélnts. The 
ncw IJarty \'las a "lJcolJlc's i-'urty" wit!l @. l-'erson2..1ist rr.tther 
tlw.n :l r·lo.rxist jJhilosojJhy, nnd a clearly reformist }Jrograr.1me. 
lt denounced both capitalism anti state socialism, i 6 nored the 
lJlCornelissen et al., op. cit., p. 246; H. Van Hulst, 
A. P1eysier and I. Scheffer, lIet roode vaandel vo 1gen \/i j 
(Utrecht, 1~G9), PIJ. 144-145. 
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c1ass strugg1e and argued for planninis, industrial organisation 
and soc1a1 secur1ty. lts principlcs included the fundamental 
va1ues of fam1ly and marriage, the unity of the Dutch nation 
w1th1n Western civilisation, and the ethical foundation of 
132 the state. 
Yct in spi te of i ts nev/ name and mouera te lJrO,{~raIfjrne, the 
Labour Party won only 28~~ of the fJo}Ju1ar vote in 1~46. It 
had probably retained a Social Derl10cratic anel fJr01etarian 
imai;e in the eyes of the electorate. A létr;;e Ht:ljori ty of 
its cadre indeed car.lC from the Social Democré~tic \10rkers Party; 
but accord1nH to a survey held arounu 1955 there were more 
clerica1 and actministrative v/orkers than manual v/orkers arnon 
them. 133 Christian Socia1ists, v~o had a1ready p1ayed an 
incrcé1sini~ role \'I i thin the Social Lleraocratic lJarty in the 
lUJUs, exercised considerable influence; they were allowed 
to set up a lJrotcstant and a Ca tho1ic "workin,~ cornIiluni ty" 
. 134 (\'Ierk;"emeenschap) anli to lJui)lish a Journ<ll. 
132"lle)jinselpro;.;ramrna van de Partij van de Arbeid," 
Parlement en Kiezer (1~48): lIl-lIb. 
l33Herkomst Positie en 0 Na ttini'en van het kader van 
de PvdA, n.p., n.d. , Chapter 1 in particular; 32>~ of a 
sample of 486 cadre, i.e. members of local branch committees, 
v/ere manual workers, 42';~ cler1cal or admin1strative vvorkers, 
salesrnen, etc., 7% lJrofessionals and ir.ltellectuals. 
l34Chr1st1an Soc1al1sts had already joined the Social 
Oemocrat1c \Vorkers Party around 1900, but had 1itt1e inf1uence 
unt1l the 1930s; in 194G a small (;roup of Catholics and a 
larger group of Protestants joined the Labour Party, providin,; 
almost 1/4 of the party cadre; cf. \'J. Bannin~~ 'reru'~b1ik en 
lJerspect1ef (Brwrn, 1972); also IJ. Ilouwaart anel L. Hui tenber, ~, 
Oriekwart eeU\ ... socialisme en re1i:;ie (Utrecht, 1977); below, 
Section 1.5. 
68 
The f.1arxist minority of the party was denied this privi-
le),.e. lt tried twiee to or~anise ~~ "50eial Democratie Centre" 
but to no avail j the first time i t a troJ:;hied' wi thin a feill 
years, the seeond time it was dissolved by the l--arty leader-
ShiP.135 lts platform eontained New Leftish demands for 
demoerntisation of state and eeonomy, a new culture and a 
new ethie, but also more "Old Leftish" items like the elass 
stru~~:~le, the need for soeialisa tion or nationalisa tion of 
. 13l) the means of production , antl state plann~n,~. The i,iarxists 
opposed the eorlJoratist pOlieies of the 50eial lJeraoeratie-
Christian eoalition, as weIl as its eolonial war a<\~ainst thc 
new Inuonesian reJ:;ublie in El4G-I ~ ~Sl, thou' ,h \1i thout much 
effect in either ense. 
At least in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the coalition 
\ol1 th Christian l-'arties seeTi1ed to benefi t thc Labour Party in 
. 137 terms of votes ana members. The ~~ovcrnn:cnt improved soeial 
seeuri ty, re;,uluteLi labour relations and stimulatecl the 
economie reconstruc tion ~tnd r.lodernisa tion of the country. 
HO\"lever, by 1960 it had more or less cor.lpleted its pro,~rarnme. 
'l'he Christian lJarties'j,reVl tired of Social Democratie reform 
l35C • \<:iedijk, Salll ,ie \!olff en het ontstaé'.n Vlln het 
Sociaal-lJemocratisch Centrula in de PvdA (Haarlem, 1971). 
13L)The yualifieCttion "i'!c\'l Leftish" is relative anc.1 loose; 
in tllc HIGUs mOGt Ncw Lcft;ist~ vlould denounce thcm as "Old 
Loft": see ChatJter 2, section 4; <.~lso \'/. Hornijn, Het 50cia2.1-
lJemocratisch Centrum (n.p., n.d.). 
l37uy 195G the Labour Party had 140,000 members and 
almost 2 million voters, 33~~ of the popular vote (Kendali , 
Ojl. cit., PiJ. 37~, 3Sl7). 
pr0l>0sa1s and I)referrcd a coali tion wi th the Liber::,l Pétrty. 
At the 1!:1~~ e1ections, thc Laoour Party lost va te s for the f irs t; 
time s1nce 1ts foundation in l~4G.138 The ~arty leadershi~ 
decided to rev1se i ts ~rinc11-les a:~ain, erLtdica tin" the htst 
remnants of 1 ts iinrxist heri ta:~e. Tlle new declara tion of 
pr1nC 11ilcti was u.ra1'teLi uy \;illenl 0annin._~, a Protestant 
::11 c la~,sc:3, ij; r lL .. lilcntc.ry (,eliIOC r<J.C:/, reli_~ion anc.. authori ty 
1n~ener,.1. Incofllc unLl vJealth shoulu be reciistriLuteJ 
:.ccol'din Lu nl~C .. ;.ll j',cllievclfl.)nt, ;lnu \'iorkers should acquire 
1 .. (Jl'l~ infllll:ncc OVC1' t!.~.i.l' c.;ni;cl'j,risc.;; ~;ut socialis;tLion of 
c.;la:.;:;e~ ',Iould not lje i.Lolishcu, Lut cLiucation vlould l)rovi,je 
all ei tizens \'11 th el!ual chances to c 11rnb the social ladder 
on thc Lasis of character anti atility. 11' some felt depriveu 
or frustrated, 60c1ul work was to prevent or solve disruptive 
soci01 tens10ns. 139 A young economist, Joop Den Uyl, defcnded 
the new pr1nciIJles with a simple staternent: "Social Democracy 
14ü hos becorne bourgeois, and right1y so." 
Indeed the Labour Party had been integrated fully into 
bourgeois society, dom1nated by an Atlant1c bourgeoisie with 
138r "1 ! L; ('. 
13~". i 1 ,) ., t" d ~ '" 'd " 
.,el. nse iJrot~ralllma van ue t ar ~ J VLtn e j1.rL.Je~ , 
Pé.o.r1eJiient en Kiezer (1 vuO) : 147-1 S3. 
140 t· b <" b I" S' l' (Al h (..luo eû y -.J. L.:OU\'len -er" 'louern oc~a ~sme IJ en 
a~.n de ::1jn, 1~7;~), l.J. 100j th\,; sl,eech \'Jas a150 published 
as :.n nrtic1e: J. Den Uyl, ";larxisrne anno 1~)5~," Socialisme 
en LJclliucréltic (l:J~')): 4'/4-4:<3. 
70 
a 11bera1-technocratic or corporatist ideology. In the 1960s 
the New Left would rebel a~ainst all these things, and in the 
19708 it would replace the "Old Left" principles of 1959 by 
New Left principles; yet many of the latter were in fact older 
than the former. llarxist ideas about class conflict, dcmocrél.-
ti8ation and socialisation, but even more clearly Stenhuis's 
dual str[ttel~y, and some of De I·lan I s or Vorrink I s ideas about 
a new culture returned, albeit in a different ancl of ten more 
radica1, annrchistic forrn. 141 
1. t> '1'l1a Chri stian Left 
Christian or(~anisations in ~)utch 1Joli tics have been 
i'.enerally classifiecl as riGht of centre. 'rhe Social Democratie 
Lca~ue consisted mostly of Freethinkers and counted the Church 
"mon .. i ts main enemies • 'l'he Social Democ rEl tic \!orkers Party 
tÜs!Jlayed indifference rather than outri~ht hostili ty, 
l'c,,<.4rJinl~ reli(~ion as a "lJrivate concern" irrelevant to 
politics. NeverthclesG, around 1900 a fe\! Christians, all 
Protestants, beäln to move to the Left, drawing socialist 
conclusions from a rndicnl interpretation of the GoslJel. 
fo110winL Uutch traditio~ they tdvided themselves into liberal 
141 The "return of ideas" is ahmySb relative, since 
ideas rarely disappear completely; in this case they were 
probably still !Jresent in the minds of some\"lhat mar,,;inal 
r.arty members, or \'tere ~~i ven 1i tt1e elilphasi s--in the case 
of Vorrink, for instanee , \/ho \'las !jresident of the Labour 
èlarty until 1955 IJut could not save "his" dying Vlorkers 
Youth Centre; see A. Van tier Lom/, Hood als je hart, In 
qcsch1cden1s van de AJC (Amsterdam, 1~74), fJlJ. !.JU ff. 
and fundamentalist l4~~ i;roups. 
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The liberé~l :~roul-', lcJ i:Jy uutch Hcforucà ministers \lho 
h'.d l;;tllGie:..: t.le010,~y at Leic.ien Uni versi ty, joinecl thc Socie.l 
t'rom 1~02 thc,roui.J publi shed 2 
journ<.ll, "Thc Joyfu1 \;/orlLi" (Ue l31ijdc \','ercld), whicll con-
tinue-i aftel' HJ:n under tJ1C name "Time "'-nu Task" (Tijd en 
'raak). lts influence .,;rew slo'.'/ly \'I i thin the party. One of 
the journal' s eui tors \Ié\S \Vi11em l.)annin~, who became a mcmber 
or the Executi ve Conulli ttee é.md one of the founding fathers of 
the ncw Labour Party. He also led the \ioodbrokers Ins ti tute 
ut Uarchehl wh1ch or,~aniscJ courses anu seminars for \'/orkers 
143 1n a l1beral Protestant spirit. 
The fundamentalist ).~roul-' was led by lI1inisters who hau 
studicd theolo~y at the Univcrsity of Utrecht, as weIl as by 
layl,lcll <.nu layvlorilcn. dost of thcll1 h~Ll ocen iillpressed LJy 
J\trah<.J.m j'~uYl'er' s cri tL.juc of C<1lJi talisII1 but LiisappointeJ. by 
the conserv~.tive sociEtl i.Jolicy of his Anti-j{cvolutionary Party. 
Con;,;L;crin·, tl1c ~ocLll UC/.locratic \'!or;zers Party too éÜheistic, 
thcy foun .. l!u tllcir m'ffi j,c.l'ty, the Lea.,ue of Christian ~ocialists 
(~ Y.0.!! C:lristcn-:"';ocl<'listcn) in 1~07. 141', At first the 
Leao,uc \'lould only 0drü t lilcmliers Hho acce[Jtecl the Calvinist 
AlJostolic Confession. I;~nored anu of ten harassed by the 
142see Houwaart and Ru1tenberg, op. cito 
143Ib1d .; also Lanninl~, op. cit., IJarticularly PIJ. 39-58. 
1440. Van der Zee, Een ti ·dsverschi~nsel. 
l~nd van Christen-Socialisten 
De voormali'e 
, Chapter 2. 
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Protestant churches, the League could not recruit more than 
250 mernbers. I t condernned capi talism as a "shame for Chris-
tianity" and cal led for socialisation of the means of prociuc-
tion in order to achieve "a Divine moral order in the Vlorld, 
\'/h1ch every Christian is called upon to fi,~ht for.,,145 
Af ter 1!H2 the Lenl~ue becaJlle more open and more rc.dical. 
An;y'one \'Iho believed in "the princi1-'le of Di vine love" and in 
146 j·latthe\'l 22:37 and ~~2::3~ could join thc [X..lrty. \lhile sOIne 
of the oluer mell10ers VIi thClrew, a :~;rou1-' of youn;:,er Ijlembers 
<11'OltnLi 13art !Je Li.~~t, an orthodox minister who i);radually turned 
to panthe1srn, be.~an to dorninate the Lea~ue. Durins the First 
'i:or1Li \'lar, De Li.\;t udvocuted conscientious oLjection to 
military service and \'/as imprisoned for a v/hile. 147 \/hereas 
before 1912 Christiun Socialists tended to jo in demonstrations 
of thc Soci<11 Democratic Workers Party, af ter lY14 they of ten 
tiCr.lonstrated together \'Iith Hevolutionary Socinlists anö 
Anurcllists. 'fhis cooperation led in 1913 to the establishment 
of a Revo1utionary Socialist Caucus which consistecl of two 
.~ Co~munists, one Christian Socialist--Kruyt, unother Protcs-
, 
tI 
148 tant minister--anli Kolthek, lC~t(~cr 01' the ~ocialist Party. 
145 In Uutch: "een ::>trijd voor Gods zeJelijke wereldorde, 
tot \ ... elke te vesti~~en ••• iedere Christen .,;eroelJen is," D. Van 
der ~ee, Het Christen-socialisme (Schiedam, n.d.), p. lG~. 
14Gvan der ~ee, ibid., IJ. lGl; he 4uotes from the new 
tJro.r:,rallullc of the Lea) .ue; J.!;i. tthcVl 22: 3 7 and 3~ refer to love 
a.lso: "Jesus saiLt unto hill1, 'l'hou shal t love the Lord, thy 
GOJ, \'/ith all thy heart, and Vlith all thy soul, <.md with all 
thy minJ. (This is the first and I',reat comfi1andment.) And 
iR the second is like i t, 'l'hou shé;.l t love thy nei.'~hbor as thysc lf'. 11 
.... 
1471)e L11~t, op. cit., i'P. 7-:?'J. 
148 Van der Zee, Het Christen-socialisme, Chapters 6-10; 
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'l'he League of Christian Socialists had \'Ion one seat in 
parliament in 1918 with a rather r<,;volutionary pléltform. It 
cal led for unilateral disarmament, socialisation of the means 
of production throu~h ~roductive associations, abolition 
01' 1 h 1t l' t' , . f I I ,14~ n er ance, ree euuca 10n, and 1nuepenuence or nuoneSla. 
At the same t1me the Leuc:,ue continued to ofJlJose seeular eduen.-
t10n anLi pointecl out that religion \'las a "task for life 
15ü ruther than a ~r1vate concern" (levenstué.lk, geen privaatzaak). 
I tEllso 1ns1steu thu t the lJroletaria t, whi 1e aetini~ as a,',ent 
of the revolut10n, oU,jht to "reeognil:le fellow-lIlan even in 
1tli enemy" and to "recover the sense of unity of all men •.• 
1 t i th r 'i ' I 1 t' t l' " 1 51 os snee e 'I ud e A~es llue '0 ea{..il. él. l.Slil. 
Soon aftel' l~lU the Leuoue fe11 é:L{..iart. The /Ileruber of 
l,arl1ument unu a few others joined the COlil/llunist h ... rty, a 
more 1II0üerate :..;rou}.i went to the ;;)oeial Democratie i:orkers 
PElrty, and the c:,roup around ue Liut founJed the Lea~ue of 
liel1 ... ious Anarchist-Colnl,;unists. 152 Uthers kept loolün;~ for 
more explie1 tly Christian or,;anisations; in 1~2u they 
founLieLl the Chril:ltian Democratie Union, tO;',ether wi th other 
~~out Kolthek see above, Seetion 1.3 (footnote ~3 in partieu-
lnr) • 
l49purlement en kiezer (l~lH): u~-0u. 
l~O Van Lier :lee, Het Ct1risten-soei3.lismc, IJ}". J5 ff, 
14l!-14~. 
1!JI1biu ., (my tranl:llation). 
152 About the new Leai,ue see <.!Jove, ~)eetion 1.3. 
small progressive Protestant 153 groups. The new party won 
10% of the popular vote in 1933, enough for one seat in 
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154 purl1ument; in 1937 i t ~oubled i ts number of votes and sea ts. 
lts pro~ramme referred to the Bible and to a conception of 
reö..,onsible rather thé.n cOliliJetitive social rel;.l.tions. I-Jore 
specific uemun~ö reselilbleu those of the Social lJemocratic 
V:ori,ers tJarty: v/orkers I p~rtici}Jution in industry, nlore 
.)ro,~resf:>ive taxus, national distirlil;.d;lent. Unlikc the Socié.1.1 
liemocró:l.ts, the Christian Democrats diJ not dro}J the rielflanc1 
155 for national disarlilament in the 193Us. 
\:hile the Christian lJeIllocra tic Union uni ted most r,rogres-
sivc Protestants, some of them sou~ht contacts with non-
Christian reli;~ious peot)le in the l\eli!~,ious Socialist 
Association. Christian Socialists, 'l'heosophists and .Panthei sts 
l1ke denriette Holand Holst--at an earlier stai.~e a "lJutch 
l'larxist"--met there [or discussions and conferences. 156 
The Religious Socialist Association did not survive the 
!;iecond \/orld \var. The Christian Democratie Union mer1.~eu VIi th 
1~3LiiJSChits, Ue protestants-christelijke, ~p. 53-54; 
the other grou~s were the Christian Social .Party anu the 
Christian Uen~crntic Party, an o[fshoot from the Anti-
Hevolutionary Party; the former comtineCl a pro,-,ressive economie 
!Jro:,ramme ... Ii th reactiont.ry demands for a na tiom.tl .Protestant 
(1.e. Dutch Heformed) state. 
1~4 Lipschit::>, ibid., ij. 57. 
lS5 
'l'he Social Democratie \'!orkel's Party drol)ped i t in 
lVJ7; for thc ~)ro;~rUIllIlle of the Christian Democratie Union 
see h:rlement en Kiezer (1~38): 75-77. 
150Vnn uer Zee, tIet Christ..:n-socié-...lisme, Chéil-'ter G; 
liouvmart and Hui tenl)er_~, op. ei t., 1--'. 33; cf. Van Praal~' 
01 1 • cit., p. 121. 
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the Social Democratie Workers Party and other groups in the 
new Labour Party. Disa~~ointed by the colonial and aefence 
~olicy of the Labour Purty, several former Chri stian Democ rats 
joinea the left-win~ opposition in the party--the Social 
l.Jelllocratic Centre arounci 1~50--or left the IJarty' al tOEether . 
'rhe la ttcr l~roul) continueu i ts 1)0] i tical ac ti vi ty of ten 
throu"h pacifist or'~3anisations like Kerk en Vreae (Church 
anel peace) anci ~layed a part in thc foundation of the Pacifist 
Socialist Party in 1~57.l57 
The Christian Left tiiel not play an important role in 
Uutch politics before 19GO. It consisteu of several small 
end short-lived grou~s of intellectuals and very few workers, 
isolated from the masses and of ten harassed by the church 
leadership. <':atholics stayed even more fai thfully vii th their 
own "\)illar" than the Protestants. Yet some of these ",roups 
produced interestini; iueas; in particular the League of 
Christian Socialists, wlüch anticipated the ideas--as vlell 
an some of the development--of the Poli ticrtl Party of HadicaLs 
l~C3 in the late 19b05 and early 1~70s. 
1. b Conc lusion 
uefore contrastini. the Uld Lef1: vii th the Uew Left in 
tile NetherlandS, \'le can sum up sowe of its characteristics 
as shown by thc historical sketches in this chapter. 
107 Lipschits, Ue rotestants-christeli 'ke, p. 5b; 
1\. Lei jser, Socialisme :.::onocr ,ltOOJdbom 1976) , 
~\). 10-13; a1so Interview 3. 
158 See Chapter 2 sec tion ~ te lo\"!. 
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In the first place, the Dutch Left never won a majority 
of votes or seats in the period lU7U-19bO. At best it coulu 
win 40~ of the popular vote, and more of ten only 30%. lts 
80c1ul base wus restricted by the reli:.sious se/;mentation or 
t;111ur1sution of the lJutch worl<in~ class aml petty Gour ié,eoisil3: 
most Cutho11c anu Ill<.;.ny Protestant workers rem<.i.ined loyo.l to 
the rel1;~ious tralie uni ons and poli tical jJarties which opposec; 
the Left. The Ol~ Left reacted to this Ly builain~ its own 
~illurs ano ~y atioptin~ other reliLious or 4U&si-reli~ious 
troi ts. J.loral and spiri tual-ideolo;,ical 4uestions recei ved 
considerable attention in party publications and discussions. 
Furthermore, several (forlfler) religious leaaers--specifically 
Protestant ministers--~layed an important role in Old Left 
'órout;s: lJoemla Nieuwenhuis, De Ligt, Kruyt, i.;annin~, lJuskes •••• 
In the second place, the Ol~ Left fell apnrt soon é~fter 
1 ts erlleróence arounu 188U. Dy 1900 one could alree,dy dis-
tin JuiSh four ,~roupin,~s or tentieneies , Hevolutionéiry Sociali s ts, 
J\1\"rchists, Social Democrats anü Christian Leftists. ll.t that 
time tlle first three were of almost e4ual stren,.,th. Af ter 
lV2U Social Democracy uominutell the Left, in terras of votes, 
membcrships un~ 1nfluencc. Hevolutiono.ry Socialists divided 
1~!) About Uomela Nieuwenhuis, the leader of the Social 
iJeillocratic Leai'.ue, :.Jee sections 1.2 i.tnU 1.3 abovc; about De 
Li ... t, ~ect10ns 1. 3 and 1. 5; ;~ruyt was e lected mer~lber of 
i-',lrlinlllent for the Lea,~ue of ChristLm Socialists in 1~18 but 
joineJ the communist Party in the Sárne year anû <.lied as a 
rcsistHnce leader in the Seconu \":orlcl ',;"ar; Dannin~; and .Juskes 
wcre Loth active within the Dutch Lábour Party, the former 
on thc ra.;ht, the latter on thc Left (the SOCiéll Dernoc ra tic 
Ccntre)--sec Scction 1.4 and l!oU\lunrt anu Huitenber,~, op. cito 
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1nto c.;ommun1sts unu "thc rest"; the forr.1cr maintained asolid 
~ut i~olatec.i ~rolctnrian ~a~c, while the lattcr uwindled to 
small sectariun _~roups in the Hl2üs and l!:J30s. 'l'he Anarchist 
Left J1sai-'iJeareli as a !Joli tical force af ter 1!:J 20, v.'hi Ie the 
c.;hl"iutian Left rCIlI,"incu <1 :.JfIlall [U 1'1 controver:.Jinl tut rJedic,.-!;e Cl 
. ,rou~ .• 
'l'hus by 1\;100 the :.:>ocial lJemocrats, uniteu in the Dutch 
LuL,our P ... rty, could LI~tcnlinc thc illlo.,;e of thc CJlu Left. The 
I .. abour iJarty huJ Lecome a SOllleV/ho. t turenucra tic m<..ss i-'é.J.rty, 
orienteu towartls clcction cali1!Jélil~ns anti i~OVernl1lent coali tions--
usually with the c.;atholic Party. It had adopteu a reformist, 
lJerhé.l.jJs even bour,;.eois li beral ~rogramrne, and droPi-'ed any 
rcference to l·iarx, the iJrolctaria t, the c lass stru.c~,~le anc.! 
the 111<e. Al thOUli.h i t maintaineLl some interest in workers I 
co-ueterrn1no.tion in industry and in cul tural ~~olicies, i t 
Sho\ ... ed "Iore concern \'Ii th ~ocio-cconol.üc iJolicy, anu \'Ii th 
thc c.;olJ War. In the l!:J~Us thi::; ~8rty \'Ioulu becomc the 
tur.~et of most He ... , Lert c ri tici~lIl. Thc Communist Party 
\'Ioul,~ sllare this fata to a lcs~er e;·~tcnt. In it:.J critirJue 
of the Ulu Left nnu its attcmpts to replace or renew it, thc 
Ue\" Left \'Iould vcry of ten revert to iueó.s of nn even olüer 
Olu Left. These ideas, re.;ardin/; self-mana .. <,ement ty workers' 
councils, direct action ancl cul tur<.:.l chan~~e, have been des-
crilJeu briefly in this chéqJtcr. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE NEW LEFT IN THE NETHERLANDS (1960-1977) 
Introduction 
This chapter follows the same pattern as the preceding 
one. The first section offers a brief description of socio-
economie and political changes which occurred in the Nether-
lands between 1960 and 1~77: economie growth, the rise of a 
"new petty bourgeoisie," social and political polarisation, 
the decline of the consociational "pillarised" system, cul-
tural liberalisation. The next four sections deal with the 
main New Left groups in the Netherlands, the Pacifist Socialist 
Party, Provo, Nieuw Links and the Political Party of Radicals. 
At the end of each section the New Left group will be compared 
br1etly w1th similar Old Left groups, described in Chapter 
One. 
The Pacifist Socialist Party could be considered the 
oldest New Left group. Founded in 1957 by people who had, 
in many cases, be10nged to 01d Left groups, it appeared far 
from new to many criticalobservers. In many respects the 
new party cont1nued the Revo1utionary Socialist tradition of 
the Revo1ut1onary Socialist (Workers) Party, the Communist 
Workers Party or even the Socia1 Democratie League of the 
late 18808. Vet 1t differed from all these in some important 
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aspecta, particularly in its social base, its "dual strategy," 
and its ideas about ethica and culture. However, not all 
aembers ot the party were happyabout these ditterences; the 
.w.. tatt tendency· could only dominate the party af ter bitter 
int.rnal cont1icts throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and its 
Ylctory aay have been a pyrrhic one. 
Provo wa. a very small and ephemeral group which resembied 
in aany ways the group ot young Anarchists around the journal 
De Moker (The Sledgehammer) or the "Take and Eat" people of 
the 19208 and 1930s. Their goals were very similar, but 
their strategies differed siinificantly. Provo's "two hand" 
strategy ot provocation and reformism, typically New Left, 
proved mueh more successtul than the revolutionary extremism 
ot the 01d Left Anarchists. Provo was succeeded by the "Elf 
lovement" (Kabouters), which seemed to pursue the "two hand" 
or dual strategy to abHurd len~ths .. Their utopian expei rment:3 
could ba compared to the etforts ot the Association for 
C~n Landownership. 
The sem1-organised group within the Dutch Labour Party 
Wllch called itselt "New Left" (Nieuw Links) borrowed its 
ideas trom Provo and the Pacitist Socialist Party rather than 
trom older lettist Social Democratie groups. While in some 
things it resemb1ed the groups around De Nieuwe Tijd, Stenhuis 
and De Kadt, as weIl as Vorrink's Workers Youth Centre, their 
approach was quite different, and more effeetive. The group 
praetieally conquered the pnrty and ehanged its programme as 
weIl as--to alesser extent--its organisation. However, 
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these changes may have appeared more dramatic than they 
really were. 
The Political Party of Radicals followed--no doubt 
unlntentlonally--the example of the League of Christian Social-
lata. Founded as moderate, almost Social Democratie but 
Chrlstian groups, both radicalised and secularised rapidly. 
Both were influenced by anarchist and revolutionary socialist 
ideas. However, the League remained small and powerless, 
Whereas the Political Party of Radicals became a real political 
torce. There are other differences as weIl, such as the dual 
atrategy and the emphasis on self-development or self-
expression of the Radicals. 
In the concluding section of this chapter the four New 
Left groups are compared with each other. In spite of 
different historical and cultural backgrounds they seem to 
have shared at least three basic characteristics that distin-
Kulsh them from Old Left groups (as weIl as groups of the 
Right). Firstly, they all strove for a fundamental democra-
tlsation of Dutch society, and more specifically for workers' 
eelf-management in industry. Secondly, they pursued a dual 
or "two hand" strategy of direct, extra-parliamentary action 
"trom above." This strategy implied a new type of political 
oraan1e.tion; 1t tended to go together with a new petty-
bourge01s soc1al base. Th1rdly, the New Left groups aimed 
. 
at a "cultural revolution" which wOuld orient people towards 
creat1vity, self-expression and peaceful cooperation instead 
of mater1al goods, work, achievement and competition. 
81 
Taken together, these three characteristics define the 
Dutch New Left. The next chapter wi11 examine whether this 
detinition can be app1ied to the French and German New Left 
a8 weIl. It wi11 a1so contain a schematic comparison of the 
development of New Left groups within the three countries. 
2.1 Dutch society and polities (1960-1977) 
The 1960s and ear1y1970s were years of economie, socia1, 
political and cu1tura1 change in the Netherlands. They can 
be summed up in terms 1ike economie growth, mass consumption, 
the r1se of a new petty-bourgeoisie, socia1 and political 
pOlarisat10n, depillarisation and cu1tural liberalisation. l 
Production continued to grow at a rate of 6% a year 
unt11 1971 when it started to slow down; it decreased, for 
the t1rst time since the war, in 1975, but went up again by 
1976. 2 Industria1 production increased faster, but emp10yed 
tewer people in the 1970s than in the 19605. On1y chemica1 
industries and oi1 refinerles expanded their work force, 
while textile, 1eather and food industries reduced their work 
torce considerab1y.3 But whi1e employment stagnated in 
1ndustry and dec1ined in agrlcultur~~rom 10.7% to 6.1% of 
the work torce--through the 1960s, more jobs were created in 
IR. Inglehart, "Political Dissatisfaction and Mass 
Support tor Social Change in Advanced Industrial Society," 
Comparative Political Studies 10:3 (1977): 455-472. 
2 OECD Economie Survey of the Netherlands, 1977. 
3ILO Yearbook 1976. 
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commerce, transport and pub1ic or private services. However, 
af ter 1970 emp10yment started to stagnate in the service 
sector and to dec11ne in industry,so that unemp10yment and 
underemp10yment rose rather quick1y, from 1.4% of the dependent 
4 
work force in 1970 to 5.1% by 1975 (registered unemp1oyed). 
D1ffer,ntiat1ng between occupationa1 categories, one observes 
between 1960 and 1971, an increase of professional and tech-
n1ca1 workers (from 9.2% to 13.3% of the work force), c1erical 
workers (trom 12.3% to 15.4%) and of sales workers, at least 
1nsofar as they were wage-earners rather than self-employed; 
5 the latter category declined from 3.8% to 3.1% The number 
of managerial or administrative workers and of production 
workers rose, but their proportion of the work force dropped 
s11ght1y over the same per1od. The percentage of self-employed 
workers dec1ined in all categories. One cou1d infer therefore 
that the trad1tiona1 petty bourgeoisie declined while the new 
petty-bourgeo1s1e grew. 
Concentratlon and centralization of capital increased, 
particu1ar1y atter the "wage explosion" of 1964, as the 
grow1ng number of mergers and take-overs indicates. By 1970, 
the 10 1argest lndustrial corporations of the Netherlands 
employed 24% of the industrial work force. The turnover of 
the 4 largest of them (Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, Philips 
and AKZO) was estimated at $21,100,000,000 while the Dutch 
4 OECD Economie Survey of the Netherlands, 1977. 
5 ILO Yearbook 1976. 
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Gross Nationa1 Product was ca1cu1ated at $28,400,000,000 in 
ti the same year. The Dutch economy may we11 be "entirely 
dom1nated by the sheer size of the first four companies and 
7 through their joint structure," as Levinson has asserted. 
These four corporations had their head offices in the Nether-
lands (as well as in Britain, in the case of Shell and Uni-
lever) but employed more workers in other countries than at 
home. Their foreign investment and exports of goods and 
.erv1ces, as well as that of many smaller companies made the 
Dutch economy more and more dependent on foreign markets. 8 
Yet the domestic market expanded also during the 1960s, 
part1cu1arly for durable consumer goods. The number of 
registered telev1sion sets increased from 1,040,000 in 1960 
to 3,086,000 in 1974. 9 Consumption of non-materia1 goods 
1ncreased almost as fast. The number of students at univer-
s1t1es more than doub1ed between 1960 and 1970. The pub1ic 
sector grew, both in terms of peop1e emp1oyed--13% of the 
work force by 1975--and money spent; 31% of the National 
Income of 1974 was spent on taxes, and 20% on socia1 security 
payments, compared to 25% and 9% respectively in 1960. 10 
The rap1d growth of production and the increasing shortage 
6 C. Lev1nson, Capita!, Inf1ation and the Multinationals 
(London, 1971). 
7 Ibid., p. 80. 
&van Doorn et al., De beheerste vakbeweging (Amsterdam, 
1876), pp. 321 tY7 ---
9CBS , Historical Statistics of the Netherlands (The Hague, 
1975). 
10Van Doorn et al., op. cit., p. 566. 
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of labour, as weIl as inflation, undermined the pOlicy of 
rigorous wage restraints enforced throughout the 19505 by 
centralized corporatist institutions like the Social Economie 
Council. The Liberal-Confessional coalition that came to 
power in 1959 tried to differentiate between more and less 
productive sectors when allowing wage increases, but clashed 
re~eatedly with the trade unions, particularly the Social 
Democratie NVV. Unlike the Confessional unions, the NVV 
preferred a centralized wage policy to a differentiated one. 
It found a temporary ally in the Liberal Federation of 
Employers, but eventually both came to accept the trend 
towards differentiation and free bargaining. The second 
Liberal-Confessional coalition, which took office in 1963, 
left most of the decisions concerning wages to the Foundation 
of Labour (consisting of representatives of employers and 
unions). A series of strikes, usually initiated outside the 
official unions, led to a IIwage explosion ll in 1964 which 
brought Dutch wages close to the European average. Af ter 
1964,conflict between employers and unions began to reduee 
the effeetiveness of the Foundation of Labour. A coalition 
of Social Democrats and two Confessional parties attempted 
to regain control over wages in 1965, but was voted out of 
office in 1966. Thus free bargaining appeared inevitable; 
only independent businessmen eontinued to fight it. ll 
When another Liberal-Confessional eoalition tried te 
llMost of this and the follow1ng paragraph is based on 
Van Doorn !:.!~, op. ei t.; and on Windmuller , op. ei t. 
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restriet wages and cancel collective contracts again in 1968, 
the unions effectively opposed it. The three major unions 
also fought a new Wage Bill which institutionalized free 
bargaining but allowed for government interference in certain 
cases. In spite of a one hour general strike organized by 
the NVV the bill became law in 1970. The law did away with 
the Board of Government Mediators, and reduced the function 
of the Social Economie Council to general advice. The trade 
union centres lost some of their power to their member unions, 
and could now devote more attention to political issues like 
industrial democracy, protection of the environment and 
government spending. The member unions which negotiated wage 
agreements began to consult their rank and file. The Catholic 
and the Social Democratie unions of industria1 workers 
introduced plant committees (bedrijfscontactcommissies) and 
shop stewards (bedrijfscontactman) although they maintained 
territorial units (districten) as the basis of their organi-
t " 12 za ~on. 
Workers became more militant during the late 1960s, 
encouraged by some trade union leaders and staff members 
organized loose1y in a Working Party for a Critical Trade 
Un10n Movement (Werkgroep voor ~ Maatschappijkritische 
Vakbeweging), but also by Marxist-Leninist groups outside 
the un1ons. In 1970, a Maoist committee cal led Workers Power 
(Arbeidersrnacht) led a march of 10,000 striking doek workers 
12 Van Doorn, op. cit., pp. 472-475; Harmsen and Reinalda, 
op. cit., pp. 387-389. 
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in protest to the office of the Social Democratic Transport 
Workers Union when the latter ended its support for the 
dockers strike in Rotterdam. 13 In the early 1970s, rising 
inflation and unemployment were met by government and employers 
with cutbacks, price and fee increases--university fees were 
raised by 500% for example--as weIl as lay-offs; the unions 
reacted by offering wage restraints in exchange for more jobs 
and public services. When AKZO planned to close down an 
important chemical plant in Breda, the unions supported the 
occupation of the plant by the workers and achieved a modifi-
14 
cation of the plan. vfuile attempts at trilateral social 
contracts (between government, employers and unions) failed 
in 1972 and 1973,the number of strike days increased from 
96,8000 in 1971 to 583,800 in 1973, the highest number since 
1946. One of the main reasons for the strikes was the union 
demand for wage increases "in cents instead of percentages" 
(centen in plaats ~ procenten) to reduce the inequality of 
incomes; both employers and unions of senior employees--
growing rapidly in those years--opposed the demand bitterly, 
but ended up conceding most of it. 15 
The trend towards radicalization and polarization of 
class conflicts was soon reversed, however, when the Labour 
Party returned to government in a coalition with Liberal 
l3Van Doorn, op. cit., p. 370; Harmsen and Reinalda, 
op. cit., pp. 383-385. 
14Harmsen and Reinalda, op. cit., pp. 402-404. 
15 Van Doorn, op. cit., pp. 484-503, 535. 
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Democrats, Hadicals and some Confessionals in 1973. To 
counter th~ effects of the oil embargo in the fall of 1973 
the governrnent introduced a Special Powers Bill to control 
wages, prices, dividends anti other incornes. Thanks to 
domestic natural gas resources, the energy crisis passed 
quickly, but the government continued to regulate wages and 
prices. The unions, unab1e to reach agreements with the 
emp1oyers, and faced with growing unemp1oyment, grudging1y 
accepted wage restraints in exchange for (modest) expansion 
of the pub1ic service sector. On1y towards the end of 1976 
did the government return to a more liberal po1icy, allowing 
free bargaining and restricting the growth of the pub1ic 
sector. Yet when bargaining broke down again, this time 
over price compensation, and unions organized "spearpoint 
strikes" in several sectors, the government mediated a com-
promise. The strikes showed that the unions had not yet 
returned to the complacency and c1ass cooperation of the 
1950s.1 6 
Both the Catholic and the Socia1 Democratie Trade Union 
Centres,since 1976 united in a Federation of Dutch Trade 
Unions (FNV), tried to develop a strategy of 1imited class 
conflicts aiming at a new socio-economie order of democratie 
planning and social ownership of the means of production 
under workers self-management. Proceeding step by step, 
16Ibid ., p. 538; OECD, op. cit.; Keesing's Contemporary 
Archives, 1974, p. 26838A; Peper in S. Barkin, ed., Worker 
tUlitancy and lts Consequences (New York, 1975), Pp. 118-153. 
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they hoped to expand the powers of Works Councils and plant 
comrn1ttees wh11e reducing that of shareholders and directors, 
and to accumu1ate capita1 gains or surplus profits in funds 
17 controlled by the workers. The government 1ntroduced 
legislation concerning works Councils and prof1t shar1ng 
(vermogensaanwasdeling), but failed to enact 1t due to res1s-
tance from Christian Democrats and Liberals. 
Polarization and po1it1cization characterized not only 
Dutch trade unions and their opponents in this period, but 
also categories 1ike students, art1sts, conscripts, women, 
farmers, Catholics and professionals. In fact, farmers had 
organized the first political action group in the Netherlands 
1n order to protest against the corporatist Public Organization 
of Agriculture (Landbouwschap) and its mandatory membership. 
When the action group of Free Farmers refused to pay the 
membership fee, many of their farms were confiscated and solde 
Subsequently, the action group became a political party, the 
Boerenpart1j (Farmers Party), which won 3 seats in par1iament 
in 1963 and 7 seats (4.7% of the popu1ar vote) in 1967. 18 
The successes of the Farmers Party in rura1 Catholic and 
Protestant areas, as wel1 as in some urban strongho1ds of 
the Labour Party, scared the leaders of these parties out of 
the1r consociational complacency. The Farmers Party dec1ined 
17NRC , 31 May 1977, 11 June 1977, 1 December 1977. 
l8A• Nooij, De Boerenpartij (Meppel, 1969), pp. 32-46. 
The PUb1ic Organisation of Agricu1ture was set up by the 
government as an agency to regulate production and distribution. 
Like a municipality, it cou1d regu1ate and tax its members and 
the members were represented through "official" unions. 
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soon af ter 1967, but a host of other new parties took over 
its function of expressing general discontent; together they 
won 28% of the popular vote in 1971. The most important of 
them,as weIl as the most permanent one, seems to be Democrats 
'66. This was founded in 1966 by liberal intellectuals who 
feIt ill at ease in the rather conservative Liberal Party 
(VVD), and who hoped to replace the pillarized multi-party 
system by a more open bipolar party system through electoral 
reforms. 19 
The multiplication of protest parties and action groups, 
and the corresponding decline of the major parties, made 
elite accommodation between the latter increasingly difficult. 
Af ter the breakdown of the Catholic-Labour coalition in 1958, 
a Liberal-Confessional coalition stayed in power till it also 
broke down in 1965, apparently because of divergent views 
b ut . 1 tI" 20 a 0 commerCl.a e eVl.Sl.on. The Catholic-Labour coalition 
was restored, with Anti-Hevolutionary support, but was voted 
out of office in 1966 by a majority of Catholics, Liberals 
and Christian-Historicals who objected to expansion of the 
public sector. They formed another Liberal-Confessional 
coalition with the Anti-Revolutionaries which governed until 
1971. In the general ele~tions of that year the coalition, 
which had tried to accon~odate action groups and unions with 
19J • Gruijters, Daarom D'66 (Amsterdam, 1967); J. GOdschalk, 
"Enige politieke en sociale kenmerken van de oprichters van 
D'66," Acta Politica 5 (1969-70): 62-74. 
20 J. Bosmans in Manning et al., op. cit., pp. 2307-2311. 
L 
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rather modest reforms, lost its majority. A fifth party joined 
the coalition, Democratie Socialists '70, which had broken 
away from the Labour Party in 1970 and won 8 seats (5.3% of 
the popular vote) in the parliament of 1~71. A year later it 
1eft the coalition in disagreement over economie policy, 
government cutbacks, and wage and price controls. New elec-
ti ons were held which confronted the five rightist parties 
with a progressive alliance of the Labour Party, the Political 
Party of Radicals and Democrats '66. The latter alliance 
~n and the former lost several seats, but neither block 
gained a majority big enough to govern. 21 
Af ter five months of negotiations, a progressive coalition 
cabinet took office with ministers (and conditional support) 
from the Catholic Party and the Anti-Revolutionary Party. 
The government introduced many reforms, but was of ten para-
1yzed by internal conflicts and restrained by worsening economie 
conditions. It collapsed in March 1977, only a few months 
before the end of its term, when the Confessional ministers 
resigned over a bill against land speculation. The three 
Confessional parties had merged in a Christian Democratie 
Appeal (CDA) in 1976, and managed to halt their electoral 
decline--from 49% in 1963 to 31% in 1972--at the 1977 elec-
tions. The Liberal Party, which had led astrong opposition, 
increased its number of seats to 28 (17.9% of the vote), 
but the Labour Party did even better with 53 seats (33.8%).22 
21D• Houwaart, Storm rond partij en parlement (Apeldoorn, 
1973) • 
22~, 26 May l~77. 
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Negotiations began between Labour and the Christian Democrats 
but broke down af ter six months. A Liberal-Christian Democra-
tic coalition came about in December 1977, ending the longest 
23 governmental crisis in Dutch history. 
Most political scientists concluded that the Dutch 
political system had been in a crisis since 1966. According 
to Van der Berg and Molleman, the party leaders of the 1960s, 
who had replaced the generation of post-war Reconstructors, 
could not cope with the pressure from political activists 
and interest groups. Consequently, they gave way around 
1970 to a new generation of more aggressive and less accommo-
dation-oriented leaders who sought polarisation and publicity 
rather than compromise and secrecy.24 
Socio-economie and political change coincided with 
cultural liberalization and depillarization. In the 1960s 
Dutch people tUrned away from puritan work ethics and sexual 
25 
repression towards more hedonistic and secular moral values. 
While the Confessional parties lost votes. the Churches lost 
members and attendence, though at a slower rate. In many 
respects the Catholic Church under the influence of Vaticanum 
11 and modern theologians like Schillebeeckx, encouraged the 
11beralization process and stopped supporting the Catholic 
23Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1978, p. 28837A; see 
also R. Andeweg, ~ al., Kabinets formatie 1977 (Leiden, n.d.). 
24 Van den Berg and Molleman, op. cit., pp. 133-164; 
see also Daalder, op. cit.; and S. Wolinetz, Party Realignment 
in the Netherlands (New Haven, 1973). 
25Emde Boas in Manning, et al., op. cit., pp. 3216-3222. . ! i 




26 Party. As in other countries, a youth culture developed 
that cut through religious and class barriers while emphasizing 
immediate individual experience--in music, speech, dance and 
sexual relations--rather than long-term collective or institu-
tional action. 27 A militant student movement--first organized 
as a Student Trade Union Novement on the French UNEF model, 
but af ter 1968 increasingly fragmented in local action groups--
mobilized and politicized both secular and Catholic or Protes-
tant students; in fact its stronfiholds were in the Catholic 
universities of Nijmegen and Tilburg, where Marxist and 
Maoist groups exercised astrong influence. 28 The mass media, 
above all television, reached members of almost all re1iEious 
groups. \.,hile the Catholic, Protestant and Socialist Broad-
casting Systems declined or stagnated--around 500,000 members 
each--the more liberal and Ie ss pillarized General Broad-
casting System and the conservative "populist" TROS System 
grewrapidly and claimed 750,000 members each in 1977. 29 
Many Catholic, Protestant and Socialist voters appeared to 
30 prefer the programmes of the TROS to those of their own pillars. 
26GOddijn in Manning, et al., op. cit., pp. 2201-2204; 
H. Bakvis, Electoral stabili t and Electoral Chancre the 
Case of the Catholic Part in the Netherlands Doctoral 
dissertation; publication forthcoming. The Second Vatican 
Council encouraged individual freedom and toleranee within 
the Catholic Church. 
27De Haas, in Manning, ~ al., op. cit., pp. 3203-3205. 
28 Smeets, in Manning, et al., op. cit., pp. 3321-3324; 
see also H. Kijne, GeschiedëniS-Van de Nederlandse studenten-
beweging (Amsterdam, 1978). 
29 NRC 8 June 1977. 
-' 
30 C. Boef, "Wetenschap, VARA en nog wat," Socialisme 
4\ 
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One could argue, therefore, that Catholics, Calvinists 
and Socialists have finally achieved equality and emancipa-
31 tion in Dutch society. Surveys show a trend away from 
reformism.in public opinion af ter 1973. 32 Perhaps proletarian 
as weIl as traditional petty bourgeois subcultures have been 
replaced, to some extent, by a more liberal and hedonistic, 
but essentially bourgeois culture or ideology. This inter-
pretation would fit in with the observations made above con-
cerning the growth of the Liberal party and liberal mass 
media as weIl as multinational corporations. On the other 
hand, fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie and the working 
class have been radicalized in action groups and trade unions, 
as weIl as in political parties of the Left. The religious 
pillars have partly broken down, and the historical compromise 
between their petty bourgeois segments and the bourgeoisie 
has lost most of its impact. It remains to be seen whether 
the new petty bourgeoisie that has almost replaced the tradi-
tional one will make a new compromise with the bourgeoisie 
or, perhaps, ally itself with the proletariat. The latter 
may occur, as I will argue below, through the New Left parties 
which find a social base in the new petty bourgeoisie. 
en Democratie (1976): 370-382. 
3lDaalder, op. cit., p. 47. 
32Inglehart, op. cit., pp. 455 ff; see also, NRC, 
2 April 1977; for another interpretation, see B. Tromp, 
"Restauratie, de mythe van de jaren zeventig," Vrij Nederland, 
24 December 1977. 
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~,hout ie::; ct:;l)lc rC~i·t;.lrc:::;. 
Leen ,) rcl,:tively dec,,;ntraliseci u;1itéH'Y :c;tdte anll <I con::>titutionul 
rnonarchy. Accordin
c
; to th(:; consti tution, the Illonarch sharecl 
the leé~isL:,tive authority vvi th parliélment anel :liJ1-'ointeJ .'1 
cu.1Jlnel: or _~ovccrllllent "aL hi~;/h~r l-JleaGure". dy 137~)t llo\lèver, 
the ,'1overnment. Henceforth, most governments consisted of 
Ininisters who enjoyeu the ::>upport of 2_ 1.Jar1i&I,lentaY'Y l.lé:jori ty. 
P"rliru(lcnt con::;iGted of tvJO houseL:, or chamlJer;.;; the 
First ChRlilt-er or Senate \'Jas elected by th3 St8 te::> or councils 
of the eleven provincès that ma~<e up the Nether1clnàs, while 
thc SecOIld ChamlJer \lU::::, elected clirect1y by the electorate. 
Thc ~econd Cjl::l1l11)(~r, \:lüch hUll r:101'C lJoV!cr::> tllé.1n the /i1'st Ché<J.lber, 
\-l3.S e1ected by univcrsill suffrat;e and prol-ortion2,1 represent::.Ltlon 
since 19l7. lts Iner:ll)ers relJresenteu a wide siJectrUlil of poli tica] 
parties , run;i,inF'; frOtil thc extrcruc ri 6 ht to tbe extreillc left. 
ïlue to th\'! ~~l(:ctor:d ~ystell, of proi-'ortional represcnt;::tion 
an~ ths a~sence of an electoral threshold any Jroup or list 
of cuncliclates that ~~otl1ered il IilÎnimuill of .:ltJout 50,000 votes 
(to te 1I10r(~ prccis(~: 2/:3 of 1/150tll of ths electuratl.J) woulJ 
sain Ft Geat in the SCjcond ChC::lIllber. The extreme Ri~ht consisted 
of 81né111 but :stable fundamentalist Calvinist partics [lnd smal 1 
but 18ss stabIe secul!:,r )Jarties tllat coulà L,e uescri'Jed as 
'right win~ pOlJulist' or even fascist. Host iraport:mt were 
the Illodera te confc,~;3ionnl parties of the IU,)1t, of ',;}üch th(~ 
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Catho1ic Party was the 1ar~eGt. TOLcther \1Ï th two Protei3tilnt 
parties, thc Anti-R2volutionary Party anti the Christial1 
Historical Union, the Ca tho 1ic Party Jorllina teu ;dLJO~ ti' 11 
dovernments between ]917 and 1973. 
rare1y uni teel in one 1,arty but v/ere uSUél11y clivided into 
risht win,; ;tnd 10ft win~ ~roui<;, olle of vlhich llli~llt GnLer 
uovernlilC1YC \:l1i10 the other iIOulcJ occui.Jy SOlll8 of the OPl,o~i tion 
hench8~3. !\hout tho Left, enoLlsll has been Siiid in the precedin,; 
"i 
2.2 The Revolutionary Socialist New Left: the Pacifist 
Socialist Party 
94 
Af ter 1945, several groups sprang up to the left of the 
Labour Party that could claim to continue the Revolutionary 
Socialist tradition in the Netherlands. All but one failed 
to build a stabIe party organization or to win at least one 
se at in parliament; therefore this section deals with only 
one party. 
The Pacifist Socialist Party was founded in 1957 by 
a group of pacifists and leftist socialists who had gone 
through several other attempts to build a party and even 
tried to operate within the Labour Party on the condition 
that they would have one member in parliament. VJhen the 
Labour Party turned them down, they continued alone. Of its 
founding members, 20% came from ~ !:.!! Vrede (Church and 
Peace) a Protestant pacifist group, 15% from De Derde V/eA 
(The Third Way), a group of intellectuals opposed to the Cold 
War and nuclear arms, 25% had been members of the Labour 
Party, 5% of the Communist Party, 12% of thc pre-war Christian 
Socialists, 4% of the Liberal Democratie League--also an 
antimilitarist party before 1940--and 25% of various post-
war parties left of the Labour Party.33 A large number 
. 
belonged to the Dutch Reformed Church (29%) but dissenters of 
all kinds--Quakers, Theosophists, Free Masons, World Federal-
ists, Esperantists, Vegetarians--were weIl represented; only 
33Van der Land, op. cit., Chapter 2 and 6; categories 
overlap. 
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Catholics failed to join at all. Almost half of the founding 
members were intellectuals or professionals, particularly 
teachers and ministers; 21% were clerical workers and only 
34 9% manual workers. 
At its first congress the party adopted a rather short 
programme and declaration of principles, concentrated on 
three basic issues: disarmament, economic democracy and 
spiritual renewal. International and national disarmament, 
if necessary on a unilateral basis, received priority both 
in the pro~ramme and the name of the party, as weIl as in 
the columns of the party journal Bevrijding (Liberation). 
The second issue, industrial or economic democracy, was of ten 
discussed by the first party chairman, Van Steenis, who saw 
his own cooperative engineering bureau as a model for the 
future; however, it remained a little vague in the party 
programme • The last statement applies also to the third 
plank of the programme , a " spiri tual renewal" of moral values 
and ways of thinking, to replace materialism, embourgeoisement 
and competitiveness by love, cooperation and free personal 
development. The only concrete proposal here refers to a 
national broadcasting system that should help to break down 
pillarization. 35 Yet the third issue was considered very 
important, particularly by Van Steenis who wrote: "the 
revolution we preach is an inward rather than an outward 
34Ibid • (on paper there was one Catholic; however he had 
previously been a Communist and (theosophist) Free Catholic). 
35Bevrijding, 20 February 1957. 









revolution ••• a revolution of the spirit." Rejecting 
both capitalism and comrnunism, he defined his party as "not 
on the Left 
between • ,,37 
not on the Right ••• but certainly not in 
No wonder most commentators predicted that the party 
was going nowhere. Schaper, an historian and member of the 
Labour Party, compared it to a cornet that drew a lot of 
38 
attention but would disappear quickly. De Kadt, also a 
member of the Labour Party and a former Revolutionary 
Socialist, passed a more severe judgment on the new party: 
"nothing but a substitute Communist Party with an atomie 
(bomb) touch ••• to be regarded as a case of political 
pathology.,,39 The hostile reaction of Social Democrats 
towards the PSP can be explained partly in terms of the votes 
that the Labour Party lost to its leftist rival, beginning 
with provincial elections in 1958 when the PSP campaigned 
for "Socialism without the Atom bomb"; even worse, voters 
who switched from PvdA to PSP appeared to be young civil 
servants and employees, i.e. categories in which the 
40 PvdA (Labour Party) showed particular interest. Other 
36Ibid ., my translation of "De revolutie die wij prediken is 
meer een innerlijke dan een uiterlijke·revolutie ••• een 
revolutie van de geest." 
37 Ibid., in Dutch "We zij niet links, we zij niet rechts, 
maar we zijn er zeker niet tussen in." 
38 B. Schaper, "De PSP, planeet of staartster?," Socialisme 
en Democratie (1958): 366-373. 
39 J. De Kadt, "Na de nederlaag," Socialisme en Democratie 
(1958): 431 ff. 






parties were hardly less hostile, even if they did not ignore 
the newcomer completely. A Catholic newspaper called the 
PSP "another invasion route for the Kremlin", and an Anti-
Revolutionary paper described i t as "a Trojan horse ••• 
41 threatening Western culture and freedom." A mernber of the 
Communist Party on the other hand accused the PSP of being 
"part of the great conspiracy of imperialists against peace" 
and a "bourgeois obstacle in the labour movement," "petty 
bourgeois" '~arliamentarist" and anti-communist, thoUgh in a 
more subtIe Vlay than the PvdA. 42 
The Pacifist Socialists replied in kind to their cri tics. 
They advertised Pacifist Socialism as an alternative to 
Communism and denounced the lack of democracy wi thin the CPN 
and wi thin Russia. 43 They mocked the PvàA as "a confessional 
party for non-believers," a "party of yesterday" and "a 
government party at rest rather thnn an opposition party" 
af ter i t had left the eovernment. f.1oreover the Labour Party 
leadership was cri ticized for i ts betrayal of socialist and 
internationalist principles and for its authoritarian action 
both within the party and in government. In criticizing the 
latter, the Pacifist Socialists agreed to some extent with 
PP. 510-535; also R. Leijser, Socialisme zonder Atoombom (Bussum, 
1976), pp. 23-24. 
41De Tijd, quoted by Van der Land, op. cit., p. 53; 
Trouw, 12 February 1960. 
42 
R. Haks, "Vier jaar praktijk van de PSP," Politiek en 
Cultuur (1961): 108-119 and 173-182. 








the Liberals who never ceased to attack "dirit:,isme," the 
44 bureaucratie intervention of the state in society. The 
two parties also shared a rather critica1 attitude towards 
corporatist institutions and codetermination as favored by 
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both Confessional and Social Democratie parties and unions. 
Of course they criticized these institutions for different 
reasons: the Liberals for their restrietions on free enter-
prise, the Pacifist Socialists for their lack of democracy 
and grass root participation. 45 At times the PSP went beyond 
verbal criticism and took action in support of wild cat 
strikes and unofficia1 unions 1ike the syndicalist Confedera-
tion of Independent Industria1 Organizations (OVB): as, for 
example, when fisherrnen near The Hague rejected a union 
contract and went on strike, the PSP col1ected money for 
their strike fund, whi1e the official unions tried to break 
the strike. 46 
That kind of action occurred rare1y, however, in the 
ear1y years of the party's hi~tory. Demonstrations against 
the atom bomb and against Dutch militaryaction in New Guinea--
c1aimed and infiltrated by Indonesia in the 1950s and fina11y 
surrendered in 1962--were more common but rather modest in 
47 terms of numbers. Af ter 1962 (a1so the year of the Cuba 
44 Bevrijding,March 1958; April 1958; January 1961; etc. 
45 Bevrijding, 6 March 1959, 17 September 1959, etc; 
however the PSP was more critica1 than the Liberal Party. 
46BeVrijdin~, 25 January 1964; see also Leijser, op. 
cit., p. 28. 
47 Bevrijding, 12 August 1960 and 20 January 1961. 
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crisis and detente af terwards) , attention began to shift 
away from pacifist issues towards socio-economie and domestic 
issues. Artieles in the party journal Bevrijding, sold in 
the streets at 10,000 or even 15,000 copies, reflect this 
trend. 48 From a "pressure JroulJ for peace" (Van der Land) 
or a "disinfection centre al;ainst mili tarist thinkin<~" (Van 
Steenis) the PSP had erown into a full-fled~ed political party 
w1th almost 4000 members and four seats in par1iament by 1963. 49 
When the Socialist Workers Party and the Social Democratie 
Centre in the Labour Party were disso1ved (in 1965 and 1959 
respective1y), most of their members seem to have joined the 
PSp.50 At the same time some pacifist members 1eft the party, 
which had in their eyes fa11en prey to "dogma tic socia1ism" 
and "anti-Americanism." 
Thus the continuity between the Revolutionary Socialist 
Old Left and the PSP became more obvious in the 1960s. Yet 
other traditions, particu1arly Anarchism and Socia1 Democracy, 
48Bevrijding counted 48 pages in 1957, i.e. 4 pages per 
issue; roughly 9 pages were devoted to prob1ems of peace and 
war, 8 to other international questions, 8 to socio-economie 
issues nnd 2 to other domestic affairs. In 1964 Bevrijding 
counterl 200 pnLes, i.e. 8 pages per issue; roughly 40 pages 
(20%) were devoted to problems of peace and war, 55 (27%) 
to other international issues, 45 (23%) to socio-economie 
ones, 20 (10%) to other domestic affairs. 
49 Van der Land, op. cit., pp. 128 fr; see also Van 
Steenis, in Bevrijding, June 1957. 
SO On the Socialist Workers Party, see Chapter 1, section 2 
abOve; on' the Social Democratie Cèntre in the Labour Party, 
aee Chapter 1, section 4 above. 
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51 
continued to inspire the party as weIl. According to a 
survey held in 1963, the party membership had become more 
secular and more pro1etarian since 1957. In 1963, more than 
60% of the m~mbers did not be10ng to a Protestant or Catholic 
church, compared to 56% in 1957. Also in 1963, 24% of the 
membcrs were manua1 workers, 15% c1erical \'Iorkers, and 26% 
intellectua1 workers or professionals; in 1957 these numbers 
52 
werc 9%, 21% and 46% respective1y. As an intcresting detail, 
the first two party chairmen, as weIl as the two members of 
parl1ament elected in 1959 were Protestants; t ... IO of the four 
had studied theology. In 1963, the two theo10gians had been 
Succeeded by more secu1ar peop1e. 
Before 1963 the party had been far from homogeneous, but 
Christian Socia1ists and Pacifists, Socia1 Democrats and 
Hevo1utionary Socia1ists had res~ccted a certain division of 
labour in the party, a110wing the Pacifists to wri te and talk 
about war and peace, whi1e Socia1ists with a Marxist back~round 
53 
wou1d ana1yze and comrnent on wages and ~rices. Even then 
there had been a few debates, e.g. about the c1ass stru~gle, 
which one 1eading member (a former Social Democrat) considered 
outdated, and another one (a Christian Socialist) inevitab1e; 
or about vio1ence and revo1ution in the Third Vlorld; however, 
51 Van der Land, op. cit., Cha~ter 6; Cornelissen in 
Vrij Nederland, 27 October 1962; other traditions wi11 be 
discussed later. 
52 pSP Hoe en \'Iat (Amsterdam, n.d.), p. 7. 
53 My impression from reading Bevrijding, confirmed in 
interview 3. 
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significant debates about theory or strategy were rare in that 
. 54 perlod. Between 1963 and 1967 the party continued to grow, 
reachin~ a peak of 300,000 votes (5%) at the provincia1 
elections of 1966; membership never exceeded 5,500, but turn-
over seemed quite high. This period of relative consolidation 
marked the beginning of internal party de bate and conflict. 55 
Debates were usually of a low theoretical level--due to 
a lack of political education of the members, as party leaders 
later admitted--and positions rarely crystallized into 
tendencies or factions. Only the Trotskyites, who had usua11y 
come to the party through the Social Democratic Centre, 
started organizing a faction around 1966 which later took 
the name "Proletarian Left" (Proletarisch Links). Confronta-
tion with this faction forced the rest of the party to elaborate 
alternative ideas and strategies in the late 1960s, so that 
by 1969 one could distinguish rough1y three tendencies within 
the party: 
(I) The Proletarian Left, hoping to turn the PSP into 
a Revolutionary Socialist Workers Party of class-conscious 
cadres spearheading and coordinating the class struggle in 
factor1es and elsewhere, which the Trotsky1 tes feIt was going 
to reach a revolutionary stage, poss1bly very quickly. As 
a first step the party should give priority to socio-economic 
questions like workers control and price inflation rather than 
54B . 'di A il d IN 19 7 21 J 196 t evrlJ ng, pr an ~ay 5; une 3, e c. 











56 to war and peace. Furthermore, the party should contact 
other revolutionary groups like the Fourth International, 
Maoists and independent Socialists in order to build the 
Revolutionary Socialist Workers Party. 
(11) A "structural reformist" tendency, dominated to 
some extent--particularly af ter 1~70--by Narxists who had 
come to the PSP throu:ih the Socialist Workers Party, or who 
agreed with the former but had joined the PSP af ter 1965, 
but also joined by many Pacifists. Observing the renewal of 
the Labour Party and the emergence of Christian Radicals and 
Democrats '66, they advocated a Progressive Alliance of the 
PSP with these parties in order to achieve structural reforms 
like central investment planning and nationalizations, as 
well as industrial democracy. The PSP would act as a pacifist 
and socialist pressure group within the Progressive Alliance, 
57 
and possibly as a bridge between it and the Communist Party. 
(lIl) A rather heterogeneous tendency, identified at 
times with the New Left, insisting on the independence of 
the PSP and on involvement in extra-parliamentary action 
rather than reformism, but opposed to the "economism" and 
"Leninism" of Proletarian Left; i t uni ted old-time Pacifists, Revo-
lutionary Socialists, and anti-authori tarian Socialists or Anarchists 
of old and New (Provo) varieties; they of ten defined the PSP 
56 \Vhen this debate started, the PSP devoted most atten-
tion to the Vietnam War and the monarchy-question in the 
Netherlands: about 15% and 19% respectively of Bevrijding, 
1966. 














as a "conscience party" representing the loni;;-term interests 
of humani ty rather than the short-term or material interests 
58 
of (manual) workers only. Wi th i ts emphasis on se1f-
management, direct action and cu1tural issues, it fully 
deserved the label "New Left" as defined above; whereas the 
tendencies land 11 also called for self-management but showed 
less interest in direct action and cultural revolution. 
'l'he history of the PSP fro/ll 1867 to 1977 is largely the 
history of conflicts between these three tendencies. Though 
the "structural reformist" tendency (11) prevailed in the 
executive committee from 1867 to 1973, none of the tendencies 
won a clear majority during that periode The open and relatively 
democratie structure of the PSP allowed all three to pursue 
their own strategies almost independently; local and regional 
branches enjoyed substantial autonomy of action, and could 
check the executive committee through Party Congress as weIl 
as Party Council, a kind of parliament elected by the regional 
branches. 59 
The revolutionary tendency Proletarian Left, which 
controlled the important Amsterdam branch of 750 members, 
initiated some actions like information and 1egal aid for 
58Bevrijding,26 September 1964 (Engels), 10 October 1964; 
Radikaal, 22 May 1968; N.B. since 1966 the party journal 
has been called Radikaal (Radical). 
59 Cf. Lipschits, "De organisatorische structuur der 









tenants in conflict with their landlords. 60 In 1969, its 
adherents organized an open conference to discuss a revolu-
tionary socialist alliance with other Trotskyites, Maoists 
and the like. The conference, financed by the PSP, produced 
a Tentative Programme based on a Marxist analysis of monopoly 
capitalism, and including a list of demands that appeared 
incompatible with capitalism but that would raise anti-
capita1ist consciousness;61 but it produced no unity among 
the Left. Proletarian Left also controlled the Socio-
Economic Commission of the PSP which organized meetings anti 
conferences with radical trade unionists, but it failed to 
62 
strike roots in the labour movement at large. 
In 1968, the Executive Committee, dominated by "structural 
reformists" of tendency 11, opened negotiations wi th the 
three progressive parties PvdA, PPR, anti D 166, on the basis 
of a platform approved by the party congress the year before. 
The negotiations broke down af ter several months, mainly 
because of disagreement about NATO and about electoral 
reforms--which the PSP opposed out of fear for its existence 
but which D' 66 considered the main purpose of i ts existence 












60 I Radikaal, 8 Hay 1968; the initiative was taken by Schilp, I 
a former member of the Revolutionary Socialist Workers Party. 
61Congres Links Nederland (Nijmegen, 1969): cf. Radikaal, 
15 May 1969. 
62Radikaal, 14 May 1970, 18 September 1969; initially 
the body was cal led the "Socialism and Trade Union Commission" 
(Commissie Socialisme ~ Vakbeweging). 
105 
voted against further participation in the negotiations, 
63 
which were to continue until 1972. That vote did not stop 
the "structural reformists" from concluding local and regional 
alliances with other progressive parties, in particular for 
the 1970 provincial and municipal elections. The results of 
this rather confused situation, where the PSP joined a pro-
gressive alliance list in four (northern and eastern) provinces 
and presented its own list in most others, proved disastrous 
tor the party as a whoIe: it lost more than half the votes 
it had gathered in 1966, mostly to PvdA, 0'66 and CPN. 64 
Thus by 1970 the strategies of both the Proletarian 
Lett and the "structural reformists" had been triedand proven 
ineffective, at least in the eyes of the PSP majority. Now 
the "new left" tendency (111) gained influence and tried to 
engage the party in massive direct action. One of its 
adherents, a Quaker and philosophy teacher, had set up a 
Vietnam Action Group in 1967 which no longer respected all 
the legal restrictions on demonstrations concerning slogans, 
itinerary and permits, and cooperated with the Provos. His 
actions caused some controversy in the }Jarty which had 
al ready lent support to a more moderate Vietnam Committee 
led by a former Communist resistance leader an~ PSP member. 
63Radikaal, 4 September 1969; the University of Amsterdam 
occupation, supported by the PSP but criticized oy PvdA, 
D'66 and PPR, was mentioned as the immediate cause, but it 
seems to me that the other two factors }Jlayed a more impor-
tant role in the long run. 
64psp lists received only 1.6% of the vote; Radikaal, 








The latter decided to withdraw from the party and to keep the 
Vietnam Committee free from partisan positions; it soon 
mobi1ized 10,000 peop1e, inc1uding Anti-Revolutionary and 
65 Catholic Party ll1embers, in the streets of Am::>terdam. The 
leader of the Action Group however was e1ected to the First 
Ch~ber (Senate)GG and continued to drawattention by actions 
l1ke presenting a toy tank to the l.Jinister of Defense during 
67 
a par1iamentary debate. He resigned in 1~G~ out of dis-
appointment with the par1iamentary system, thus inviting a 
'b 'd D 1 N' h' 68 compar1sonetween h1m anome a 1euwen U1S. Anti-
par1iamentarism became popu1ar in 1~G~ and 1~70, not on1y 
in the PSP but also among action droups and student organisa-
tions. When a student group in Amsterdam occupied the Uni-
versity Administration building, on1y the P~P anti CPN supported 
their action for more student power. Both parties gained 
69 inf1uence and members allloni; students. The new party members 
in turn involved the party in more direct actions, for example, 
65 Radikaal, 24 April 1967, 11 May 1~67, 25 May 1967; 
E1seviers Weekblad, 1 Ju1y 1967. 
66 The First Chamber, e1ected by the provincia1 1egisla-
tures, has lost most powers to the directly elected Second 
Charnber and can only postpane or veto 1egislation. 
67 Radikaal, 20 September 1969. 
68 Nederlands Dagblad, 20 January 1969; Haagsche Courant, 
24 June 1969; on Dome1a Nieuwenhuis see section 1.2 above. 
69 According to Kortelink's survey, 13% of the students 
voted PSP in 1970; in Amsterdam 16%, Tilburg (Catholic) 41% 
Radikaal, 26 November 1970. In both universities students 
occupied buildings in 1969. 
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against pOllution around Amsterdam. 
In 1970 the PSP mounted its first (and last) mass cam-
paign of actions against the military apparatus, Krak'et 
70 (Break it (down» with the help of Kabouters. By demon-
strat1ng in front of mi li tary camps and barracks, the party, 
or rather the paticipating branches and action groups, hoped 
to ra1se the consc1ousness of conscr1pted soldiers and to 
break down the apparatus in four years. The campa1gn proved 
rather ineffective, apart from causing a panic among Veteran 
Leg10ns and r1ghtwing newspapers--the former aSking the govern-
ment to ban the PSP, the latter wr1 t1ng about "AL Fatah 
methods" and "East German agents." Only the educational work 
of the League of Conscripts inside the army may have had some 
impact in the long run, contribut1ng to an 1mprovement of the 
1egal and financial conditions of the conscripts; the PSP 
rnaintained close relations wi th this League, which operated 
as a secret organization (of about 600 members) within the 
more moderate and legal Union of Conscripted M111tary.71 
By 1971 none of the three tendenc1es appeared part1cularly 
successfu1, a1though the success of the extra-par1iamentary 
strategy wou1d be more diff1cult to eva1uate g1ven its vague 
i a1ms 1ike ra1s1ng consc1ousness. The e1ectoral platform } 
70 Radikaal, 17 September 1970, 1 October 1970; about 
Kabouters see section 2.3 below. 
71 Parool, 11 September 1970; Telegraaf, 3 October 1970; 
De Groene Amsterdammer, 10 October 1970; the Un10n of Cons-
cr1pted M1litary, (VVDM) organ1zed 34,000 conscripts, i.e. 






looked like a compromise between them, defining the party 
as a vanguard, articulating and coordinating extra-parliamentary 
action, and strivin~ for structural reforms through parlia-
ment, notably more power for V/orks Counci Is, non-violent 
defence, and a more democratie European Community. The 
platform also expressed support for action groups like 
Kabouters, Feminists, and the Working Party for a Critical 
'7' ) Trade Union iIovernent. '- The" struc tural reformi sts" of tendency 
II were not very happy vrL th the last point, fearing tha t lIlany 
action groups alienated the masscs of the working c1ass and 
detracted from uni ty aloong the Left, \'Ihi Ie mobilizini~ more 
elements in the petty bourgeoisie on superstructural issues. 73 
They had doubts about the New Left style campai~n of the party 
as weIl, particularly about a poster picturing a naked girl 
in a meadow wi th a cow in the background enti tled "PSP: 
d1sarming" (PSP Ontwapenend). 74 
Their doubts were confirmed by the election results. 
Aga1n the PSP went down, from 2.9% (1967) to 1.4% of the 
popu1ar vote. However, it increased its vote in Amsterdam, 
Tilburg and Nijmegen--three universi ty tm'ffis, the first two 
strongho1c.J.s of Proletarian Left, the latter a strongho ld of 
the "structura1 reformists." The Ti 1burg branch was 4uick 
to point this out and to recommend i ts (I,iaoist) "mass line" 
72 PSP Werkpro6ram 1971-75; cf. Radikaal, 12 November 
1970, 17 December 1970. 
73 E•G., Hadikaal, 4 AU1;USt 1972 (Aa1ders). 







75 to the whole party. 
109 
Proletarian Left went onto the offensive now, sending 
copies of a memorandum "Back to political reality, forward 
to Socialism" to party cadres, and opening an angry debate 
in the party journal and in party meetings. It even resulted 
in fist fights in Rotterdam where PL almost controlled the 
76 party branch. The group hoped to be recognized as a 
tendency, but found itself bitterly attacked by both "struc-
tural reformists" anti "ncw leftists" to~cther. At the end of 
1971 it was expelled from the party. When its expulsion by 
the Executive Committee was challenged in the Party Council, 
members of ~roletarian Left were allowed to return if they 
dissociated themselves from the group; many of them did, and 
only 50 or so went on to found the International Communist 
League (Internationale Kommunisten ~) which affiliated 
later with the Fourth International. 77 
The disappe'arance of Proletarian Left did li ttle to 
abate the internal conflicts within the PSP. The Executive 
Committee, still dominated by "structural reformists," had 
produced an "Analysis and POlicy Plan" in 1971 (mainly in 
response to the Proletarian Left memorandum) which implied él 
pro~ressive alliance with the Labour Party in the long run--
75Radikaul, 27 Mny 1971; PL was Jiviaod between Trotskyites 
anti rvlaoists by thi s time, thou,.;h few we re ;J.';I:lre of ü 11 tlîe 
differences. 
76 Haagse Post, 23 November 1~74. 
77 
Radikaal, ;>0 Jnnuary 1~l72; NHC, ?2 Noveli!ljCr 1Y71, 
13 December lY71. 
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though it also sawa role for the PSP in articulating and 
coordinating extra-parliamentary actions "except for petty 
78 bourgeois purposes ." Party congress approved of the plan, 
but the more extreme adherents of tendency 111, concentrated 
in The Hague, rejected any suggestion of an alliance with the 
"neo-liberal" PvdA. 79 The Executive Committee went ahead 
anyway, and came to limited agreement with PvdA, PPR and 
0'66 in 1972; in exchange for permanent consultation, it 
promised support for a progressive government of the latter, 
except in matters of NATO, defence and electoral reforms. 8O 
Agreement between PSP and PPR went further, but did not lead 
to formal changes, in spite of some suggestions for a merger. 
Congress approved these agreements, but compensated the oppo-
sition by electing one of its adherents, Van der Lek, leader 
of the list of parliamentary candidates, instead of Wiebenga, 
former party chairman and "structural reformist" (thou~h not 
a Marxist); a referendum among the members confirmed the 
choice of congress. 82 
In spite of the sudden change in leadership, the PSP 
81 
78pSp , Analyse en Beleidsplan, (2nd ed. (Amsterdam, 1976). 
79 Radikaal, 14 October 1~71. 
80Radikaal, 24 November 1972; Volkskrant, 10 November 
1972. 
81 Radikaal, 23 June 1~72. 
82' Radikaal, 29 September 1972; Volkskrant 28 September 
1972; the lisr-leader, i.e. number 1 on the ballot, generally 











did not 10se any more votes in the 1972 elections. 1t 
received 1.5% of the popular votc, enough for two seats a~ain. 
Both seats \\Tere now occupied by "new leftists" who saw thelJl-
selves as spokesmen for action groups as weIl as "watchdolSs" 
B3 for a progressive ~overnment. At the party congress of 
1973, the "new leftists" completed their capture of the party 
by electing one of their own as party chairman, again defeatinf~ 
Wiebenga, the candidate proposed by the Executive Comrni ttee. 
Moreover they rejected the socio-economie orientation of the 
old Executive Committee towarels mass orsanisations--particularly 
towards NVV unions rather than action groulJs and unofficial 
uni ons like the syndicalist OVD. Even worse, the most out-
Spoken advocate of ;:;truc tural re forlili:..;rn ;md pro)~ressi ve 
alliances in the Exee utive COfiUlli ttee, Zanen, was voted out 
of office, anJ reJ:;L!ced by 0. former l-'roletarian Leftist wi th 
Maoist leanings. Now tendency 11 formed the party opposition; 
even the "structural reformist" editor-in-ehief of Hadikaal, 
the party journal resi~ned in protest, and was replaced by 
a "new leftist. ,,84 
The two tendencies clashed on every possible occasion 
anti issue--foreign pOliey, economie policy, housing, environ-
ment, parliamentary strategy--in the partyjournal and at 
meetings such as the thematic conferences organized by the 
83Radikaal. 8 December 1972, 12 January 1973. 
. 
84nadikaal, 23 March 1973; the former, Gortzak, was a 
farmer Communist resistance leader, the latter, Branderhorst, 












Executive Committee in 1973 and 1974. A few pacifists or 
moderates left the party when it spoke out in favour of the 
85 Arab 011 embargo aga1nst the Netherlands. At another con-
gress late in 1973 the vast majority of the party approved 
of cond1tional support for the Den Uyl government of the PvdA, 
D'66, PPR and Christian Democrats and of cooperation with 
the first three parties "provided its goals and content make 
1t poss1ble to estab11sh counter-power at the base in order 
86 to realize effective structural reforms in a socialist aense." 
The "structural reformists" had tried to replace the word 
"provided" by "in order to," but suffered another defeat. 87 
They maintained their influence in the northern and 
eastern branches of the party, where they cou1d campaign in 
the provincial and municipa1 elections of 1974 for unity of 
the Left and for socio-economie reforms. In other parts of 
the country, environmental and cultural issues--"no more 
highways," "for a more playful way of life," "biological 
88 farming"--played a more important role. The PSP lost 8 of 
12 provincial sea ts (recei ving 1. 3% of the vote). arnong them 
85 Radikaal, 7 December 1973; Volkskrant,29 November 1973. 
86nadikaa1, 7 DecemLer 1973; the Dutch text was: "mits 
de doelstellingen en de inhoud van de samenwerking mo~elijk­
heden openen tot het vestigen van macht aan de basis, teneinde 
effektieve struktuurveranderingen in socilistische zin te 
kunnen doorvoeren." 
87In Dutch: "mits" by "teneinde"; the "structura1 
reformist" motion received 30~~ of the votes at the con6ress. 





all the seats held by "structural reformists." The editor 
of Radikaal interpreted this as another confirmation of the 
"new left" line. 89 
On the other hand progressive alliances appeared 
fairly successful in Amsterdam and other municipalities. In 
Amsterdam a left front of CPN, PvdA, PPR and PSP had \'Ion a 
clear majority, and formed a municipal government in which 
Riethof,a former student activist with Trotskyite sympathies, 
but now vice-chairman of the PSP, became alderman (wethouder) 
90 for art and urban trans~ort. New Leftists like Van der Lek, 
the parliamentary party leader, expressed strong reservations 
about Riethof's step, maintaining that: 
a revolutionary party in a capitalist society like 
the PSP does not take part in parliaments, provincial 
or municipal councils to exercise power primarily ••• 
but to show where power lies. 9l 
Tensions within the party reached a climax in November 
1974. When the Amsterdam city council had to vote on the 
construction of a subway line through an old and popular 
neighbourhood (Nieuwmarkt ), Riethof voted wi th CPN, the PvdA 
rightwing, and the parties of the Hight in favour, although 
92 his party had campaigned with the Slogan "Stop the subway!". 
89 Radikaal, 3 April 1974. 
90 Radikaal, 22 Nay 1974; aldermen retain their seats on 
city council. 
9lRadikaal, 1 Harch 1974; in Dutch: "een revolutionaire 
partij als de PSP zit in een kapitalistische maatschappij niet 
in de eerste plaats in dat parlement en de raden en staten om 
macht uit te oefenen ••• maar om aan te tonen waar de macht 
eigenlijk zit ...... 























The other PSP member in city council, the 1eft-wing of the 
PvdA and the PPR were out-voted. Riots broke out in the 
neighbourhood concerned the same night; a few months later a 
bomb was planted in the sUbway tunnel under construction. 
Reithof resigned from the city ~overnment anà was even recalled 
93 from the city council by his party branch. 
Heanwhile the "structural reformists," now more or less 
organised as a faction, and accused of being "power-hunbry 
Moscow-oriented Social Democrats" and "Stalinist infiltrators," 
met 1n a northern village and decided to leave the party. 
When their motion "aL~ainst the administrative chaos and 
moral derailment of the Executive Comrnittee" was rejected at 
the next party congress, their spokesman (and former party 
chairman) announced his departure. Immediately "new 1eftists" 
started sin~ing the "International" while one of them , a 
lJol1ce inspector, shouted "Away ''Ii th the Reaction! ,,94 Never-
theless the Executive Committee proposed to continue "critical 
cooperation" wi th the proGressive ,;overnment parties anà to 
regard the PSP as part of the Dutch labour movement--both 
rather "structural reformist" positions. It also proposed 
to devote more attention to political education, and to 
restrict internal debates to a members' bulletin; until then 
they had taken place in the journal Radikaal, which the party 
93 Volkskrant, 27 February 1975, 10 March 1975; Radikaal, 
12 March 1975. 
94 Radikaal, 25 Noveml>er 1974; Haagse Post, 30 November 
1974; Interview 1. 
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sold to bookstores and members alike, requiring more and more 
space as years went by.Y5 Not all "structural reformists" 
left the party, possibly less than 100, but the ones who left 
had been active party cadres whose sudden departure caused 
96 disarray in several branches. 
The party recovered slowly, counting 5000 members again 
by 1977. Host new members were very young, inexperienced 
though weIl educated, and earning low incomes--as the party 
treasurer noticed with dismay, since contributions varied with 
income. Therefore the party had to reduce its full-time 
staff, close its publishing house, and also its scientific 
bureau which had produced a theoretical journal, Socialistisch 
Perspektief, since 1972. The rejuvenation of the party 
rank and file affected also the Executive Committee which 
counted 11 (out of 15) members aged 30 years or less in 1975. 97 
Though rejuvenated and radicalized, the party seemed to 
return to its roots as weIl, giving more attention a6ain to 
que5tions of ''lar and peace instead of wages and prices, as 
weIl as to social and cultural issues characteristic of the 
98 19705 like nuclear energy, ecology and feminisme Foreign 
affairs had always attracted the attention of Pacifist 
95From 6% in 1967 to 21% in lY7l and 1973. 
96 Cf. Radikaal, 19 December 1974; Interviews 1 and 6. 
97 Radikaal, 27 December 1975. 
98 The changes are small, however, if one com~ares p~rty 
journa1s e.g. of 1971 and 1975: peace and war questions take 
up 8% and 9% respectively, socio-economic and domestic issues 
47% and 31%, international questions 15% and 37%, and cu1tural 






Socialists, but the models changed sliehtly. Around lY75, 
Portugal inspired them because of its experiments with workers 
99 
control and direct democracy. Non-violent forms of action 
and defence were studied again, though in a more political-
strategical than moralist context--i.e. as a way to build a 
socialist society 'from below' rather than to avoid evil. 
Pacifism was (re)defined as "the attempt to minimize violence; 
this attempt can be motivated by (moral) principles and/or 
practical motives." lOO More rigorous pacifists objected to 
this aLtitude but were defeated; subsequently they set up a 
\'/orking Party "A~~e<11" (Appel) which was allowed by the party 
majority to act as a ~ressure group within the party. 
The A~0eal group, to a larije ex tent older pacifists, 
presented an alternative platform for the 1977 general elec-
tions. \'Jhen i t was rejected by Party Congress wi th a large 
majority, many Appeal members left the party to set up a 
Work1ng Party for Ecology, Pac1f1sm and Socia11sm. 101 A 
mot1on for an electoral agreement w1th PvdA and PPR was also 
defeated, though w1 th a smaller major1 ty. Congress voted 
1nstead for a radical {Jlatform; for "a really socialist 
pOl1cy," demanding nationalizat1on of major industries under 
99 Radikaal, 2G March 1975, 19 July 1975. 
lOOIn Dutch: "-.:en streven naar minimalisering van 
:~we1d. Dit streven kan ~emotiveerd zijn door principiele 
enjof ~rakticse motieven"; Ue PSP over het vraagstuk van het 
]e\':elcl (Amsterdam, n.d.), p. 4. 
101 , ~cc Voll<sj,:r~nt, 24 January 1977 anti De Niem:e Linie, 
liJ ilay 1~7(); on thc \,'orkin.·, j):trt:y for Ecolo;y, P;ccifisrn and 
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workers control, abolition of the army, withdrawal from NATO 
and EEC, small-scale socialized agriculture, and democratie 
self-management for workers, students, teachers, artists, 
scientists, old aged peop1e--a "socialist council-republic, 
102 i.e. a republic Vii th direct dernocracy." Realisation of 
these demands would re quire a uni ted left front of all working-
class parties, as weIl as direct action from beloVl, for example 
at the shopfloor. In the ~~eneral elections of 1~77, the PSP 
went dovm frorn 1.4% to .9% of the popular vote, and lost one 
of its two seats in parliament. Yet in the same year the 
party membershilJ grew again; so the party could celebrate 
. _ 103 lts 20th birthday with some ga1ety. 
In 20 years the party had of ten changed leaders and 
platforms but preserved most of its principles, its structure 
and probably also its social base. International and national 
disarmament, economie democracy and spiritual renewal continued 
to be its principal goals, even if they were expressed in 
more rauical terms--"self-management" instead of "economie 
102JiIy English translation of the originally slightly more 
elaborate Dutch text: "Onze keuze voor een republiek is niet 
die voor een burgerlijke staat met een gekozen in plaats van 
een erfelijk staatshoofd, maar gericht op een socialistische 
radenrepubliek, het oude ideaal van uiteenlopende socialistische 
stromingen, van anarchistisch tot marxistisch. Daarin bestaat 
een direkte demokratie, die is samengesteld uit VOlksvergaderin-
gen van alle betrokkenen." PSP Aktieprogramma 1977-1981 
(Amsterdam, 1977), p. 9. The English translation is based on 
a shorter Dutch version, distributed during the 1977 election 
campaign. 
103personal observation, April 16, 1~77; by the end of 
1977 the party counted 6500 members (Hoe ziet de PSP eruit? 
(Amsterdam, n.d.), p. 12). 
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democracy," "fighting culture" instead of "spiritual renewal." 
With the intensification of the class struggle, Marxist or 
Neo-Marxist notions had gained popularity; and 50 had Anar-
chist notions of direct action. New issues had entered the 
political arena, of ten introduced by Pacifist Socialists: 
pollution control, feminism, nuclear energy. 
Party organisation had remained rather loose and de-
centr~lised. The 90 or so local branches of ten initiated 
actions independently of party headquarters. They would 
elect delegates to provincial and national congresses, which 
were held at least once a year. Since l~60 the provincial 
congresses would elect the Party Council (Partijraad) which 
acted as a kind of parliament, checkin~ the Executive Committee, 
arbitrating internal conflicts--not very rare within the PSP--
and drafting lists of candidates for parliament. The lists 
were to be discussed in congress, and approved or altered by 
the rank-and-file in a referendum. Party Congress would vote 
on general policies and party platforms, it would elect the 
Executive Committee and hear the member(s) of parliament. 
Membership of any (national, provincial or local) executive 
committee could not be combined with membership of elected 
bodies (parliament, provincial or municipal council) except 
under special circumstances. Contacts between the former and 
the latter group of party members were maintained by a con-
sultation committee. IvIembers of the executive committees 
also ma1ntained contacts with the various working parties and 
and action groups that operated at the national or local level 
j 
! 
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in areas like foreign affairs, environment and technology, 
feminism, homosexuality, housing and urban planning, socio-
economic issues. 104 
Though the party defined i ts ovm function in terms of 
political action and education, it also performed "latent 
functions" like providin[.> opportuni ties for socia1 intercourse 
and self-expression. The branch in The Hague, for instance, 
described its active core as "younG' competent, enthusiastic, 
easy to get on wi th and almost homo;eneous"; i t reported 
several political actions as well as street cabaret and 
t ' ith b t' 't 1 t' 't' 105 par les w ea mUS1C among 1 s annua ac lVl les. The 
Women Talk Groups and Men Talk Groups set up since 1973 
served functions like self-expression and personal communica-
ti 1 , 'tl lOG on even more exp lCl y. 
These 1nternal and "expressive" funct10ns may aistinguish 
the Pacifist Socialist Party from its Hevolutionary Socialist 
ancestors. Perhaps this difference could be related to the 
different social base of the PSP, which recruited most of its 
members from "new petty bourgeois" categories like teachers, 
students, professionals and from clerical workers, whereas 
l04Hoe ziet de PSP eruit? op. cit., pp. 12-18; see also 
I. L1pschi ts, "De organi sa torische structuur der Nederlandse 
politieke partijen," Acta Politica II:4 (l9G6-1~H)7): 265-29G. 
l05Radikaal, 12 January 1973; the Dutch text of the 
quotation: "jong, capabel, enthousiast, prettig in de omgang 
en vri jwel homo)~een." 
106See Radikaal, 24 November 1973, 1 February 1974; 









its predecessors seemed to have had more proletarian members. 
According to an internal discussion paper, 60% of the employed 
party members in the late 1970s were affiliated wi th unions 
107 
of teachers or civil servants. One might infer from elec-
tion surveys held between 1970 and 1972 that manual workers 
were better represented among Pacifist Socialist voters; in 
1971, for example, almost 1/3 of PSP voters in the sample 
were manual workers, but more than 1/3 were professionals and 
intellectuals. The numbers of PSP voters in these surveys 
were very small, but they followed a consistent trend. lOB 
Given its heterogeneous social base, the Pacifist 
Socialist Party could not be expected to ~ive as much at ten-
tion to working-class interests as its Revolutionary Socialist 
ancestors. It shared wi th the Hevolutionary Socialist ','!orkers 
Party or the Communist Workers Party a concern with self-
107"Demokratische machtsvorming voor het socialisme," in 
ün(s) genoegen 39 (10 August 1979): 130. 
108The Dutch Election Study 1970-1972 used a sample of 
1838 individuals, of which only 32 respondents reported a 
PSP vote in 1967 and 15 intended to vote PSP at the next elec-
tion; of the 15 possible voters 4 were industrial workers a~d 
4 clerical or service workers. For comparison; of 45 possible 
Communist voters, 26 were industrial workers (Data from the 
International Consortium for Political Research, Nr 7261). 
The National Election Study of 1971 used a sample of 2495 
respondents, of which 24 reported a PS!? vote; 8 of the 24 
were professional workers, 7 industrial (manual) workers, 
3 actministrative or sales (clerical workers. Of 39 CPN 
voters, 19 were industrial workers • 'l'he European Communi ty 
Study of Inglehart and Rabier shows an even higher proportion 
of intellectuals and professionals arnong PSP voters in 1970: 
43%; clerical and manual workers made up 18% and 7% respec-
tively. Again, the numbers are too small to draw any firm 
conclusions. 
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management, direct action, and cultural change, but it did 
not restriet these to workers. In this respect the PSP 
resembied Christian Leftist and some Anarchist groups--such 
as the League of Anarchist Socialists--which also attracted 
little proletarian support. With the same groups it shared 
its pacifist principles--especially in the late 1~50s and 
early 1960s--and its interest in moral questions. Only its 
dual strategy seemed relatively novel. l09 
Hhereas the Pacifist Socialist Party shared at least its 
busic aims with the Revolutionary Socialist groups of the 
1930s and before, it had very little in common with the 
Communist Party of the 1960s and 1970s. The Communist Party 
of the Netherlands had preserved its Marxist-Leninist prin-
ciples, its centralised orbanisation, and its ~roletarian tase, 
as weIl as i ts emphasis on short-term economie issues throu,~h-
110 
out these years. The party denounced the demand for workers ' 
self-management as "self-deception." It cal led for "democra-
tic rights" and a government of the Left, but (Ud not develop 
a dual strategy. It pleaded for democratie education and 
111 
culturul freedom but not for a new culture. Though the 
party did modify some of its ideas and demands, for instanee 
109For a more elaborate analysis of Pacifist Socialist 
ideas see below, Chapter 4, section 1. 
110 De Jonge, op. cit., pp. 148-16~; see also the platform 
Actie- en eisenpr04ram 25e Congres CPN juni 1975 (Amsterdam, 
1975). 
111Ibid .; for a Communist critique of self-management 
see H. l.Jilikowski, "Zelfbestuur en zelfbedrog," Politiek en 





about art and science, it remained basically an Old Left 
group. In the early lY70s it won votes and probably members 
as weIl among artists and intellectuals, but its electorate 
. 112 
remained overwhelmingly workl.ng class. lts electoral 
strongholds were old working-class neighbourhoolis in indus-
trial urban centres as weIl as rural areas in the North--the 
same areas where the Social Democratic Lea~ue had mobilised 
its first voters. Once in the frontline of social change, 
these area6 were now in decline. The Communist Party arti-
culated the discontent in these areas but did not translate 
it i t . t 113 n 0 a new proJec • Though criticalof the Soviet Union 
in the late 1960s and early 19706, the party never advocatect 
"Euro-communism." While many European Communist parties 
moved away from the Soviet position in the late 1970s, the 
Dutch party moved in the opposite direction. Perhaps as a 
consequence, it suffered a severe electoral defeat in 1977, 
114 t(oing down from 4.5% to 1. 7~b of the popular vote. 
Apart from the Pacifist Socialist Party and the Communist 
Party there were several other smaller groups in the Nether-
lands durin~ the 1960s and 1970s that could claim the label 
"Revolutionary Socialist": Maoist groups like the Socialist 
112 See note 108. 
113 De Jonge, op. cit., pp. 188-189; for a more balanced 
but also critical view see G. Harmsen, "Tegen arbeiderisme en 
sociologisme," Ter Elfder Ure 9/10 (1971): 429-474. 
114NRC , 26 r.Iay 1977: CBS Election Statistics. 
T--------------------------------------------------------------.. 
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Party and the Communist Uni ty I.lovement, or Trotskyi te groups 
1ike the International Communist League or the Novement for 
Workers' Self-management. Though some of them were new in 
the 1960s or 1970s anel all of them were on the Left, none of 
them would meet our definition of the New Left; none of them 
would probably claim this label either. 115 
2.3 The Anarchist New Left: Provo's and Kabouters 
Provo's and Kabouters are difficult to describe in spite 
of their small size, their short-lived existence and well-
. 116 documented h1story. Both groups were so heterogeneous, 
open and ephemeral, and their activities so bizarre, that any 
at tempt to analyze and interpret them runs the risk of being 
rebutted if not ridiculed. 
This applies to the Provo's even more than to the 
Kabouters. The term "provo" had lJeen used first by Dr. 
Buikhuizen, a social scientist, to refer to unruly street 
youth that spent its free time provoking the police in many 
Dutch cities around 1960. In 1965 a handful of youn~ workers 
115For a critical survey of most of these "new Old Left" 
groups see Harmsen, "'l'egen arbeiderisme en sociologisme"; for 
the ideas of the International Communist League see Een 
socialisties antwoord op de krisis van het kapitalisme-(n.p., 
1978); about the Socialist Party see O~ we& naar het socialisme! 
Een maatschappij voor mensen (Rotterdam, 1974); this party, 
probably the larges t among the "New Old Left," won 0.35'., of 
the popular vote in 1977 (NHe, 26 1,jay 1977). 
116r.lost of this section is based on the Provo Archives 
owned by the University of Amsterdam Library, and supplelflented 
wi th material related to Provo and Kabouters from i ts Docu-









and students with some sympathy for Anarchism decided to 
publish a paper with this name. Pessimistic about pro~ress 
and the possibilities of change, the J,roup announced that "it 
must be the loser in the end, but it will not forego the 
chance to provoke this society wholcheartedly at least once 
more.
1I117 Provocation would be its full-time occupation and 
major ~oal, \<,i thout any uI terior purpose , the first issue of 
i'rovo dec lt;.re d: 
We cannot convince the masses, we hardly want to 
(convince) ••• that mindless bunch of cockroaches, 
beetles and ladybugs. IIS 
As an example Provo contained a few instructions about how to 
make bombs and ciynamite, reprinted from IIThe lJractical anar-
chist,1I as weIl as a smallfire-cracker taped on a pa,::;e. The 
. 119 police accepted the provocation and confiscated the 1ssue. 
The full-time provocators devoted only part of their 
time to writinb' printing and sellin~ their paper--a means of 
subsistence for rnany of them--while they spent the rest in 
the streets and squares of Amsterdam provoking policemen and 
passers-by in so-called happenings. Happenin~s were original1y 
non-matrixed forms of theatre, i.e. perforrned vii thout time, 
l17provo pamphlet, 25 Hay 1965; in Dutch: "(Provo ziet 
in dat het) de uiteindelijke verliezer moet zijn, maar ae 
kans deze maatschappij altans nog eenmàal hartgrondig te 
provoceren wil het zich niet laten onti~aan." 
l18In Dutch: "\'Je kunnen de massa niet overtuigen, we 
willen het nauwelijks ••• die geestloze troep kakkerlakken, 
torren en onzehieveheersbeestjes"; Provo 1 (12 July 19(5). 
119 J. Lrunbrecht, Anarchisme bij Provo (Louvain, 1974), 





p1ace or characters that differ from the Irea1" time and p1ace 
120 of the audience or the characters of the performers. 
Artists like Kaprow, Whitman and Oldenburg introduced them 
in New York around 1960, and Dutch artists followed their 
examp1e in Amsterdam a little later. An imaginative jack-
of-a11-trades and native Anarchist, Robert Jasper Grootveld, 
started initiating happenin~s on the Spui Square in downtown 
Amsterdam in 1964. He chose this square not only because of 
its central location but also because of a small statue 
donated in part by a Dutch tobacco company. Almost every 
Saturday night from midnight onwards, Grootveld \'lould speak 
there about the dangers of tobacco and the consumer society 
in general, distribute artifacts made by himself, and chant 
slogans with his audience; strange exchan6es like "What does 
the farmer sow?--The farmer sows hemp," "Ugh, uC;h, a halJpy 
121 
smoker is not a firebrand" or simply 11 Image ! 11 Usually 
~olicemcn wou1d watch the ha~~cning but not interfere with 
it. That changed when the Provo joined in. 
Grootveld welcomed the Provo but the police, suddenly 
worried about disturbance of the peace and subversion, 
reacted rather vio1ently. Passers-by who shouted at the 
po1icemen were arrested, beat en and on,one occasion burned 
120M. Kirby, ed., Happenings (New York, 1965), pp. 9-42; 
Lambrecht, op. cit., pp. 76 ff. 
121 
"Wat zaait de boer?--De boer zaait hennep," "Uche, 
uche, een tevreden roker is geen onruststoker," "image"; in 
Dutch these words do not make any more sense than in English; 
they refer, of course, to drugs and tObacco, or to mass media 
(images) that seemed to attract as' weIl as to repel Grootveld. 
126 
in the face. Thus the Provos gained some publicity in the 
local press and sympathy at least among some Amsterdam citizens. 
lliost publici ty was negati ve, stressing the IIworkshyness, 11 
lack of re~~ular jobs and IInegative attitu~" of the Provos; 
at a conference of the Hoyal Dutch Academy of Sciences, a 
physician named Professor Prick explained them in terms of 
cultural decadenee and a general inability to deal with 
affluence and leisure. 122 In spite of--or because of--this 
neaative image, the Provos and Grootveld attracted ~rowing 
crowds at the Spui Square on Saturday nights, mostly artists 
and students as weIl as street youth from nearby workin6 class 
districts. Most of the happenings be~an with relatively 
innocent provocations 1ike painting the statue or a bicycle, 
distributing leaflets or currants (as biblical symbols of 
love), but ended in massive police action and tnctical retreats 
123 
and returns of the Provos. 
Throul~h these happenings the Provos hOi-'ed to mobi1ize 
the "provotariat," full-time or part-time unemployed anc! 
dissatisfied youth not yet intet:rateu in the consUlner society. 
Unlike the workinlJ class, which hau "fallen asleel-J in front 
of i ts television set," the non-workinl~ provotariat had a 
revolutionary potential--comparalJle to·the proletariat in 
unJerdeveloped countrie~, its potential ally. However, the 
~rovotarian revolution would be cultural as weIl as l-Jolitical, 
122 NRC, 20 April 1~b6; earlier Volkskrant, 9 Au0 ust l~b5; 'i'eleáraa~24 July 1965. 
123 Lambrecht, op. cit., l-JY. 223 ff. 
127 
rather than socio-economie. It would usher in a new culture 
oriented towards "useless creativity" rather than commercial 
production and mass consumption. Since the Old Left parties, 
including the "colourless PSP" and "senile Marx-worshippers" 
of the CPN, had proved incapable, eSlJecially on the cultura1 
front, a New Left was deemed necessary, of which Provo could 
124 lJe the van,suard. 'l'hi s analysi~, eXlJounded Ly Provo theor-
ists Van Duijn and Van Lindt in various issues of Provo, 
provoked the anger of older Anarchists as weIl as Marxists. 
The former took offence at their "elitist" rejection of the 
working class as a potential ally, while the latter addeq 
125 
criticisms of their "bour!jeois ideas" and idealisme 
Provo strategy proved effective, however, in attractin~ 
attention and sorne followinl; amonl; the street youth and 
students. Sales of the periodical (appearin~ monthly from 
July 1~65 to March 1~67) went up from 500 in Ju1y 1965 to 
5000 in October, 10,000 in April 1966 ana 20,000 in June and 
August 1966. 126 Soon similar groups spran~ up in many Dutch 
and even Belgian towns, and began to lJublish their own 
1?4Van Duijn, in Provo 1 (12 July 1~65), 7 (25 Feburáry 
1966); Van Lindt (Ananar) in Provo 2 (17 August 1~65), 4 
(28 October 1~G5). 
125 De Lobel, in Hamaer, op. cit., pp. 209-213; R. De 
Jong, "De provo's en hun verhouding tot het anarchisme," 
!Juiten de Perken 58 (1965): 19-22; G. Harmsen, "Provo's, 
anarchisten en marxisten," Buiten de Perken 57 (1~65): 1-13; 
O. Brendel, "0pen Brief aan Provo HoeI van Duijn," Daad en 
Gedachte 2:5 (1~65)--the first two were Anarchists, the last 
two were Marxists. 
126R K" 1 • unze 
tischer Praxis am 
(Hannover, 1974). 
and G. Hotgers, Aktionistische formen poli-
Beispiel Provo/Kabouter in Amsterdam 
128 
papers. 127 
Provocative action did not rell1ain the only component of 
Provo strategy. Many Provos wanted to showalternatives to 
the existing society to mobilise their potential followers 
(though they would hate that term), and also ~artly to provoke 
the authorities. These alternatives were ~resented in Provo 
or in leaflets as "white plans": White 13icycles, to be owned 
and operated by the municipality as free ~ublic transport to 
replace polluting and murderous automobiles; White Cars, 
running on electrical power, for the same purpose ; Vo/hi te 
Chicken, i.e. POlicemen, unarmed and provided with pieces 
of chicken, bandages, and candy to help rather than repress 
people; White \'Jives, promiscuous and weIl protected against 
128 pregnancy, etc. Most of the plans sounded simple and 
sensible enough to appeal to a wide audience, but also radical 
enough to articulate discontent with the prevailing system. 
An architect and former Situationist, Constant (Nieuwenhuis), 
who had inspired some of the Provos, tried to interlrate the 
12Y \vhi te Plans into his utopian model New Babylon. 
Not all Provos liked the White Plans and their reformist 
implications. A small grouV decided to realize utopia here 
and now, and set up a commune, "13astarcJ," while rnaking a 
127 DesperadO in Rotterdam, Scandal in Groningen, Ontbijt 
op Bed (Dreakfast in Bed) in l-1aastricht, ~ in Brussels. 
1?8 Provo, passim; Lamhrecht, op. cit., Chapter 111. 
12Yconstant, "New Babylon," Provo 4 (21) October 1~(5); 
see a150 below, Chapter 3 section 1. 






living by breaking vending machines; before lon~ the whole 
group was arrested and put in jail. 130 Gradually the remaining 
Provos polarized into a more activist and a more moderate or 
reformist \'lin~:;. 'rhe activists s~emed to prevail during the 
campaign against the wedding between Princess Deatrix and 
Claus von AmslJer.è'" a German and former member of the Hitier 
Jugend, and for both reasons rather unpopular amon~ many 
Dutchmen. Yet the finale of the campaign proved somewhat 
disappointinb for the activists, :.:;ince only a fe\'l smoke Lomts 
131 
were thrown at the royal coupie. The most spectacular 
smoke bomb was thrown in fact by a moderate, De Vries, a 
student who had joined the Provos <.lurinl..~ the campáiGn. J.1ainly 
because of this bomb, he \'las offered the leadershi~ of the 
list which Provo lJresented at the f.1unicipal elections in 
Amsterdam. Participation in the elections had been decitied 
upon by a Lroup of 40 Provos both as a fo~n of provocation, 
and as a way to realize sOllle of the White Plans Lut it was 
.. 132 
resented by some of the act~v~sts. 
The election campaign was full of action, like the 
launching of a White VJhale in a canal, anel cycle tours with 
posters saying "Vote Provo, for a good laugh!" (Stem Provo, 
keje lachen!). It brought Provo l3,00Q votes (2.b%) in 
Amsterdam, enough for one scat. Accordin6 to a survey held 
130 Lambrecht, op. cit., pp. 223 ff. 
131Ibiu • 
132R• Van Duijn, Het witte i;,evaar (Amsterdwil, 1~(7) 
PP. 178 f1'. 











by Dr. Van der Ma~sen, most of the votes came from well-educated 
133 professionals, rnana!;ers and skilied workers in the old ci ty. 
De Vries occupied the se at for one year while continuing to 
take part in happenings. He conceived of Provo as a "reser-
voir of capable }ieople," furtherini~ "personal freedom, radical 
non-conformism, militant anti-militarism and 'sweet' anarchism," 
while "giving priority to well-being over affluence" anu 
seeking to "break down the barriers of life philosophies. ,,134 
'rhe Prime fünister showed an interest in this capable youn,s 
d · . t 1 hi f . t . 135 man an 1nV1 ec m or an 1n erV1ew. 
Soon af ter the municipal elections, a major "happening" 
in Amsterdam cau~ht the Provos comlJletely off t;uard. Construc-
tion workers, who mainly belonged to a union led by Communists 
and not affiliated with one of the official confederations, 
were suddenly forced to pay an administration fee to the 
official unions for holiday coupons. When they held a sit-
dO\ffi demonstration in front of the Social Democratic trade 
union office to protest this measure, scuffles with policemen 
who were trying to disperse the workers left one worker dead 
133 C. Van der Maesen, "Kiezers op drift," Acta Politica 
II (1966-1967): 169-200. 
134In Dutch: "reservoir van· capai;)ele mensen) (Volkskrant, 
2 r.tay 1966) "persoonli jke vri jheid ••• radicaal non-conformi sme, 
militant antimilitarisme en een 'lief' anarchisme," "welzijn 
voor welvaart," "communicatie ••• door schil van levens-
beschouwingen heen breken" (B. ])e Vries, "Provo van binnenuit," 
in E. Frenkel, ed., Provo, Kanttekeningen bij een deelver-
Schijnsel (Amsterdam, 1967), pp. 19-31. 
135 Parool, 3 June 19Gb; ])e Vries went to Italy in 1967 






on the pavement--dead because of a heart attacI{, as physicians 
later declared. The construction workers, feeling that the 
police had killed one of their colleagues, went on strike 
and marched through the city, beatin~ up polieemen and Lreaking 
windows of Social Democratie and Hightist newspapers. Special 
troops were cal led into the ei ty and succeecled in suprjressinl~ 
the riots with te ar gas and rifle fire, leaving ~O people 
136 
wounded. Provos played hardly a role in the riots; a few 
wrote "Ivlurder!" on walls and took part in the attack on a 
Rightist newspaper building--"a corrupt stron~hold of undemo-
cratic forces ••• which should have been burned down" according 
to theorist Van Duijn. 137 On the other hand, Provo condemned 
the violence, as did the Communist Party; only the Council 
Communists welcomed i t as an intense moment in the class 
138 
struggle. 
Though the riots led to the dismissalof the burgomaster 
and pOlice chief responsible for the h2.rd line a.'~ainst Provo 
haplJenings, they souncled the (leG. th-knell rather tC1éJ.n vic tory 
bells for Provo. The activist \'lin'J grew increG.sin,~ly une[,sy 
with the "revisionist" trend uno set up a "Hevolutionary 
Terrorist COllllni ttec!', wherc<.'..s thc reformists turncd morc G.ncl 
more away from violence. \1ith the ncw line of flexible 1Jolice 
l3G Parool, 3 June 19Gb, 15 June 19Gt); Telc!~raaf, 15 June 
19GG. 
137Van lJuijn, lIet witte pp. 190 ff.; cf. Provo, 
10 (30 June 196G). 












response (rather than massive retaliation), non-violent 
provocation uecame more difficult. On1y a few élctivists 
drew the lo.~;ical conclusion anti tried to blovi up a sta tue of 
a colonial war hero--unsuccessfully--as an exarnple of more 
mili tant provocation. Others joirlcd the Vietrw.m Action Group 
at illegal demonstra tions, occasionally srnashin,:; winJo\'ls of 
the American Consulate--against the advice of provo. 139 
Fee1in;; that Provo was dorninated oy Illoderates, the activists 
bI ' 1 d t . . At· 140 'l'h f . t pu lS e helr oV/n papers ln IIlS eru.::.'-.m e re ormlS s 
started a célli1lJaign for a mernber of the Labour Party at the 
general elections of l!:l67, mixin~~ hope VIi th irony, thou,~h 
their theorist Van Duijn advised people to vote psp. 141 
Provos now becarne respec tabIe, of ten invi ted to I.:,i ve lecture s, 
or to appear at the suduen1y popu1ar teach-ins, and other 
~roups adopted their tactics at demonstrations. At a castIe 
in the South of the Netherlands , Provos conferrcd \-/i th German, 
British and French Anarchists and beatnik~ as weIl as with 
Nieuw Links mernbers of the Laoour Party (PvUA). 142 \'Ihi Ie 
Provos began to act within the law, sorne of their ene~ies 
took to il1egal action : rockers destroyeti a Provo boat and 
139 Provo,9 (12 Hay l~GG), 15 (Ho.rch 19(7); cf. NHC, 
3 November 1966. 
140 Image and God, NeJerland en Oranje (God, Netherlands 
and Orange). 
141Wi th slogans like "Esas for President"; Provo 14 
(February 19(7); Egas was an older member of the Labour Party 
with some sympathy for Provo; he had been a state secretary 
(junior minister) in 1965-1966. 
1420ntbijt op Ued ~ (February 19(7); about Nieuw Links 






















seamen organized a trip to Amsterdam to beat up provos. 143 
The last issue of Provo was published in J.Iarch 1967. 
In May 1967 af ter confused debates between activists and re-
formists, the grou~ Provo dissolved itself at a last happening 
in a park where the new munici~al );overnment had o~ened a 
144 Speakers Corner. Soon hippies and flower children would 
take their place and dominate the Amsterdam scene. Only the 
Amsterdam city council continued to have (ex-)provos in its 
midst. They rotated their seat every year and tried to 
propa~ate their White Plans but most of them left the counci1 
d ' 't 145 lsappoln ed. 
Anarchism was to revive a,sain in 1969, while HoeI Van 
Duijn occupied the Provo seat in the Amsterdam city council. 
Students and artists demonstrated and occupied buildings in 
order to achieve control over their own affairs; environmen-
ta1ists agitated against po11ution and economie growth; 
squatters invaded deserted buildin~s. Van Duijn tried to 
speak for these Groups in city council, aSking questions and 
presenting memoranda with greater frequency than any other 
councillor. Towards the end of 1909, he took the initiative 
to unite many activists of these groups in the Orange Free State 
(0 ' "t t) 14G ranJ evrl J s aa • 
1970. 
143 Lambrecht, op. cit., pp. 270 ff. 
144 Algemeen Handelsblad, 16 May 1967. 
145parool, 4 March 1967; Haause Post, ti March 1976. 
146 VolkSkrant, 15 September 1969; Vox Carolina, 1 May 













Orange Free state was to be an alternative society (or 
to be more precise, the state apparatus for an alternative 
society anà counter-culture) which would grow "like a toad-
stool on a rottin!,-; trunk," drawing juices from the trunk, 
i.e. elements of the old society worth conserving lil<.e know-
ledge, liberal traditions, socialist ideals. But it would 
develop a new non-a;~ressi ve ("soft") technology, an economy 
oriented to needs rather than profits, non-violent defence, 
a systern of self-;Jovernlllent through councils in factories , 
schools anel neighbourhoods, anel a non-authoritarian erotic 
culture based on "the unity of life." This society could 
be called socialist, since all means of production would be 
owned cOllectively; but it would be "socialism of the erect 
penis rather than of the clenchecl fist," to be realized 
through a "sweet revolution ••• (or) rather evolution" 
enstead of violence and class 147 struggles. 
General decisions in Oran~e Free State were taken by a 
weekly People's f.Ieeting (VolksvergaderinG), and executed or 
specifiecl by Peoplc 's lJepartmcnts. These v/ere set up parallel 
to Dutch government depé..'rtments, but ,:c!,iven 'alternative ' names 
and tasks: Subculture and Creativity instead of Culture and 
Recreation, SabotaBe instead of Defenca, Mental Health instead 
of Justice, Need Satisfaction instead of Economy. The Depart-
ment of Need Satisfaction consisted of (perhaps a dozen) 
1471n Dutch "sweet revolution," lieve revolutie, sounds 
like "rather evo1ution," liever evolutie; pamph1et Proklamatie 
Oran'e Vri 'staat in R. Van Duijn, Schuldbekentenis van een 












productive associations, of ten communes, that operateu biolo-
gical farms, health food stores and clothing cooperatives. 
A Department of Social Affairs ran drug counsellin~ pro~rammes 
and a rather efficient service for old a~ed people that deli-
vered meals and carried out odd jobs free of charge. The 
Housing Department provided lists of empty buildings for 
squatters. A Department for Public Works tried to plant 
trees in streets and squares of Amsterdam, and developed 
plans for gardens on the roofs of houses and cars (!). The 
Sabotfti:;e Departmen t Vlas to follow up a Sabota~;e j·lemoranduro 
whieh had been presented by Van Duijn in City Couneil--
causing quite an uproar--and to replace military and eivilian 
defense by non-violent mass aetion, in cooperation with the 
PSp.148 
RoeI Van Duijn played a pivotal role in these aetivities, 
representing Orange Free state as ambassador in the Amsterdam 
ei ty council and tryin,~ to "turn around" (convert) the loeal 
authorities. 149 When lIlunieipal e1eetions were held in 1970 
he headed a list called "Amsterdam Elf rrown" (Amsterdam 
Kabouterstad) which won a surlJrising 38,000 votes (11%) and 
5 seats in City Council; most votes eame from the old eity 
wherc thcy exceeded those for thc Labot:lr Party, !\.I11steruélm' s 
l48sabotagenota, in Van Uuijn, ibid., pp. 30-35; ef. 
Parool, 11 September 1970. eecause civilian defense is a 
munieipal concern, Van Duijn could raise the issue in City 
Council; however, it refused to publish his memorandum. 
149 In Duteh omturnen, hip term derived from English (to 
turn) Vrij Nederland, 10 January 1970. 
I 
136 
major party, but many also came from older working class 
districts and well-to-do residential areas. 150 Similar lists 
obtained seats in municipal councils in The Hague, Leeuwarden, 
L . d 151 T t eL en, Alkmaar and Arnhem. he sea s were usually occupied 
by young professionals, artists or students. 
Several former Provos joined the Kabouters (Elfs)--as 
Orange Free state supporters cal led themselves--but others 
denounced the movement as too constructive, naive and bureau-
152 
cratic. Older Anarchists and Council Communists expressed 
similar criticism--one of the latter publicly called HoeI 
Van Duijn a correct populari ty-seeker and a fascist. 153 '1' wo 
activists in the student and artist movement criticized the 
Elfs (Kabouters) as petty-bourgeois amateurs and "court-
jesters" who presented no danger to capitalist society. In 
a debate with Van Duijn, one of them predicted that OranJe 
Free State would be integrated in bourgeois society without 
much friction, unlike better organized movements 1ike the 
Communist Party that had roots in the dai1y class strugl;le. 
Van Duijn, shocked by the "hard attack," pointeJ to the 
mili tant and activist side of Oran;~e Free State--squattin .. ~, 
sabotage--that complemented the constructive or playful side, 
150Gemeente Statistiek Amsterdam, 1~70. 
151NI\C, 4 June 1~70; these are mostly non-industrial towns 
of aboutloO,OOo inhabitants, thou;~h 'l'he Ha:~ue is lar., ... ~er. 
152Stolk, e.g., Vox Carolina, 1 May 1~70, Vrij Nederland, 
13 June l~ 70. 
153v d ~, an en nerg, quoted in Tele:;raaf, 6 Harch 1~70. 
:i 














and argued that his critic (and the CPN) ignored the cultural 
d h 1 . 1 t f . 1 1 t' 154 an psyc 0 og1ca aspec s 0 SOC1a revo u 10n. 
The critic's prediction about the integration of Orange 
Free State into bourgeois society came true, however, perhaps 
even sooner than the critic had expected. Already in the summer 
of 1970 participation in the movement seemed to decline. The 
Elf Tovm (Kabouter) party in the Amsteràam ei ty counei 1 dis-
played activities in many are as like slum clearance projects, 
popular allotment gardens and dru~s--smokinu hashish in 
council until they were forcibly rell1ovect. Llut the link be-
tween the eaucus "md the People' s J'jeetin,;s becawe weaker. 
Internal disagreement arose, in particulur rllen RoeI Van Duijn 
proposed to run candidates in the 1971 general elections, ana 
"Stinging NettIe Elfs" (Brandnetelkabouters) confronteCi 
"Crocus Elfs" (Crocuskabouters) ; the former even atteml~ted a 
coup and published a paper called "'1'11e Elf Colonel" (De 
155 Kabouterkolonel ). The lnst PeolJle' s Beetini~ VJaS helcl in 
June 1971 wi th only 20 peolJle .l-Jresent--·,<!hereas in 1970 about 
500 would attencJ reGularly--ancl the Kauouterkrant (Elf 
Gazette) stopped publishing soon af ter t11at. 15b 
Some People' s lJepartments continued ;:,.s independent 
action groups nnu so did the Kabouters'in City Council. In 
1973 the caucus decidell to eXlJel HoeI Van lJuijn , .. :ho sulJ~equently 
154De Nieuwe Linie, 4 April 1970; T. Hegtien and K. ~oehmer, 
Van provo naar oranjevrijstaat (Amsterdam, 1970). 
155 
Parool, 16 OctolJer 1973; Katouterkolonel, February 
1971. 













lt:7 joined the Poli tical l!arty of Itauicals. ~ A few i'~é.iLouter~ 
took !Jart in thc l~74 munici.i-Jal elections on the list of th~ 
Alf\sterU~ÁLl !\c-cio:1 Farty U~lil~terrlal1l Aktie eartij) out this list 
.L'ailed to ';fin é.my é:;Cé.,tS. ;·,o::>t. i'ormer i·~<.üouter stron)lolc.is 
I/ent to the 1'0 li tiCéd Party of Hacüca1s an 1 a feH to the l)~l~. 1 ~8 
~)ornc former J'::al.Jouters and Provos relJ1ained <;cti ve in neit~hbour-
hood cOIl1!nittees and action !',rouf..ls, but others en~eu ui-' in a 
wental institution, ~rison or at odd jObS.15~ 
'l'hour:;h both Provo and Oranl4e Free State proveu to be 
short-li ved and ~phemeral movements , they may have had a 10n",-
1asting impact on Dutch culture and ~olitics. Provo in 
particular seems to have acted as a catalyst in the "4uiet 
cu1tural revolution" of the 19605 that turned Amsterliam from 
a puritan and parochial town into a centre or moral freeOom' 
lGü 
and counter culture. Even critics of Provo anti Oran~e 
Free State had to adrni t that their playful provocations 
inspired other New Left grou~s, students, feminists, environ-
lGl 
mentalists and even workers, not only in the Netherlands 
157Vo1kskrant, 17 September 1973; Parool 16 October 1973; 
see a1so below, section 2.5. 
158 Volkskrant, 18 J·Jarch 1974; Gemeente ~tatistiek Amsterûam, 
1~74 • 
159sto1k kept printin~ pamph1ets, etc., for local ~roups, 
Schirnme1~enninck, city counci110r in 1967-G8, presided over a 
neit~hbourhood commi ttee; Bronkhorst and 'l'uynman went to prison 
convicted of theft and c.iru~ charges (Panorama, 12 ~ay 1972, 
Knack, 17 April 1974, Haagse Post 6 J·larch 1976, Parool, 7 December 
1977) • 
160W• Gortzak , "Breken is geen scheuren," in i'iannin.o!, 
et al., op. cit., ~~. 232l-232ti. 






1l>2 but even in France, Germany and the U.S.A. 
139 
The strategy of playful provocation combined with refo~nism 
(Whi te Plans), distinguished Provo and Oran,,~e 1'ree State from 
the Anarchist Old Left. Other characteristics like their 
"idealist" ernphasis on psycho 10,;ical and cul tural revolution, 
their contempt for the working class, and their uto~ian 
experiments wi th prouucti ve associa tions (in Oran.·~e Free 
State), can be tr8.ced back to older Anarchist )_~roups like 
the Lea,Gue of Anarchist Socialists, the "Sleugehamlller" or 
the "'rake anu Ea t" peolJ1e, and the Associa ti on for Common 
lG3 Landownership. lilost of these groups seem to have had a 
ra ther rnarbinal or lJohelilian social uase, simi lar to thr .. t of 
Provo, whereas the more proletarian Anarchist mass movement 
of the turn of the century showed more concern vii th economic 
issues, strike action, etc. With the latter, Provo sharea 
on1y the general anarchist princilJles of self-mana~ement or 
direct dernocracy, direct action, anel moral or cultural freedom 
to experiment. But no Anarchist;rou~s Letore EJl>l> hali tried 
, 164 to combine direct action vii th electoral act1.on. As an 
ld A h ' t 1 1· 165 th" l-o' t' o er narc 1. s scho ar romar <:e a, - 1. S un1. Cjue COInu1.na 1.on 
could perhaps explain Provos' success. 
162 Lambrecht, op. cit., pp. lY6-207. 
1G3 see above, Chapter 1, section 3; cf. Ramaer, op. cit., 
p. 65. 
164Van Duijn, Het witte uevuélr, pp. 52-76. 
165 H. De Jon/..; , "Provos and KaLouters ," in I. Apter and 
J. Jol1, eds., Anarchism Today (New York, 1972), pp. lYl-20Y. 
, 
f 
2.4 The Socia1 Democratie New Left: Nieuw Links in the 
Labour Party 
Throughout the 1950s there had been some 1eftist 
140 
opposition against the increasing revisionism of the Labour 
Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) which reaehed a peak with 
the new declaration of princifJ1es approved with an overwhelrning 
rnajority by Party Congress in 1959. The Socia1 Democratie 
Centre, which had tried to organise the leftist opposition, 
166 
was disso1ved by the same Party Congress. Some of its 
rnernbers remained active within the party, whi1e others joined 
the Pacifist Socialist Party. As a group they had never 
exercised much inf1uence in the Co1d War era, when their 
rather orthodox Marxism was confused too easi1y with Soviet 
Marxism. 167 
In the 1960s a new 1eftist opposition emerged with a 
rather different sty1e and background, more in tune with 
that of the party leadership. A1ready in 1960 a few members 
cautious1y criticized the "American approach," the intolerant 
anti-marxism, the 1ack of socialist goals, and the meritocratie 
168 tendencies of the Labour Party. Yet this opposition seemed 
to accept the basic orientation of the party towards cultural 
issues, income distribution, codetermination of workers in 
the context of a "mixed economy"--i.e. capitalism with 
l66Wiedijk, op. cit.; Vrij Nederland 5 September 1970. 
167 Ibid.; see also Chapter 1, section 4 above. 
l68E • g • artieles by Barents, Brouwers, Koopman et al., 






substantial state intervention. To most of them even the 
manifesto "Socia1ism for Tomorrow," written by young 1eftw1ng 
members of the British Labour Party, appeared too Marxist, 
too economistic, and too biased in favour of trade unions, 
although they had some good words to say for it as well. 169 
In the area of foreign policy they criticized even more cau-
tiouSly the rabid anti-communism of the PvdA rightwing--which 
advocated more "cultural imperialism" through Peace Corps 
volunteers and regretted Kennedy's "soft approach to 
Communism.,,170 They also expressed concern about the alien-
ation of the rank and file from the leaders of trade unions, 
but suggested as a solution more personal service, rather than 
a "return to ideology." Even so they differed c1ear1y from 
other party members who denounced all strikes--because they 
"encourage Communist infiltration"--and any participation of 
rank and file in union decision-making--because that might 
171 
"lead to anarchy." 
Naturally, the losses of the PvdA at the provincial 
elections of 1962 were attributed by the internal 'left' 
opposition to the party's "governmentalism," and its failure 
to offer clear alternatives to the ruling Confessional-Liberal 
169 Van den Doel, Dolman, Dankert, in Socialisme en 
Democratie (1961): 644-648, 655-659, 660-665 respectively. 
170 S. Tas, "Kinder-kruistocht?," Socialisme en Democratie 
(1961): 718-726; K. Roskam, "Afrika op de wip," Socialisme 
en Democratie (1962): 72-75. 
171 Buiter et al., Socialisme en Democratie (1962): 
3-22, 172-182 730-750; and Van Praag, ibid., pp. 212-231. 
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coa1ition. The party leadership, on the other hand, 
reacted by rep1acing the flamboyant par1iamentary leader 
Burger with the more pragmatic, professional and "sensib1e" 
Professor Vondeling. It also drafted a moderate though re-
formist e1ectora1 platform, "For the Qua1i ty of Life, 11 which 
followed Galbraith in calling for more public services 
(housing, education, public transport) rather than more 
private consumption, as weIl as for more planning and workers' 
173 
codetermination. Yet at the general elections of 1963, 
the PvdA lost 5 seats, 2.3% of the popular vote; most of these 
votes went to the PSP and the Farmers Party (Boerenpartij). 
Whi1e the right wing of the party explained the losses in 
terms of leadership problems and the general satisfaction of 
the voters with their society, the left wing argued that 
affluence created greater aspirations, and thuS greater 
discontent, which could express itself in a more radical 
"new lef til or support for protest parties like the Boeren-
partij.174 A staff member of the Catholic trade union centre 
came to their support, and warned that progressive Catholics 
might bypass the PvdA if the latter provided no clear alternative 
172F • 11100i j, "Falerde oppositie," Socialisme en Democratie 
( 1962) : 3 68-3 71 • 
l73 J • Eijkelboom, "Impressies van het congres," Socialisme 
en Democratie (1963): 191-193; "Om de kwaliteit van het 
bestaan," Parlement en kiezer (1964): 189-194; the term 
'reformist' is used here in contrast with the more conservative 
platform of 1959. 
l74E • Van 'l'hi jn, "De lange golf kort en klein," Sociali sme 
en Democratie (1963): 54-63 for the left wing; for the right 











175 to the Catho1ic Party. 
143 
Both leftists and rightists in the PvdA argued for more 
workers' participation in decision-making in industry, a1though 
rightists showed more concern about the need for hierarchy 
d 1 t ·· th' th t . 176 an c ass coopera lon Wl ln e en erprlse. One leftist 
even suggested socia1ization of economic power, but only in 
177 
vague terms. Again, the Left was reinforced by an outsider, 
employed in fact by the Liberal Telders Foundation (the 
scientific bureau of the Liberal Party), who suggested 
regulation rather than repression of class conflict through 
178 
a parliamentary system of industrial democracy. 
At the end of 1965, the time seemed to have come to 
rea11ze some moderate reforms, as envisaged by the pI' tform 
IIFor the Quali ty of Life, 11 when the PvdA returned to govern-
ment in a coalition with Catholics and Anti-Revolutionaries. 
Unfortunately for the Social Democrats, the government only 
lasted until 1966, when a majority of the Catholic Party 
voted with the Opposition against the increase in government 
l75T • Coppes, "De wenselijkheid van politieke vernieu-
wing in Nederland," Socialisme en Democratie (1964): 337-
343. 
176H• Wallenburg, "De medezeggenschap in een ideologische 
impasse," Socialisme en Democratie (1965): 101-112; cf. 
H. Versloot , "Het rapport-Verdam in het perspectief van de 
onderneming," ibid., PP. 249-273. 
l77H• Eijsink, "Verantwoordelij heid in machteloosheid," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1965): 81-88. 
178w. Top, "De democratisering van het bedrijfsleven," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1965): 548-556; the author soon 










spending required by the programme of reforms. In the 
same year, the PvdA reached a new electoral low at the 
provincial elections, receiving only 23% of the popular vote. 
According to a survey held in Utrecht, many voters turned 
trom the PvdA to either PSP or Boerenpartij (Farmers Party) 
because of the PvdA's embourgeoisement, and its financial 
p01icy (raising sales taxes).180 
Thus it is not surprising that the leftist opposition 
became more vocal in 1966. Nagel, one of its younger members, 
and the only one who had been elected to the Executive Committee 
in 1965, published a provocative book "Hi there, PvdA!" (~ 
die PvdA!) in which he analysed the decline of the party, and 
--
proposed a "new left" approach of radical but undogmatic 
"modern socialism" similar to that of the PSP, in order to 
win back the youth that the PvdA had alienated. 18l Shortly 
betore the extraordinary party congress of 1966--called to 
discuss the fall of the government and its consequences--
Nagel met with a group of friends of different backgrounds, 
but with similar feelings of discontent about the state of 
the party. The group decided to write another book to 
specify the approach and platform the party should adopt. 
The book, "Ten over Red. The Labour Party challenged by New 
179 A. Vondeling, Nasmaak en voorproef (Amsterdam, 1968), 
Pp. 169, 171-176. 
180 Van Dam and Van Steenbergen, "Het verlies van de 
PvdA in een oude arbeiderswijk bij de Statenverkiezingen van 
23 maart 1966," Sociologische Gids (1966): 368 ff. 
181 J. Nagel, Ha die PvdA! (Amsterdam, 1966). 
n I1 
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Left," struck the party like a thunderbolt. lts demands 
sounded radical, though far from revolutionary: redistribu-
tion of power and income through workers participation in 
management fOllowing the American ScanIon model, a.central-
ized income and investment pOlicy, nationalization of banks, 
as weIl as more foreign aid, recognition of the Viet Cong 
and the German Democratic Repub1ic, and an unspecified 
"socio-cul tural revo1ution. ,,182 
The group presented the book to the surprised party 
leadership as a "contribution to the discussion," and kept 
quiet about its further ambitions--to rep1ace the existing 
leadership and to return the party to the opposition benches. 183 
Several members of the group, now referred to as Nieuw Links 
because of the subtitle of the book, were delegated by local 
branches to the party congress. With "civilized manners and 
dark blue suits" they won the respect and sympathy of many 
older members, and the attention of the mass media. The group 
had already established direct links to the media through its 
members, 16 of whom were journalists, 4 publishers and 2 market 
researchers. Most of the 52 others held faculty or teaching 
Positions.184 The group had no territorialor organizational 
base in the party, but it soon mobilized a nationwide 
l82Van den D 1 t 1 T" d oe , e a., ~en over roo • 
Nieuw Links aan de pv~(Amsterdam, 1966). 
Uitdaging van 
183 Van den Doel, in Haagse Post, 9 October 1976; 
Interview 4. 
184 Van den Berg and Mo11eman, op.cit., p. 112. 
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following through a series of national and local meetings and 
teach-ins. Iilernbership remained more or less informal, though 
a mailing list was administered by the group's secretary Van 
der Louw. A somewhat secretive "core group" (kerngroep) 
exercised leadership, chairing the meetings and editing 
pUblications. 185 
Three publications appeared in 1967, dealing with socio-
economie pOlicy, internal party reform, and cultural policies. 
The first one, written by the more radical members of Nieuw 
Links, in collaboration with former members of the Old Left 
Social Democratie Centre, caused some discontent among moderate 
Nieuw Links members; yet it contained little more than an 
elaboration of the socio-economie ideas of the earlier publi-
cation in more Marxist language, except for the one major 
issue of income pOlicy. Whereas the moderates insisted on 
a centralized control over wages, prices and other incomes, 
the radicals showed more concern about free bargaining for 
the unions. 186 The second publication contained proposals 
for greater internal democracy and "horizontal communicat1on" 
in the party.187 The third booklet resulted from a conference 
of Nieuw Links members and Provos in the South of the Nether-
lands, and expounded many Provo ideaS about creativity for 
185 Kroes, op. cit., pp. 56-57. 
186 H. Lammers, et al., De macht der rooie ruggen 
(Amsterdam, 1967); critICal comments came from Van den Doel, 
see H. Van den Doel, Lastig Links (Utrecht, 1976), pp. 129-
133. 







creativity's sake, free access to information, all round self-
development and a total socio-cultural revolution. 188 
In 1967, the Labour Party adopted a few ideas of the 
group when it voted on a new electoral platform. The platform 
included demands for an income policy, more foreign aid (2% 
of the National Income), election of worker directors, more 
accessible education, and "socio-cultural development for 
all."l89 The party took a more critical position with respect 
to American bombing of North Vietnam, also under pressure 
from Nieuw Links and against angry resistance from the right 
wing which denounced the former's "Communist propaganda within 
the PvdA. ,,190 
This modest shift to the Left could not prevent another 
electoral defeat in 1967. The PvdA lost 6 of its 43 seats 
in parliament (4.5% of the popular vote), mostly to the new 
Democrats '66 but also to CPN and Boerenpartij (Farmers Party). 
Only one Nieuw Links member, Van den Doel, was elected to 
parliament. A staff member of the Scientific Bureau of the 
Labour Party close to Nieuw Links attributed the success of 
Democrats '66 to its democratie structure and image, which 
188 Gregoor et al., De meeste mensen willen meer (Amsterdam, 
1967). 
189 PvdA Program, Parlement en Kiezer (1968): 262-265; 
cf. Haagse Post, 9 October 1976. 
190 E.g. E. Van den Beugel, "De brief over Vietnam," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1966): 740-744. In 1965 the PvdA 
had tabled a motion in parliament expressing "sympathy and 
support" for the American effort "to throw up a dam against 
aggression from Communist China" in Vietnam. 
j ~ , 
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contrasted favourably with the (lack of) internal democracy 
in the PvdA. 191 Several Nieuw Links members soon advocated 
cooperation with Democrats '66 and the emerging Christian 
Radical movement in a "Progressive Alliance," or Progressive 
People's Party, to renew party life and to allow the voter a 
real choice between a progressive and a conservative bloc or 
party. They feIt Democrats '66 to be kindred spirits--both 
were "political amateurs," dissatisfied with the "Establish-
192 
ment" of the Dutch party system. Other Nieuw Links members 
opposed this idea, however, out of fear th at socialist prin-
ciples would be further diluted. 193 Since the rest of the 
party appeared equally divided about this issue--moderates 
like Vondeling arguing for a Progressive People's Party, more 
extreme rightists opposing it--the debate was rather confused, 
open-ended, and not very fruitful until 1973, when Party 
Congress finally rejected the plan for a Progressive People's 
Party.194 
Meanwhile Nieuw Links reinforced its position within 
the party. In 1967 it captured 7 of the 24 seats on the 
Executive Committee, partly through clever tactics. 195 Older 
19lR • De Rooi, "Kantekeningen bij de verkiezingsuitslag," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1967): 161-167. 
192E • g • M. Van Dam,"Zonder tolerantie geen concentratie," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1967): 486-491. 
193W• Schermerhorn, "Gedachten over een progressieve 
concentratie," Socialisme en Democratie (1967): 498-504. 
1945ocialisme en Democratie (1973): 453-476; cf. 
Couwenberg, op. cit., Chapter V. 





party members of ten resented the tactics, but feIt sympathy 
for the dynamic and pragmatic sty1e of the group, and its 
emphasis on cultural p01icies and militant socialism. To 
qounter the decline of membership and electorate, they argued, 
the PvdA had to listen to Nieuw Links and appeal to young 
196 people. Possibly, as Van den Berg and Molleman have asserted, 
the new and middle-aged leaders of the party lacked the self-
197 confidence and toughness of the post-and pre-war generation. 
Furthermore there was no trade union opposition to Nieuw 
Links, as Wolinetz pointed out, because the ties between NVV 
and PvdA had been loosened, and union leaders feared New 
198 Left opposition in their own ranks. Nonetheless some 
opposition against Nieuw Links was organized within the Labour 
Party by local branch leaders and Cold War extremists who 
feIt threatened in their organizational or ideological posi-
tions respectively. In 1968 they set up a committee called 
"New Right" (Nieuw Rechts), later renamed "Democratie Appeal" 
( 199 Democratisch Appel). They put pressure on the Executive 
Committee to expel Nieuw Links, but fai1ed to prevent a 
196 G. Ruygers, "Over de inhoud van een progressieve 
poli tieke in de tweede helft der zoste eeuw," Socialisme en 
Democratie (1968): 201-216; C. Egas, "De tweede helft van 
de zoe eeuw vergt een mentaal radicale. politiek," ibid., 
PP. 304-310. 
197 Van den Berg and Molleman, op. cit., pp. 146-149. 
1985 • Wolinetz, "The Dutch Labour Party: a Social 
Democratie Party in Transition," in W. Paterson and A. Thomas, 
eds., Social Democratie Parties in Western Europe (London, 
1977), pp. 342-387. 
199 I • Lipschits, "Slytage in het Midden," in Manning, 










compromise being reached which ended the national meetings 
and the existence of the "core group," but not the local 
teach-ins and meetings. 200 
Perhaps the growing divergence of opinions within Nieuw 
Links made the group look more harmIess in the eyes of the 
party leadership. With its increasing influence, the group's 
internal differences became more manifest, especially since 
it lacked a coherent political analysis or theory. Already 
in 1967 moderates like Van den Doel had criticized the more 
radical and Marxist statements of the group, whereas a radical 
rnember had accused Van den Doel and Lammers, another founding 
mernber, of personal ambitions. 201 In 1968 Van den Doel was 
202 
expelled from the core group. Nieuw Links members in 
Rotterdam tried to provide a more theoretical analysis, criti-
203 
cizing corporatism and advocating "conflict theory" instead. 
The Federation of Youth Groups in the Labour Party, close to 
Nieuw Links but generally more radical, carried the analysis 
further in a Neo-Marxist direction inspired by Gorz, Galbraith 
and Mandel (~ étonnés ~ ~ trouver ensemble). Critical 
of the Social Democratie reliance on the bourgeois state, the 
Federation argued for a strategyof "reforms from above sup-
ported by extra-parliamentary action from below," in order 
200 Kro es, 0 p. ei t ., p. 61. 
201 Van der Zwan, in Voorwaarts 7:4 (1967). 
202 ~agse Post, 9 October 1976. 
203C • Boef et al., Mooi rood is niet lelijk (Rotterdam, 
1968). 
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to socialize the means of production under workers control, 
204 
and to democrati~e the state apparatus. However, neither 
analysis was fully accepted by Nieuw Links as a whoie. 
Extra-parliamentary actions did involve more and more 
members of the Labour Party in 1969 and 1970, but not without 
causing conflicts within the party and (to alesser extent) 
within Nieuw Links. When students occupied the administra-
tion building of the University of Amsterdam in 1969, militant 
Nieuw Links members joined them, while the Executive Committee--
including its Nieuw Links members--condemned the action and 
praised the police intervention that ended the occupation. 205 
On the other hand, the party approved of more moderate action 
like the rent information service started by Van den Doel 
and other Nieuw Links members. 206 
At the 1969 Party Congress, Nieuw Links achieved several 
successes. Congress voted for recognition of the German 
Democratie Republic, against tacit opposition from the powerful 
West German sister party--a symbolic issue which had aroused 
emotions on all sides. More important to Dutch polities was 
the resolution against another coalition with the Catholic 
Party, another favourite demand of Nieuw Links, which Congress 
204W• Van de Zandschulp, De krisis van de sociaal-
demokratie (Amsterdam, 1969). 
205 Kroes, op. cit., pp. 62-63; the action was praised 
by Grosfeld as a revolutionary step towards a higher, more 
direct form of democracy (Socialisme en Democratie (1969): 
461-476) but denounced by De Jonge as totalitarian and 
Leninist (ibid.,(1970): 94-99). 
206 Kroes, op. cit., p. 66; Haagse Post, 9 October 1976. 
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endorsed. Congress also voted for restrietions on the cumula-
ti on of functions within the party, and elected 9 members of 
Nieuw Links to the Executive Committee. Only with respect 
to Dutch membership of NATO did it refuse to follow the left 
. t. 207 oppos~ ~on. 
These successes worried not only the right wing, but 
also the centre of the party. Den Uyl, parliamentary leader 
since the resignation of Vondeling in 1966, even referred to 
208 the New Lef t's "faseistic methods of grabbing power." 
However, a new compromise was reached in 1970. Firmly en-
trenched in the party apparatus and many local branches--
Amsterdam, Groningen,Rotterdam--Nieuw Links could afford to 
dissolve its semi-formal organization. For the right wing 
it was too late. The group around Democratie Appeal left 
the Labour Party in 1970 and founded a new party, Democratie 
Socialists '70 (Democratisch Socialisten '70). Nieuw Links 
had finally conquered the party posthumously as it were; its 
former secretary Van der Louw became party chairman in 1971 
and about half the seats on the Executive Committee went to 
209 (ex-) Nieuw Links members. 
In his first address as party chairman, Van der Louw 
described the PvdA as a "party in action" that was to reflect 
207Keesing's Historisch Archief, 8 March 1969. 
208Vrij Nederland, 5 April 1969. 
209Kroes, op. cit., p. 65; Van den Berg and MOlleman, 
op. cit., p. 121. N.B. to avoid cumbersome prefixes, I will 
continue to refer to 'Nieuw Links' as a tendency within the 
PvdA af ter its official dissolution in 1970. 
.4 
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the society it aspired to, a less competitive society that 
allowed for love and lust instead of sexual repression. The 
party should translate human prob1ems into political action 
outside as weIl as inside parliament. Moreover, "horizontal 
communication" within the party could be improved. 210 Local 
and regional party branches acquired more power, particularly 
concerning the selection of candidates for parliament. Through 
the Party Council elected by the regional branches (federations) 
the 1atter also increased their influence on general policy 
positions. The Executive Committee in turn tried to expand 
its influence over the parliamentary party, which had so 
far escaped Nieuw Links control. 2ll Since Nieuw Links suppor-
ters tended to take a more active part in party affairs, 
enhanced rank and file participation generally reinforced 
Nieuw Links influence. 
Clever use of bloc voting, informal pressure, late night 
meetings, and other forms of manipulation may have contributed 
to the Nieuw Links victory, but they do not explain it com-
pletely. A survey among 2000 party members in 1971 showed 
considerable support for the group--50% approved and only 
24% disapproved of its activities--not only among younger 
members and intellectuals but also among some older Social 
210A• Van der Louw, "De PvdA meer dan een kiesvereniging," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1971): 1-7. 
2llSee J. Vande, W. Bles and Verbaas, De procedures van 
kandidaatsstelling voor de Tweede Kamer, Centrum voor de 
studie van politieke partijen, (Groningen, 1972) (mimeograph); 
A. Schilthuis, "De PvdA alsvereniging, " Socialisme en Democratie 










Democrats with a certain nostalgia for the pre-war Social 
Democratic Workers Party.212 Furthermore, the electorate 
154 
appeared to approve of the changes in the party by endowing 
it with 1.2% more votes and 2 more seats at the general 
elections of 1971--in spite of competition from Democratic 
Socialists '70 which won 5.3% of the popular vote and 7 seats. 
Of course a vote for the PvdA does not necessarily imply 
agreement with its programme. On the one hand, surveys 
showed substantial public support for demands for a more 
equal distribution of wealth, income and power, particularly 
for workers in their enterprise; these demands figured promi-
nently in the electoral platform of the Labour Party and had 
a1ways been pressed by Nieuw Links. 213 On the other hand, 
voters disagreed with other demands like increased foreign 
aid and higher taxes, and required more "lawand order" than 
PvdA leaders and in particular Nieuw Links wished to see. 214 
The elections of 1971 could be seen as another victory 
for Nieuw Links, the more so because 5 of its members now 
entered parliament. Yet they aggravated the disagreement 
between its moderate or reformist and its radical, more 
activist wing. The former advocated closer cooperation with 
212 30% of the survey sample had been members of the 
Social Democratic Workers Party (SDAP), 37% feIt nostalgia; 
only 24% had joined the PvdA af ter 1960; H. Van Stiphout, 
"Proeftuin der democratie," Socialisme en Democratie (1971) 
436-459. 
213verkiezingsprOgramma 1971-75, Parlement en Kiezer 
(1972); Surveys: National Election Study, 1971; Dutch Election 
Study 1970-72; see De Nederlandse Kiezer '71 (Meppel, 1971); 
J. Thomassen, Kiezers en gekozenen in een representatieve 
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De~Dcrats '36--with J1 SCHtS Rnd 6.8% of thc popu1ar vote 
f'8rty of r~aclicals, ie nC(;t~ss;)ry even tn:::t co.)lition with 
Confessiona1 parties. ~;incc the JUsht had lost its j,;;3r1ia-
ment~:;.ry itli:ijori ty, ;-;,nè tl18 three rro;ressive partier:3 had 
E;;~ctchy) CO;;!i--;lOn pro.-~rar:lfIic, they ,:lr~ued that the Pvdl, h:'l.d a 
mora1 ob1iJation to form a government, but needed Confessiona1 
21 r"," 
support to do SO. ~~ The radica1s, on the other hand, 
stuck to the reso1ution of 1969 and thc "po1arization strate,";y" 
. . Cf' 1 dJ' b 1 21G V1S-él-V1S on eSS10na.LG an J1 er::;l ~-3. The radica1s 
carried thc day, thc PvdA remaincd in opposition v~ile 
Democratic ;;ocin1i3t:, '70 joincd thc coa1ition of Lther:'l1~~ 
end Confessiona1 p~rties. Taldng ct rather tou8h stand a~z;ainE;t 
welfare and cducation expenditures, the ncw Government proved 
8.n A8.Sy tarç;et for 1118ny action r;roups and trétclc unions , vr1'1ich 
thF; raclic:i.l,y ::.)ucce~);o;fuJ.ly urged thc Labour P:'l.rty to 217 Empport. 
The ra.dica1 stratcLY appeared to have benefi ted thR PvdA in thé 
next senera1 e1ections. They Here held as early as 1972, vrhen Dej:lo-
cratic Socialists '70 left the government over their opposition to 
d Ot ~218 an prlce con .ro1s. The PvdA \10n 4 more sea ts, recoverin.::; 
frolll i t8 recent losses ancl returnin,g to i t::-; position of 1963, wi tIl 43 
19 <1 • 
215'1 an den Doel, Socialisme en Delilocratie (1971): 18~-
2161) eper, 
')'8 {."~ It· 1 
. )l(,., 
ibid., PD. 414-424;0 cf. Houwaart, op. cito 
r:it., pp. 37-57. 
pp. 7-36 • 
Ä 
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seats and 27.3% of the popular vote; Nieuw Links ailllerents 
219 
occupied about a quarter of the seats. The three progres-
sive parties, PvdA, D
'
66 and the PPH, had fought the elections 
on a common platform, "Turning Point 1972" (Keerpunt '72) 
with proposals for electoral reforms and for social reforms 
concerning Works Councils, profit sharin~, comprehensive 
d t · d f t d f i . d . 220 e uca ~ont e ense cu s an ore gn a~ ~ncreases. Nieuw 
Links memlJers objected to some points, such as the rather 
modest meaSures against pollution and depletion of resources, 
b t t d . t' .. 1 221 u accep e ~ ~n pr~nc~p e. Now they were faced again 
wi th the dilemma of 1971; whether to form a {;overnment wi th 
Confessional support or to remain in opposition. 
The second op ti on appeared to be an unrealistic one 
since the Right (Liberals and Confessionals) could no longer 
muster a majority in parliament. Realizing this, some radicals 
suggested a progressive minority government based on trade union 
222 
support. To most Labour Party members, including Nieuw 
Links supporters, this third option seemed too risky an 
adventure and the first option carried the day without too 
21910 or 12 seats, depending on one's criterion of Nieuw 
Links membership, cf. Wo linetz, "The Dutch Labour Party," 
Pp. 356, 375; Kroes, op. cit., p. 50. 
220 Keerpunt '72 (Amsterdam, 1972). 
221 J. Pronk, "Keerpunt getoetst," Socialisme en Democratie 
(1972): 560-564. 
222B• Peper, "Progressieve mi'nder heidsregering en 
bedrijfsleven," Socialisme en Democratie (HI72): 475-481; 
even with CPN and PSP support a progressive government could 





much resistance. When party leader Den Uyl presented a cabinet 
with 10 members of PvdA, D'66 and PPR and 6 Confessional 
ministers, af ter five months of negotiations, only 3 Nieuw 
223 Links members of the caucus voted against it. Pronk, a 
fairly radical Nieuw Links supporter, became minister for 
foreign aid and justified it as a chance to politicize people 
224 through government. One other minister (out of the 7 PvdA 
members o~ the cabinet) had been elose to Nieuw Links and 
3 of the G PvdA state secretaries (staatssecretarissen: 
junior ministers) could be considered active members of the 
225 i5r oup. 
Given the political and economie constraints at the 
time--dependence of the government on Confessional support 
in parliament , oil embargo, economie recession, pressure from 
big businessmen--the impact of the Nieuw Links and other Labour 
ministers was necessarily limited. Pronk may have succeeded 
in shifting foreign aid priorities to the poorest and most 
progressive countries--Cuba, Tanzania, Sri Lanka--but con-
tinued aid to less progressive countries like Indonesia, 
Colombia and Egypt. He did give more attention to "conscien-
tization" at home, in schools and mass media. At international 
conferences he tried to mediate between developed and under-
developed countries, of ten to the dismay of his more conservative 
223 De Groene Amsterdammer, 23 fvlay 1973. 
224De Groene Amsterdammer, 20 December 1972; ~, 
12 January 1973. 
225 Kroes, op. cit., p. 50. 
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L b 11 f F " Aff" 226 a our co eague or ore1gn a1rs. While foreign aid 
declined in most Western countries from .34% of the National 
Income in 1970 to .31% in 1977, it went up from .61% to .85% 
in the Netherlands. 227 In education a Labour minister and 
his state secretary, another active member of Nieuw Links, 
prepared a grand scheme for comprehensive high schools to 
break down the existing hierarchy of schools based only on 
intellectual abilities (and class baCkgrOund).228 Another 
Nieuw Links state secretary contributed to decentralization 
of power and subsidies in welfare, and to more public involve-
ment through hearings in physical planning. Labour ministers 
and state secretaries also shifted priorities in housing--
from construction to renovation, and from general to indivi-
dual rent subsidies related to income--and tried with some 
t th b t h " h dl" 229 success 0 narrow e gap e ween 19 er an ower 1ncomes. 
Nevertheless the left wing of the PvdA--even more so the 
CPN, PSP and PPR--could accuse the government of failing to 
implement its platform, particularly with respect to defence, 
which received more rather than less money, and economie 
policies dealing with unemployment and investment, which 
226NRC , 24 lVlay 1977. 
227 Le Monde, 30 June 1978. 
228 
Departement van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, Contouren-
~ (The Hague, 1975). 
229 
See A. Peper and A. Van der Louw, "Keerpunt '77--de 
weg terug?," Socialisme en democratie (1975): 329-356; see 
also W. Gortzak, ed., De kleine stappen van het kabinet Den 





1 th . 1'f t· 230 prover ra er 1ne ec 1ve. Important reform bills regarding 
prof'i t sharing, investrnent controls , codetermination of workers 
in Works Councils anel land speculation were proposed but 
vetoed by thc Confessional parties. A conflict about the 
land speculation bill led in 1977 to the collapse of the 
231 
coalition only three months before the end of its term. 
The frustrations suffered by the PvdA in government 
exacerbated the tensions within the party, in particular between 
radical Nieuw Links activists and trade unionists on the one 
hand and an aId Guard of moderate rightists on the other hand 
who identified strongly with "their" governrnent; moderate 
Nieuw Links supporters of ten held a centre position. Some 
"Old Guard" members left the party, which had become too 
. 232 
"anarchii:itic 11 and too secular for them. When the Party 
Con\;ress decided to revise its 1959 Dec1aration of Principles, 
many intense debates were held in the party journal Socialisme 
en Democratie about all the basic issues--industrial democracy, 
strategy, 10cal polities, feminism, education, cultural pOlicy, 
NATO. Most of these will be analyzed further in Chapter 4, 
but a brief summary here may serve to show the polarization 
and radicalization of ths party and its New Left current. 
230See for instanee Radikaal, 12 February 1976 and 17 July 
1976: also Volkskrant, 12 June 1976 and S. Poppe, "Arbeiders-
controle op het ondernemingsinkomen," Socialisme en Democratie 
(1975): 445-460. 
231KeeSing'S Contemporary Arcnives, 1977, p. 28574A. 
232 G. Van Walsum, "Brief aan het partijbestuur," Socialisme en 
Democratie (1973): 129-143; also A. Bozer, "De vlag en de 




The question of industrial democracy had been studied 
extensively by a committee of social scientists in the party 
who sympathized wi th Nieuw Links. 'rheir report recommended 
the Yugoslavian model of workers' self-management, to be 
realized by legislative reforms as weIl as direct action and 
233 
organization at shop floor level. Right wing members 
criticized the report for its ignorance of economie conditions, 
its "typically Duteh" preferenee for class conflict over 
class cooperation, and its distrust of managers, whereas 
1eft wing trade-unionists agreed with the conclusions but 
234 
objected to the moderate strategy of the report. 
Po18rization and politicization of loca1 politics in-
creased vvi th the municipal and provincial elections of 1974, 
resulting in party conflicts in Amsterdam and Groningen. 
A few aId Guard members tried to resurrect the SDAP (Social 
Democratie Workers Party) in the Province of Groningen when 
Nieuw LinkS captured the Labour party and removed the aId 
Guard from executive and legislative bodies. 235 The new 
municipal government of Groningen (city) devoted considerable 
attention to experiments with comprehensive high schools and 
233wiardi Beckman Stichting, Op weg naar arbeiderszelf-
bestuur (Deventer, 1976). 
234St V R·· V A· s· 1· D evens, an h1Jn, an mer1ngen, OC1a 1sme en emo-
cratie (1974): 497-502, 503-517; (1975): 59-72 respectively, 
on the Risht; Laterveer, Socialisme en Democratie (1974): 
518-525, on the Left. 
235B • I1idde1, De nieuwe elite van de PvdA (Groningen, 
1976); Vrij Nederland, 1 June 1974, Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 
8 March 1~74, Volkskrant, 14 November Hl74, R. Van Duijn, 
En Tranen (Amsterdam, 1976): the new SDAP soon disappeared 
again. 
4 
neighbourhood councils, and to urban rather than private 
236 
cars. Also in 1974, the Party Congress gave local and 
161 
provincial branches the right to recall party representatives 
in municipal or provincial governments and councils, in 
order to guarantee that the latter would carry out the platform 
on which they were elected. 237 The Old Guard denounced this 
decision as "anti-parliamentarism" and "anarchism.,,238 
Feminism penetrated the PvdA in the early 1970s and 
transformed its quiet Women's Club (Vrouwencontact) into a 
militant activist group of Red Women (Rooie Vrouwen). Siding 
usually with the left wing of the party, but occasionally 
clashing with it, the feminists called for a "cultural revolu-
tion" to achieve equality of rights at work and in the family, 
but also to replace dominant masculine values of competition, 
239 
achievement and production with more feminine values. In 
240 1975 they succeeded in electing a woman chairman of the party. 
Cultural renewal or revolution was also envisaged by the 
236~, 30 December 1975; Interview 7. 
237J • Van der Bergh, and P. Jansens, "Recall niet herroepen," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1974): 146-156. 
238B• Schaper, "Om de fundamenten onzer democratie," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1974): 93-96. 
239H• D'Ancona, "De noodzaak van een culturele revolutie," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1972): 103-109; also J. Kool-Smit, 
"Feminisme en socialisme," Socialisme en Democratie (1974): 
380-390; for criticism from the right wing see A. Van Rhijn, 
"De grondslag van 'Socialisme nu' een wrak fundament," 
Socialisme en democratie (1974): 93-95; for criticism from 
the left wing see C. Pronk, "Een vrouwenorganisatie in de 
PvdA," Socialisme en democratie (1972): 252-254. 
240NRC , 15 April 1975. 
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Working Party for Socialist Education and Workin~ Party for 
a Socialist Broadcasting System. The former played a modest 
role in the heated debate about the comprehensive school and 
the "emancipatory content" of education. 24l Not only Liberals 
and Christian Democrats, but even Labour Party members worried 
242 
about the egalitarian implications of the plan. Radicals 
on the other hand considered it too individualistic and tech-
t " 243 nocra l.c. 
broadcasting. 
A somewhat similar debate took place about 
The Working Party for a Socialist Broadcasting 
System, set up by Nieuw Links activists with members of PPR 
and PSP, acted inside and outside the VARA (Worker Radio 
Amateur Broadcasters Association) as a pressure group for 
more socialist information and education. 244 lts opponents 
in the party preferred a more pluralist VARA that would be 
able to compete with the conservative broadcasting systems 
245 by entertainin~ the masses. Occasionally, the young New 
241 W. Baars, "Opmerkingen over de relatie tussen onderwijs 
en arbeidsmarkt," Socialism en Democratie (1975): 491-500. 
242D• Mantel, "Verdwalen de socialisten in de gelijke 
onderwijs-kansen jungle?," Socialisme en Democratie (1976): 
323-330. 
243 p • Reekman, "Hoger onderwijs in de toekomst," Socialisme 
en Democratie (1976): 294-304; W. Baars and J. Van Iersel, 
"Een bi jdrage aan de onderwij sdiscussie," i bid., pp. 521-529. 
244 BardoeI et al., "De VARA verder onder het mes," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1976): 360-369; T. Pauka, "Een 
middelbaar echtpaar in een versleten bed," ibid., pp. 84-100. 
245C • Boef, "Bedden schudden," Socialisme en Democratie 
(1976): 114-126 and 370-382; M. Anstadt, "De VARA en het 




Left advocates of emancipatory socialist culture were joined 
by Old Leftists who objected to the "sexual licence and aggres-
sivene!'~s of today's youth" and cal led for a return to "spiri tual 
foundations and noble passions"; but they were uneasy allies 
as b t 246 es • 
Foreign policy issues also divided radicals and moderates, 
particularly the question of Dutch membership of NATO. Against 
the willof the Executive Committee--dominated by Nieuw Links 
moderates--Party Congress voted in 1~75 for only conditional 
b h ' 247 mem ers J.p. The polarization of the party, or to be more 
exact its division into three different currents, was brought 
. 
out more clearly in the discussion about general strategy and 
economic pOlicy. In response to rising unemployment, the right 
wing led by Finance Minister Duisenberg proposed restraints 
on wages as weIl as on governrnent expenditure in order to 
a110w more profit and hence (he hoped) more investment in 
jObs. 248 The reformist centre of the party, represented here 
by Nieuw Links leader Van den Doel, insisted even more on 
wage restraints but also on increased government expenditure 
t t · b t' 1 1 'th bI' , t 249 o crea e JO s, par J.CU ar y J.n e pu J.C servJ.ce sec or. 
246 J. In't Veld, "Karl Ivlarx in een nieuw perspectief," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1975): 1-14; J. Buskes, "Voor mij 
hoeft het niet meer," Socialisme en Democratie (1973) 183-189. 
247NRC 12 April 1975. 
-' 
248 W. Duisenberg, "Een alternatief verkiezingsprogram," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1976): .211-224; D. Wolfson and 
B. Le Blanc, "Een linkse norm," ibid., pp. 55-66. 
249H • Van den Doel, in Vrij Nederland, 29 May 1976; 






The left wing opposed both wage restraints and government 
cutbacks and suggested strict investment controls to prevent 
further reduction of the labour force. 250 These economie 
strategies implied different political strategies. Duisenberg 
presented an alternative electoral platform to party congress 
and argued for a coalition between PvdA and CDA (Christian 
Democrats), while the left wing rejected his platform as a 
"Christian Democratie, if not a Liberal product" and expressed 
severe doubts ab out a coalition with the Christian Democrats. 251 
On the other hand, rightists and centrists came to question 
the "populist" orientation towards extraparliamentary action 
252 favoured by the Left. 
The electoral platform of 1977 seemed to reconcile 
all three currents by demanding wage restraints, a modest 
expansion of the public service sector, and stricter invest-
253 
ment controls. Duisenberg, probably the main loser, cam-
paigned loyally for the platform and contributed to an unexpected 
e1ectoral victory of the Labour Party. The party won 53 
seats and 33.8% of the vote, more than ever before; this was 
250S • Van der Gaast, "Gewoon doorgaan met links ademhalen," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1976): 538-548; also Volkskrant, 
12 June 1976. 
251Ibid .; also E. Van den Brink, "Doorgaan zonder partij?," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1976): 397-401. 
252 B. Schaper, "Het ontwerp verkiezingsprogram," Socialisme 
en Democratie (1976): 49-51; similarly B. Tromp, "Socialisme, 
organisatie en democratie," ibid., pp. 155-172. 
253Voorwaarts •••• Het verkiezingsprogramma van de Partij 




mostly at the expense of PPR, PSP and CPN. Commentators 
disagreed whether the shift signified a radicalization of the 
PvdA or de-radicalization of the Dutch voter. 254 The left 
wing of the PvdA was encouraged by this and succeeded in 
vot1ng down a coalition agreement negotiated by the 
parliamentary leaders of the PvdA, D'66 and CDA in Party 
Council. At the end of 1977 the PvdA returned to OPPosition. 255 
At the same time the PvdA Congress approved of a new 
and more radical Declaration of Principles. It defined its 
main purpose as free and autonomous self-development for all 
through a more equal distribution of power, income and knowl-
edge, without endangering the future by over-exploiting natural 
resources. More specifically, the party would strive for 
workers' self-management in industries and services, sociali-
zation of key industries and banks, democratie planning, more 
small-scale production, political decentralization, more 
democratie and creative education, more foreign aid, and 
equality for men and women at work and at home. It was to 
achieve these ends through parliamentary action as weIl as 
support tor action groups, while itself acting as a model 
256 for the future, a "movement of active and liberated people." 
One might conclude that the Labour Party had returned to 
254NRC , 26Ï1lay 1977, 11 June 1977; CBS Election Statistics. 
255Keesing's Contemparary Archives, 1978, p. 28837A. 
256In Duteh, "een beweging van aktieve en bevrijde 
mensen," PvdA Beginselprogramma, PK 9:10 (1978).: .46. 
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the traditional Socia1 Democratie princip1es which it had 
dropped or di1uted in 1959; but a1so that it had mixed these 
with typica1 New Left ideas of Revo1utionary Socialist or 
Anarchist origin--workers' se1f-management, direct action, 
cultura1 change, small-sca1e production and decentralisation. 
01d Left Social Democrats of ten had mixed feelings about the 
renewal of the party, approving of the former but objecting 
257 to the latter change. 
Not only the programme, but also the organisation and 
style of the Labour Party had changed between 1960 and 1977. 
Power had shifted from the centre to the periphery, in 
particular to regiona1 and local branches. Elected repre-
sentatives in parliament, provincial or municipal councils 
had lost much of their prestige and independence. They could 
even be recalled by their party. Extra-par1iamentary action 
had become a legitimate and popular activity, at least among 
younger or female (feminist) party members. From a fair1y 
centralised, homogeneous and disciplined mass party the PvdA 
had turned into an of ten chaotic, pluralist "movement of 
active and 1iberated peop1e." 
Most of these changes could be attributed to the inf1uence 
of Nieuw Links and--not unrelated to this--the influx of new 
members of a new petty bourgeois rather than a proletarian 
background. As mentioned above, according to a survey held 
257 See references under footnote 240; also J. Scheps, 
Kink in de kabel (Apeldoorn, 1972); unlike the Old Guard of 
the right wing, these Old Leftists rarely deserted the party. 
L 
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around 1955, clerical and administrative workers had almost 
dominated the party cadre in the 1950s, while manua1 workers 
made up about one third. In the late 1970s, a survey showed 
that only 14% of party cadre--delegates to a party congress--
were engaged in agriculture or industry, while 47% exercised 
a profession in public service or independently. Whereas in 
the 1955 sample, 69% had left school at twelve and only 4% 
had received any higher (college or university) education, 
only 8% of the delegates in the 1970s had not go ne beyond 
1 t h 1 d 58% h d t 11 ""t 258 e emen ary sc 00 an 0 a gone 0 co ege or un~vers~ y. 
As there are no data available about rank and file members, 
one can only speculate that they changed in the same direction, 
although perhaps slower than the top of the party. The 
electorate may not have changed very much. Lijphart held a 
survey in the 1960s which showed that 48% of Labour Party 
voters were blue-collar workers and 21% white-collar workers. 
The national election studies of the 1970s present figures of 
32 or 33% manual (prOduction) workers and 12 or 13% clerical 
259 
and sales workers; but the figures may not be comparable. 
258unfortunately the two surveys use different definitions 
of "cadre"; the 1955 survey included executive committee 
members of local branches~ whereas the later survey regarded 
all delegates to the party congress of,February 1978 as 
"cadres"--but of course the two categories overlap and of ten 
coincide, as many local branches delegate members of their 
executive committees to party congresses. On the first 
survey see above, footnote 133. On the second survey see, 
r. Lipschits, L. l,liddel, and W. Van Schuur, "Het middenkader 
van de Partij van de Arbeid," Socialisme en Democratie (1979): 
51-67. 
259 The survey in the 1960s was held by or for Professor 
Lijphart, see Lijphart, Polities of Accommodation, p. 29 
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While rnaintaining its traditional working-class electorate, 
the PvdA renewed its party cadre, taking in more radical, New 
Leftist intellectua1s to replace more conservative, Old 
Leftist clerical workers and manual workers. This might 
explain the relative success of Nieuw Links, which could 
recruit and mobilise these intellectuals--unlike its many 
predecessors like the Social Democratie Centre in the lY50s, 
the ~roups around De Kadt and Stenhuis in the lY30s, or the 
Marxists around De Nieuwe Tijd and the Tribune in the early 
1900s. Nieuw Links also differed from its preaecessors in 
other respects. It did not present a coherent ideolo~y or 
strategy which the party had to swallow or reject entirely; 
not did it organise itself in any fo~nal sense as a faction 
or around a journ~l. Hence it could be integrated easily in 
the party but also diffuse its ideas without too much resis-
tance. When the resistance grew, the resisters found themselves 
opposed and isolated in the party. Outside forces no aoubt 
played an important role as weIl: a changing socio-cu1tural 
climate, intensified class struggle, the electoral threat 
from New Left groups like the PSP and the (future) Political 
Party of Radicals or even Democrats 'bb. 
(Unfortunately few details are given, apart from the number of 
respondents, which was 15Y5). On the election studies of 1970 
and 1971 see footnote 108. The criteria for manual or olue-
collar work may be different in these studies; moreover, they 
count housewives separately which Lijphart does not seem to do. 
Inglehart and Habier arrive at an even lower proportion of manual 
workers among PvdA voters: 26%. Gortzak, Director of the 
Scientific Bureau of the Labour Party, estimated that more than 
50% of PvdA voters, but less than 50% of its members, were munual 
workers--again excluding housewives, one presumes; see W. Gortzak, 
"De PvdA en de arbei ders, 11 Hoos in de vuist 4 (1975): Y-13. 
1 
169 
2.5 The Christian New Left: The Political Party of Radicals 
Until the 1960s the Christian or Confessional parties in 
the Netherlands maintained a high degree of organization and 
unity among the Protestant and Catholic segments of Dutch 
society. This allowed them to dominate parliament and 
government. Their unity began to crumble around 1~65 under 
the impact of new theology, changes in the churches, and 
secularization, es~eCiallY within the Catholic SUbculture. 2GO 
The largest Confessional party, the Catholic People's Party, 
opened a discussion of its foundations and character which 
divided the party into five factions with conflicting views 
about the future. The largest faction hoped to merge the 
party with the two major Protestant parties in a Christian 
Democratie Union on the German model. A smaller but rather 
vocal faction preferred a Christian Hadicnl party that would 
261 
cooperate wi th the PvdA. These Catholic Hadieals contacted 
262 like-minded Protestants and published a common programme. 
When efforts to stop the movement towards a Christian Democratie 
Union seemed to fail, the Catholic Radicals left the Catholic 
Party and founded the Political Party of Hadieals in January 
1968. 263 
260B k . -a Vl.S, op. cit., pp. 175-226. 
261 Ibid ., pp. 233-290; D. Hoekstra, ed., Partijvernieuwing 
in politiek Nederland (Alphen aan de Rijn, 1968), pp. ~-62. 
262B• De Gaay Fortman ana W. Veld, eds., Christen-
radicaal (Hilversum, 1967), especially pp. 11-28. 
2ti3Bakvis, op. cit., pp. 233-254; M. Van Bulten, ed., 
Van spijtsternmers tot KVP radicalen (Utrecht, 1967); F. Van 
Ginneken, De PIJH van 19G8 tot en lIIet 1971 (lJrelia, 1976), 
pp. 6-10; Tnterview 8; only a few Protestants joined the new lJé.lrty. 
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The party started with almost 2000 members,mostly young 
Catho1ic inte11ectuals or white-collar workers with at least 
secondary education. To the disappointment of its leaders, 
very few manual workers joined the party, while most Catholic 
264 trade union leaders stayed aloof. The first party chairman, 
a prominent trade unionist and forrner Hinister of HousinG, 
205 soon resigned and returned to the Catholic Party. He was 
succeeded by Jurgens, a young lawyer and son of a Unilever 
executive with n great interest in the new theology. Though 
still hoping to attract Confessional voters, he helped to 
give the PPR a more secular and activist orientation, partly 
2GG inspired by Nieuw Links in the Labour Party. 1he Party 
Congress adopted a platform in 1969 that cal led for electaral 
reforms, equal influencc for Capital and Labour, a maximum 
income, more foreign aid, Ie ss defence spending, and free 
pUblic transport. The Political Party of Radicals defined 
itself as an "action party that wants to change mentality and 
social structures" in order to achieve freedom, self-developrnent 
2G7 and solidarity with mankind and nature. Ta emphasize its 
activist orientation it callcu local branches "action ccntres" 
(aktiecentra) • 
264 . 
Van Ginneken, op. cit., pp. 12, 152. 
2G5Ibid ., pp. 13-14. 
266 . 
Ib1d., pp. 100-111; Het Vaderland, 17 September 1968; 
Volkskrant, 3 October 1968. 
207 
In Dutch: "aktiepartij die mentaliteit en maatschappe-
lijke strukturen wil veranderen," PPH Ronduit, Radikalenkrant 
12 (October 196!:l). 
171 
In ract, the PPl{ "'las to SU1-Jport rather than initiate 
actiollS, but mo.ny of its members o.lso belon:::;ed to action groups, 
2b8 
e",pecially environmentalist and 'l'hird World groups. A 
large majority of the membershi~ approve~ of revolution in 
Latin America, thou~h only a minority supported ille~al extra-
parliamentary action in the Netherlands, such aS students 
269 
occupying the University of Amsterdam. Jurgens justified 
(peo.ceful) extra-parliamentary action mainly as a way to raise 
political consciousness among voters, and to exercise pressure 
b f 1 , t 270 on mem 'e. YB 0 par lawen • 
In a little book pubiished just before the provincial 
elections of 1970, Jur.':',en~ stressed three planks of the party 
platform; support for underdogs in society, codetermination 
in industry, anel European security. While criticizing the 
trade unions for stayins aloof from polities, he advocated a 
progressive alliance with PvdA, PSP and ])166. 271 At the 1970 
provincial and municipal elections, the PPR tried to present 
common lists with the PvdA and occasiona11y PSP or ])'66. The 
Radicals won on1y 2.5% of the popu1ar vote and 19 provincia1 
seats, most1y in the Catholic South--possib1y partly because 
of the many former ~riests and nuns on their 1ists. 272 At 
268 . Intervlews 2, 8; Radikalenkrant, passim. 
269Radika1enkrant 4 (October 1968); 10 (July 1969); 
Vrij Nederland, 12 October 1968. 
270E • Jurgens, De PPR op aard'e (Nieuwendijk, 1970), 
PIJ. 30-31. 
271 1'1 . )ld. 
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the municipal elections the party did generally better in 
11 t ,. b b . t . th '·1 . t . 273 sma owns ana ~n su ur an commun~ ~es an ~n arge c~ ~es. 
Disapvointed by the election results, the Party Congress 
elected a new Executive Committee--still dominated by 
Catholics, but including three Protestants and one non-
Christian--and even discussed dissolution of the party. 
Af ter an "X-ray Commission" had presented a report and recommended 
a more independent position and more attention to Confessional 
voters, Congress decided to refrain from dissolvin~ the party 
and to accept the recommendations. Some moderates and trade-
unionists had opposed the report, which was couched in fairly 
radical and trendy language, and left the PPR; a few joined 
the PvdA. 274 
The general elections of 1971 caused more disapppointment 
and self-doubt arnong the Radicals, who had fought them with 
a "shadow cabinet" and a common platform with D'66 and the 
PvdA. 'fhe PPR polled 1.8% of the popular vote, enough for 
only 2 seats; most of the voters were young intellectual or 
clerical and sales workers of Catholic . . 275 or~g~n. This time 
Party Congress gave up hope of winning over Catholic or 
Protestant \'lorkers, and decided to focus on the "partisans 
276 
of the poor" instead of the poor themselves. The "cane 
273Radikalenkrant 19 (June 1970). 
274 Van Ginneken, op. cit., p. 34. 
275Ibid ., pp. 156-157; National Election Study 1971: of 
29 PPH voters in the sample, 7 were industrial workers, 12 
progessional, clerical or sales workers. 




sugar wing" of radical activists had won out against the 
"trade union win:~, 11 as party historian Van Ginneken put it. 277 
Rather than concentrate on elections, the party was to spread 
a new mentality and take action outside parliament with 
278 
respect to issues like peace, foreign aid anti ecolo~y. 
'rhe new strategy waS elaborateu further by a new party 
chairman, Dolf Coppes, a former priest and social worker. 
He conceived of the PPR as part of the European New Left, 
striving for socialization of production anti workers self-
management, as weIl as personal development and solidarity 
with all of mankind. Though capitalism remained the main 
f h " "1" dIt 1 d td t ' 279 enemy or 1m, SOC1a 1sm an c ass s rug~ e appeare ou a-eG. 
The PPR was to build a bridge between extra-parliamentary 
action groups in workshops, schools and neighbourhoods on the 
280 
one hand, and parliament on the other. 
The three Hadical members of parliament who had split 
from the Catholic party in 19G8 were not very happy with the 
ncw lino. Two of them, both close to the trade unionist wing, 
had left the PPH by Hl71j thc third was reelected in 1~71, 
but feIl ill and res~gned the next year. Thus a new team 
277Van Ginneken, op. cit., p. 15; Vrij Nederland, 
13 November 1971; cane sugar was sol~ by Radicals and others 
in Third Wor1d shops, main1y as a symbo1 of positive foreign 
aid. 
278 Radika1enkrant 28 (September 1971). 
279Radika1enkrant 32 (March 1972); pub1ished separate1y 
as weIl, as D. Coppes, Nu is het meest radikale nog niet goed 
2;enoeg. 
280 
'I'rouw J 22 September 1971; Haagsche Courant, 4 November 
1~J71. 
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filled the list of candidates in 1972, headed by Bas de Gaay 
Fortman, a young lawyer and professor of economics, who had 
just returned from Zambia and given up his membership of the 
Anti-Hevolutionary Party. He led a rather playful campaign 
in American style--talkin~ to ~eople in the streets, intro-
ducing himself, usinlI sad~ets like an American army cap--
directed acainst the Liberal Party rather than the Confessional 
parties \'lhich had been the tar,_.,ets of the PPH in 1~70 and l~'i'l. 
The campaign proved very successful; the PPH won 7 seats in 
parliament and 4.8% of the popular vote, mostly from first-
time voters, but also 1'rom the Confessional parties and Pvdi\. 
Only 45~ were Catholics, 25% Protestants and 30% non-
Ch . t· 281 rl.S l.an. The parliamentary party still over-represented 
Catholics, but included two Protestants. It could also boast 
two trade unionists, both active in the WorkinS Party for a 
Critical Trade Union }~vement; one of them, Van Gorcum, led 
282 
a small union of Protestant senior employees. 
Bas de Gaay Fortman, the parliamentary party leader, 
described the PPR as a "long-term, mentality and vant',uard 
party" (lan;;:.e termi jn, mentali tei ts- en voorhoedeparti j) tha t 
was rooted in action groups but was also ready to take part 
283 in a progressive government. The latter statement proved 
281B• De GaayFortman, Politiek op termijn (Baarn, 1974); 
De Nederlandse Kiezer '72 (Alphen aan de Rijn, 1973). 
282Hadikalenkrant 36 (November 1972); 37 (December 1972). 
283 , De Gaay Fortman, De Nederlandse, Chapter 2; Haagse 
~, G January 1~73. 
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true when Den Uyl, the Labour party leader, offered the Hadicals 
two posi tions in his cabinet and a sta te secretaria t. l'he 
PPR accepted, but against the opposition of astrong left 
wing. 284 1'his left wing had gro\m rather rapidly, mostly 
from young members who joined the party in great numbers af ter 
1971, of ten af ter a disappointing experience in the PvdA or 
without any political experience at all. The new party chair-
man, a Protestant education worker nnd former PvdA rnember, 
showed sympathy for the left wing, while emphasizing the dis-
tance between PvdA and PPH, arranging meetings and exchan~es 
of articles in party journals with the PSp. 285 The left win~ 
seemed far from homogeneous, inspired by anarchism as well as 
JvIarxism, but of ten uni ted in opposi tion to the "embour.':.!,eoise-
ment" and "governmentalisrn" of the party members in govern-
ment and parliament. 
Internal conflicts soon ravaged the party, both at the 
national and the provincialor municipal level. Already in 
1973 the Party Council--called Core Group (Kerngroep) in the 
PPH--clashed with the parliarnentary party over the defence 
, 286 budget, which the latter refused to reJect. In 1975 the 
Executive Committee, led by a female teacher with sympathy 
for the Left, fought similar conflicts.with the parliamentary 
284 VOll<skrant, 12 February 1973; De Groene Amsterdammer, 
6 June 1973; Radikalenkrant/PPHAK (I-larch 1973); the vote was 
342 against 242. 
285pPHAK (October 1973) (December 1973); NHC, 12 June 1972; 
De Nieuwe Linie, 7 February 1973, Het Binnenhor;-lO February 1973. 
286D T' 'd e lJ , 15 December 1973. 
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party over Dutch membership in NATO and cooperation with 
287 Christian Democrats. Van Gorcwn, the leader of the Protes-
tant union of senior employees, and the only member of parlia-
ment who supported the left wing .ê:. outrance, resigned and 
joined the PSP in 197G. 288 At the national level, conflicts 
coultl still be controlled until 1977, but in Groningen they 
came to a he ad in 1975. The Radical member of the pro6ressive 
provincial ~overnment clashed with the majority of his party 
branch when he voted for the establishment of a large chemical 
plant that could pOllute the environment, but would brinG 
jobs to an area with high unemployment; he changed his vote 
289 
only when threatened wi th recall. In the Ci ty of Groninisen 
a Hatlical alderrnan came also under attack from his own party 
v!hen he sided \\Ti th the PvoA against Communist agi tation in 
290 
working class neighbourhoods. 
The internal conflicts as weIl as the rather idealist 
demands of the PPR made it a difficult ally for the other 
progressive parties. In Amsterdam, Radicals joined a leftist 
municipal government af ter the elections of 1974, which had 
~iven them 3 seats (6% of the popular vote) on City Council. 291 
287Volkskrant, 24 June 1975; l-'PHAI: 72 (5 December 1975). 
288 Volkskrant, 27 June 1975; NHC, 8 June 1976; PPPJ\.K 65 
(August 1975), 85 (June 1976). 
289 Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 28 August 1975, 22 September 
1975, 11 June 1976. 
290Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 11 February 197G. 
291Gemeentestatistiek (Amsterdam, 1974); the PPR did best 




RoeI Van Duijn, former Provo and Kabouter, but member of the 
PPR since 1973, was elec ted alderman for enert>Y affairs. He 
attempted to practice his "theory of two hands"--reformin;::; 
through government anti experimenting with utopia at grass 
root level--by stimulating solar and wind ener~y production, 
biolo~ical farming on municipal farms, and alocal broad-
casting system, and by provoking his colleagues. He proved 
only moderately successful in the former, but extremely successful 
in the latter. Tensions rose in the municipal governrnent 
\'Ihen Van Duijn supported the resistance ai~ainst sUbway con-
struction in the inner city, which all his colleagues had 
voted for. 292 Soon af ter the city had calmed dovm, Van 
Duijn was expelled from the municipal ~overnment. The PPH 
remained united behind him and refused to nominate a successor, 
so that the left coalition in Amsterdam feIl apart. 293 
The Radical members of the national government showed 
more moderation than Van Duijn, but even they of ten took 
minority positions that aroused the indignation of their more 
conservative colleagues. Their ideas about social defence--
"'rhe Netherlands an open city"-- were denounced as "utopian" 
and "fatally dangerous" by Catholics and Democrats '66 
t " 1 294 respec ~ ve y. Efforts to stop indu:iitrial expansion and 
292Van Duijn, En tranen. 
293 Ibid .; NRC, 4 December 1975, 10 January 1976. 
294De Tijd, 22 March 1974; Telegraaf, 26 March 1974; the 
memorandum "'1'he Netherlands an open ci ty" was published by the 
party but with approval of its members in the government; it 
proposed reduction of military defense and preparation of 
social or non-violent defense. 
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save the natural environment were o~posed by both Right nnd 
Left, Liberals and Communists. When the Radical minister of 
Culture, Hecreation and Social Vlork, proposed "relevance to 
society" as one of the criteria for subsidizing works of art, 
he ran into angry opposition from the leftist League of 
295 Dcsigning Artists, the Communist Party and the Liberals. 
By 1977 the PPH had becorne sornewhat isolated in the Dutch 
political system, to the dismay of most moderatcs. With 
grcat difficul ty i t accelJted an elcctoral alliance \'Ii th the 
PvdA and a common ~latforrn--in spite of distli;reernent about 
industrial democracy, economic ,~rowth and cultural policies--
but it refused to consider another coalition that would 
296 include Christian Democrats. This relative isolation may 
have contributed to its electoral defeat in 1977; from 7 seats 
and 4.8% of the popular vote in 1972 (or 5.4% at the provincial 
elections of 1974) it went down to 3 seats and only 1.7% of 
the vote. While many of its 1972 voters switchea to PvdA, 
DI 66 and even the new Christian Democratic Appeal,the remaining 
or new voters of 1977 were more secular (34% did not belang 
to a church, 34% belonged to the Catholic Church) and 
possibly more radical, since they had of ten voted PvdA or 
297 PSP before. 
The electoral decline led to another period of self-
295NHC , 7 February 1977, 8 February 1977. 
296 
- Volkskrant, 7 Harch 1977; PPHAK 99 (18 l'Jarch 1977). 
297pPHAK 106 (August 1977); ficiures from Intomart Election 
Survey, pub lica tion forthcomin~~. 
7 
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nna1ysis and internal debate, rcsulting in the resi~nation of 
the Executive Cornmittee and a victory for the mOderate, parlia-
mentarist 0111 Guard. The new Executive Conuni ttee, thoul~h lnore 
moderate thé~n thc ollt one, was headed (lè.>,ün by a typical 
activist, ,1 farmer priest and Pvw\. rnClf10er \'.'ho worl<cd in a 
~rintin~ coo~crativc 
') lj 3 
arw li veej in él comraune in Groningen. L 
1100':cver, the darxist vice-chairman oi' the old Executive Committee, 
v/ho L}voureu ;t popul.ar front of FilE, PvdA :lnd CPN, VI<.\S not 
2:} :J 
reelected. 
'l'hou~h losinL voters, the PPH continued to win members. 
Frorn 3S00 in 1971 and GOOO in 1973 it grew to 13,000 in 1975 
and 16,000 by 1977. 300 In the early days every meIllber could 
attend a party congress, but now 10cal branches (action centres) 
could delei~ate only 10;~ of their membership to a con~~ress. 
A measure of direct democracy was retained through the right 
of local or provincial branches to reca11 party members from 
municipa1 or provincial governments or councils. The party 
counci1 or Core Group, elected by provincial branches, could 
recall the national Executive Committee, elected by Party 
Con,~ress. Party Con);ress in turn cou1d reca11 l-'arty rnembers 
301 
of parliament or even <.;overnment. Interna1 party democracy 
298 pP1{AK 112 (11 November 1977); 113 (25 November 1977). 
29lj'rh . . t' h' 1)'", e l'larXl.S Vl.ce-c éll.rman, _ 
out of 386 votes for the chairmanship 
(19 November 1976). 
Jon~, had received 93 
in 1976, PPRAK 92 
300pP1u\K 63 (June H05); 113 (25 November 1977); Haagse 
~, 30 r.Iarch 1974. 
301DY_laws in PPHAK 87 (10 September 1976). 
? 
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seems to huvc Leen asc;rea t as in thc PSP--a!Jart rrOlij the 
la tter' s rcrerenuum amon,,~ the memiJership--and lJossi tly (~reater, 
if one uscs circulation of elites as an indicator; in the first 
ten years of its existence, the PPR had 8 different chairmen, 
whereas thc PSP could toast only five over the first ten years 
302 
of its existence anu four durin~ its second decade. 
Party members enjoyed not only consideratIe influence on 
uecisions of thc iJé1rty, hut also many opportuni ties to tUj(e 
fJart in local or na tional actions • 1\ t the na tional leve 1 
they could choose amont~ 50 ~~roups, concerned wi th envi ronmental 
or ener~y 4uestions, foreign aid, boycotts of An~olan coffee 
(unti 1 1975) or (South-African) OutslJan oran::;es, support 
national liLera tion lilovements, femini sm, clnd so forth. The 
350 loc~l branches or action centres tried to stimulate ana 
coorclina-ce loc(,l étctions anu cliscussions, while also aSI)iring 
to be "re",.l cOiilmuni ties" for their member::; by, for example, 
303 havin~ common meals. The Amsteruam branch practised more 
direct democracy by rotating executive functions. Four thematic 
workin:..:. parties at national and loc al levels studied the four 
main thernes of Hadical ideology: power, peace, environment 
and well-being (welzijn). The party journal--entitled 
Radikalenkrant (Radicals' Journal) from 1968 to 1973 and 
PPItAK (short for "Poli tical Party of Hadieals Action Journai," 
302rrhe PvdA has had only seven chairmen over 30 years; 
in fact, turnover in the PPR Exectitive Committee was considered 
too high ty the party leadership, PPHAK 106 (Aul:!;ust 1977). 
3UJ, Speech of chairman Van Vam, in, PPlU~K (January 1~74). 
( 
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but also meaning "hash" or "leftovers" in Dutch) af ter 1973--
published theoretical studies (not very of ten) and reports on 
actions and decisions of the party, as weIl as a column on 
"practical radicalism" with advice about yoga, health food 
and meditation. Hadicals, af ter all, were expected to chan~e 
themselves as weIl as the world through a "soft revolution.,,304 
The attention given to individual consciousness and 
personal involvement may betray the Christian heritage of 
the Political Party of Radicals. It mayalso remind the 
reaaer of the League of Christian Socialists as weIl as of 
Anarchist Sroups like thc Lea~ue of Anarchist Socialists. 
Bath the League of Christian Socialists and the Political 
t-'arty of Radicals broke away from Confessional parties (though 
the former only indirectly) and developed into radical activist 
groups with anarchist tendencies, while failin~ to mobilize 
Christian workers. HOI'lever, whereas the anarchist tendencies 
destroyed the League, they may have reinforeed the PPR, at 
least in terms of members. The Hadical combination of extra-
parliamentary activism anu parliamentary reforrnisfil--Hoel 
Van Duijn' s strateL~y of the "two hands"--has of ten been 
considered the party's main asset, thoubh it has also produced 
severe conflicts and could still destroy the party in the 
lon8 run; it does distin~uish it frofil the Christian Old Left. 305 
Though hetero!J,eneous in ideoloi;ical and reli,l~ious background, 
304 M. Ter Borg, De zachte revolutie (Amsterdam, 1976). 
305pPRAK 102 (6 May lY77); see section 1.5 above. 
1(12 
all Radicals seemed to accept this strategy, as weIl as basic 
p1anks of the party pro,,';ramme like workers self-management 
without nationalization --by convertin~ shares into bonds and 
turning lJower away from (former) shareholders to workers 
councils--direct action, cultural revolution and individual 
306 
self-development. They also tended to share a similar 
social background of whi te collars , hi,~her educé-ttion and 
middle class incomes: 37% were "senior employees" and 35% 
IIjunior emlJloyees," according to a survey held at the end of 
I~G3; only 9~b were manual workers • About 30% had enjoyed 
some form of hi~her (college) education. 307 
2.() Conclusion 
The brief histories of the four main New Left groups in 
the Netherlands have filled a rather long chapter. From 
them we can now extract the elements for a uefinition of the 
Dutch New Left--as weIl as elements for a critical evaluation 
of the New Left project, which will be the topic of Chapter 
Five. 
To some extent the Pacifist Sociali~t Party, Provo, 
Nieuw Links and the Political Party of Radicals continued or 
306 A special lJarty con~ress voted,an elaborate plan for 
wor!{ers' self-management in 1975; see PPRAK 71 (November 1975); 
see also PPHAK 80 (April 1976) and PPliAK 91 (November 1976). 
307van Ginneken, olJ. cit., p. 152; according to inter-
viewees 2 and 8 these lJroportions chan~ed little durin~ the 
1970s; manual workers never joined the party in large numbers, 
but perhaps the number of stuuents and unemployed increased 
while social and cultural workers became more important 
within the (vague) category of (senior?) employees. 
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revived different Old Left traditions: Revolutionary Socialism, 
Anarchism, Social Democracy and the Christian Left. Yet they 
also shareJ three basic characteristics that distin~uish them 
from the Old Left, or at least the mainstream of the Old Left: 
(I) They all strove for a fundamental aemocratisation 
of society, and specifica11y for workers' se1f-mana~ement in 
industry. They of ten started with rather va~ue notions of 
economic democracy in the 1960s, but developed more specific 
308 
,ma radical lJlans in the 19 70s. The ::JocL.!.1 Democratic anu 
Communist mains-cream 01' the Old Left had rejected the idea 
of self-mana~ement as an anarchist or synuica1ist aeviation; 
the more marginal Revolutionary Socialist and Anarchist 
tiroups as weIl as same Christian Leftists had su~ported--and 
indeeu introduced--the idea but rare1y elaborated it in specific 
309 plans. The Hi~ht remained opposed to self-management in 
the 1970s, thou,.;h i t came to élccejJt proposals for more powerful 
\' 1 f' 'I . "',I \' 1, " t ,310 \or<s ~ounc~ s ana poss~~ y vorKer U~rec ors. 
308 Especially PvdA (Nieuw Links) and ppn.; the PSP did not 
produce a plan but discussed many details in conferences and 
i'lorkin:1 parties ; only Provo ne{~lected this yuestion, durin,:, 
its short existence; however, its successor, Oranjevrijstaat, 
experimented with self-manasement in its own or~anisation; 
these ideas are analysed in more depth in Chapter 4. 
309 See above, Chapter 1; in the 1~20s Social Vemocrats 
published elaborate plans for a form of industrial democracy 
which they would reject out of hand as too authoritarian in 
the 1970s (see Op weg naar arbeiderszelfbestuur, op. cit., 
p. lb); the utopia of 50 years ago may seem arealistic if not 
already outdated plan now! 
310 See the ~overnment programme of the Liberals and Christian 
Democrats in 1977, "Bestek '81," quoted in NEC, 30 June 1978; 
for the platforms of these parties see Parlement en kiezer (1971), 
especially pp. 110, 165-1G7, 368-369, 512-513; and I. Lipschits, 
ed., Verkiezini~spro~ramma' s (The l-la!~ue, 1977), especia11y 
pp. 10 and 229-230. 
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(11) All four .:-;roups ado);Jted a dual strategy of "two 
hands" or "two tracks"; direct extra-parliamentary action 
"from belo\'l" and parliamentary or le;;islative action "from 
above." Their direct action tended to serve instrumental as 
weIl as expressi ve eneis; in other words, i t \,é:l.S a means 
towards other ends but also an enti in itself. 311 Thus it 
was a form 01' pressure on authori ties or a \'ray to raise poli-
ticnl consciousness amon~ participants or observers, but also 
a [orm of play an~ Gelf-expression and an experience of soli-
durity for New Leftists. Old Leftists mi~ht use direct 
action for instrumental ends--only moderate, mainstream Social 
Deldocra ts \"lould refuse these means--out not for expressi ve 
ends. I,loreover, they rarely combined direct action wi th 
electoral action in a dual strategy, but generally subordinated 
the former to the latter (Social Dernocrats, Christian Left) 
or the latter to the former (Anarchists, to alesser extent 
-, ,. 31 ~~ Revolutionary Soclallsts). 
311The distinction between instrumental and exvressive 
action is taken from F. Parkin, ~iddle Class Radicalism 
(Manchester, 19G8), p. 34. It is similar, of course, to 
Weberls distinction between zweckrational and wertrational; 
see also Kroes, op. cit., p. 11. 
31 ') ~See Chapter One; Anarchists conceived of direct action 
as a rneans towards revolution, culminating in a general strike 
or mass insurrection, to which electoral action might contri-
bute as a form of agitation--thou~h more of ten it detracted 
from the main ~oal, hence it was rarely used by Anarchists; 
Hevolutionary Socialists attached more importance to it tut 
relied also on üirect action, culminating in a takeover of 
the Louri;eois sta te by armed worlcers, as the only secure way 
to socialism; however, some of thern did not define their 
strate,;y clearly but su,~Gesteû an unspecified "peaceful road 
to socialism"--but none of them developed a dual strate~~y. 
Notitie: 
 
Door een fout in de paginering, ontbreekt 
pagina 185. Het vervolg van pagina 184 vindt u 
op pagina 186. 
p 
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The or~anisational structure of the New Left groups to 
some ex tent reflected the strategy of "two hands." Generally 
they allowed more power to local branches and to action groups 
or working parties than Old Left i;roups vlOuld--except perhaps 
for the Anarchist Federation. The New Left ,~roups also 
recrui te d more new petty bour,\..seois rnembers, inte llec tuals an~ 
yrofessionals, and fewer rnanual workers than most Old Left 
organisations. '1'his mi~ht explain differences in style and 
. . 313 or~';an~sat~on. 
(111) All four ~roups cal led for a cultural revolution 
and a new mentality oriented towards self-expression, creati-
vity, solidarity anti peaceful cooperation, rather than indi-
vidual achievement, economie ~rowth and competition. This 
new mentality was expressed by protests a~ainst the Cold War 
an~ the Amcrican intervention in Vietnam, by support for 
"'l'hird \:orld" countries but also by the counter-culture of 
beat music, drur~s, hapf.>cninL';s and the "sexual revolution" in 
the IY60s and the ecological movement or feminism in the IY70s. 
Some Old Left groups such as the Lea!;:;ue of Christian Socialists, 
the l,loker (Sledgehammer) ;;roup or the vJorkers Youth Centre 
had adhered to somewhat similar values but in a different 
context: the class stru~gle, which reijuired self-discipline 
anti sacrifice; individual picasure, self-ex~res~ion and 
creativity were secondary to them. 
If one adds up the three elements one could define the 
3l3'1'his somewhat speculélti ve and incomlJlete explanation 
\'lill be developed further in Chapter b below. 
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New Left in the Hetherlunds as a movement 1'01' fundamental 
Llemocratisation of society aimin,~ at self-manal~ement and 1'01' 
a new culture oriented towards self-expression, creativity 
and peaceful cooperation, which it tried to achieve by 
combining direct extra-parliamentary action with parliamentary 
an~ le~islative action in a dual strate~y. The four ~roups 
described here met these criteria, though same more than 
others; also, most of theli1 were divicteel into factions or 
tendencies, some of which were more "new leftish" than others. 
The next chapter vii 11 examine whether one could apply 
this definition to the New Left (Neue Linke, Nouvelle Gauche) 
in Germany anel France. In Chapter Four the ideas sketched 
here will be further analysed and related to German and French 
ideas. These ideas will be evaluated in Chapter Five, in 
the social and politican context described earlier in this 
chapter. Since these last tv/o chapters take a systema tic 
rather than a historical approach, it may be useful to dwell 
a little on the historical puttern found in this cha~ter here. 
lÎ.round 1960 only the Pacifist Socialist Party could be 
classified as a New Left ,;roup--wi th difficul ty. Dy 19G5 a 
pure New Left ~roup sprang up: Provo. It inspired in turn 
the psP--to more direct action--and some young mernbers of thc 
Lrtt)our Party. In 196G thc latter startecl Nieuw Links, at 
first only mildly New Leftish, but by 1970 ;;enerally wi thin 
our defini tion. In 19 G8 a f';roup of Christians set Uj) the 
Political Party of Hadicals, which evolved in a Uew Left 
direction wi thin a fevl years. In the 19 70s, the Labour Party 
18~3 
as a whole accepted the be,sic Ile\·! Left ideas o r1'his pattern 
will be compared to the development of the New Left in France 




COMPARATIVE COMMENTS ON THE NEW LEFT IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 
Introduction 
A systematic comparison of the Dutch, French and German 
New Left would encounter difficulties of many kinds. In 
spite of their geographical proximity France, Germany and 
the Netherlands have different histories, languages, social 
structures and political systems. The number of relevant 
variables seems too great to bring any comparative analysis 
to a satisfactory conclusion. Therefore the purpose of this 
chapter is a more modest one: to apply and generalise the 
definition of the Dutch New Left of the previous chapter to 
groups that are considered part of the French or German New 
Left. A few comparative comments will help to understand 
the peculiar characteristics of the Dutch New Left. 
In spite of some important differences, the New Left 
groups in the three countries seem to share the basic charac-
teristics summed up in Chapter 2.6, especially the goals of 
fundamental democratisation and cultural revolution. Not all 
French and German groups pursued a dual strategy, however, as 
parliamentary or legislative action appeared impossible or 
unattractive to them. These groups--the "Subversive Action" 
tendency in Germany, the Situationists, Neo-Anarchists and 
189 
190 
Socialisme ou Barbarie in France--will be classified as "New 
Ultra-Left" here. They remained small and marginal but played 
an important "seminal" role in the first stage of the New 
Left movement in these countries, comparable to that of Provo 
in the Netherlands. 
Even groups in France and Germany that shared all three 
characteristics and pursued a dual strategy lent less emphasis 
to parliamentary action than their Dutch counterparts. They 
also displayed more interest in theoretical questions, and 
Marxist theory in particular, but less interest in moral and 
cultural issues. Nevertheless they resembled Dutch New Left 
groups in many respects. Particularly striking were the 
similarities between the Dutch Pacifist Socialist Party and 
the French Unified Socialist Party, as weIl as those between 
the Dutch Labour Party and the French Socialist Party. The 
German Young Socialists could be compared to Nieuw Links in 
the Dutch Labour Party, but the German Socialist Student League 
seemed relatively unique. It proves equally difficult to find 
German or French counterparts of the Political Party of 
Radicals. 
The similarities between groups in the three countries 
go beyond their basic characteristics •. They concern also the 
social base of the New Left movement, which seems "new petty 
bourgeois" in most cases, and to alesser extent proletarian 
or semi-proletarian--i.e. clerical or white collar workers 
rather than manual workers. Furthermore, the movement followed 
a somewhat similar pattern of development in the three countries. 
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Started by radical, more or less anarchist groups in the margins 
of the political system, it would gradually "contaminate" 
larger leftist,usually Revolutionary Socialist parties--such 
as the Dutch PSP, the French Unified Socialist Party, to 
some extent the German Socialist Student League. In a third 
stage it might involve large mass organisations like the Dutch 
PvdA, the French Socialist Party and the German Social-
Democratie Party. 
These comparative comments should convince the reader 
that the Dutch New Left was not a unique and isolated phenomenon 
which could be attributed to peculiar Dutch circumstances such 
as pillarisation or consociationalism, or personal factors 
alone. The similarities found here suggest that it was a 
movement of ideas--which can be shared or borrowed easily--
rooted in certain social conditions, which may be typical of 
Western Europe and possibly of other advanced capitalist and 
industrial societies. The last point goes beyond the scope 
of this study, but will be taken up in a speculative way in 
Chapter Six. Chapters Four and Five will deal in more depth 
with the ideas of the New Left. 
3.1 The New Left in France 
The French Left has a long and impressive history which 
of ten served as an example to the Left in other eountries sueh 
us the Netherlancls. 1 Anu.rehisLI W:~lS (jui te iLllJortant in the late 
lEspecially in the l880s and l890s, when Domela Nieuwenhuis 
and other members of the Social Democratie LeaBue turned away 
from the "state sociali:.:JJilII of the Cerman model to the liber-
tarL'n <tud unarehist soeialislJl of Franee; sec Harnaer, op. ei t., 
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19th and early 20th century but became marginal af ter the 
First World War. By 1940 the Left waS dominated by two mass 
parties, the Communist Party and the Socialist or Social-
Democratie Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière; a 
third party, the Parti Radical, had joined them occasional1y--
for instanee in the Popular Front of 1936--but switched to 
2 the Right at other times. With the liberation of France from 
German occupation the Left reached a peak of popularity and 
power. Socialists and Communists together won majorities at 
the polls and carried out important reforms in a coalition 
with Christian Democrats. 3 
However, disillusionment, disagreement and decline set 
in soon afterwards. The Cold War divided the two mass parties 
of the Left. In 1947 the Communists were forced to leave the 
government and returned to a rather dogmatic and isolated 
form of opposition; yet they maintained mass support among 
large numbers of workers and peasants--between 20 and 25% 
of the electorate. 4 To remain in government the Socialists 
had to cooperate with parties of the Right; but af ter 1951 
they rarely did this. Yet the party lost many working-class 
p. 19; and R. De Jong, "Le mouvement 
Bas," Le mouvement social 83 (1973): 
libertaire aux Pays-
167-180. 
2 See G. 
1973); also; 
llli (Paris, 
Lefranc, Les gauches en France. 1789-1972 (Paris, 
D. Ligou, Histoire du Socialisme en France. 1871-
1962). 
3 Ibid .; also J. Chapsal and A. Lancelot, La vie politique 
en France depuis 1940 (Paris, 1975), particularly pp. 98-99, 
107-110. 
4R. Tiersky, French Communism 1920-1972 (New York, 1974), 
pp. 156-159, 320 ff. 
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voters and became a rather conservative party of notables, 
town councillors and rural burgomasters, though it maintained 
its Old Left Marxist or "Guesdist" programme. 5 In the 1950s 
the party played a rather ambivalent role in colonial wars 
in Indo-China and Algeria. Eventually France lost its vast 
cOloniql empire and recovered, like the Netherlands, by 
expanding and modernising its industry; but it was General 
De Gaulle rather than the Socialist party who guided the 
country through this difficult periode De Gaulle was supported 
by a new mass movement which was classified as right wing by 
scholars but which drew many voters from the Left. 6 
In view of the decline of the Old Left, France seemed 
ready for a New Left at a time when the Dutch Old Left was 
still going strong. As early as 1948 the philosopher Sartre 
and other Existentialists attempted to organise a new party, 
the Rassemblement Démocratique Révolutionnaire. Criticalof 
both the Socialist and the Communist party, it fo1ded soon 
afterwards in the Cold war. 7 Several other groups also sprang 
up in the late 1940s and early 1950s, trying to organise 
leftist Catholics, Radicals, Socialists and Communists who 
were dissatisfied with their parties. The most important 
5Ligou, op. cit., pp. 554, 596; see also M. Levin, 
Fission and Fusion on the French Left (Ithaca, 1970), pp. 
101-181; and J. Touchard, La gauche en France depuis 1900 
(Paris, 1977), pp. 297-305, on the influence of Guesde. 
6For an analysis of the right wing character of Gaullism 
see, R. Rérnond, La droite en France (Paris, 1968). 
7L . ev~n, op. cit., pp. 245-250. 
4# 
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group was probably the Mouvement de Libération .2.!:! Peuple, 
originally a social and cultural organisation of Catholic 
working-class families, which had been radica1ised and po1i-
ticised in the 1940s. Committed to socia1ism and direct 
action, the group maintained its interest in cultural issues 
and in a "révolution intérieure"--a typical New Left trait. 8 
With several other groups, the Mouvement de Libération 
du Peuple set up a Committee of Liaison and Initiative for 
the New Left in 1954. In 1957 the Committee became a politi-
cal party, the Union de la Gauche Socialiste. Like the Paci-
fist Socialist Party--founded in the same ycar--it was a 
réJ.tl1er heterogeneous group of intellectuals and clerical 
workers, united by an important issue, that of war and peace. 
Like its Dutch counterpart the Union de ~ Gauche Socialiste 
attracted groups of dissident Social Democrats and Communists; 
however, the groups were much 1arger in this case and required 
a formal merger. The new party came into being in 1960 and 
was called the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU). lts members 
shared a concern about the Algerian War and, to alesser 
extent, about democratisation of state and society and 
opposition to the Gaullist regime, but little else. 9 
Conflicts erupted within the party as soon as the Algerian 
8Ibid ., pp. 202, 210-220; J. Poperen, La gauche française 
(1958-1965) (Paris, 1972), PP. 68-72; and J-M. Donegani, 
"De MPF en PSU: un mouvement ent re en socialisme," Autrement 
8 (1977): 116-125. 
9Levin, op. cit., pp. 251-258, 176-180; see also G. Nania, 
Le PSU avant Rocard (Paris, 1973), pp. 61-64; E. Depreux, 
Servitude et grandeur du PSU (Paris, 1974), passim. 
< f 
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War approached its end. At the 1963 congress, seven tendencies 
competed for party support, ranging from 1ibera1 reformism 
to revolutionary socia1ism of Trotskyite inspiration. The 
"revolutionary reformist" tendency, which fitted our definition 
of the New Left better than any other, won a small majority. 
Without rejectitig par1iamentary action it 1ent emphasis to 
extra-par1iamentary action; it hoped to mobilise the "new 
working class" of skilIed technical and clerica1 workers for 
10 democratisation of the economy and the state. Internal 
conflicts continued to divide the party--and to contribute to 
its decline--until the Revolutionary Reformists won a clear 
2/3 majority at the 1967 congress and monopo1ised the Execu-
tive Committee. ll Most adherents of other tendencies, especi-
ally the moderate ones, left the party to join one of the 
political clu~s which mushroomed in the mid-1960s; they 
attracted many intellectuals who rejected the 01d Left parties 
and aspired to a more "modern" and "democratic" France. 12 
Thus by 1968 the Part i Socialiste Unifié was a fairly 
small but homogeneous party with a coherent and rather 
10Levin, op. cit., pp. 337-362; Nania, op. cit., pp. 191-203; 
Depreux, op. cit., Pp. 277-283 (text of the "revo1utionary 
reformist" motion) • 
llDepreux, op. cit., pp. 141-156; J. Poperen, L'Unité 
de la Gauche (1956-1973) (Paris, 1975), pp. 68-71; between 1960 
and 1967 the Executive Committee had represented different 
tendencies. 
12Poperen, La gauche française, distinguishes the reformism 
or "gauche moderne" of these moderate clubs from the "revolu-
tionary reformism" or "gauche nouvelle" of the PSU; however, 
the distinction is not a clear one, as some clubs were less 
"reformist" than the PSU--e.g. Poperen's own club; about the 
clubs see also J. Mossuz, Les clubs et la politique en France 
(Paris, 1970), especially pp. 5-14; Touchard, op. cit., PP. 319-323. 
t r 
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sophisticated project. George Lichtheim, an historian and 
political theorist, summed up the project as "technocratie 
revisionism" and concluded that 
the PSU had the merit of not being tainted with 
either Stalinism or reformisme This was perhaps 
another way of saying that it possessed neither a 
mass following nor a political platform; but intel-
lectuals rarely bother about such things, and in 
any case the PSU could be regarded as a stimulant 
to the two major organisations. 13 
Lichtheim exaggerated a little; intellectuals made up only 
40% of the membership according to a survey of 1968, and most 
of its voters were probably manual workers--but it was indeed 
a small party, counting at most 10,000 members and about 
500,000 voters in 1967. 14 It won a few seats in parliament 
but concentrated its activities on political education, public 
meetings and demonstrations. 15 
Lichtheim made a useful distinction between the "techno-
créltic revisionlsm" of the PSU and the "radical syndicalism" 
of more extreme and rnarginal ,~;roups which also tried to renew 
16 the French Left. In France these groups would be considered 
"L~auchiste" rather thetn "nouvelle l,auche"--perhQPs one coulcl 
translate this as "New Ultra-left" and "New Lef til respectively. 
13 G• Lichtheim, Narxism in Modern France (New York, 1966), 
p. 167. 
14Nania, op. cit., pp. 114-117; see also M. Rocard, Le 
PSU et 1'avenir socialiste de la France (Paris, 1969), pp:-5-44. 
15Nania, op. cit., pp. 207-228; Depreux, op. cit., 
passim. 
16Lichtheim, op. cit., pp. 183-192 especia11y; these 
notions will be clarified somewhat in Chapters 4 and 5 below. 
4 
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Unlike the New Left proper they rejected all parliamentary 
anel electoral action, but like the New Left they fought for 
self-management in society and for cultural revolution. In 
fact, they of ten inspired the New Left in these two areas, 
as will be argued below. Three of them will be described 
briefly here. 
The first one had split from the Fourth International 
in 1948 and published the journal Socialisme ou Barbarie from 
1948 to 1965. Like the Dutch Spartacus League, it moved away 
from Trotskyism to a form of Gouncil Gommunism, inspired by 
the Dutch Marxist Pannekoek. However, it went further and 
began to revise Marxism, criticising its positivist and 
bureaucratic-totalitarian elements. While the group's most 
important achievements may have been theoretical, it also 
17 
engaged in action on a modest scale. 
The second group had broken away from the Anarchist 
Federation in 1956 and published a journal, Noir et Rouge, 
between 1961 and 1970. As the name of the journal suggests, 
it tried to bridge the gap between 'Black' Anarchism and 
'Red' Marxism; it did not develop a coherent theory or 
18 project but remained a rather open discussion group. 
The third group was the most extreme and the most 
l7Gombin, op. cit., pp. 33-48; also D. Howard, 'The 
Marxist Legacy (New York, 1977), chapters 9 and 10; Sëë also 
Howard's interview with the main theoretician of the group, 
Cornelius Gastoriadis, in Telos 23 (1975): 131-155. 
18C• Lagant, "Sur Ie Neo-anarchisme," Noir et Hou~e 46 
(1970): 21-29; see also, A. Laude, "Les anarchistes," La Nef 
48 (1972): 117-129. 
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interesting one. Founded in 1957 by intellectuals and artists 
who had of ten sympathised with Surrealism and cooperated in 
the international COBRA group and counting branches in France, 
Italy, Scandinavia, Germany and the Netherlands, it could be 
considered the first New Left or Ultra-left International. 19 
In order to overcome the alienation and passivity of everyday 
life in capitalist society, they hoped to "create situations" 
of political and artistic action; hence they called themselves 
"Situationists." Their direct action of ten used or abused 
existing symbols and messages, such as advertisements and 
comics, to ridicule and debunk dominant ideology. Their aim 
was to abolish all "separate activities" of work, art, 
polities and so forth and to integrate them into one total 
creative act of free self expression. This would require a 
20 total revolution, led by workers' councils. The Situationist 
International never had more than 30 members, according to 
its own account, and kept the number down by recurrent purges 
and expulsions of members who appeared inconsistent, dishonest 
d . t 21 or ev~an. The group could be compared to Provo, which it 
had inspired through one of its Dutch members, Constant 
19G• Bartseh, "Die Situationistische Internationale," 
Osteuropa 26:4 (1976): 287-300; the COBRA group consisted 0 
artists from Copenhagen, Brussels and Amsterdam. 
20See Internationale Situationniste (Amsterdam, 1970), 
a reprint of the 12 issues of this journal which appeared 
between 1958 and 1969; for a more e1aborate discussion of 
its ideas see below, Chapter 4.2. 
21See Internationale Situationniste 12 (1969): 105-106; 
Bartsch estimates a membership of 1000 but without indicating 
his source (op. cit., p. 296). 
7 
Nieuwenhuis--but "dîsowned" Provo because of the latter's 
technocratic and elitist tendenc1es. 22 
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The three groups of the New Ultra-left remained small 
and were of ten divided by internal quarrels. Yet their 
influence spread beyond their ovm circ les, throu"sh their books, 
PQmphlets G.nd journals. Early in 1968 a radical group of 
students, called "~ enras:;és" in analogy with revolutionaries 
of the 1790s, began to disrupt classes and to agitate among 
students at Nanterre with Situationist slogans. Radicals of 
different backgrounds, Maoists, Trotskyites and Anarchists, 
joined a loosely organised Mouvement du 22 mars on the initia-
tive of a young soc1010gy student, Daniel Cohn-Bendit. Within 
a few weeks the Nanterre campus was closed dovm and i ts 
students moved on to the Sorbonne in Paris. Soon the Sorbonne 
was occupied by students, headed at first by the enragés from 
Nanterre who covered the walls of the respectable old building 
with Situationist slogans, such as "Prenez vos desirs pour 
la réalité" or "L'humanité ne sera heureuse que quand Ie 
dernier capitaliste sera pendu avec les tripes du dernier 
23 bureaucrate." From the Sorbonne a wave of occupations, 
strikes and other more or less revolutionary actions spread 
through Paris and all of France like wild-fire. 24 
22Internationale Situationniste 11 (1967): 65-66. 
23 R • V1énet, Enragés et situat10nnistes dans Ie mouvement 
des occupations (Par~s, 1968); also R. Gombin, Le projet révolu-
tionnaire (Paris, 1969), pp. 32-35; for a slightly different 
view see A. Dansette, Mai 1968 (Paris, 1971), pp. 50-51, 69, 152. 
24The literature about these events is too vast to be 
quoted here in detail; apart from the works quoted in footnote 
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Though the events of May and June 1968 in France cou1d 
not be exp1ained by one simp1e factor, the inf1uence of the 
New U1tra-1eft may have been substantia1 if not crucia1. 
B.E. BrO'l'ffi, a rather criticalobserver, conc1uded that "the 
spirit of '68 was perhaps best captured, one might even say 
incarnated, by the situationists.,,25 U1tra-1eftist ideas 
about workers' counci1s and se1f-management, direct action, 
cu1tura1 revo1ution and se1f-expression inspired posters and 
graffiti in the streets, and a1so speeches and platforms of 
more moderate leaders such as the Socia1ists and Socia1 
Democrats at the Char1ety Stadium. 26 
The New U1tra-1eft did not survive its triumphs of 1968. 
At first the sma11 groups attracted scores of new members and 
supporters, but soon afterwards they co11apsed, exhausted and 
confused. Some Maoist groups took up their ideas about direct 
action and direct democracy, but within a few years they 
tended to disappear as we11. 27 However, in a different and 
23 the f0110wing reader seems usefu1, C. Posner, ed., Ref1ections 
on the Revo1ution in France: 1968 (Harmondsworth, 1970); for 
a good journa1istic account see P. Sea1e and M. McConvi11e, 
French Revo1ution 1968 (Harmondsworth, 1968). 
25 B.E. 13rown, Protest in Paris. Anatom of a Hevo1t 
(Morristown, N.J., 1974 , p. 90; for simi1ar views see Bartsch, 
op. cit., p. 288 and J-F. Bott, "Les s1tuationnistes et 
l'économie canniba1e," Les Temps Modernes 299:300 (1971): 
2175-2181; a good summary of explanations or interpretations 
of the events is provided by Ph. Dénéton, and J. Touchard, 
"Les interprétations de la crise de mai-juin 1968," Revue 
Française de Science Po1itique (1970): 503-514. 
26poperen, L'Unité de la Gauche, pp. 139-140, 414; 
Dansette, op. cit., pp. 283-285; Depreux, op. cit., pp. 229-244. 
27See "Ni p1eurs ni couronnes," Noir et Rouge 46 (1970): 
1-20; G. Debord and G. Sanzuinetti, La véritab1e scission 
qq 
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diluted form their ideas were taken over by New Left parties 
like the PSU and trade unions like the Democratie Confederation 
of Labour. 28 
At its 1969 congress the PSU adoptcd a new prograrnrne 
which called for self-mana;~ement in factories and schools and 
29 
a new, socialist culture. '1'0 carry out the platform, the 
party decided to expand i ts modest nUJIlber of factory cells 
and to .si ve tlîem more \lei ';1'1 t VIi tJün the party or:~~ini sa tion. 30 
With the platform it won 4% of the popular vote in 1968, 
almost twice as much as in lY67. ;.Iemtership v/ent up é,-\~ain 
to 15,000; raany neVJ merabers \'lcrc Catholics wilo had l)een 
radicaliseû lJy the events of 1~G8 but objectcd to the anti-
clerical character of the Communist Party and the Socialist 
party.31 j·lémy of them helû radical and almost New Ultra-
leftist ideas; hence they of ten cri ticised the party leader-
ship's "technocratie" anc.i "reformist" leanings. 
dans l'internationale (Puris, 1972), pp. 11-80 and 83-95; 
about the Maoist groups in question see p. Kessel, "Vive la 
Révolution," La Nef 48 (1972): 105-115; J. Moreau, "Les maos 
de la Gauche Prolétarienne," ibid., pp. 77-103. 
28The French Confederation of Democratie Labour (Confédé-
ration Française Démocratique du 'l'ravail) had been a Catholic 
organisation until 1964; throughout the 1960s it became more 
radica1 and "New Lef ti sh," i. e. interested in worl<ers' se 11'-
management, direct action and cultura1.change; see E. Descamps, 
ed., La C.F.D.T. (Paris, 1971). 
29 Rocard, op. cit., pp. 125-183. 
30Ibid ., pp. 179-180; cf. K. Evin and R. Cayrol, "Les 
partis po1itiques dans les entreprises," Projet 106 (1976): 
633-648. 
31 Rocard, op. cit., p. 115. 
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Michel Rocard, elected party leader (National Secretary) 
in 1967, achieved personal successes at the presidential 
election of 1969 and at a parliamentary by-election in the 
same year; at the former he won 4% of the popular vote, not 
much less than the Social-Democratic candidate Defferre, 
while at the latter he defeated the Gaullist Prime Minister 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs Couve de Murville. However, 
electoral successes did not make him popular among his Ultra.-
leftist critics. 32 Between 1969 and 1972 Rocard was of ten 
outvoted at party meetings by the radical opposition, which 
only failed to capture the party because of its internal 
divisions. About five more or Ie ss Maoist and Trotskyite 
tendencies clashed with Rocard's New Left tendency, and with 
each other. 33 By 1972 Rocard seemed to have restored some 
unity in the party, around a new and more radical platform, 
the Manifesto of Toulouse. 
Workers self-management, democratie planning and cultural 
revolution remained the party's main goals, but they were 
interpreted in a more radical perspective of direct democracy, 
abolition of the social division of labour and creation of 
new desires. Moreover the manifesto committed the party to 
pursue a more revolutionary strate~y of popular mobilization 
32poperen asserts sligrtly facetiously, "dans Ie parti 
d'après mai 1968, il niest pas recommandé d'être candidat 
et il est franchement déconseillé d'être élu," L'Unité de la 
Gauche, p. 407. 
33 Ibid., pp. 223-226, 407-413; R. Voog, "Le PSU dix ans 
après," Chronique Sociale de France 5:6 (1971): 5-39. 
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and direct action, primarily at work-places to fight for 
workers' control, and secondarily in neighbourhoods, schools 
and consumer organizations in order to weaken bourgeois 
34 ideology and to prepare the way for a new culture. Most 
of the demands would have been acceptable to the New (and to 
some extent the Old) Ultra-left of 1968, for example the 
Mouvement du 22 Mars founded by Cohn Bendit. 35 The PSU 
established contacts with several Ultra-leftist groups as 
weIl as the PCF in these years, but nothing more than temporary 
tactical alliances at local elections resulted from these 
t " 36 mee J.n~~s. 
When the Communist Party and the Socialist Party agreed 
on a Common Programme in 1972, the PSU criticized its elec-
toralist and statist aspects but offered its critical support 
to a future Socialist-Communist coalition. The criticism 
did not satisfy the bulk of the Ultra-leftists, who began to 
leave and join existing groups like the Ligue Communiste 
(affiliated with the Fourth International) or establish new 
parties. 37 On the other hand the moderates around Rocard 
were attracted by the renewal of the Socialist Party and 
34r.Janifeste du parti socialiste unifié (Paris, 1972). 
35 Sauvageot, Geismar, Cohn-Bendit, Duteuil, La révolte 
étudiante (Paris, 1968), particularly pp. 63, 67, 81; cf. 
Gombin, Le projet révolutionnaire, pp. 19-23. 
3u Voo~, op. cit.; Poperen, L'Unit6 de la Gauche, p. 40Y. 
37Ibid .; also Lefranc, op. cit., pp. 241-245; some 
extremists tad left before 1972, some were expelled, e.::?;. 
the HéJ.Oist faction of Peasants and \1orkers. 
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finally joincd it aftar the ~rcsidentiul election of 1~74.38 
Af ter the splits and expulsions of the early 1970s the 
PSU sceffied to achieve some stability and coherence, of practice 
ns weIl as thuory, but no uniformity. Three or four tendencies 
kept competing for support at party congresses, which a~~reed 
on principles and objectives but differed on the strategie 
question concerning electoral alliances with the Socialists 
and Communists or with Trotskyites and other extremist groups. 
Generally, the left wing of the party worried more about its 
independenee with respect to the Union of the Left (PCF and 
PS).39 The 1977 party congress adopted a new platform, almost 
40 
unanimously, thou~h three alternatives had been presented. 
It again promised critical support for a Socialist-Comwunist 
coalition, hopin~ that popular unity and mobilization followin~ 
~n electoral victory of the Left would create a dual power 
structure and force the government to take steps towards 
socialism and self-management (Ie socialisme autogestionnaire). 
lts concrete demands resembied those of the 1972 Manifesto, 
but were more specific and more radical in some aspects, for 
instanee elimination of the school as a separate 1nstitution, 
38Tribune Socialiste, 20 December 1974; Politique Hebdo, 
27 l~arch 1975. 
39 Le Monde, 12 October 1974, 16 May 1976; POlitique Hebdo, 
19 December 1974; Liberation, 1 February 1975; Quotidien de 
Paris, 3 October 1974. 
40Tribune Socialiste 722 (15 becember 1976); alternative 
A represented the rnajority view favourable to coolJerat10n with 
PCF and PS, alternative D preferred the extreme left, alter-
native C a maoist line independent of other ilroups; cf. 
Interview 13. 
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establishment of consumer councils to control retail prices, 
and collective household services. 4l It defined its theory 
as an "open r.1arxism," allowing the relative autonomy of 
suprastructures, particularly religion; its National Secretary, 
Mousel, had been active in Catholic organizations. 42 
Though party members campaigned actively in local and 
general elections (in 1976, 1977 and 1978) they devoted more 
time and energy to direct action in neighbourhoods, factories 
and schools; PSU members played a leading part in the strike 
and occupation at the LIP plant at Besançon, in tenant and 
commuter committees in Paris, in neighbourhood councils in 
Grenoble, and in the national consumers' union, the Confédé-
t . d . 1 d d d . 43 ra 10n syn 1ca e u ca re e V1e. At the municipal elections 
of 1977 it made alliances mostly with the Socialists and 
Communists, but also with the Trotskyite Ligue Communiste 
Révolutionnaire or with other radical groups like the Ecologists. 
In 1978 it again failed to win any seats in the National 
44 Assembly. 
Comparing the development of the French PSU with that of 
the Dutch Pacifist Socialist Party, one is struck by the many 
41"ProPositions de programme pour la construction du 
socialisme autogestionnaire en France,v Critique Socialiste 
29 (1977). 
42Ibid ., p. 88; about Mousel see La Croix, 17 December 
1975. 
43 N• Rocard, ed., Des militants du PSU (Paris, 1971); 
Tribune Socialiste, 15 November 1975; Le Monde, 20 June 1976; 
PSU Documentation 106:107 (1976); Interview 13. 
44Tribune Socialiste, 23 Harch 1977; Le Honde, 21 j·la.rch 
1978. 
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similarities. Both had started around 1960 in opposition to 
the militarism and class collaboration practiced or condoned 
by the major Socialist (or Social Democratie) party in their 
War and the Al:~erian V/ar, but won new members and adopted new 
and more radical ideas during the late 1960s; internal con-
flicts raged in both, resulting in the departure of extreme 
leftists, of Trotskyite or Maoist persuasion, ns weIl &3 of 
reformists in the carly 1970s. In the late 19703, both 
united (thoU~h not completely) around radical platforms for 
workers ' self-mana:;ement, direct democracy and cu1 tural 
revolution, to be ~ursued throu~l direct action as weIl as 
through activity in parliaments or municipal councils. Of 
course there were important differences as weIl; the PSU 
used more Harxist langua'i:',e, tried to organize workers in 
sections d'entreprise (factory celis), and showed more toler-
ance for competing factions or tendencies--institutiona1izing 
them through proportional representation in the Executive 
Committee (Direction Politique Nationale) and the presentation 
of alternative motions and "orientation texts" or programmes 
45 
at party congresses. Both attracted many committed Christians, 
45 PSU Documentation 106:107 (1976); Rocard, Le PSU, 
p. 178-182; both PSU and PSP were orga~ized in three tiers, 
branch (section)-re~ion (fédération)-nation; party congress 
was elected by branches in the PSP but by regions in the PSU; 
it would elect the Executive Committee (Direction Politique 
Nationale or Partijbestuur), larger in the PSU than in the 
PSP; the latter would select a National Bureau or Dagelijks 
Bestuur; between congresses a party council (Conseil National, 
Partijraad) could check the Executive Committee--it played 
an important role in 1974 in resisting Rocard's attempt to 
merge with the PS. 
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mostly Catholics in the case of the PSU and Protestants in 
the case of the PSP. The similarities between PSU and PSP 
were not entirely fortuitous. Contacts between them were 
frequent and friendly; the larger and intellectually more 
productive PSU of ten acted as the elder brother and no doubt 
transmitted ideas to the PSp. 46 
Heanwhile the Social Democrats of the SFIO and many 
political clubs had also digested the events and ideas of 
May 1968. The SFIO itself did not survive the May events, 
nor its subsequent defeats at the general election of 19G8 
and the presidential election of 19G9--where its candidate, 
Defferre, received only 5% of the popular vote. Between 1969 
and 1971 it merged with a majority of the clubs under the new 
name Part i Socialiste, and under a new leader, François 
Mitterrand, leader of the largest confederation of clubs and 
fQrmer minister under the Fourth Republic. 47 Under Mitterrand's 
leadership the Socialist Party negotiated a Common Programme 
with the Communist Party which attracted 47% of the voters 
. t 7 1 t' 48 1n he 19 3 e ec 1ons. The PS also renewed its own programme 
46At congresses and celebrations like the annual summer 
festival of the PSU near Paris and the PSP festival at 
Utrecht in 1977 leading members from the other party would be 
present (Personal observations, June 1~7G La Courneuve; April 
1977 Utrecht). 
47Actually Nollet had resigned in 1969, but his successor 
(until 1971) Savary was generally seen as a caretaker and 
Mollet supporter; cf. Poperen, L'Unité de la Gauche, pp. 228-
336; P. Guidon1, IIistoire du nouveau parti socialiste (Paris, 
1973) • 
48 Poperen, ibid., pp. 360-399, 428; Guidoni, op. cit., 
pp. 339 ff. 
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and attracted many new members, mainly from progressive Catholic 
circles like the CFDT (Confederation of Democratic French 
Labour) but also from the PSU. An open conference on 
socialism and cooperation during Mitterrand's presidential 
campaign in 1974 helped to recruit most of the new members. 
Self-management (autogestion) was discussed intensively at 
the open conference--not surprisingly, as one commentator 
observed, since it had lone been the hobby-horse of progressive 
Catholics. 49 In 1975 the Socialist Party adopted a special 
platform on self-mana:';ement, prepared by a former PSU memLer, 
Martinet, The platform cal led for the socialization of major 
industries under the mana~ement of workers councils, with some 
supervision by representatives of consumers and of the state 
and in the context of democratic plannin:; i t ,üso cal led for 
él democratic trélnsformntion of the state "from belo\'[ anel from 
above" and for chan~es in education, urban l->lanr.in~ anel "Ie 
cQclro ~ 19:. vio" in .:;enora1. 'ro achieve this thc PS \'loulcl 
have to tal<:o extl'CL-par1iaTilentary as v/c11 as ~overnmontal 
Qction, in alliance \'lith other leftist parties Lased on CL 
"front de classe" of manual and c lerical workers , professione Is 
an(~ farmers; i t \'lould also have to clemocratize i ts O\'ffi organi-
t o 50 za l.on. 
49H • Portelli, "Au rendez-vous du PS," Es~rit 4:5 (1977): 
178-183, "la référence à l'autogestion, importee d~ la CFDT 
et du PSU et qui allait devenir l'axe doctrinal du parti, 
constituait jusqu'alors la charactéristique du progressisme 
catholique." (p. 179). 
50"Quinze thèses sur l'autogestion," Le Poing et la Hose, 
15 November 1975. 
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The new party achieved a considerable degree of internal 
democracy, at least insofar as it allowed many conflictin~ 
tendencies to coexist in its midst and compete for office and 
for new members. Practically all types of aId and New Left 
were present: aId Left "Guesdist" Social Democrats in the 
group Bataille Socialiste, more radical Marxists around Poperen 
in ERIS (Etudes, Recherches et Informations Socialistes), 
Modern Leftists around Defferre, Mauroy and Mitterrand, New 
Leftists around Rocard and Nartinet and more radical New 
Leftists in CERES (Centre d'Etudes, de Recherches et d' 
Education Socialistes).5l 
The two New Left currents cooperated for a while, 
publishing Fronti~re together. But they split over tactical 
issues in 1~75, when Jilartinet and Rocard joined the party 
leadership whereas CERES formed the main opposition to 
Mitterrand and was ousted from the Secretariat. The theoreti-
cal and personal backgrounds of the two currents were slightly 
different, thou~h both included many Catholics and higher 
civil servants, professionals and academics. The group 
around Rocard and Martinet, which started to publish Faire. 
came from the PSU and showed more concern about statism 
52 (étatisme) and socio-cultural issues 1ike eco1ogy. CERES, 
51 N• Lieber, "Ideo1ogy and 'I'actics of the French Socialist 
Party," Government and apposition 12:4 (1977): 455 ff; also 
(more biased), Guidoni, op. cit., pp. 77-86; Poperen, L'Unite 
de la Gauche, pp. 322-335, 433 ff. 
52Lieber, op. cit.; e.g. Faire 23 (1977); M. Rocard, 
"Changer les enjeux," La Nef 52 (1973): 57-78; G. r.1artinet, 
L'avenir de uis vinat ans (Paris, 1974); M. Rocard, Questions 
a l'Etat socialiste Paris, 1972). 
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which published Répères, had remained loyal to the SFIO of 
Mollet, although it was radicalized during the 1960s. Some 
of its members and some of its ideas also came from the PSU, 
but these ideas were integrated into a more Marxist perspec-
tive inspired by Gramsci, Lefèbvre and Gorz, and by Castoriadis 
and Bourdet of Socialisme ou Barbarie. 53 With Rocard and 
I/lartinet i t shared ideas about workers self-management, 
cultural revolution, the quality of life and the need for a 
dual strategy of parliamenatry and extraparliamentary action, 
but it put more emphasis on economie issues and in particular 
on expansion of the state sector through nationalizations. 54 
CERES also disagreed with the party majority--which included 
Rocard and Martinet since 1975--about forei~n policy and 
preferred an alliance with left win~ Gaullists or Nationalists 
to the existini]; alliélnce with left wing Hadicals. 55 
CERES was di ssol ved as an "or(~anized tendency" in 1977 
b t t · d t bI' h R' è d t . f 56 u con 1nue 0 pu 1S cp res an 0 organ1ze con erences. 
It controlled about 15 of the 95 party federations, including 
Paris; in Paris its members engaged in several extraparliamen-
tary actions , a:·~ainst the construction of a freevray and é;gainst 
53W• Charzat, et al., Le CERES un combat pour Ie socialisme 
(Paris, 1975), pp. 244-249. 
54See Répères 43 (1977); and Interviews 11 and 12; the 
differences between the two New Left tendencies will be 
cl,'lrified furthcr in Cha1lter 4.3. 
55cElms hoped to rcu.lise sociali::;m in Frélnce independent 
of the EEC, whereas nocard c.:;;). lJre fe rre~ a more intern~.l tioné:tli st, 
Eurol-,ccul strél.te~:;/; sec n0t:èrc::; 41 (1977): 20-4,) es);)cciu.l1y; 
é,lso Le ]"lonJe, 22 j:larch 1~)7e. 
5')Le ~.londe, 19 June 1~77. 
4 
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land specualtion; they were active in 45 sections d'entreprise, 
mainly at banks, post offices and government agencies. 57 At 
the 1977 party congress, 25% of the delegates voted for the 
53 CERES motion. 
Both New Left tentiencies, CERES and the Fairc-brouP 
around Rocard, contributed to the renewal and radicalisation 
of the Socialist Party. To some extent it became a New Left 
party, appealing to voters with slogans like "Vivre autrement" 
and "Chaneer l.§.. ~" and demands for "autogestion" and "espaces 
verts" (green spaces, parks), and supporting or initiating 
various extra-parliamentary actions. 59 lts appeals were 
successful, insofar as its share of the popular vote rose 
from 17% in 1968 to 23% in 1978. Most of its new voters and 
members were probably white collar workers. Membership went 
up from about 70,000 in 1969 to 150,000 by 1975. 60 
The growth of the Socialist Party may have worried its 
Communist a11y. When the 1978 election came closer, tensions 
increased. Ne~otiations about a revised Common Platform broke 
dOVin. Divided, the French Left narrowly failed to win a 
57 Rapport d'activité 1971-1973, Fédération de Paris 
(mimeograph). 
58 Le Monde, 19 June 1977. 
59 See A. I>1eyer, "Réflexions sur l'originalité du PS," 
La nouvelle revue socialiste 12:13 (1975): 5-24; R. Cayro1, 
"Le PS et l'autogestion," Projet 813 (1975): 9G9-974; Le 
Monde, 6 Ju1y 1975. 
60V• Wright and Machin, "The French Socialist Party, 
1971-75," Political Wuarter1y 46:1 (1975): 36-52; C. Ysma1, 
"La gauche française et les classes sociales," Projet 106 
(1976): 649-658; Le Monde, 21 March 1978. 
majority--and may have entered another period of internal 
"1 
conflicts, self-doubt and renewal. b 
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A brief comparison of the French Parti Socialiste with 
the Dutch Partij ~ de Arbeid shows many similarities, 
expecially in the years af ter 19GO. Both parties had declined 
in the 1960s while they were in olJPosi tion--after a periou of 
participation in government in the late 1940s and 1950s--and 
both revived themselves around 1970, achieving a record vote 
in the late 1970s. Both attracted rnany new voters and rnembers 
from the Ca tholic seiJment of the workiniS c lass--al thouûh 
probably more white than blue collar workers--and improved 
their relations with the Catholic trade unions. Both adopted 
more or less New Leftist platforms in the 1970s, demandin!~ 
workers' self-management, cultural chan~e, decentralization 
of the state, democratic planning and education; both hoped 
to realize this through parliamentary as weIl as extra-
parliamentary action. Both were radicalized and renewed 
under pressure from the Left, from outside (PSU or PSP) and 
inside (CERES or Nieuw Links); both lost their extreme anti-
communist ri~ht wing (the DS'70 in the Netherlands, the 
Mouvement Dérnocrate Socialiste de France and other groups in 
France).62 
61 Le Monde, 29 June 1976, 10 January 1978, 21 March 1978. 
62Le Monde, 7 November 1974, 21 March 1978: in 1978 the 
MDSF won one seat in the National Assembly through an alliance 
with other Centre parties, the Union pour la dérnocratie 
française; DS'70, its Dutch counterpart, also won one seat, 
in the 1977 election. 
213 
Of course, there were strikind differences as weIl. 
Thou;~h both the PS and the PvdA became their countries' 
large st parties in terms of votes, the former had to compete 
with an almost equally large Communist Party whereas the 
latter alrnost wiped the Dutch Communist Part:/ from the elec-
G3 toral map. Furthermore, the PvdA had led a ,:;overnment 
coalition with Christian Dernocrats from 1973 to 1977 anel 
ne:.:;otiated for its renewal in 1977 though without success, 
whereas the PS refused any alliance with the Centre and 
maintained a rather uneasy opposi tion front ,'Ii th the Conll;luni~3t 
Party in 1978. Thus the PS of ten took JilOre r:"iic:.l ~osi tion::; 
than its Dutch counterpart and defined itself as revolutionary 
and f.Iarxist--thou~h i ts voters and i ts rnernLers J.1ay weIl have 
been even less ~roletarüm tha.n those of the (4 PvdA. ) Tbe 
French Soci;~lists, on thc other h;mcl, trie'[ tu orj"nizc 
workers in sections ei' entrcljrisc, which Dutch mcmbers Ol thc 
PvdA only startcd to cliscuss in 1977. b5 The or,l,anization of 
63 The PCF received 21% of the popular vote in 1978, the 
CPN le::os than 2% in 1977; the PCF mcmbership exceeded that of 
the PS by 2:1, if not more; cf. Borel1a, op. cit., pp. 159T 176. 
64L 'identité du PS, Dossier Formation 2; Meyer, op. cit.; 
a survey held by In~lehart and Rabier in 1970 showed thEt the 
PvdA attracteci slightly more blue collar vlorkers than thc PS--
26% and 23% of their respective electorates; on the other hand 
PvdA voters expressed more aften support for revo1ution than 
PS voters in 1970: 7.7% and 5.5% respectively; but Dutch 
voters in general showed more sympathy for revo1utionary action 
than French voters in that year; According to one survey, 
manual workers made up 3% of party dele~ates to the 1973 con-
~ress, professionals and intellectuals about GO~; see R. Cayrol, 
"Les militant du Parti Socialiste," Projet 83 (1974): ~j29-940. 
65 B • Middel, "Partij van Arbeid: ook voor arbeiders," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1977): 3-12. 
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the PS resembied that of the PvdA, but appeared more tolerant 
of tendencies and factions; on the other hand, First Secretary 
Mitterrand may have held more personal power in the PS than 
parliamentary party leader Den Uyl or party chairwoman Van den 
66 Heuvel in the PvdA. The New Left currents or tendencies 
wi thin the two parties differed even more. Both founc~ support 
amon~ young intellectuals, some of Christian back~round, but 
the French CERES was much better organized and grounded in 
Marxist theory than the more moderate,open and heterogeneous 
Nieuw Links group; perhaps the current around Hocard and 
67 i'lartinet waS more silClilar to the latter. 
A comparison between the Communist Parties in Franco ano 
the Netherlands could prove interesting as weIl, but would ~o 
beyond the framework of this thesis. Both parties seemed to 
have maintained Old Left traditions, though the French ~arty 
68 
may have accepted New Left ideas to a greater extent. 
66The organisational structure of the PS differed only 
sli<.1htly from that of the PvdA; i ts Party Con;;ress would elect 
a Comité Directeur, which would in turn elect a Bureau Executif 
but which would be led by the Secretaire National. Dele<.:;utes 
to party congresses and conventions--cf. the party councils 
of the PvdA--were elected by the regional branches or fédérrt-
tions; see F. Borella, Les partis politigues dans la France 
d'aujourd'hui (Paris, 1973), pp. 158-161. 
67 
"Better organised" does not mean "more effective"; 
indeed, the more informal and chaotic Nieuw Links probably 
exercised more influence over the PvdA than CERES over the PS. 
68Thus Pope ren perceives an interpenetration of ideas and 
a certain convergence between the two main parties of the Left, 
PS and PCF, and the two main theoretical traditions, Harxism 
and Catho1icism, L'Unitê de la Gauche, p. 417; cf. Touchard, 
op. cit., pp. 359-362; however, the nature and impact of the 
transformation of the PCF towards "Eurocommunism" seems to 
remain an open question--by 1978 the process had not been 
completed. 
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3.2 The Ncw Left in Germany 
The German Left has been dominated for more than a century 
by the Social Democratie Party, the Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands (SPD). Only in the 1920:..> û.nd early 1930s did 
it have to face serious competition from thc Communist Party. 
Both parties were suppressed brutally by the National 30cialist 
resime but emer3ed a~ain af ter the German defent in 1945. 
Whereas the Communist Party enjoyed Russian protection in 
East Germany and could control the first German :~overnll1ent in 
that part of the country vlhich became the Gerrnan Democro.tic 
Republic, it did not do vcry weIl in the \'!estern parts which 
became the Federal Repub1ic of Germany. A1ready in dec1ine, 
the party was banned by the Federal Court in 1956. Thus 
the SPD became not only the larJcst but also the only party 
of the Left reprcsentecl in the Ferlero.l Pé.:.rli8.Il1Cnt. rct i t 
faileJ. to v/in a lWljority or to join D. coali tion ,;overnL:ont, 
as ncither Libcr&ls nor ChristL.cn lJelilOcrlits--'t;h8 other L:;J.in 
l<lrtic:J--:">!10\lC l all,i" intol'\Jst in d co;diti',Jll '.iitlt ~ocL,Li.:JL.;. 
Fearin,-~ no cOJ:1J.j~ti tion frol;; tlle Lcft uut or:l,) rroll: thc .;i )1 t;, 
principles. This proc i2ss culrdillateJ i11 tLc jj~u (;Od8",;,)cr(~ 




b !-I-J. l;rRuns, et ~ü., Uie 3PU in ~er Kri~3c (Frankfurt, 
1973), pp. 176-180; SPD, Grundsatzpro~ramm (Bonn, 1959); 
sec; o.1so C. [·bnn, Thc llistory of (;erJIl~Jny since 17n9 (iU,rrnonds-
vrorth, 1974). 
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During the 1950s the SPD had occasional1y supported 
extra-parliamentary mass actions, particularly against nuclear 
armament ("Kampf den Atomtod," 1958) and abainst German member-
Ship of NATO (Paulskirchenbewegung, 1955). But af ter 1959 
it directed all its efforts towards aChieving electoral 
70 
results. lts efforts bore fruit; the Social Democratie 
share of the vote grew from 32% in 1957 to 36% in 1961, 3~% 
in 1965, 43% in 1969 and finally surpassed that of the 
Christian Democrats in 1972 vii th 46%. 71 \'Jhile winning voters 
in the Centre, the SPD alienated its left wing and in particular 
its student organization, the SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher 
Studentenbund), or German Socialist Student League, which was 
excluded from the party in 1961 because of i ts "pro-coml71unist" 
. t. 72 pos~ ~ons. The SDS and its older supporters--organized later 
in the Socialist League--soon became the core of the "homeless 
Left" (heimatlose Linke) of radical democrats, pacifists and 
Marxists outside the SPD who tried to continue extra-parliamentary 
action against rearmament and against the political restoration 
of authoritarian tendencies. 
Throughout the 19506 attempts had been made to found 
neutralist or pacifist parties to the Left of the SPD, but 
70E • Richert, Die radikale Linke (Uerlin, 1969), pp. 70, 
81-84; cf. Von Freyberg, et al., Geschichte der deutschen 
Sozialdemokratie 1863-1975 (COlogne, 1975), Ch. VII. 
71 Brauns, op. cit., p. 339. 
72Richert, op. cit., pp. 88-89; H.M. Bock, Geschichte des 
'linken Radikalismus' in Deutschland. Ein Versuch (Frankfurt, 
1976), pp. 192-193. 
» 
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vrithout any electoral success. A new atteI,1pt in l~Gü to unite 
the "hOrilG lC:JS Left 11 in the German Peaco Union (Deutsche 
Friedens-Union, DFU) promised to be more successfui. Ilowever , 
in the 1~L>1 .:;,;eneral elec tion, the new party won only 1.9% of 
the popular vote, and no scats, in spite of--or because 01'--
support from Communists who had <llso become "homeless" in 
1956. 73 The force of anti-communist and Cold War ideology in 
0est Germany may have prevented the Peace Union from emulatin~ 
the successes of its Dutch counterpart, the Pacifist Socialist 
P<.!rty; the 5% threshhold of the Gerrnan electoral system may 
o.lso have discoura~ed potential voters. 
Disappointed with electoral action and--equally ineffec-
ti ve--extra-par'liamentary action , many "home less Leftists" in 
the sus and elsewhere turned to "philosoLJhical action," i.e. 
the stu.:ly of j·larx ancJ various Heo-l·larxists like Castoriadis, 
~illiams, C.W. Mills and the Frankfurt School. These intellec-
tu,ch; esL·j)lished contacts \lith New Left Cluts in '13ritain and 
the Parti Socialiste Unifi6 in France, and began to identify 
themselves as the German New Left (Neue Linke).74 Skeptical 
about the poli tical }Jotential of the German vrorking class, 
and in particular its political and socio-economical or~aniza-
tions--thc SPD and lJGll (DeutscherGewerksch:~tftsbund, Gerrnan 
Trade Union Federation)--they came to reject both the Stalinist 
and the Social Democratie Old Left. This development within 
73 R' h t ' t ) 2 9 ') l C ,c r ,op. Cl' ., P p. ~. - ,). 
74Ibid ., P~). 3i3-~39; Bock, Geschichte des 'linken RadHcaismus', 




the "homeless Left" led to conflicts ',:i thin the Gerr;,an Peace 
Union nnd the SOS. In the SDS the ~ew Left won control in 
19G1, lost it in 1964 ~nd, in a different form, re~ained it 
in 190Li. 75 
Dy 19CiG the 1.101i ticnl scene ha.J. chan:;eci. Thc cooperntion 
betVieen SOCi"1l Democrnts 2nd Christian Delflocrats in a GrLi.nd 
Coa1i tion resu1 teG. in (anlon,l~ other thini~s) Emcr~ency La\ls, 
seen by lllany observers as "CreeiJin<:; fascisrn"; this scerncu to 
confirm the New Lef t's critique of Socia1 Dcmocracy. 
resistance a~ainst the coalition nnd its pOlicies also ~rew 
within the SPD--revivin~ its 1eft wing--the main burden of 
it was borne by the SDS and its allies. 7Li These al1ie5 ware 
mostly other student orsanizations such as the Libera1 Student 
Lea~ue and the Social Democratic Colle3e League. In a few 
places, however, members of the SDS joined with liberal 
intellectuals and professionals, as weIl as 1eftist union 
leaders, in Repub1ican Clubs and in ma5S rallies oPPosing the 
i~overnrnent. '1'his so-ca11ed Extra-Par1iarnentary Opposi tion 
failed to prevent the Emergency Laws from being passed and 
feIl apart soon afterwards, divided over tactics and u1tilr1ate 
77 
ends. In 19 G9 some of i ts members formed an e1ectora1 coa1i tion 
75 BOCk , Geschichte des 'linken Hadikalismus', PP. 195 ff.; 
the New Left of 1961-64 differed from the New (Ultra) Left 
that took over in 1966, as is shown below. 
76Richert, op. cit., pp. 97 ff; the smal1 Libera1 Party 
carried out some opposition within parliament, particu1arly 
a~ainst the Emergency Laws, but aureed with the Grand Coa1ition 
on rnany other issues. 
77K • She11, "Extrapar1iawentary Opposition in Postwar 
l;ermany," Comparative Politics 2:4 (1970): 653-630; Bock, 
Geschichte des 'linken Radikalismus', pp. 213-217. 
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with the German Peace Union and the resurrected Communist 
Party, but fai1ed to win more than 0.6% of the popu1ar vote--
even less than the Peace Union won by itself in 1961 and 
1965. 78 Many other members of the Extra-Parliamentary 
Opposition must have voted for the SPD, probably hopinG th~t 
a clear victory over the Christian Democratie Union would 
allow the Social Uemocrats to pursue a more progressive 
1 . 79 po lCy. 
Dy 1969 the SDS had changed considerably; from the (New) 
::.>ocial Democratie Left it had moved towards a New Ultra-Left 
similar in many ways to the New Ultra-left in France. The 
moderate New Left leadership of the early 1960s had been 
interested in extra-par1iamentary action and in the theories 
of C.\'l. IUlls, Galbraith, lilallet, etc.; whereas the ~roup 
which prevailed af ter 1966 was inspired by Marcuse, Reich, 
and in a practical way by the Dutch Provos and the International 
Situationists and sought to turn extra-parliamentary action 
. t t· 1· t t· 80 ln 0 an l-par lamen ary ac lon. The core of the new 
leadership came from a small circle of artists and students 
around Dieter Kunzelmann, who had been a leading member of 
the Situationist International from 1961 to 1962. The 
Subversive Aktion, as the circle calle~ itself, started to 
78In 1965 the Peace Union (DFU) won 1.3%, Drauns, op. 
cit., p. 339. 
79 "'h 11 . t ~ 79· L Ed·"y lip 1· t· 1 eh 
.:> e ,op. Cl., p. b , • ln6 er, 0 1 lca an,1e 
in Germany," Comparative Polities 2:4 (1970): 559. 
80nock , Geschichte des 'linken Radikalismus', pp. 104-
221; some Provos went to sec the SDS in Berlin. 
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publish a rather esoteric journal, Anschlag (Attack), in 
1963, discussing the inte~ration of the workin4 c1ass into 
bourgeois society, the Third Wor1d, automation, and other 
theoretical questions. On the other hand the Jroup a1so 
initiated direct actions of a provocative nature notably at 
meetings of German advertising specia1ists, during the visit 
of Tshombe, then Prime Minister of the Con20, to Ber1in in 
19G4. 81 On1y the last action mobi1ized a sizcable crowd of 
1000 demonstrators and proved Q fruitful exercise in flcxible 
clemonstration t;lctics. Just before this, most ::'~ubversivc 
Al~tion members h:1d joinecl the SD~-) ,'".nd formed :::n "anti-authori t~lri;-m 
faction" ,'lithin it. TV/o years later, in 19Go, they formed 
the majori ty faction. One of the Subversi ve Ai,:tion lnem::crs, 
l{udi Dutschkc, caVle to rel~resent the SUS, and the Extrél,-
Parliamcntary OPiJosi tion as a \'1hole, '::-J.t man:,r meetin,;s ;,ne;. 
() 1') 
conferences, unti 1 <~ fanD tical ri ,.',hti st shot him in 19 GS. ()C_ 
Dutschke, who had fled from East Gerlilany "inC. rn<;,intélined 
'a I-larxist perspcctive, broke wi th Kunzelmarm and the Illore 
an<:rchist (if not nihilist) win~~ of Subversive Aktion in 19C5. 
While more optimistic about the role of the workin~ class 
and the chances for a revolution in Gerrnany, Dutschke seelfied 
to share the anti-authoritarian and counter-cultural concerns 
81Ibid .; F. SBckelmann and H. NaGel, eds., Subversive 
Aktion (Frankfurt,197G), pp. 35, 55, G9, 146-147, 262-2C4, 
294-295; the relative success of the Tshombe netion shows the 
sensitivity of the New Left to international and Third Vorld 
issues. 
82Richert, op. cit., pp. 107 ff.; see also G. Statera, 
Death of a Utopia (New York, 1975), pp. 94, 97, 111. 
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of the anarchist wing. Dutschke hoped, however, that a "long 
march through the institutions," (factories, schools and 
colleges), by revolutionary activists might provoke and 
enli~hten the masses of youn:~er workers and intellectuals, and 
make them aW2,re of their real needs \'Ihich had been repressed 
or manipulated by the class in control of those institutions; 
by the same process the revolutionaries would change themselves 
and overeome their internalized repression and fra~mentation.83 
The ideas of Dutschke and other anti-authoritarian SDS 
leaders like Krahl and Wolff in Frankfurt--who adopted and 
radicalized the theory of the Frankfurt School--were tried 
out in student oeeupations of universities and institutes, 
partieu1arly in Ber1in and Frankfurt in 1908 anti 19G~. Student 
activists set up (or took over existing) seminars and workshops 
to articulate and politicize student needs, as weIl as 
organising projects for young workers anel apprentices. 84 
'I'hough the German workin/J class aS 'J. who1e remnined rather 
hos'ti1e towards these projects, some youn;~ worlzers took ljart 
in the projects and in street clernonstrations orzanized by 
the SDS. Possib1y as a result of this, the demonstrations 
83U5cke1mann and Na~el, op. cit., ~p. 190-195, 293-
?94, 307-328; see also U. 13er;~mann, et.al., j{ebellion der 
Studenten oder die neue Opposition (Heinbek, 1968); these 
ideas will be discussed further in Chapter 4.2 below. 
84 See Statera, op. ei t., pp. 100, 109 ff. See also 
B. Rabeh1, "Von der anti-autoritären Bewegung zur sozial-
istisehen Opposi ti on ," in .Ger,rsmann, op. ci t., pp. 151-17~; 




b ' I t d ,B5 ecame more VlO en an a~~resslve. The implications of 
this escalation, coupled with the elisintegration of the 
Extra-Parliamentary Opposition, divided the anti-authoritarian 
majority of the SDS. The resurgence of the "traditionalist" 
Marxist wing, thou~h weakened by expulsions, compounded the 
internal conflicts. The last national conference of the SUS 
broke up in chaos, intensified by an action of militant femin-
8G ists against "Prick Power" within the movement. In 1970, 
a kind of post-mortem conference was held by the v8rious 
);roups that claimeu i ts legacy to clissolve the or,~anization 
d d ' 'd 't h' 87 an lVl e up 1 s arc lves. 
The descendents of the SDS, and of the Extra-Parliamentary 
Opposition in ~eneral, could be divided into four cate~ories. 
The most extreme activists, of ten excluded from the SDS or 
operating only on its fringe, continueel the escalation of 
militancy into terrorisffi; Kunzelmann, for example, who was 
expel1ed from the SDS in 19G8, went to a Palestinian trainin~ 
camp and returned as a momber of the Hed Army Faction Ier! by 
E' (' 
Baader and I·leinhof until 1976. J() The terrorists' lJessirü stic 
85F • Wolff ;::md E. \'finclaus, erIs., Stuclentenb8\'le.~un'~ 1967-
69 (Fr,mkfurt, 1(77), 1.J1J. 173-192; l~. lIartun'~, "Versuch, die 
Krise der I'1.nti-étutori t:\rcn B8\'!';<un', \'lieder ZUl' S:)l'c~che zu 
lwin:en," Kurshuch 48 (1977): 14-LlI!. 
f3G"olff "ni l'!l'nl'.-,uC' 0" ~J'+ ,'; "'0 "'J'). the f'-'ffil'nl'cc-I-\~ t .... l " ({' . • ....J, ... '. ' ___ v e , .:.j~,_,. (-,~_:.:;-r:,._).-:._, ~I •• _• ...., 
'I'fcibcrrat (\.Tomen's Council) also cilsru1Jted lilany 1ectures at 
thc Uni Vcrsi t:j" of Frcwkfurt, ,i.JarticuLJ.rl:/ in 1\; [o1'n(; ';.i L,:.J~ 
course, SprinJ 1969 (Pcrso~al observation). 
87])OC1.;:, GC3clüchte :~3S 'linken ;(á,r)i!([1,lislidJs', ,j. 264; 
Stc~ter~l, oiJ. ci t., IJ. 24:~. 
/) ',' 
"--'!loslcr, 0V. cit., LJl. 11::-)-:Ll:);;~ock, ii)Îrj., pp. 278-2c;O. 
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view of the German workin~ c1ass as an inte~rated element of 
bour~eois society was shared to some extent by moaerate neo-
anarchist e1ements who continued more or 1ess p1ayfu1 forms 
of action wi tlün the uni versi ty or in communes of squatters. 89 
A third category agreed with the anti-authoritarian practice 
of the neo-anarchists but tried to mobilize anti coordinate a 
I,;reater variety of groups [.nd interests amon,cS inte11ectua1s 
as weIl as wo~{ers and to deve10p SOffie kind of ~arxist theory; 
most of this catcgory consisted of 10cal action 6rouPS affili-
Çi,ted wi th the Socialist Bureau, but SOlüe may have joined the 
S D Youth Orga.niza tion (JUS)). 90 Finally, m;::"ny anti-
authori tarians returne(t to OlJ Loft Marxism-Leninist posi tions 
of a Naoist, Trotskyite or Soviet-Hussian variety, tryin~ to 
reconstruct a revo1utionary workers partyalon"" Leninist, i.e. 
democratie centralist lines. 91 
Most of these groups remained small and isolated durincl 
the 1970s. The Communist Party, reborn in 1969, may have 
recruited 40,000 members by 1Y7~ Gut at the 1976 elections 
89H • Grimminger, "Hausbesetzungen in Frankfurt," Bei tr'8. .. ;e 
zur Konf1iktforschung 6:3 (197G): 91-124; Cohn-Dendit, exi1ed 
from France in 1968, had joined the SDS in the same year and 
led a ~roup of Neo-Anarchists or Spontils af ter 1970, activo 
in syuatting actions and later in ecolo~ica1 action in Frank-
furt. \ 
90 H. I.lewes, "The German Ncw Left," New German Critiy ... e 
1:1 (1973): 22-41; Doek, Geschichte des Ilinken Radikalismus l , 
pp. 264-267; Links 79 (1976); Frankfurter AIIuemeine Zeitung, 
10 June 1978; the boundary between this category and the second 
one was not very sharp: Cohn-Bendit a1so took part in the 
Congress against Repression, sec Links 79 (1976). 
91Statera, op. cit., pp. 234-247; Bock, ibid., pp. 267-
277; ).10s1er, op. cit., pp. 64 ff. 
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92 
could muster only 120,000 votes, 0.3% of the electorate. 
1 ts student or.\];aniza tion, the J:Iarxi st Student LeaGue "Spart2.kus" 
provcd more successful in student elections, winning 8% of 
all German student council seats in 1972-1973. 93 The 
various I·laoist groups fared worse, together gathering less 
than 10,000 members and less than 0.2% of the popular vote in 
1976. Their student or~anisations won 7% of the scats in 
1972-1973. 94 The Trotsl{yites did even worse, with about 
2000 members and 5,000 votes (less than 0.1%) in 1976. 95 
Compared to these (more or less) 01d Left 3roups, the New 
Left appeared sli:.1ht1y more popular amon!:; Gerrnan youth. IJevl 
Left ~roups rarely put up candidates for general e1ections, 
but they won rouGhly 25% of thc student council seats in 
1972-1973 and mobilized 20,000 participants at a Con~ress 
a;.:;ainst Repression at Frankfurt in 1976. 96 Even more important, 
hov/ever, were the Youn[; Sociali sts, affi lia teel ,·ti th the SPD, 
who ha.d developed frorn 10yal party career-seekers into mili-
tant party rebels durini_~ the 19CJOs. In 1909 they adopted 
a Uew Leftist platform vii th demands for workers self-rnana,~ement, 
9211 . t 'ewes, op. cJ. ., p. 
Today," New Left l\.evie\'1 99 
24; G. iünnerup, 
(.1976) : 3 -44. 
"The Bundesrej,..ou!Jü: 
93r:rewes, ibid.; J. Pazurek, "11S13 Spartakus--J.lode oder 
Gefahr?," Politische Studien 201 (1972): 42-51. 
9 4r 1 . b . d . 1 . . 1 .' . 1 (l 7 c: tI' . t 
.'ewes, J.'J.'.; l·J.nnerup, J..)].([.; J.n -J IJ VlO ·laOJ.8 
pflrties ran co.ndidntcs for the fecleral elections . 
95rünnerup, i bid.; only one '.L'rotskyi te .c;roup took ~)[irt; 
the low ra te of voters-rnernbers (3: 1) could indica te iso la.tion. 
96 Links, 79 (197G). 
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socialization of key sectors in the econorny, democratization 
of all sectors of society and particularly of education and 
th d ' 97 e mass me ~a. 
The Jun;;-Sozio.listen (JUSOS: 
n rtic uLüed Ne\! Left ,;o~üs li].:e free sc lf -r8:tlL~cttion, re;:~J 
cornmunication an:l ::301ir:lrèrit~/ Let\'!c~en inen (n,nel \:o::h::m) éèS ',':cll 
:.:;tr;Jte.';~TII (DOLiclstrr'te ;ie) of direct action at the :~ré::,ss 
roots comlJined \'lÏ th le,c~i sla ti ve ü.nJ e lee tor.::d .:lction, in 
or~er to rCé.i.lize structural or systei.l-transcelluin,.; (sys'~;~;,l-
\':hieh tl1ey bOITO'.1ed froJil Gorz and. fro1.l C 12.uS Orfe, G .. youn'J 
l:iel'lbl3l' of thc Frankfurt SchoOl. 9SJ Direct D.ctiofJ. at the ,~r:;.ss 
roots level was intended to put ~ressure on leóislators and 
",overnrnents but also to contribute to self-organization and 
thc articulation of needs by the wor;ünij c lc:.ss. 
From 19 G9 onuards, the Youn i ; ;.)ocialists ini tiated severQl 
direct actions, usually in the sphere of circulation and 
consuli1,tJtion rather than prociuetion: construetion of childrens' 
})lay,,;rounds, or6anization of cicly-care centres (particuL;:.rly 
97"Zustand und Auf ;;aben der SP iJ, 11 in O. F1echtheim, ed., 
DOl<urnente zur artei ')oli tischen Entwicklun\! in Deutschland 
sei t 1945 13erlin 1971 , pp. 11:38-190; more elahorated later, 
cf. N. Gansel, ed., Ueherwindet den Kapita1ismus oder waS 
vfOllen die Jun(~sozialisten? U~einbek, 1971), pp. 55, 81, 9b, 
107,141,177. 
9 ,) 
°Ib' , ~Q. , pp. 98, 143, 153. 
99 , . GanseI, op. c~t., PiJ. 59, 99, 135; see [11so ti. IIeiJ.1ann, 




for foreign immiErants) and urban renewal projects. IOO There 
Vlas talk of shop-level organization, but as most Young Social-
ists seemed to be students and junior civil servants rather 
than workers, they could do little more than support actions 
taken by others, like left-wing traele unionists. 101 In some 
cities, like Wiesbaden, the JUSO and its older sym~athizers 
were ab1e to control the municipa1 government and carry out 
reforms, such as the construction of parks and pedestrian 
strests insteud of ncw freeways, nnd of npartments instc8d of 
offices in downtown areas, whilc ~llso trying to involvG 
citizens in hearings; in this they resembied Nieuw Links 
members of the Dutch Latour Party.l02 
Direct action could lead to a confrontation with party 
leadership, particu1arly when the action invo1veel peop1e 
outside the SPD and, worse, members of Communist groups.103 
Of course these incidents were p1ayed up by the rightist mass 
media and the Christian Democrats, VJho formeel the official 
100GanSe1, op. cit., pp. 107-108; see a1so V. Uauersber~er, 
ed., \1ie links dürfen Jusos sein? (Heinbek, 1974), pp. 66-127. 
101nrauns, op. cit., pp. 261-263; the relationship between 
JUSO and the trade-unionists in the SPD was of ten uneasy, 
though i t irnproved tov/arels the end of the 19 70s, see K. 
Dachslei tner, "2u Entstehuni?; und Funktion eler Af A als 
'Arbei tnehrnerflugel der SPD," BHitter für deutsche und 
internationale Politik (1976): 802-816; also Der Spiegel, 
3 September 1979. 
102S I' b ee ·laucrs erger, op. cit., pp. 117-127; about Nieuw 
Links see eh. 2.4 above. 
103GanSel, op. cit., pp. 68-78; see also P. Arend, Die 
innerpartei1iche EntVlick1un:~ der SPD 1966-1975 (Bonn, 1975) 
pp. 146-153. 
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opposition aftel' 1969. The leadership of the SPD of ten reacted 
sharply to JUSO actions. In 1977 it even suspended the new 
chairman of the Young Socialists, Bennetel', when he declared 
"for us JUSOS membership in the party is not a dogma on v!hich 
104 
Vle insist at all costs. tI On thc other hand, the Youn:~ 
Sociéllists of ten founu allies amon,':'" older and more moderc.'cte 
left-wing party members. Together they pushed throu~h some 
reforms of the party org,:mization--mo.kin:..,; eXtJUlsion more 
difficult, élnd circulation of elites casier--c.ls \lell 8.3 cert[~in 
modifications in party platforms, concernin~ financial, 
economie and forei.~n policy. Thus a 10n3-te~n proJramme 
~(rescnted by Schmiclt--a ri:.1ht-\'lin,~ membel' and fror.1 1974 
Chancellor (Dundeskanzier), i.e. leader of the coalition 
~;overnment--\':as rejecteè, by the party conJress and revised by 
2" Llore lef ti st commission, ','rhich;nve more emph~ ~Ji '-' to inves t-
1 ,~~rt:- ~,ction, ',li thout, 110\,r,~ver, :oin., hoyonc: thc C;'o(leshr~r, ~ 
IjrO,;ramme of 1959. 105 The left ,'lin;.; of the party ca})turc j <-. 
thir(i of tlle se~~ tG on the Executi ve COli!;,:i t tee (;)é~rtci V02StC.,1l. 
r~' .. i soel i ts reiJre ,,,ento.tion in ~Jarli<.tmcnt frOllt 20 to 45 l:lcrnLers 
1041n C;errnnn: "Für uns Jusos ist die iü tJlicdschaft in 
(~er P[lrtei }:ein DOi~lIla, an clem ,'lil' nun in jeJel.l Fc..ll festhéel ten," 
liuOted in G. L;:,nG<;uth, "JU30:::;, I~oli1munisten, Sozialdelnokraten," 
Die politische j,Ieinun,';':; 173 (1977): 95. 
105Arend, op. cit., pp. 115-119; also l·I. Hirsch, liL' 
évolution récente de la socLil-d6Iilocr<:ltie allemande," Es})ri t 
7:8 (1973): 155-170; see also the SPD Oekonomisch-politischer 
Orientierungsrahmen fnr die Jahre 1975-1Y85 (ilonn, 1975), and 
Jun;;soziali sten Informa tionsdienst 15 ( 1975) • 
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between 1969 and 1972; its support amon~ the rank and file was 
estimated at 40% by 1975. 106 Af ter 1975 its inf1uence [ilél.Y 
have declined somev,rhat, dUB to "counteraction" taken by the 
right wing and the Chancellor, to a general riühtist "mood" 
among the electorate (indicated by the electoral 10sses of 
the SPD in re~ional and federal elections), and to internal 
conflicts within the left Vling. 107 
These interna1 conf1icts increased with the ra~ic21ization 
of tile Youn:~ Socia1ists. 'fhe New Left and Neo-I·larxist 1e:J.cler-
ship elected in 19G9 was soon faced with a groVling opposition 
from the Left, led by a more 01d Left faction which defined 
i ts posi tion as "I;Iarxist Left" but VlaS soon called Stamokap 
because of its emphasis on the connection between the state 
. 1 . t 1 108 ano ~nopo y capl a • This "Harxist Left" Vlas cha11en,;ed 
in i ts turn by a growing "Anti-revisionist Left" vlhicil con-
demned both the leadership and the Marxist Left as revisionists 
and advocated a revolutionary strate~y based on mass mobiliza-
tion through direct action • 109 \!hen the Anti-revisioniste 
made an alliance with the Sta~okap-faction in 1977, they 
defeated the Neo-Marxist candidate for the leadership and 
e1ected Benneter to the chair; a few months later he was 
106Arend, op. cit., pp. 153-164; in 19G9 the SPD had 224 
members of par1iament (Bundestag), in 1972, 230. 
107 Arend, op. cit., pp. 165 ff. 
108See F. Duve, ed., Der Thesenstreit um'Stamokap' 
Uteinbek, 1973). 




suspended by the party. This develo~ment may have alienated 
the JUSOS from the older and more moderate left wing of the 
SPD around Steffen and Von Oertzen, while these internal 
debates and intrigues probably reduced the effectivene~s und 
attraction of the Yound Socialists outside the party. 111 
As an or~anization of all members of the SPD under 35, 
the JUSOS have no counterpart in the Netherlands; the Nember-
ship of the Federation of Youth Groups in the Partij ~ de 
Arbeid is voluntary and quite small--estimated at 2000 in 
1~77--whereas the Youn;; Socialists of the SPD nurnbered 250,000 
in 1972. 112 They acted as an officially recolsnized workin<.~ 
party (ArbeitsGerneinschaft) within the SPD, trying to refonn 
and radicalize the party. They shared this intention with 
the Dutch Nieuw Links !~roup and the French CEHES. The iucas 
of the three groups about worl<ers self-management, di ree t 
action and cultural revolution seerned similar, though more 
rnoder<1te in the Netherl<1nds, more vél,sue in France ~lnd more 
abstrnct in Gerrnany. All three Uroups suffered sorne settacks 
in the 1970s--Nieuw Links dissolved itself in 1970, but 
its influence may have penked around 1975; CERES sta~nated 
113 
af ter 1975; the JUSOS ap~eared to declinc af ter 1975. The 
110Lan .. ~.,;uth, op. ei t.; also II. '.lieczorck-Zeul, "Jusos in 
cler Krise," Die neue Gesellschaft 24:4 (1977): 593-598; the 
differences between the factions should not be exag~erkted, 
cf. IIeim:tnn, op. cito 
111 ].Jewes, op. ci t., 1-'. 3(3; confirmed in Intervie\', 14. 
11? ],lewes, op. cit., p. 25, éln;~l O. De Jon~ anel G. De i;ruyn, 
"De PvciJ\ en de 'beloftevolle jeu~d'," Hoos in de vuist 4 
(Novemher 14, 1977): ll-1S. 
ll~ /I .1 .. ' t 
"r8n,.c, 0l'. Cl ., .';'. ll)::, fC; cf. V:i,11 der Louv: (:nr~ PCicr', 
op. cit., 1'1. :3?9-:3Sb . 
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JUSOS \1ere 1e~lst succcssful in refvrrlin,'; thcir ~arty--in 
s~ite of thcir impressivc or'Janisctt;ion cmcl their theoretical 
sophistication. 
Thc Socia1 Democratie P"rty of C;crJÎI".ny rcm;dneu (~. Llü,;cr;t(:;e 
01d Lcft party throué~hout the 1::J70s. It ret~üncti a 18.1';.:,0 
\,:orkinl..>-c lass mernber::;hi ~,--evcn i f JIlOS t nc';, mam be I'S in the 
1~7üs v:ere whi te collar würkers or intcllcctuals anu pl'ofes-
sionals--as weIl as a working-class elcctorate. Unlike its 
Dutch élncl French countcrparts, the SPD did not 10se members 
or votcrs in thc l:JGOs anu early 1::J703; in fact i t Vion botlt, 
apart from a brief slump in 19ó6-1::JG~~. 1:lhereas the PvdA ['.n"l 
the PS or SFIO spent most of the 1900s and 1970s in the 
op[Josi tion, the SPD tool< l-l'trt in coali tion .,.:,overnrllents froIo 
19 0,- u'" • 114 on\'laru. 
The East Gerrnan Left will be i:5nored in t1üs cha}Jter. 
lts [joli tical and :::>ocia1 context seeInS too different from 
thot of thc Dutch Left to al10w any lfleanin!~ful cOlf1parison. 
~3.3 Conclusion 
From these, necessarily condensed comparisons one can 
infer that New Left ,,!,roups in France anel Gerlilany ~senerally 
shared the basic characteristics of the Vutch NCVI Left SUflll'ied 
114The proportion of manual workers among SPD members 
dec lined from 4!:)% in 19 ~2 to 28(;~ in 1977, accordinil, to Haschke; 
Arend Gives sliGhtly higher figures for new members: 54% of 
new members in 1965 and 35% of ncw members in 1972 were manual 
workers; membership went UlJ from 585,000 in 1954 to more than 
1,000,000 in 1977; according to a survey, 57% of the SI-'l) voters 
in 1972 were manual workers (see ArenJ, op. cit., pp. 41-55; 
J. Haschl<e, ed., IJie poli tischen Partcicn im VJcsteuro}Ja (Hcinbek, 
1979), p. 75. 
b 
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up above in Chapter 2.6. All groups strove for El. fundaJliental 
àemocratisation of society and most of them for vlorkers ' self-
mana~ement in particular. All of them advocated direct 
action and most of them <leve 101>eli a Jual stra teJ;Y. All of 
them called for a cultural revolution. 
In fac t, the simi lari ties bctvleen New Lei't groul-.Is in the 
three countries ~o beyond their basic characteristic3. They 
concern also the social base of the::>e ;~roups, which tended 
to be "new petty bour,:;eois" in most cases. Intellectuals, 
artists and professionals controlled the u[Jper echelons and 
of ten also made up most of the active memtership of the.:.;e 
parties, according to most surveys nnd personal observations. 
\1hi te collar workers of ten joined the lar:~er NeH Left parl;ic3 
nnd voted for theJn, while manuni or blue-collar workers r~rely 
joined but occasionally voted for a New Left party. 
!iioreover, the New Left movement followed a sornewha t 
similar pattern of development in the three countries. 
Rou~hly one could distinguish three sta~es: (I) IlIncubation" 
of New Left ideas at the margin of the pOlitical system, 
amonG radical, more or less anarchist groups. These Groups 
tried to continue and renew older revolutionary traditions 
and disapproved of electoral or purliamentary nction; hence 
they did not fit our definition com~letely and are re~arded 
as "Ncw UI tra-left" rather than 1Jew Left in the strict sense. 
On the other hand they did take up nnd develop older ideas 
about workers' self-mana~ement, direct action and cuitural 
ch[jn:~e which would be taken over bY Ue\v Left ,:~roups la ter. 
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The most important New Ultra-left .~roup was probably the 
Situationist International. While its French branch was more 
effective and stabIe than the German and Dutch branches, the 
latter also played a significant role. The German branch 
inspired "Subversive Action," \<Ihile the Dutch Situationist 
Constant Nieuwenhuis influenceci Provo. Provo be,:,ai1 as é1 New 
Ultra.-left LrouiJ tut turnecl to electoral action and ü "two 
hc'nds" s trn.tc ~y in 1 ~ .~(j. 
(11) "Contr'Jilir1Ci.tion" of 3Llall I~e\'l Loft l:'Jél.rties \ü th 
i ion!:> ;~1.out 0clf-nl(~né.L ,":rnent, ([iroct "ction (ln·j 2. nc',!, creative 
: rl'.i c;xl·re:C~Gioni,)t cultur,; frOl.1 the I': e ':1 UI tr;J-left. These 
, ~.rtir~::; h:'.,J ;)20n e.5t::.LIL;hcd toforo l~i.)O ;jy Leftists of i'.:, 
J: :VOll1tio;!:;l~~r :;oci:'li~:.;t tr:l,(li tion v.'ho rojoctcll both COlllii:unislil 
~nd ~ocial Dcmocrncy: the Pacifist Socialist Party in thc 
r:etherliln;!;~, the F:lrti SocL.,.liste Unifió in Fré1nce an·j, to a 
less'8r cx tent, the Socüllist Student Le2~:ue (SDS) or i ts 
"lJnrent .;rouIJ," thc: Sociali 3t LCD :.~ue, in Germany. In the 
19LOs thcse ~roups adopted more radica1, ünarchistic ideas 
and tac t~c s a:...; \'/el1 a::: nev: lllclilber~:;, usual1y younG in te 11ec-
t1~;-Áls, of Ultr".-lcft ori_;in. iJe\-! Lc;ft ten~Lencie5 of ten cL,shecl 
' .. -ith Ol': L;:f.'l; ;;:~r::L;t or .:(,r':i~;t-:;.Jcilini~it tcrhicllcic:.:> "Iithin 
(111) "uiîi'u.:.ion tt oi' ~;~.~\I Lcft icie;:')s \:itiün SociG~l 
t::'on:~ . 
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IJrocess of diffusion. At the Salile -cillie they tricd to increase 
their o\'ln influence Vii tllin the part,}!. Not all of thern suc-
ceeded. The Nieuw Links Group within the Dutch Labour Purty 
nnd the "Cane SUIc~ar" wini~ of thc Poli tical Party of Hauica1s 
were qui te succcssful in ca.lJturin;.:; and chan:~in;~ their party j 
CEHES and the Faire J;roulJ were fairly success1'ul in radicalisin,.:: 
thc French ~:iocialist Party but could not calJturc it j the Youn,~ 
Socialists failed to change or conGuer the Gerrnan Social 
115 Democratic Party. Uy 1~75 the jJrocess seerilc(l to have :310\'18.1 
down, if not stoppeJ alto~ether. 
Thou~h the pattern was similar in all three countries, 
there were important Llifferences. Some .::;roups do not fit in 
very \'1el1, specifical1y the Dutch Poli tic[~l P;rty of H::cdica1s 
and the Gerrnan Socialist Student Lea,,,ue. Chri stL'.:tn Leftists 
did not found a separate party in France and Gerlilany Gut 
joined one of the existing Socialist, Social Democratic or 
!\narchistgroups. Socia1i:;;t stuucnts in Franco anel th(; 
Netherlands diu not stay outsiele tbe rnain pC'trties of the 
Left--but of course they had several parties to choose from, 
11G 
un1ike their German co1lea~;ues. 
l150ne coulJ adel thc Frcnch trade union confederation 
C.F.D.T. to this categoryj a rather conservative Catholic rnass 
organisation before 1960, it was rauicalised anel capturea by 
a ::.;roulJ of youn,~ acti vi sts around the jourl1éll Heconstruc tion 
and adOljtcd Cl New Lef ti st prol:,rarnme in Hl lA and 1 Y 70 j see 
LJescarnps, op. cito 
116 \1hy there were no other Gcrrnan parties of the Left 
apart from the SPD (and the i11e::..:;al Communist Party), is an 
interesting question but soes beyond the scope of this thesisj 
there V1cre many attemlJt~j--the Peace Union, the Action 1'01' 




There were also more general differences between the Dutch 
New Left groups on the one hand and the German and F'rench 
,;roups on the other. The former tended to lend more emphásis 
to electoral and le::;,islative action as weIl as to moral and 
cultural issues, whereas the latter showed more interest in 
theoretical questions nnd in NarxisIn. Though Christians pl~yed 
an important role in Ue\'T Left !~roups in all countries, they 
v!cre probably more important in thc Dutch l'Jevl Left--thus 
continuing an older Dutch tradition, it seems. The Dutch 
Left, both Old and Nei'l Left, operated in a more reli,;iouG 
environment. Dutch society and polities were pillarised to 
a much greater de~ree than German or F'rench society and poli-
t . 117 lCS. 
One may conclude that the Dutch New Left was peculiar, 
but not unique. It cannot be explained only in terms of 
Uutch circumstances, but should ue seen a Dutch variety 
of a more universal, \'Jest European (if not '.'lOrld-wiCe) 
phenomenon. This phenomenon was in the first place a move-
ment of idcas, which could be shnred or uorrowed; in the 
second place i t could be seen as Cl social movement reL,ted to 
the interests of social classes or factions. The second 
point \'Till be taken up--in a speculatiye way--in ChafJter Six 
l17Th . 11 . t . . c . t . t h . ere was some pl arlsa lon 1n -ermany, OU 1 aa 
rractical1y broken down uncier Hi tlcr I s re~sime; thus the SPD 
a ttractcd rnany Ca tholic voters, COlTii)(lred to the Dutch PvdA--
in the InHlehart and Rabier sample, 34~ of the SPD supporters 
and 17% of the PvdA supporters VlCre Catholics , while the 
Catholics made up 44% of the German and 32% of the Duteh 
sub-sél.mple; see alBO lJ. :lartin, A General Theory of Secular1-
z~tion (New York, 1978), Ch~pter IV. 
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below. Cha;lters Four nncl Five \'lil1 :lenl more in depth v/ith 
the i deas of the New Left, which h:-Jve so f2X on1y been summe:: 
up in " fe\'! ]:cy-l.'lOrrls--:'cfllocr~:_tis;,tion, sc1f-II1:m;::_,:~cmcnt, du:-:l 
stratc';y, cu1tllrcü revo1ution, sclf-c~:~r()ssion. 
CHAPTER 4 
A THEORETICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW LEFT PROJECT 
Introduction 
In the preceding two chapters the ideas of the New Left 
have been summed up in a few key-words and slogans, culled 
from different party platforms, manifestos and journals, 
more or less in chronological order. Here the ideas are 
reconstructed into more or less coherent theories. They are 
presented witnout critical comment~ and as far as possible 
without reference to particular historical circumstances or 
personalities. The theories are se en as parts of a single 
New Left project, though one which is not necessarily consis-
tent and unambiguous. 
A project is defined here as an attempt to understand 
the world and to change it. The project of the Dutch New 
Left in particular was an attempt to understand and change 
Dutch society and polities in the 1960s.and 1970s. It dealt 
specifically with the role of science and technology, the 
. 
class structure, the state, culture, and the relationship 
between man and nature. It rejected Old Left interpretations 
of contemporary society, polities and culture as forms of 
economism and determinism. Unable or unwilling to produce 




frequently borrowed ideas explicitly or implicitly, from 
French, German or American theorists. Hence this chapter 
contains several "excursions" into French and German theories 
that may help to reconstruct the project of the Dutch New Left; 
the American theo.t'ies will be mentioned but not discussed 
here, as they are generally well-known and go beyond the scope 
of this study. 
The chapter is divided into four sections wnich deal 
respectively with the Revolutionary Socialist, the Anarchist, 
the Social Democratie and the Christian New Left projects 
(or sub-projects). The first section concentrates on the 
Pacifist Socialist Party but includes sub-sections about 
important theorists who seem to have inspired it: Serge Mallet, 
André Gorz, Oskar Negt and Han-Jurgen Krahl. Re-thinking 
Marx, these theorists showed great concern aboui. the develop--
ment of capitalism af ter the Second World War and the defensive 
or passive reaction to it ~rom the Old Left. They came to 
advocate a strategy of "revolutionary reformism," aiming at 
the establishment of counterpowers within capitalist society 
which might result eventually in a revolutionary break. This 
strategy should be pursued by the "New Workers," who were not 
yet integrated into or intimidated by capitalist society, in 
the sphere of work as weIl as in the spheres of leisure, 
culture and polities. Their grass-roots struggle should be 
supported by legislative and electoral action of the New Left 
party--the PSP, or in France the PSU, in Germany perhaps the 
Socialist Student League and its allies or the Socialist Bureau. 
* 
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The second section concentrates on Provo and its successor, 
the Kabouter (Elf) I'4ovement, while sub-sections deal wi th 
theories of the Situationists in France and Germany and the 
Socialisme ou Barbarie group in Francej the latter by way of 
contrast, to show the differences between a Dutch and a French 
Neo-anarchist group, but also because it indirectly inspired 
other Dutch New Leftists. Though quite different in many 
respects, these groups all shared a rather gloomy conception 
of advanced capitalist society as almost totally "integrated" 
and alienated through bureaucratie and ideological manipula-
tion. Opposition could (and should) occur only in the margin 
or at the very bottom of society, through cultural "happenings," 
political provocation or small-scale resistance and sabotage 
at the work~place. Political parties could not, in general, 
be trusted. Only Provo and Kabouters took part in elections, 
while their French and German counterparts denounced elections 
as treason. 
The third section deals with the Social Democratie New 
Left and in particular with Nieuw Links in the Dutch Labour 
Party. As this group split fairly soon af ter its emergence 
into two conflicting wings, this section is divided also into 
two parts. l The (sub-)project of the radical wing resembled 
to some extent the Neo-Marxist Revolutionary Reformism of 
the Revolutionary Socialist New Leftj however, it leaned 
more towards reformism than towards revolution. The moderate 
I See above, Chapter 2.4. 
dd 
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wing developed a fairly ori2,inal "Neo-Fabian" programme of 
structural reforms aiming at a "democratisation" of Dutch 
society, cul ture anel poli tics. V!hile the Neo-Harxists 
borrowed ideas from many foreign sourees, such as CERES in 
France and the Frankfurt School in Germany, the Neo-Fabians 
beemed almost self-sufficient; only by the end of the period 
under study did the French sociologist Touraine have some 
impact on the thinking of the latter. 
The fourth section deals only with the theories of the 
Political Party of Radicals, a relatively unique and typically 
Dutch group. lts rather eclectic project included structural 
reforms similar to the ones advocated by the Social Democratie 
New Left, but lent more emphasis to cultural and mental change. 
Perhaps it also betrayed its Christian heritage in its dis-
trust of state action and its ideal of pluralist society. 
The PPR shared this pluralism to some extent with members of 
the Dutch Labour Party and the French Socialist Party who 
of ten had a Christian background as weIl. 
Though these four projects derived from different tradi-
tions, they had many major themes in common. All of them 
rejected Old Left economism and determinism, while practic,ally 
all of them attached importance to the role of science and 
technology, the integration of the working class in late 
capitalist society, the relative autonomy of the state and 
of culture vis-à-vis socio-economie forces and the need for 
a more harmonious relationship between man and nature. These 
ideas seem to justify the notion of ,a single New Left project, 
b 
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of which the Anarchist, Revo1utionary Socialist, Socia1 
Democratic and Christian or Pluralist New Left can be con-
2 
sidered sub-projecta. 
4.1 Toe Project of the Revolutionary Socialist New Left: 
Revo1utioüary Reformism and Counterpowers 
The most important Revo1utionary Socialist New Left 
group in the Netherlands was the Pacifist Socialist Party.3 
The party, or rather the majority of the parvy, strove for 
revolutionary change by means of structural or "revolutionary" 
reforms and the establishment of "counterpowers" in Dutch 
society. The strategy of Revo1utionary Reformism was theore-
tica1ly developed by French theorist~ specifica11y Serge Mallet 
and André Gorz; their theories are brief1y discussed in sub-
sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3. Sub-sections 4.1.4 and 4.1.5 deal 
with the German theorists Han-Jurgen Krah1 and Oskar Negt 
who have had some impact on other aspects of the Pacifist 
Socialist project. 
4.1.1 The Pacifist Socialist Project 
The majority of the Pacifist Socialist Party seemed to 
agree that capitalism had changed but retained its essence 
since Marx wrote Capita1. Private property in the means of 
production, private enterprise and production for profit 
continued to structure the economy, which in turn continued 
to dominate society. New technology contributed to rapid 
2However, this depends on one's perspective; when recon-
structing the various sub-projects, I refer to them as "projects." 
3 See above, Chapter 2.2. 
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economie growth and concentration of capital as weIl as uneven 
development, with of ten disastrous consequences for under-
developed areas and the natura I environment. The role of 
the state vis-à-vis the economy had chanj3ed from "night 
watchman" to active regulator and planner as weIl as producer. 
As the state became interlocked with the economy, the class 
of bourgeois property-owners and managers merged with the 
political, military and cultural elites into one ruling class 
or power elite. The power elite transcended nationa1 boun-
daries within the European and even the Atlantic area, through 
formal organizations like NATO or the European Economie 
Community and more informal meetings 1ike the Bilderberg 
conferences presided over by the Prince of the Netherlands. 
Thus political power, like economie power was more and more 
concentrated in a few hands, whi1c representative hodies lost 
effective control over their executives and bureaucracies. 
Capi talism penetra tcd more and more spl1e.ces of' 1ife, "colünizin.," 
our daily life, leisure , entertainment and education. Comracr-
cialized mass media contributed to politic81 apathy by 
deflecting attention from political and socia1 reality townrds 
a dream world of stars and sensation. Political parties of 
the Right and the (Old) Left reinforced the tendency towards 
apathy and mass consumption instead of mass action, by con-
centrating power in their own party bureaucracies and by 
raising demands for material benefits--wages, pensions, full 
employment--which could be satisfied without undermining 
• 
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capitalism and its elitist power structure. 4 
On the other hand capitalism had not eliminated all of 
i ts contradie ... ions. It ~~ad succeeded in preventing or at 
least ab~ting econvmic crises at a very high cost. Firstly, 
capitalism needed a "military-industrial complex," i.e. mass 
production of arms which could cause a nuclear disaster; 
this danger led sOllle people to question the militarist and 
Cold War ideology that had propped up the capitalist system 
since the Second World War. Secondly, contradictions intensi-
fied between rich and poor countries. Many of the poor 
countries turned to socialist or at least non-capitalist 
paths of development and thus reduced the international 
market which capital needed to reproduce itself. Thirdly, 
b undless expansion in rich countries like the Netherlands 
caused pollution of the environment and a general decline in 
the quality of life, not only for workers but even for the 
middle classes and consumers in general. 
The middle classes or strata, which included the better 
paid and better educated part of the working class, showed 
less concern about wages and social security than the old 
working class, but more concern about the organization of 
their work and more general social and cultural issues. 
During the 1960s they began to react against the "coloniza-
tion" of their lives by caP.i..talism, of ten through direct 
action. Students and teachers oc~upied schools or went on 
4 Rooddruk voor morgen (Amsterdam, n.d.), pp. 9-87 • 
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strike, ';:eminists took to the streets, consc.cipted soldiers 
demonstrated for the right to ha.e their own union, social 
workers, artists and scientists organized teach-ins and action 
groups. All these groups seemed to aspire to some form of 
direct democracy or self-management as weIl as to a new model 
of civilization or culture oriented towards other goals than 
economic growth and private profit. 5 
The Old Left, both Communists and Social Democrats, 
had neglected or even suppressed these aspirations and actions 
in favour of electoral gains and economic growth, which would 
solve all problems according to them. Once the action groups 
became too strong and noisy to be ignored, the Old Left 
parties tried to manipulate them to increase their own power 
and to win a few more seats in parliament. 
In contrast with this, the Pacifist Socialist Party took 
a different line. While respecting the autonomy and spontaneity 
of the various action groups, it offered them a long-term 
political perspective as weIl as representation of their 
interests in parliament. In parliament the PSP supported any 
reforms that would help grass roots groups or action groups 
to build up counterpower, i.e. power independent of and in 
opposition to the power of the ruling Glass. The gradual ex-
tension of these counter-powers in the economy and polity of 
the Netherlands and other European countries might usher in 
a peaceful transition to socialism. Co-operation between 
5Analyse en Beleidsplan (Amsterdam, 1976) (1972), pp. 12-
14; with references to Gorz, Mallet, Krahl, Harmsen and others. 
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socialist parties in Europe like the PSU in France, the PSIUP 
in Italy and the SF in Denmark had been useful though insuf-
ficient; a European transition to socialism would require a 
united front with Communist and Social Democratie parties. 
However, such a front would work only in times of crisis, when 
revolutionary initiatives from the grass roots might be able 
to overcome the bureaucratie and reformist tendencies of those 
6 Old Left parties. 
In normal, tranquil periods, the PSP was to maintain its 
independenee and to lend at best critical support to Social 
Democratie or Communist parties. A government led by Social 
Democrats such as the Den Uyl coalition of 1973-1977 of ten 
allowed more counter-power to grow in some sectors, but on 
the other hand it modernized and strengthened rather than 
underlllined capitalism, by controllin~ wages and (a.Lways to El 
lesser extent) prices, subsidizing business and taking over 
unprofitable enterprises. It would improve education and 
health care but also adapt these to the demands of modern 
capitalism. It would encourage workers and others to take 
part in cultural life and to express their ideas, but only 
in the context of individualist bourgeois culture. 
The PSP was not interested in governmental power. It 
tried to anticipate in its own activities and organization 
the kind of society it strove for: open and undogmatic, 
6Ibid ., pp. 16-20; artieles in Radikaal by Eirk Meijer 
in particular; for instanee in Radikaal, 2 February 1972, 
2 March 1972, 13 April 1972 and 16 October 1974; also Henk 
Branderhorst, Radikaal, 19 July 1975, and Huib Riethof in 
Socialisties Perspektief 2 (October 1972); also Interview 6. 
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decentra1ized and democratie, co-operative and peacefu1. To 
the dominant bourgeois culture it opposed a "culture of 
strugg1e" (strijdkultuur) oriented towards solidarity and 
co11ective action in the interests of the wage-earning c1ass 
rather than towards individual expression and competition. 7 
It encouraged self-organization and politicization in the 
socio-cu~tural sector as much as in the economie sector, and 
in particular "project education" (projektonderwijs) in 
schools, anti-authoritarian day care centres, co11ectives of 
hospita1 inmates, and prison inmates, womenls 1iberation groups 
and homosexual discussion groups. Artists were encouraged to 
deve10p and spread the culture of struggle through action 
theatre and through the Socialist mass media, l~tab1y through 
the Association of Workers Radio Amateurs (VARA). Eventual1y 
art wou1d be integrated into daily life and everyone might 
become a (part-time) artist. 8 
The culture of struggle was part of the struggle for 
socialism. Socialism was defined by the Pacifist Socialist 
Party as a system of common ownership of all means of produc-
tion managed by the producers themselves. Self-management 
would start at the shop-floor, in regu1ar meetings of all 
workers, but it would also require democratie central planning 
7The notion of a "culture of struggle" was discussed in 
Radikaal in 1975 and 1976; before then individualist ideas 
about a counter-culture were more popu1ar; for instanee during 
1967, the poet, mystic and LSD-advocate Simon Vinkenoog wrote 
regu1ar columns in Radikaal. 
8Thus Wim Gijsen conc1uded a series of artieles in 
Radikaal (1967) • 
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at the national and, eventually, the global level. On the 
other hand, economie democracy would flourish more if produc-
tion was decentraliz~d in small units and if "soft technology," 
e. g. solar energy, were to replace "hard technology" like 
nuclear power. This would also reduce pollution and depletion 
of resources; even if it also reduced economie growth, the PSP 
preferred this to the capitalist mode of production. It 
feIt that the Old Left had avoided this dilemma and retained 
a rather arrogant and anthropocentric notion of nature as a 
mere object for human domination and exploitation; even Marx 
had to be corrected on this pOint. 9 Socialist society and 
culture had to be Ie ss aggressive and authoritarian, less 
achievement- and consumption-oriented, but more feminine, 
more peaceful, more collectivist, creative and playful than 
capitalist or bourgeois society and culture. Conflicts wou1d 
be resolved peacefully, through a system of councils--in 
workshops, offices, schools and neighbourhoods, to be coordi-
nated by a national parliament under grass roots control 
through imperative mandates and the right to recall its 
members. Military defense would be replaced by non-violent 
civilian or socia1 defense, based on mass action. Violence 
had to be avoided or at least minimized, even during the 
transition to socialism, as it contradicted the fundamental 
goal of socialism, i.e. 1iberation from domination or 
9 G. Harmsen, Natuur, ,~eschiecJenj. s, fi lo~30fie (Ni jfllewcn, 
1974), pp. 13-20. Or. GeI' lIarmsen, one of the few theoreti-
cians in the PSP between 1965 and 1974, was probab1y more of 
an "orthodox" I·Iarxist than the ma.jori ty of the fjarty members; 
cf. Interview 3. 
o tO 10 OppOS1 10n. 
4.1.2 The Theory of Serge Mallet: The New Working Class 
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Serge Mallet, a French sociologist and a leading member 
of the Parti Socialiste Unifié from 1960 until his death in 
1972, formulated a theory that had some impact on the project 
of the Dutch Pacifist Socialist Party. 
According to NalIet, capitalism developed in three stages; 
or more precisely, each stage was dominated by a different 
form of capitalism and a different segment of the work~ng 
class. At the first stage, capitalism was characterized by 
small-scale production in family firms and by skilied workers 
who lived, worked and thought like independent artisans. Proud 
of their trade and distrustful of the state as weIl as of 
their employers, these workers tended to join trade unions 
with anarchist or syndicalist tendencies. 
In the second stage, assembly-line production began to 
prevail. This required semi-skilled or unskilled workers and 
large factories. Poorly-paid, lacking education or any 
cultural tradition, these workers were usually bored by their 
monotonous work and lacked pride in their occupation. If 
they joined a trade union at all, it would be an industrial 
union run by Social Democratie or Communist bureaucrats con-
cerned with collective bargaining and state legislation rather 
than direct action. Though these Old Left union and party 
leaders used a great deal of anti~capitalist rhetoric, they 




were in fact integrated into the capitalist state. They did 
little to arouse their rank-and-file members and voters, the 
workers, from their apathy. 
In the third stage technological change led to automated 
production, supervised and maintained by highly trained and 
skilied workers, controlled by the managers of multi-national 
corporations. WeIl educated and weIl paid like the artisanal 
workers of the first stage, the New Workers of the third stage 
feIt pride in their vocational skill and were less concerned 
about wages. On the other hand they identified more with the 
corporation, which of ten trained them on the job, provided 
them with pensions and other benefits,and tried to socialise 
them into a corporatist and particularist way of thinking. 
This socialisation effort of ten failed because of the hierar-
chical power structure of the corporations; frustrated in 
their high expectations, the New Workers demanded more influence 
over their work and began to question even the power structure 
itself. The general strike of 1968 showed the radicalisation 
of these workers in France: many of them occupied their 
factories and called for workers' control over working condi-
tions or even complete workers' self-management. Because of 
their education and their location in the centre of advanced 
capitalist production, the New Workers feIt capable of under-
standing and eventually managing the production themselves--
and rightly 11 so. 
11 S. NalIet, La nouvelle classe ouvri~re, 2nd ed. (Paris, 




The Old Left, both the Social Democrats and the Communists, 
had neglected or even scorned the New Working Class and pre-
ferred to defend the interests of the Old Working Class in 
dying industries and backward areas; the Communists even 
allied themselves with reactionary small businessmen and 
farmers against the capitalist monopolies. The Old Left 
strategy of participation conflictualle implied conflict at 
the level of the enterprise and participation in collective 
bargaining with managers and government agents at the national 
level. To reconcile this contradiction, the Old Left main-
tained firm control over the local union branches and limited 
union demands to economie issues that would not undermine 
capitalism as such. The struggle against capitalism waS left 
entirely to the political parties (SFIO and PCF), or rather 
to their electoral campaigns, since they embarked on very few 
other activities and remained rather powerless in parliament. 
The Ultra-left pursued a more revolutionary strategy 
but directed it only at marginal elements of the Old Working 
Class. While its goals seemed to be correct--workers' control 
or self-management--it would never reach them without some 
support from the "technological vanguard" of the (New) 
Working Class, the engineers, technicians, and scientists. 
The only organizations in France that articulated interests 
of the New Working Class were the Parti Socialiste Unifié 
(PSU) and the Confédération Française Democratique du Travail. 
(CFDT). The factory cells--groupes d'entreprise--organiz~d 
by the PSU, particularly af ter 1968, attracted many New 
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Workers and articulated demands f'or workers' control. M.embers 
of' the PSU and the CFDT of'ten cooperated in direct actions 
that had economie as weIl as political goals. In view of' the 
New Workers' strivin~ f'or independence, and their--of'ten 
justif'ied--distrust of' political parties, the PSU would 
ref'rain f'rom any attempt to manipulate or direct them; it 
was to act only as an "intellectuel collectif'," providing the 
workers with political ideas and alternatives. Even so, 
direct action was more important to the party than electoral 
or parliamentary action. Advanced capitalist societies were 
increasingly dominated by multi-national corporations rather 
than national governments and parliaments; hence capitalism 
should be attacked at its core, where workers could take 
power. 
The New Workers could not take power and abolish capitalism 
all by themselves. They needed the cooperation of' Old Workers, 
intellectuals, peasants and perhaps civil servants, in a 
Socialist Front against capitalism--but not a Popular Front 
against capitalist monopolies. A Socialist Front would f'ight 
f'or workers' self'-management as weIl as f'or transformation 
of' the capitalist state into a workers' state ruled by workers' 
councils, and eventually abolish the state altogether. Even 
the division of' labour would eventually be eliminated. 12 
12S • Mallet, Le gaullisme et la Gauche (Paril, 1965); 
see also S. Mallet, Le Pouvoir Ouvrier (Paris, 1971), passim 
The last work takes a more radical position than the earlier 
one, but the diff'erences seem small enough to ignore here. 
+ 
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4.1.3 The Theory of André Gorz: Revo1utionary Reformism 
The French Austrian phi1osopher André Gorz seems to have 
inf1uenced many New Left groups in France, Germany, the Nether-
lands and elsewhere. ThoUiSh he was not an active member of 
the PSU, his theory of revolutionary reformism was adopted 
and applied by that party more than by any other French Party 
or ~roup. Thc Dutch PSP and the German Young Socialists as 
weIl as the Socialist Bureau used his ideas in a similar way. 
Hence it seems appropriate to discuss the theory here. 
Rather than deal with the totality of Groz's rich and 
comprehensive theoretical work, I will focus on his conception 
of the state and the strate~ic implications which he derived 
from it. Rejecting the Old Left notion of the state as a 
mere instrument in the hanels of a rulin[~ class, Gorz insisted 
on the relative autonomy of the bour.:;eois state from the 
bourgeoisie. While the state was determined (in the last in-
stance) by the capitalist mode of production and its division 
of labour, it followed its own logic. Because of its separa-
tion from civil (bourgeois) society the state could reconcilc 
conflicting interests in society, particularly within the 
ruling class--the bourgeoisie. Since the bourgeoisie could 
not achieve political he~emony, at lea:»t in Western Europe, 
without some support from other classes or fractions of 
classes, it needed a relatively autonomous and neutral state 
to acquire that support. The autonomy and neutrality were 
relative and to some extent illusory, however; the separation 
of political interests from economie interests tended to 
1 
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isolate the individual citizen from his socio-economie environ-
ment and thus prevented collective action to change that 
environment. In other words, the state helped to preserve 
the status quo in the interest of the ruling class; and more 
specifically that of the dominant faction within the rulin~ 
class, i.e. the monopolist bourgeoisie, in the case of con-
13 temporary Western Europe. 
Since the SeC\.lnd World War, the rUling classes seem to 
have hesitated between a conservative alliance with the 
traditional petty-bourgeoisie and farmers and a "modernist" 
alliance with the new petty bourgeoisie and a fraction of the 
working class. In both cases they tried to concentrate poli-
tical power in the executive branch and its technocratic 
agencies, but in the latter case they of ten sought to consult 
trade unions and to involve workers in Gaullist style 
"participation" rather than depend on parliament to for[!;e the 
alliance. 
In response to this, the Old Left tried two different 
strategies with equally poor results. Social Democrats 
usually accepted the "modernist" alliance with monopoly 
capital in order to win concessions with respect to the 
social and economie conditions of the working class. Commun-
ists on the other hand refused such an alliance and pursued 
a more defensive strategy in order to win the traditional 
petty bourgeoiSie, the non-monopolist bourgeoisie, and the 
13A• Gorz, Le socialisme difficile (Paris, 1967), 
pp. 11-45. 
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farmers for an anti-monopolist alliance against the dominant 
faction of the ruling class. Neither strategy could chan~e 
or even undermine capitalism in the affluent countries of 
Western Europe. Revolutionary Ultra-leftism was equally 
ineffective, given thc relative integration of the working 
1 " . . t 14 c ass ln oour.'~eols SOCle y. 
The only viabie alternative for the Left was rcvolutionary 
reformisrn: a ;:;trateJ:Y of rcforms ai ming at counter-power for 
the workin!~ class in the short run and revolution in the 10nE! 
run. These reforms would satisfy repressed collective needs 
for power and sOlidarity rather than individual needs for 
security and material benefits. The latter could usually be 
accommodated by the ruling class--though its economie con-
cessions were of ten cancelled by inflation or wage restraints--
whereas the former tended to endanger its very existence. 
Hence the rUling class would probably attempt to prevent or 
frustrate the revolutionary reforms; but in doing 50 it would 
raise the class consciousness and uni ty of the worldng class. 
The workers would become aware of the contradictions of 
capitalism, of the clash between the logic of profit and the 
logic of their own necds, and perceive the socialist alterna-
tive as a real possibility. Eventually they might turn their 
counter-power into dominant power and complete the revolution. 15 
14A. Gorz, "The Way Forward," in A. Lothstein, ed., 
"All We Are Saying," The Philosoph'y of the New Left (New 
York, 1971), pp. 320-342. 
15corz , Le socialisme diffic11e, pp. G9-111; see also 
Gorz, Réforme et U6volution (Paris, 1969). 
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Revolutionary reforlnisrn requireci a rcvolutionary party 
capable of carrying out a platform of reforms, but flexible 
and open enou~h to transcend these reforms in mass action. 
1,lass action \rould occur spontaneously, at the grass roots, 
throu;,;h vlorkers I counci Is or strike cOTllmi ttees; Dut a party 
VlaS neeàed to ~ive it political direction, based on an analysis 
of the concrete social formation (society). Furthermore, the 
party had to synthesize the demands of different sectors and 
factions of thc working class--defined in a broad sense, 
including the "neo-proletariat" of scientific and technical 
workers. ,'3y allowing free debate and direct democracy at the 
grass roots, the party would anticipate a proletarian state 
in i ts own or~!,anization. Bence i t had to bc able to take 
power and tr,msform thc bourgeois state, into a proletarian 
state durin~ u revolutionary crisis, without concentrating 
all power in its own hands as Communist parties tried to do. 
At the sanIe time the party had to create a proletarian culture, 
a new vmy of life oriented towards collective needs rather 
than private profit. 
It was the absence of such a party more than anything 
else which caused the revolution of 1968 in France to fail. 
While the masses were gradually radicalized, the Communist 
Party tried to restrain them and to narrow their demands to 
wage increases, instead of encouraging experiments with 
workers' control and counter-power~ Of course, armed insurrec-
tion would have been suicidal at that time--or any other time, 
in an advanced capitalist society at peace--but mass mobilization 
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could have leu to a revolution without armed resistance from 
the bourgeoisie. However, mass mobilization had to be pre-
pared and anticipated by patient efforts at mass education 
16 
and pOliticization, through revolutionary reforms. 
4.1.4 The Theory of Hans-Jurgen Krahl: The Total Worker 
Though closer to the New Ultra-left than either Gorz or 
Malle~ the German student leader and philosopher Hans-Jurgen 
Krahl also influenced the Dutch PSP, particularly through his 
theory of the Total Worker. 
In his interpretation of Marx's ~rundrisse, Krahl con-
ceived of the scientific intelligentsia as part of the Total 
v/orker (Gesamtarbei ter). 'rhe increasin~~ application of science 
and technology to capitalist production tended to integrate 
intellectual and manual work, and to merge both manual and 
intellectual workers into one class, the Total or Collective 
Worker. Uoth manual and intellectual workers were alienated 
from their work and from themselves, but the latter were slow 
to realize it. Rather than accept their proletarianized 
condition, the intellectual workers cling to petty bourgeois 
notions of private property, individualism and "high" culture. 
Like the artisans in the 19th century, they defended their 
property of tools and products against any expropriation or 
collectivization. Yet they would have to give up these notions 
and to overcome their positivist specialization in separate 
disciplines and sub-disciplines irt order to emancipate 
lGGorz, Héforme et R6volution, pp. 9-56; Gorz was influenced 
by Sart re and by Italian trade unionists like Magri and Trentin. 
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themselves. Emancipation could only take place in alliance 
with the manual workers. The intellectual workers were to 
become the co11ective theoreticians of the Tota1 Worker. 17 
For the time being, Krah1 assigned this task to the SDS 
(Socialist German Student Lea~ue) in Germany. Even if the 
student movernent, led by the SDS, had started as an anti-
authoritarian petty bourgeois protest against the dec1ine of 
individual freedom, it was now (i.e. 1968-1969) aware of its 
proletarian condition and in the process of sheddin~ those 
petty bourgeois ideas. A new notion of pro1etarian indivi-
duality would develop, transcending the separation of produc-
tion and consumption, work and leisure, that characterized 
bour~eois and petty bourgeois individuality. 
For this purpose the radical students needed some facilities 
within the university. They had to fight for reforms that 
allowed them influence over institutes, research and personnel; 
provided these reforms were seen as steps in a revolutionary 
strate~y. Reformist student groups neglected the latter, 
whereas many revolutionary students, particularly the ~laoists, 
neglected the former and preferreJ to withdraw from the uni-
versity. Neither group had maintained a critical notion of 
emancipation. The Frankfurt School hod developed such a 
notion but failed to link it to any form of praxis. 18 
1 7H_J • Krahl, Konsti tution and Klassenkéllopf (Frankfurt, 
1971), pp. 330-347. 
l8Krahl , Konstitution and Klassenkarnpf, pp. 276-277, 
313-322, 191-198, etc.; most essays in this collection were 
written in 1968 and 1969. 
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4.1.5 The theory of Oskar Negt: The Proletarian PUblic Sphere 
Krahl died shortly af ter the SDS dissolved itself. His 
work was published posthumously by a group of collea~ues and 
friends, who had taken similar political positions. Oskar 
Negt was one of them. Af ter 1970 he Lecl:-trne one of the lflajor 
theorists of the Socialist Bureau and influenced the Dutcll 
PSP as weIl. 
As a junior "third generation" member of the Frankfurt 
School, Negt devoted considerable attention to cultural ques-
tions. Bour~eois culture had always been ~redatory or 
parasitic, based on appearances or remnants of pre-capitalist 
tradition, religious beliefs and the privatism of the family. 
Monopoly capital tendect to erode even these remnants. Culture, 
including art, science, education, leisure, family life and 
reli~ion, were subsumed under capital, not only in a formal 
but also in a real sense, affectin~ its content. 
Capitalism had turned inward, so to speak, directincl 
its imperialist thrust for accurnulation into manis inner 
nature instead of outer nature and foreign countries--though 
the latter thrust continued, the former became more important. 
Thc satisfaction of relevant human needs for sOlidarity, 
communicative and sensuous experience,.contact with nature 
and consolation for death or disease, which used to be seen 
as the function of the family, religion, art or culture in 
~eneral, was now associated with the consumption of commodi-
ties. A new "culture industry" produced commodities that 
appeared to satisfy these needs through projection of images, 
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notably on television. People purchased these commodities 
and appeared satisfied, for a while, because their personali-
ties had been deformed and fragmented in family, school and 
workplace. 
The internal expansion of capitalism created new contra-
dictions, however. Human needs could not be satisfied by 
appearances and images in the long run, unless human nature 
chan~ed so drastically as to lose its human and autonomous 
character altogether and to become robot-like. The breakdown 
of neo-capitalist pseudo-culture in a cultural revolution 
seemed a more likely alternative. A cultural revolution could 
be a short-lived affair like the events of May 1968 in France 
or the German student revolt of 1968-1969, unless it found a 
firm base in a " pro l e tarian public sphere" (Proletarische 
Oeffentlichkeit) resulting from self-organization and coopera-
tion of workers and intellectuals. Except for brief periods--
1917-1921 in Russia, for instance--the Old Left had neglected 
culture and the public sphere, while imitating bourgeois 
forms of órganization in political parties separated from 
cultural and material production. 19 
The New Left, and in particular the Socialist Bureau in 
Gerrnany, héÁ d tried to compete with the 01d Left for numbers 
of votes or members, but they would fail, anyway, since the 
masses would remain loyal to reformist parties as long as 
reforms appeared feasible. Instea~ of playin~ the 01d Lef t's 
19 O. Ne~t and A. Kluge, Oeffentlichkeit and Erfahrung 
(Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 267-310 especia11y. 
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game, the New Left was to articulate and mobilize the immediate 
interests of people at work, at home, in school, etc. It had 
to start with immediate needs and fragmented people, and 
could only hope to end up with whole human beings and authentic 
needs. Through civic action, study and experiment it could 
help workers to develop their imagination and to articulate 
their needs, independently of political parties or unions. 20 
As an example, Negt described a German public school 
project in which he played a certain role. The school was to 
re late education to the real experience and languacle of the 
children, particularly working class children, in order to 
satisfy their social and emotional as weIl as their co~nitive 
needs. The children were to learn through concrete exar;;ples 
or cases rather than through memorization of general rules 
and techniques. Teachers were to introduce these examples 
vlith a minimal use of authority and a maximal appeal to self-
re 6 ulation and sOlidarity among the children. Of course no 
school could isolate itself from society and turn into a 
"socialist island"; but it could lJrepare working class chilciren 
for the class struggle. Since neo-capitalisrn needed workers 
who were ab Ie to co-operate and exercise some self-control, 
it could allow experimental schools such as this, even if it 
would try to reproduce industrial discipline and division 
21 
of labour within any school. 
200 • Negt, Keine Demokratie ohne Sozialismum (Frankfurt, 
1976), pp. 300-312, 446-491. 
21 Ibid ., pp. 380-418. 
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4.1.6 Conc1usion 
The Revo1utionary Reformists formed a re1ative1y homo~en­
eous category within the New Left. They shared a common 
source of inspiration, marxism, and the intention to revise 
or renew J·larx's theory in order to nnalyse lute or neo-cöpi talism 
in ~rance, Germany or the Netherlands. 
Three major changes in capitalism were observed by most 
Hevolutionary Reformists. First, production had become more 
scientific and more abundant; hence a new type of working 
class had emerged, better educated and better paid than the 
old one. Second, the state had become more active and of ten 
intervened in the economy. Third, capitalism had penetrated 
daily life and culture, resulting in ideological adaptation 
as weIl as new contradictions. 
The strategies that Revolutionary Reformists derive~ from 
this analysis were also relatively similar. The Old Left 
had been integrated into the capitalist system because of 
its economism and electoralism; hence the New Left was to 
avoid both and concentrate more on political and cultural 
issues as weIl as extra-parliamentary action, without ne~lecting 
economic issues and elections altogether. By encouragin~ 
workers to take control over their working conditions, and 
encouraging other groups also to organize and articulate 
collective needs, they hoped to develop socialist counter-
power at the centres of capitalist production. By pressing 
for relatively modest reforms at first, they hoped to mobilize 
even the reformist majority of the working class, while 
------------------------------~-~~~~-~-~-----
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trying to radicalize it through these reforms and the inevit-
able repression of some of them. The development of counter-
powers would not be irreversible, but even reverses could 
raise working class consciousness. Eventually, workers would 
be able to take power away from the bourgeoisie, and to 
socialize the means of production undcr workers' control. 
The Revolutionary Reformists also a~reed to a great extent 
ab out the type of political party re4uired to carry out their 
strategy. The party had to be open, decentralized and active 
at the grass roots level as weIl as in elections and legis1a-
tures. No such party existed in Germany, but the Socialist 
Bureau and even the SDS each came fairly close to it at some 
point. 
4.2 The Project of the Anarchist New Left: Provocation from 
the Periphery 
This section deals primarily with Provo, the most impor-
tant Dutch Anarchist ~roup in the 1960s, and the Kabouter (Elf) 
Movement which succeeded it around 1970. The Provo project 
waS influenced significantly by Situationist ideas, which 
are discussed in sub-section 4.2.3. This influence was 
mediated by the Dutch artist and theorist Constant Nieuwenhuijs, 
vlho had been a member of the Dutch section of the Si tuationist 
International before he wrote a few articles for the journal 
Provo. Provo had haq contacts also with the Derlin branch 
of the German Socialist Student Lea~ue (SDS), led by Ruài 
Dutschke and Bernd Habehl, who had been inspired in turn by 
German Situationists as weIl as by the Frankfurt School. The 
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theories of Dutschke, R~behl and the German Situationists 
are discussed briefly in sub-section 4.2.4. Dy way of con-
trast, the project of Socialisme ou Darbarie is reconstructed 
in sub-section 4.2.5; it shared many basic ideas with Provo, 
but combined Anarchist ideas wi th 1,Iarxist theory. 
T·lost of these groups were very small .race-to-face oroup3. 
J\.lthough they counted usually one or two leadinj theorists 
amonJ their members who pUblished their ideas in books, it 
\'Jould be unfair to treat the projects of the . ..;roups a::; l.Jl'OClUctS 
of these theorists alone; no doubt the lutter discussed their 
theories with other group members. Hence the theories are 
22 treated here as products of the groups. 
4.2.1 The Project of Provo 
Provo analysed Dutch society in a rather original way. 
It attached great importance to new technology, perceiving a 
big gap between on the one hand the technological and econollJic 
lJotential for freedont and creativity, and on the other hand 
the repressive reality of that society. The cybvrnetic 
revolution in technology would allow complete automation of 
industry and the abolition of human labour without a reduction 
in wealth. All wealth could be redistributed to eliminate 
poverty in the world. 
On the other hand the process of automation was slowed 
down by the authorities, both state bureaucrats and managers 
22 
They were usually presented as such by the theorists 
of the group, which was of ten defined as a "collective indi-
vidual." 
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of large corporations, who were interested only in raisin~ 
the production and consumption of commodities. Furthermore 
they enticed the masses to spend their spare time and money 
consuming largely superfluous commodities like television and 
cosmetics, or even harmful ones like cigarettes, cars, candy 
and french fries, instead of enjoying leisure in a more crea-
tive and healthy way. Indoctrinated by mass media and school, 
the masses accepted this authoritarian capitalist system nnd 
its uourgeois ideology of competition, career-orientation, 
work ethic, monogamy and theism. Even the working class, once 
the most militant opponent of the system, had "fallen as leep 
in front of its television set" and appeared content with its 
slave-like consumer life. In fact, the working class had been 
integrated with the middle class into an amorphous mass of 
"suekers" (klootjesvoll<: an unfriendly term wi th sexual 
connotations in Dutch).23 
The Old Left, both the Communists and the Social Democrats, 
still represented the working class by raisin,~ demands for 
hiGher wages and socia1 security--demands which cou1d be 
inte~rated easi1y within the existing system. The only 
opposition that the authorities really feared and that cou1d 
undermine the system was the cultural or rather counter-
f . P 24 cultural action 0 groups l~ke rovo. 
23"Ananar" (Van Lindt) in Provo 2 (August 1965); Constant 
(Nieuwenhuys) in Provo 4 (October 1965); Provo 7 (Feburary 
1966). 
24Van Duijn, "Aan de linkse beweging," Provo 7 (February 
1966). 
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The social base of l-'rovo WEèS not to oe found in the 
proletariat but in thc provotariat. This small and hetero-
.;8neous cl:>."'s consistecl of artists, hippie::;, students and 
:'3treet youth \Jho Ii veu in the periphery of the system because 
of their economie condition--part-time or fuII-time unemploy-
ment--ancl their psycholo~ical condition--a subversive or anti-
authoritarinn state of mind. They were the produets of 
automation and affluence, but they did not take part in either. 
Decause of their peripheral position they seemed relatively 
immune against addiction to consumer goods, the work ethic or 
authoritarian submission to authorities. Their morality was 
permissive, libertarian and creative, their sexuality promis-
cuous, and their polities playful and provocative. Provo, 
"the first provotariem moveraent in the world," articulated 
their political interests by initiating happenings and other 
provocative action, but also by proposing "Vlhite Plans." 
Provoca ti ve action , i. e. symbolic defiance of authori ty, 
could serve several functions. First, it might help the 
provotariat to achieve some homogeneity nnd class-consciousness 
as weIl us a sense of identity at the individual level. 25 
Secondly, i t \'lould create publici ty in the mass media, 
l:,articularly when the police reacted brutallyagainst the 
provotarians in the street. Given the isolation of the provo-
tariat from mainstreara society, anel the enormous ideological 
power of the mass media over the minds of the consumer masses, 
25"In resistance I am myself" (In het verzet ben ik mezelf), 
as RoeI Van Duijn put it in Het wittegëV:ar, p. 7~ 
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r;ub1ici ty a10ne could rnobilize ~5upport for l-'rovo and under-
mine the dominémt ic.leolo[:,y. Third1y, vrovoca.tion could set 
off a fascist backlash--vrhich would .'~;ive Provo the chance to 
come to a heroic end; thi s was seen é.iS a serious 1=,ossi bi li ty 
') ,-
on1y in the first rnonths of Provo's existence.~u Fourthly, 
provocative 8.ction was fun. 
\Jhi te plans formeJ the second leis of the Provo strate(;y. 
They sUj,gested serious reforms to solve urbent problems in 
Dutch society in the short run. If effectively irnplemented, 
the tJ1ans rlli,,;ht contribute to an increasin.,'; i~,opulari ty of 
Provo; ir rcjected, thcy wou1d reveal the incapacity of the 
autllori tie!:.> to ado;,t i.dmple éJl1d ilfl(.l,~inati ve solutions for 
lH',i,ent pro);lcms. In both CCises Provo would rnobilize some 
surport. 
Particip tion in municij,.Ja1 elections could be justified 
in a similar way. The municipal council of Amsterdam would 
serve as a platform for provotarian ideas but possibly also 
as an instrument of reform and experiment. If provotarian 
groups won a majority in the council, they could start decen-
tra1izing authority to neighbourhood councils and experimenting 
with workers'self-management in municipal corporations--i.e. 
27 
management by "the most capable and most educated workers." 
New departments would be set up to "initiate change" and to 
r'6 
L See footnote 117, p. above (Chapter 2.3). 
27. . . J1art~ Jn Van Lindt, "New Alnsterdam ," in Provo 9 
(12 I;lay 19 66) • 
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"organize communication and fun." Eventually thc streets 
would be re-appropriated for creative public activities and 
working areus would be re-integrated with living areas. 
The next step in Provo strate;;y would be the transforma-
tion of thc r";ether lands, Ue l<.si urn and LuxewlJur,; into a [edera-
tion of self-~overnin" regions nnd municipali ties. The three 
mor18.rchies would be Etbolishec:'. Ceremonial E,ctivities likc 
the openin'I, of a new brid.,e could be perforrncd by film stars 
or models. 'l'his transforlilation could take place wi thin 
capitulism, i.e. without a revolution. 
Hevolution cOLlld only be scen aG a long-term ,;oal in thc 
affluent societies of North America and Europe; in the 1~ird 
World on the other hand the proletariat was still capable of 
revolutionary action und deserveci provotarian support 1'01' 
28 that purpose. However, in the long run, capitalism would 
collapse in the western world as well, whether throu;;h revolu-
tion or a nuelear holocaust. It eould not prevent the full 
automation of industry indefinitely; thus the working elass 
woul d eventually di Sé.:q.J!Jear, and the lJrovo taria t of unemployed 
subversives woulcl make uiJ the majority of the population. 
A provotarian revolution would affect the socio-economie 
order us weIl QS thc volitic~] order, but above all the domi-
nEnc cultuI'c. '1'11'2 ,10\'1 'ilorld oruer would h; socialist and 
libertarian, based on collective ~roperty, decentralized 
authority, self-management and disa~nament. While automated 
28Roel (Van Duijn), in Provo 12 (September-October 
1966). 
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industry and agriculture would produce an abundance of food 
and other necessary goods, the people would travel around in 
free public transport, live in collective hotels, and spend 
most of their time in creative play and communication. Every-
one \'lould become an o.rtist, but art would be a collective 
activity. Creativity would be controlled by love, a6gression 
sublimated in cooperation. Sexual freedom and pleasure would 
not be restrained by any moral convention but only by feelin~s 
of solidari ty. Throu;!,h play man might control his desire 
for domination and reconcile himself with Nature instead of 
tryin~ to dominate it. 29 
4.2.2 The Project of the Kabouters 
Towards the end of the 1960s, the provotariat had grovin 
from a marginal bunch of heterogeneous street youth into a 
fairly large group of young people who shared a similar style 
of life, speech, dress and (long) hair; most of them lived in 
Central Amsterdam. Provocation was no lon~er necessary to 
mobilize them or to make their existence knovIn • Hence their 
strategy changed from provocation of the authorities to 
construction of thei r own "al terna ti ve" society, consi stin\.;:; 
of productive associations, consumer cooperatives, squatters' 
communes and a People' s i,leeting to coordinate these counter-
institutions. The new society would grow within the old one, 
29 Van Duijn, Het witte gevaar, pp. 55-76; see also Van 
Duij~ De boodscha van een wi~ze kabouter (Amsterdam, 1969) 
D. Van Weerlee, Wat de Provo's willen Amsterdam, 1966), 
pp. 13-22. A more elaborate reconstruction is provided by 
Lambrecht, op. cito 
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"like a toadstool on a rotting trunk," attracting more and 
more supporters by the force of its example and through the 
propaganda of its ambassadors. 
The revolution would still start in the periphery, i.e. 
the provotariat and its counter-institutions rather than the 
proletariat or the central sectors of the economy. However, 
it would be a non-violent and "sweet" revolution, if not a 
gradual evolution. Even the authorities could eventually be 
"turned around" (converted), the Kabouters argued, once they 
realized that their capitalist society was doomed to destroy 
itself. Some provocation might help them to see things in a 
new liÎ~ht. JiIoveover, confrontation between the authori ties 
and the Kabouters might prevent the latter from isolating 
themselves from political reality; the Anarchist Old Left had 
of ten become sterile and impotent because of its isolation in 
productive associations ana rural settlements. On the other 
hand, the Socialist Old Left had neglected to construct counter-
institutions and to change the mentality of its members. 'I'he 
Kabouters tried to avoid both errors. Mentality and social 
structure had to be chan3ed at the same time, through the 
development of counter-institutions and the agitation for 
reforms in municipal councils and other institutions of the 
30 
capitalist state. 
4.2.3 The Situationist Project 
Since one of Provo's main theorists, Constant Nieuwenhuys, 
30Van Duijn, Schuldbekentenis van een ambassadeur; see 
also '1'. Re/~tien and K. J3oehmer, Van provo naar oranjevrijstaat 
(Amsterdam, 1970). 
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had been a member of the Situntionist International, Situa-
tionist theory may prove relevant to an understanding of 
the Provos. 
In particular, the Situationist notion of the "spectacle" 
can throw some li;)1t on the strélte~;J of provocutive action. 
In conternporary capitalism, the spectacle had. become the main 
C01illi;odity as weIl as the major forlll of ideolo,.::,y anel domination. 
It i.;ave a certain cohesion to society and rneanint~ to individual 
lives, its consumption was seen as the Goal of production E:.nu 
the main form of leisure. Vet it alienated the individual 
producers and consumers, vreventing them from corl1municatincl 
VIi th each other nnd from eniSaging in creati ve acti vi ty. All 
capi talist societies tended to becolile "spectacular," even the 
state capi talist Soviet Union and ttle under-developed Third 
\lorl d--in the latter the spectac Ie Vlas more concentra ted in 
the person of the national leader, whi1e other spectacular 
C OllllilO di ties were anticipated but not yet consurned. In the 
West, mass production of spectacular commodities allowed the 
31 populace to consurne spectacles at home. 
'l'elevision was only one spectacular cornrnodi ty, thou;::;h 
an im~ortant one. Politics hE:.d a1so become a spectacle, a 
phoney strugg1e between stars who pret~nded to represent the 
masses, whi1e obfuscating the class struggle. The proletariat 
had lost its revolutionary perspective and its autonomy, while 
more and more bureaucrats represented it in parliaments and 
31 G• Debord, La soci6té du spectacle (Paris, 1967), 
Chapters land 11. 
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,};overnment<.;--v:hcthe r they cal led thelllsc 1 yes Communi sts, 
l'li:lOi sts, Trotskyi tes, Socialists or Anarchists made no 
Cifference. For most leftists in Europe, thc revolution had 
aL:.;o lJecowe a ~31Joctacle, which they \'!iltched taJdn:~ lJlace in 
tJle 'l'lür(l 1./o1'1d. 
Thou~h still ~rowin~ in nUlllber, the proletariat had 
declineu sUGjectively, as a consciou5 class. It had become 
alienated from itself not only at the work-ylace but now also 
in its politica 1 and cultural life, during leisure at home. 
The Old left, whether r.Iarxist, Hevisionist or Anarchist, 
failed to prevent this decline because of certain theoretical 
weaknesses in dealing with problems of organization, the state 
and ideolo,,,::y. In oPposiniS his "scientific socialism" to 
utopian socialism, Narx (and even more perhaps Engels) 
retained á. determinist and bourgeois conception of science, 
ignoring the fact that science would disapyear alon~ with art, 
philosophy, poli tics [md economics when bourgeois society 
collapsed. Anarchists like Bá.kunin were ri~ht in criticizing 
llarxism as authori tariá.n, but their practice tended to be 
equally authoritarian, perpetuatin~ the division of labour 
between active propa~andists or terrorists on the one hand 
and more passive, receptive masses on the other hand. Kautsky, 
Dernstein and Lenin went even further, however, reducin~ the 
proletariat from a potential subject to nn object of history, 
viliich depended on economie forces hnd professional party 
l ·t·· f·t . t· 32 po 1 lC1ans or 1 s emanc1pa 10n. 
32Il . ! )1,( • , Chaptcr IV. 
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Situationists in Germany and the Netherlands--Constant 
Nieuwenhuys among them--concluded that because of automation 
"the proletariat might disappear before it made a revolution.,,33 
They expected artists and inte1lectuals to take over the 
revolutionary role of the proletariat and to develop a new 
culture oriented towards free time--instead of the linear or 
pseudo-cyclical time notion of industrial capitalism--and 
towards creativity instead of consumption. The "happeninGs" 
, 
of New York artists and of Dutch Provos marked the beginnin3 
of a new revo1utionary era; they were attempts to "construct 
a si tua tion" and to overcome a1iena tion and separa tion between 
artist and audience. 
The majority of the Situationists disagreed with these 
conc1usions. They we1comed the New York happenings only as 
self-destruction of the old svectacular forms of art, usina 
the miserabIe materiCl1 from the old world instead of startin;~ 
from scratch. They approved of the Provo critique of capital-
ist consumption and its attcmpt to integrate art and polities 
into claily life, but not of its "technocratie elitisrn" 0.nu 
i ts denunei<ltion of the proletariat as "sueY~erc." Further-
more, they warned that even Provo h0.ppenin~s could turn into 
34 
spectacles. 
Aecordin,~ to the ri1ujori ty of the Si tua tionists, the 
".--, 
oO"Le proletarL:lt ris'-iue de disi.Jarai tre sans avoir L.li t 
SLl revolution, " Internationale Situationniste 3 (1959): 24. 
34 InternCl tiona1e :::;i tua tionni :ste 11 (19l) 7) : especial1y 
65.,.Go. 
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proletariat had lost its revolutionary perspective but not 
its revolutionary potential. It continued to fight the rulin~ 
c lass, thou2,h in a more hidden, of ten "criminai" way. In 
particular youn~ workers, and youth in general, rebelled 
a;l,ainst their alienation by destroyini.:S mü.chines and consurner 
~oods. The events of i.lay anel June 1968 seemecl to confirrn 
the majority position: during the ~eneral strike many 
factories were occupied by the workers and decorated with 
revolutionary slo~ans, occasionally of a Situationist nature; 
more significantly, workers' councils spran6 up here and 
there, markinJ the beginnin~ of a new revolutionary periode 
Of course, hureaucrats of all leftist persuasions, from 
Stalinist union officials to would-be bureaucrats of ~auchiste 
groups like Cohn-Gcndit, jumped ~t once on these spontaneous 
workers' actions and tried to suppress or rnanipulate them. 
'rhey succeeded, at least temporarily; the rnovernent collapsed 
vii thin two months. However, class consciousness had advanced 
considerably. The revolution had been put on the agenda 
. 35 
a,_~aln • 
A revolution had to be total, i.e. cultural and political 
as weIl as economic. Workers' councils would take all power 
and introduce self-rnana~ement, both as.an end in itself and 
as a menns to change society. The councils would do away 
with all specialization, hierarchy and separation between 
35Viénet, op. cit.; see also Internationale Situationniste 
12 (1969): 3-34; and Debord andSanguinetti, op. cit., 
pp. 97-117, 119-127. 
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workers and with representation by political specialists. 
All power wou1d rest with general assemblies of workers on 
the shop-floor. Eventually, work anti leisure would be inte-
grated, with the abolition of the wa~e system and the division 
of labour. P1easure without constraints--"jouir sans 
')6 
entraves"--would be the main purpose in life.'"' 
The Situationist International had assigned itse1f a 
rather modest ro1e in this process. Until 1~6g it could 
contribute to the renewal of revo1utionary theory and prepare 
the ground for the events of May and June. Af ter those events, 
it began to break up and to eliminate itself, since there 
were enough revo1utionary workers now to develop and apply 
the theory without Situationist support. Noreover, situationism 
itself was being turned into a spectacle or ideolo~y in the 
hanös of new lJetty bouróeois "cacires," intellectuals and civil 
servants, as weIl as into an object of investi~ation and con-
t 1 t · f L·....· 37 emp a-l.on or 1l1.SI..Orl.ans. 
4.2.4 The Suuversive Action Project 
'l'he Gerli1an section of the Si tuationist International VlaS 
expelled in 1962. It continued its theoretical and practical 
work as an indelJenuent group, renamed "Subversive Aktion." 
The group studied the writings of'the Frankfurt School 
extensi vely and accepted the latter 's cri tique of bour;:,;eois 
culture, but criticized it for its pessimism and lack of 
36Internationale Situationniste 12 (1~69): 64-79. 
37Ibid ., pp. 112-114; a1so Debord and Sanguinetti, op. 
cit., pp. 11-80. 
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;Jction. Critique Y'(,[iwincö ineffcctive 'without action. Provo-
cntive action coul~ revea1 thc repressive nature of Gourgeois 
institutions like the state, as woll ~s thc university and 
marriage. 'fhc direct action of the lJutch Provos was praiseu 
and imitated in actions against advertizing a~ents and the 
Ca tho lic church. Yet thi s kind o1~ ac tion was seen as "Vorpraxi s, " 
[-re-praxis, rather than "Praxis": it could help to test 
critical theory and to win new members for the revolutionary 
micro-ceils that the Subvcrsive Action ~roup tricd to set up 
. 't;' t't . tIt· 38 ln many Gc~nan cl"les, bu 1 was not yc rcvo u lonary. 
Some dis~l,~,recment arose 'di thin thc c,,I'OU1J about the lij):oli-
hood of a rcvo1ution in Wostern Europe. '1'he l\lunich win,:-.; 
around l~un:001mann [end dockelmann leaned towards pessimism, 
\lhcreécs the flcrlin -,'lin,-, arounJ Dutschke :.~nci Habeh1 consid8red 
1 t · . \ . L' .. . '-1' t' I· L ' 3 ~ rcvo U'lon C,l j.OSS1,J1.1Cy \"Jl','un ne nexcwcnt,;y years or so. 
Thc ~,lunich win" was JilOSt ililpre ssed ()y tiie inte d,ra tion of 
aJvG:.ncec.:. capi talist society. \'Jorkers and c,,"pi talists L.e~an 
to share subjcctive anti objective interests in a capitalist 
economy that provided a minimum of wealth for all. Both 
classes accepted and internalized the achievement principle 
i 2 (~istuni.?sprinzip) which characterized capi talist as weIl as 
Soviet iJcology. Hoth were alienated. Ideology hao become 
an integral part of the late capitalist mode of production, 
3::3 u Uockclmann anJ NaGel, eds., ol-!. cit., pp. 157-lbO. 
39. Kunzelmann chun~cd his mind rather fre4uently; by 1965 
he expecte~ a revolution at very short notice and was expelled 
froJIl thc.;rou;;; later he joincd a Haoi st,~roup (j\10s1er , op. 
cit., P0. 115-11G. 
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not just a "superstructure" as I,Iarx had asserted. Hence a 
revolution could only be a cultural or i~eological one; socio-
economie change, like nationalization of the means of produc-
tion, would not eliminate internalized repression and aliena-
tion. At best, economie chan~e could create the conditions 
for a cultural revolution. Automation in particular might 
help to undermine the achievement principle anti create a 
c 1,:.1.s::;; 0 f unelllploye d tha t could Le 1Il0 0i lized a,!,ainst the sys tem. 
The destructive actions of street youth (Halbstarken) showed 
a potential as far as they recon4uered the street as a 
public space for communication rather than spacc for private 
transport and consumption. On the other hand, their actions 
lacked a revolutionary goal, and could not really transeend 
the authoritarian and hierarchical structure of late capitali~t 
society. 
Apart from waiting for automation, the Subversive Action 
sroup should concentrate its efforts on political education 
(Aufklarung) and theoretical reflexion. A drastic revision 
of I·Jarxist theory was deeliled neccssary, particularly with 
respect to the role of the lJroletariat as the subject of 
history and the relationship between "base" and "superstruc-
ture". Thou~h the economy was still predominant in society, 
it had been integrated with the state and culture to such an 
extent that it would be more appropriate to speak about the 
"economization of society" than about the "determination of 
society by the economy~; in fact, the economy itself had 
become ideolo~ical. Uirect action at the level of economie 
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production, such as the or~anization of factory cells or 
workers' councils, would sooner or later be inte~rated in 
the system, through forms of co-determination, as long as 
workers internalized the dominant ideology of achievement, 
competition, consumption and sexual repression. 40 
The Berlin win,:; did not want to revise f.'Iarx qui te as 
llluch, though it did question the revolutionary role of the 
proletariat in Europe Dnd North America. A proletarian revolu-
ti on could be expected in Latin America, however, and a little 
later in Africa and South or West Asia. Hopefully, at least 
marginal groups like students and unemployed workers in Euro~e 
as well as racial minorities in North America would show 
solidarity with those revolutions. Automation and unernployment 
could possibly create conditions for a revolution even in 
developed countries. A revolution would not occur automatically 
af ter an economic crisis, but only af ter a lon~ class stru~gle. 
The stru,;.sgle mil~ht consist of "a lon~~ march throu~h the insti-
tutions ," provoca ti ve actions a:;ainst authori ties and demon-
utrations as well as inforrnative actions like street discussions 
anel teach-ins. 
Given the ilflportance of international solidarity, the 
Derlin wing of Subversive Action related many actions to 
Third World countries like Zaire (Con~o), Vietnam and Iran. 
It cooperated with other groups, mostly student or~anizations 
lil"e the SDS (Socialist ~~erman ~)tudent Leé.1<;ue), élnd finally 
40Böckelmann and IJa;el, op. ci t., pp. 160-Hi7, 181-1~3G, 
1~5, 247-251, 2~5, 301-3UG, 437-454. 
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merged with the latter in 1965. 1t looked at thc SDS not 
only as an ally in action but also as a means to establish 
contacts with revolutionary students in the Third \~rld and 
to recrui t support8rs . 41 :for its o\'/n proJ8ct. 
4.2.5 The Project of Socialisme ou D~rbarie 
Like other Anarchist New leftists the ~roup th~t ~uLlished 
;)ociali sme ou .uarbarie acce~Jted th8 fac t tha t the workin,); 
class had been inte~rate~ into cnpitnlist society at le~st 
in North America and Western Europe, as weIl as in the state 
capitalist or bureaucratic societies of Eastern Europe and 
Asia. It (iualifieci that statement, hoviever, by [Jointin,i, out 
the continuini; class stru,~~i.~le at a sub-insti tutional level, 
i.8. on the shop-floor. At that level workers kept fL~htin'> 
thcir bosses, not only for hiDher vm~~es but also for other 
workin~ condi tions of a wore humane l.:.:ind, throul;h "inforlilul 
111 other woràs, they resisted the capitalist or;.:;unization 
(and constant re-or:~anization) of production throui.;h collec-
tivc 8.ction. On the other hand their collectivc action or 
coop~ration V,W.s neccsiSary, even for the accumulation of 
capital, since the cupitalist organizntion of production 
suffered frorn internal conLradictions., 
These contradictions could be reso1ved on1y if the 
worl:ers woulu contr01 anu coordinnte all proQuction throut.~h 
41 11 .. n.d., pp. 
338-340; see also 
written by Rabehl 
tively. 
169-178, 190-195, 230-238, 282-285, 307-328, 
iler~mann, et al., op. cit., the chapters 
and Dutschkë,-PP. 151-178 and 33-93 respec-
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workers councils and general meetings at the Shop-floor. 
Similar contradictions existed at a higher level between 
private appropriation and collective needs, which also re-
quired workers coor;eration through federal councils for their 
resolution. The vlOrkers ' victory in thc class strug{"le was 
possible but far from inevitable. As its nalile implied, 
Socialisme ou Darbarie rejected historical determinisme It 
merely statcd that the class struggle would continue as long 
as production was or~anized (or dis-or~anized) by non-producers, 
whether state bureaucrats, private entrepreneurs or managers 
in their employment. 'l'he strug<.41e woulJ. continue even if 
workers were hardly conscious of it, and if the unions or 
parties that claimed to represent them tried to suppress it. 
In fact, in advanced capitalist society it was of ten the 
unorganized and poorly educatec.l unsl<illed workers who led the 
strug!.:;le. 
A group like Socialisme ou Darbarie could not represent 
let alone replace the workers in their strugiile • At most i t 
could help to raise their consciousnessbYpublishina theoretical 
and practical studies and initiatin~ discussions. Therc was 
internal disagreement as to the exact role the group had to 
play, however, some i',i vin;:: priori ty to. the former and others 
t t 1 tt f t ' 42 o he a er unc lon. 
42This reconstruction is extremely simplified; for a 
more elaborate effort see Howard, op. cit., PP. 222-301. The 
primary sourees are P. Chaulieu, "Sur Ie contenu du socialisme," 
Socialisme ou Barbarie 22 (1957): 1-75; C. Castoriadis, La 
société bureaucratiy,ue (Paris, 1973), especial1y Part 11;-




The five projccts discussea ubove do not exhaust uIl the 
10 ,~ical possit,i 1i ti es of New Left Anarchi mn. Yet they showed 
;-t wide rcm,",c of theories, from the cxplici tly unti-Idarxist 
i\narchisrn of Provo élnd the more utopian Ké,:',bouters to the a1most 
ürthoc:ox "l~Lr~:iGr,l of ~)ocialimilC ou ljn.rLJéerie, which resclilbled 
11 Du;:;ch ,lar:-::i :31.1" 
Thc Uutch ~;roups eX~jreGsecl fllore;:jcssilllisrn about the 
r~l()r(; confi .... lencc tn )";;lrliarnental'y clction él.n,,~ in technolo;;icéll 
ché~n~e (autorn:-\tion) é'.S \'1O.ys to chrm,..';e society. Thc German 
11 Subversi ve Ac tion" ,;roup, and 8:311eC ially i ts l'Iunich wini;' 
;èl,:;reec1 to El large c;:tent \'li th thc Dutch, exce}Jt on l j arlié"lllen-
t2.ry action • Thc French groups, both Soci<:llisrne ou B~) rbarie 
and thc Situationists, cxpected revolutionary chan~e even in 
~estern Europe, as Cl result of direct proletarian action. 
Thus only Provo anel Kabouters 4ualified as New Left in the 
strict sense, whereas the other ~roups belonged to the New 
Ultra-lert. 44 
HO\'!evcr, thc clifferences should not be exa::.-;gerated. All 
:~roupè') D., ,recct tha t rcvolutionary class consciousness had 
ûcclined éli,lOE u Vlon;,crs in Hestcrn Europe, due to bureaucratic 
lnanil~,ulation by Olei. Left union éLn(~ party leaders, the affluence 
1l:\';OI~;L,in, Le:.:; o1'i\"ines <Ju ,>luchisr,le, ;Jl). lül-l~l; hence one 
eoul cl eél tc:~ori se ~)oe i<:11i SlilG ou U:u'barie as Hevol utionary Soeiali st 
r<.lther tllétn An;:_lrchis~ 1Jc\'/ Lei~t, hut in either category it would 
Le a !Tjar, ~inal CéÁse. 
44 ~Jcc éil;ove, Cho1iter 3.1 al)out this distinction. 
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and abunuance of conSUliier 2,oods, and the mass media. All 
rejected existin~ or~anisations of the Left and preferred 
new and less formal types of organisation, like workers' 
councils or cells on the shopfloor, or informal action ~roups. 
They also rejected the historical deterl.linism <lnG. econorilism 
of the Old Left, and devoted serious attention to cultural 
and poli tical factors in their analysis of society. I·Iore-
over, they asreed to a considerable extent in the way they 
defined their own function; primarily as production and 
Jisseminntion of new rcvolutionary idcas é,mu. as eclucation nnd 
lilobilisation of the masses throui~h direct action, of ten of a 
symbolic and playful, but provocati ve nature. In othcr vlOrds, 
thcy tried to provoke the masses--and the authorities--from 
the periphery of a relatively integrated society. 
4.3 The Project of the 80cial Democratic New Left: 
Democratisation from lnside 
The group Nieuw Links, and its successors in the 80cial 
Democratic Ncw Left, hoped to reform thc structure of Dutch 
society in éJ. democratic direction vii thout a revolution. 
Operating inside the bourgeois state and inside a 80cial 
Democratic mass party, they intended to democratise both and 
to reuistribute power, wealth and other values in society. 
This was about all they agreed on. Even before 1970, 
radical and moderate members of Nieuw Links disagreed about 
ultimate goals nnd the scope of the reforms they wanted. 
Af ter 1970 they feIl apart into two rather diffuse tendencies, 
the more or less Neo-l'.larxist radicals and the "Heo-Fabian" 
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moderates. They formed roughly the left win~ and the centre 
in the Dutch Labour Party, thou,sh the di vidin:~ line was not 
45 
always clear. The (sub-, or even sub-sub-) projects of 
the two tendencies are reconstructed in sub-sections 4.3.1 
anel 4.3.2. 
The Dutch Neo-Harxists borrowed ideas from the theoreti-
cally more advanced French ;;roup CEHES, v/hich is discussed 
in sub-section 4.3.3; and from Germ;-..:.n Neo-Marxists, especially 
the Frankfurt School, who are discussed briefly in sub-section 
4.3.4. The Neo-Fabians were theoretically more independent. 
Only towards the end of the 1970s did they refer to a theory 
of Alain Tournine, a French sociolo~ist and member of thc 
Socialist Party, which is the subject of sub-section 4.3.5. 
4.3.1 Neo-Marxist Reformism in the Dutch Labour Party 
The Neo-!v1arxists in the Labour Party ai~reed wi th the 
Neo-l·larxists in the Pacifist Socialist Party on most issues, 
but differed in emphasizing reforms and the relative autonomy 
of the state. 
They agreed that the contradiction between capi tal and 
45 See above, Chopter 2.4; the distinction between the 
two tendencies was confirmed in Interview 4 but contradicted 
in Interview 5; both interviewees VJere v/ell-informed lnembers 
of the Dutch Labour Party; however, the latter argued that the 
theoretical debate within the party was too confused to be 
:lnalysed in terras of tendencies. IIence the terms are used 
here vIi th caution; one misht say: as ideal-types, rather than 
labels for existin!.3 groups or factions. Other typolo;ies 
could be used, such as the one developed in a case study of 
the Amsterdam federation of the Labour Party in the 1970s, 
which differentiates bet\':een IIs1ilall-scale democrnts," "larç;e-
sctl.le dcrnocrats," ancl "administré,tors"; sec K. l~rants anel 
P. Vnn Prna,;, "Groepsvormin;::: in soorten," Socialisme en 
Derr:ocr::·tie (1~79): 5:31-542. 
') () ') 
c...U'-
,1111.< ;jarticé~ haG. &ccc}Jted in thc 1:3408 anG. l!:)!:)üs. Aftel' 19l;(), 
for \/orl(crs 'control anli self-Itl<::'tnager,lcnt. Thc Dutch Labour 
Farty could no lon,~er i,",nore the revival of thc c1ass btru,..',;;le; 
i t h,~d to sup,t:.ort Uw tradc-unions in fiL,htin,,~ the relilnants 
of corporatism and cXFanding the ri,!,hts and powers of viorkers. 
Thou,,~h raclicalizec:. <lurin~ the I!:) GOs, the PvdA continucd to 
play an ambivalent role in the class struj~le, sidin~ sometinlCs 
4G Hi th thc ':lorkers i.l.n,~ sOli,etimcs with thc elllplo;yers. 
On the other hand, the Neo-I·Iarxists fel t, the PSP played 
no role at all. At least through the PvdA they coulJ achieve 
some reforlils, enlar.,in.::-; the power:::; of \:orks Councils anel 
a~olishin~ coc~orotist institutions 1ikc thc Socio-Economic 
Council. Furtherhlore, they could co-operate with traJe-
unionists t111'ou.;11 tlle \:orking l'~lrty 1'01' Industrial Democracy 
(',jcrk\;roelJ 1)o(;1'i j f~ûClnokra ti bering) in order to link iJO li tic al 
anu socio-econornic ac't;ion. 'v/orkers' self-management was seen 
as the ~oal. It vlould be combined wi th democratie planning 
and nationalization of key sect,)rs of the economy, investment 
controls, ineome redistribution and educational reforms. 
41';' • Van de 6andschulp, op. cito 
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A Social Democratie government would be able to carry 
out these reforrns under pressure from i ts Neo-l'.'iarxist wing. 
Af ter all, the ~overnment anti the state in general enjoyed 
a relative autonomy vis-a-vis society even if the two were 
interlocked. Generally the state tended to serve the interests 
of oig capi t::ll, but é~S the "expression of the c lass re la tions" 
it could serve proletarian interests aS weIl. In long periods 
of struggle the pro letélria t h~-J.d captured libri dgeheads" \"11 thin 
the bourgeois state such as universal suffrage, free educntion 
and social security. Now the time had come to take a further 
step and establish elements of direct democracy throu2;h worl<ers I 
cour1Cils, neighbourhood councils and the like, in order to 
complement parlinmentary Jemocracy and complete the democra-
tization of the state. In other words, the state was to be 
democratized from inside, rather than smashed from outside 
as revolutionary ],·larxists continued to advocate. Democrati-
zation would be a ~radual process. Capitalism would resist 
for a \'/hile but slowly ;;ive way to socialism. 47 
Althou~h the Neo-Marxist Reformists favoured ~overnment 
participation, they were unhappy with the coalition of Socia1 
Democrats and Christian Democrats led by their party leader 
Den Uyl in 1973-1977. The c011apse of·the coalition in 1977 
seemed to prove them ri;:ht: the Christian Democrats would 
ah;ays sabotai~e structura1 reforrns that threatened the interests 
of co.pita1. 'I'herefore the PvdA was to turn to the smaller 
47J • Hui,\.~e and P. Heekman, Doorn in de vuist (Amsterdam, 
1978), PP. 12-17, 59, GG ff. 
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parties on the Left, the Co~nunist Party, the Pacifist Socialist 
Party and the Political Party of Radicals (already a coalition 
partner in 1973-1977). TOJether the Left won only 59 of the 
150 seats in the 1977 parlinment, but in the 10nJ run it 
could hope for a majori ty, :J;i ven the continuin,~ polariza tion 
in the country. The Left should stri ve for uni ty, allowin,~ 
members of the four parties as weIl as other activists to 
join New Left Polities Groups to e1nborate a common platform 
and to en3a~e in common actions. 
While the PvdA should remain a peoJ;le's party and repre-
sent not only manual workers but also intellectuals, farmers 
ancl small busines:::ancn, i t should edso support thc proletariem 
"culture of'Gtrug:~le" (strijclkultuur). This cultural stru,,::;,.;;;le 
took place in the press and the other mass media as weIl as 
in schools, uni versi ties and."l.rt centres . Thou:,;h a revi vD,l of 
the ";\ed F;:,ui1ily" or "Hed Pillar" \,'as nei ther possible nor 
even desirable, Social Democrats should at least support 
efforts of students, teachers, artists and journalists to 
e;q)émd c.~er.lOcratic rights and to fi~~ht bourGeois culture in 
48 these areas. '1'00 of ten the so-called socialist media like 
the Association of \','orkers Hadio Amateurs Viere spreadinc; 
l::)our,~eois culture amon:::; the v/orkers instead of tryin~s to 
eld:-.incipate them from it. Er.lancipa tion VlaS of ten defined a;:; 
48'1'11e terms "Hed Fami ly" (Rooi e fami lie) and "Hed Pi llar" 
(Hoc:e zuil) refer to the close co-operation between 50cial 
Dëii1öë ra tic parties , trade unions , ne'\Nspapaers, radio broad-
castinJ association, youth groups and sa on before ~940; 
between 1945 and 1965 most ties between these organizations 
ware cut; see above, Chapter 1.4 and 2.4. 
individual self-develoi)r:lent insteud of collective action even 
Ly the ~)ociéll Ler.1ocr(~tic Jlinister of Education Van Kelilenade 
49 in his c;rand proposuis for c01i1prchensi ve schoo Is. 
Thc l"""vJJ\ \'las to he an anti-capi talist people' s party, but 
not a nationalist one. Thou~h criticalof the European 
Community, the Neo-Marxists hoped to transform it rather than 
leave it. On the other hand they did want to 1ea.ve NATO and 
to cooperate more with the Third world. 50 
4.3.2 Neo-Fabian Reformism in the Dutch Labour Paety 
'Neo-Fahian' is a label that is attached here to a type 
of theory without the theorists' consent. The moderate 
mombers and successors of Nieuw Links in thc Dutch Labour 
Pé~rty \;ere not influencccl ciircctly by the FalJian Society of 
L;:-itu VictorL.lD J~n~Lmd; L,ut they shared most of i ts charac ter-
L.:;tics: L~r{'i.duali:.3L'l <."-n<.1 parliamentarism, elapiricism and 
eclecticism, a moral concern with social o4ua1ity and a 
prcference for economic efficiency and planning. 51 
Neo-Fabian Heformism could be regarded as the dominant 
49 p • Reckman, "IIoi;er onderwi j s in de toekomst," Socialisme 
en Democratie (1976): 294-304; W. Daars and J. Van Iersel, 
"Een bijdra:~e aan de onderwijsdiscussie, " iiJid., pp. 521-529; 
'1'. Pauka, "Een middelbaar echtpaar in een versleten bed," 
ibid., pp. 84-100: Dardoel, et al., "De VAHA verder onder 
het mes," ibid., pp. 3CiO-369-.---
50Huige and Reckman, op. cit., pp. 60-63. 
51 3ee A. McBriar, Fahian Socialism and English Politics 
(1884-1913) (Cambrid~e, 19G2), passim; also, M. Cole, The 
story of Fa:Jian SocÜÜism (London,' 1961), es;::,ecially pP:-26-
33; /~. ULun, Phi 10:";0' ,hic;ü Founcl;) tions of En 'li sh Socialisrn 
(Cambrid,:e, 1·1.'15S., 1951 , pp. 7;~-79. Perhaps the similarity 
i:::; only s1l:---cri'icL"l, lJut ~]t lCaGt i t seem;.;; ~l<lelJuatc for the 
r:lodcst lJur!--,osc of C::l t(;,orisin,~, theories. 
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ideo10gy within the Dutch Labour Party throughout the 1970s, 
and perhaps a1so in the 1960s, insofar as important party 
leaders 1ike Den Uy1 seemed to adhere to it. 52 On the other 
hand, it was a1ways contested, compromised and mixed with 
other ideas from the 1eft wing or ri~ht wing of the party. 
Whi1e it can be distinguished re1atively easily from the Neo-
Marxist Reformism of the left win~, it is of ten difficult, 
if not impossible, to distinguish it from the even more 
ec lec tic and "fJragma tic 11 ideas of the right ,,,,,in,.;;. 
While criticizing Marxism as outdated, simplistic and 
incorrect, the Neo-Fabians also denounced cafJitalism as unjust 
and inefficient. Some of them cal led for a New Marx, whereas 
others c1aimed to have found one already in the person of 
Jan Tinbergen, a Dutch economist, Nobel Prize winner and 
rnemlJer of the Partij Y§..!2 de Arbeid. 53 
Tinbergen had he1ped to draft the Plan for Labour that 
was presented by the Social Democratie Workers Party (SDAP) 
in 1935 in order to reduee unemployment and deflation. In 
the 1960s he feIt that these problerns had been solved and 
that ;30eial Democrats should turn to new problems. He gave 
priority to the fOl10wing three: development of the Third 
\lOrld, cetente between the First (Capi talist) and the Seeond 
52 See Haagse Post, 9 October 1976 and 21 hay 1977; however, 
Den Uyl'S adherenee waS usually qualified, as the main Neo-
Fabian theorist Van den Doel eomlJlained later (Vrij Neuerland 
3 November 1979). The term 'ideolo,f.,)" is used here in a 
cri tien.l S0nse: "the dominant iucoloc1y " are the ideas of 
the dOlilinant :~roul)--Öee Le 10\'1, ChafJte r :).:3. 
53V lIL t ' l' 1 ~m Jen )oe , ~0ö -lc; ln cs, Pij. 40-49. 
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(Socialist) World, and cultural renewal. Welfare economics 
would help to solve these problems, and particularly to 
redistribute income accordin~ to effort rather than native 
talents or monopolies at a national and global level. 
Cultural renewal required the forrnation of a new cultural 
elite and censorship of decadent forms of art and entertain-
54 
ment. 
Tinber~en's theory was developcd further uy one of his 
students, Hans Van den Doel, who became one of the founding 
members and leaJin;~ theorcticians of Nieuw Links. The ~ost-
\"lar we lfare state had sol ved many problems and brought ~'Srea t 
benefits, notably full employment, a more e~alitarian distri-
bution of income and wealth, social security and mass education. 
On the other hand it had also created new problems and tensions, 
like centralization and bureaucratization of power, alienation 
and relative deprivution--aspirations risin~ faster than 
incomes--poverty in the Third World and, in the First World, 
ccolo,~ical crises and thc nei~lect of non-lilaterial anu collective 
neeus in favour of material anu inJi vi dua.l neetis . \'/hi Ic the 
old conflict between capital and labour had lost much of its 
importance, new conflicts erupted within these classes, 
54J • 'rinber,\?;en, "Optimale loonpoli tiek," Socialisme en 
Democratie (1962): 3!S2-357; idem, "De toekomst van de inter-
nationale socialistische samenwerking," Socialisme en Democratie 
(1964): 590-594; idem, "De betekenis van de welvaartseconomie 
voor het socialisme," Socialisme en Democratie (1965): 594-
605; idem, "De toekomstige sociale orde en onze bewegin6," 
ibid., pp. 728-743; see a180 his more technical work 1ncome 
distribution: analysis and pOlicies (Amsterdam, 1975). 
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b08tvleen monopolists , between big ano. small capi talists or 
between well-pnid and poorly-paid wnge-carncrs. 
The Old Left tcnded to ignore the ncw conflicts and con-
tinued to focus on thc ola ones--the ~arxist Old Left in 
particular; or it dcnied all conflict and advocated a "harmony 
model" of social relations. In fact a "coalition model" would 
be morc appropriate to describe the interaction between the 
various interest ,~roups in a welfare state. l":any trade 
unionists hncl rejectcd the "harmony model" of the 1~50s for 
,~ooll reosons, but had ,~one to anothcr extrelilc by adoptin,_~ a 
"conflict mo~jel" of old-fashionea class stru:é;gle. These 01<1 
Lef ti st::..; al::.:.;o continued to as:':: for hi,;her \!a:,es inste'::''Ld of 
:lcCeiJtin,; 'Il[,~,;e rcstr(,~ints in return for non-ma terial benefi ts, 
~nrticularly participation in decision-makin~ and more socinl 
nnd cultural services. Thcy overlookeci thc fc:.:.ct that \'Jac~c-
earncrs '::'cnd cJ:lj.Jloyers sharc:: at least;} cornwon interest in 
the prosjJeri ty of the lJuteh eeonomy, which llli~f,ht be endan:J,ercd 
by continuin;; 
The only way to solve the new conf1iets and to distribute 
not only wenlth but also power more equally was throu~h state 
intervention. On this point Neo-Fabian Heforioism c.istinguished 
i tsel l' most c learly from Pluralist Heformi sm and Neo-l'larxi st 
Heformisfll \"rr11ch él.CCeI;ted state intervention only reluctantly. 
Thc lJeo-F;"bi:ln~3 ::.:.;llO',Jcd littlc rcluctance to or;ue for expansion 
5 t-
')'Jc,rl :;cn Uoc1, Lcu,;ti, 1inl.::s, kj. 9-49, 32-122; a 
sli:;ht1:! :',lore radical é,né~lysis \'lC1,S t)res,,~nte(i in 13. PelJCr, 
"l)cl::oc1."':l(;i:.: in iiCIl"l;'/crJl:,n.,;, " in Uoef ct :ll., 0l). cit., 
.}...I. 3-;-){:;; "~l;~o IrlC(;r"Jic·,/0·4 r:rlcl~. 
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of the public sector, state regulation of wages and prices 
and selective subsidization of cultural projects. Only state 
intervention in the economy could lJrevent the ecological dis-
asters predicted by the MIT Report to the Club of Rome--which 
the Neo-Fabians toak very seriously indeed. They did not 
v:ant to re;Jlace the market eeonolily by Cl C01i1pletely vlanned 
cornmand econolily, but t:iey vli:mteci to control (~t lca.st extornal 
(~ffect~) :lnd monopolies. 
On the other hand, the Neo-Fabians did agree with other 
r:cw Leftists on the ne.ed for clclilocrc..tization of the sté..\.te 
\iüll LeS the eCOnor;IY. Jloth public é.G)d l,rivate enterl)rise should 
Ion., as external effcc ts could (Je controllee: Dy the state. 
";orkers I particilJC1.tion Ghould start at the shop-floor, but 
wor;.::ers should also elect representatives to the Board of 
56 Directors. According to Van den Doel, even the civil service 
Vlas to be democratized in a sirnilar v./ay to prevent too mueh 
concentration of ~ower in the executive branch, as weIl as 
to rcduce the size of the . 57 serVlce. 
56In 19G6 Nieuw Links Reformists suggested profit-sharinci 
and co-deterrnination based on the Seanlon Plan, allowin~ 
v/Orkers anel mana~crs equa1 rei-'resentation on deeision-lllCikin,:;'; 
committees at various levels in a cor~Qration; later this was 
dropped in favour of sli~htly more radical proposals, see 
\'fiardi Heekman Stichtin,~, Op we,.!, naar arbeiderszelfbestuur 
(Deventer, 1976) as weIl as Interview 4 and Van den Doel, et 
al., op. cit., Chapter 2; 13. Peper, "Wenselijkheid en rnO,<:;elijk-
hei d van dernocra ti serin,:!, van de onLiernernin;;," Economi sch-
Statistische Berichten (19G9): 1103-1110. 
57H • Van den Doel, Demokratie en 
toLan de Rijn, 1975), Chapter VI, 3.3. 
Niskanen. 
\'lelvaartstheorie (Alphen 
lIe draws on Vanek ano. 
2~() 
Democratization of the state should not result in direct 
democracy, as the NeH Left radicals \'ii shed. On the contrary, 
representative democracy was to be strengthened. Political 
polarization and electoral reforlils should allo\\l the voter a 
c laar and decisi ve choice oetween Yélrties advoca tini.~ al terna-
ti va yolicies. The PvdA ought to force centri st purties li1ze 
the Christian Democratic Appeal to either accept or reject 
an alliance before elections, so thot voters vlOuld knoV! what 
parties mi~ht join a coalition af ter elections. A stron~ but 
democratic state and especially a strong but democratic 
yarliament were needed to check powerful private interests 
in society--both unions and employers--and to legislate 
structural reforms. 
While direct democracy would lead to anarchy or dictator-
ship by "passionate minorities," given the limited lJenefits 
nnd hi,)l costs of political participation for most ~eople, 
direct action could complement anrt even reinforce representa-
tive democracy. Dy informing represcntatives about the needs 
of certain ~roups, direct action could prevent o~pression of 
"passionate minori ties" by a luk:evtarm majori ty; and resul t 
in a compromise, forcin.:: the majori ty to compensa te the 
. '" 58 
minorities for their sacrlflces. 
The PvclA should therefore support direct action in some 
cases, provided i t could inte,~ra te the ;~oals of the action 
58Van den Doel, Lasti 0 LinkS, pp. 135-144; the term 
'passionate minorities' and some of the ideas were borrowed 
from R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theor (Chicago, 1956); 
cf. Partij, Parlement, Activisme Deventer, 1978). 
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groups concerned into a coherent poli tical pro,:;ramme. It ou;,;ht 
to resist Populist pressure from the Left to en.~a~e in direct 
action as a party, or to support any action uncritically. The 
Populist stratcgy would benefit only the strongest forces in 
59 
society in the lonj run, and could destroy the party. 
'1'he Neo-Fabians also differed from the Neo-j'larxists wi th 
respect to thc cultural revolution which both of them advocated. 
The cultural revolution conccrned the PvdA only insofar as it 
required certain cultural policies that a government with 
PVllA ministers n1ÎL;ht carry out. In particular urban planning, 
housin~, education and health care deserved thc attention of 
rt reformist ;,;overnrncnt to improve efficiency as weIl as demo-
cratic ~articipation of the citizens concerned. The workinG 
class had to be encoura~ed to participate in cultural activi-
ties and in cducation, so that upward mobility would increase 
and alicnation would decrease. As lon~ as manual labour h~d 
not been abolishcd by rlutomation, some éllien(l.tion mizht liersist ; 
but it couJ.d be recluced if thc Left clevoted more attention to 
socio-cul turl-Ll rather than 30ciü-cconolnic l",roLJlems. Ecluca ti on 
waS to encoura~e indivitiual expression anti sclf-detcrroination, 
cri tical thinkini; anti comraunica tion wi th others. The ~overn-
ment, had to subsidize more lJro~ressive.anu critical art and 
amateur sports rather than elitist or traditional art and 
5~In Neo-Fabian circles the terlIl "populist ll usually re-
fcrred to Neo-Marxist anti Nco-Anarchist ideas or actions of 
the left v/in:=, of the PvdA or the PSP and PPH; see especially 
13. Tromp, 11 30ciali srne, or,;ani sa tie en dernocra tie, 11 80ciali srne 
cn lJcmocrntie (1~7G): 155-172. 
60 
record-hunting commercial sports. 
4.3.3 Neo-Marxists in the French Socialist Party: CERES 
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In many ways the theory of the Centre d'Etudes, de 
Recherches et d'Education Socialistes (CERES) came very close 
to Old Left or orthodox Marxism. 61 On the other hand it in-
cluded sufficiently numerous New Left themes and terms to 
justify the prefix 'Neo'. 
According to CERES, the relationship between the sociali-
zation of the productive forces and private property of the 
means of production still constituted the primary contradic-
tion in advanced capitalist societies like contemporary France. 
However, it was not the only one. Contradictions also existed 
between imperialist expansion of international capital and 
the terri~orial boundaries of national states, as weIl as 
60H• Leune, "Naar een nieuwe schoolstrijd," in Boef et 
al., op. cit., pp. 97-116; N. Gregoor, et al., op. cit., 
specifically the contributions from Ten-Ca~(pp. 7-16), 
Gregoor (PP. 17-26), Soutendijk (PP. 39-90) and Van der Louw 
and Krooshof (PP. 91-106); see also the polemics against Neo-
Marxist ideas about cultural issues, especially C. Boef, 
"Bedden schudden," Socialisme en Democratie (1976): 114-126 
and his reply to critics, pp. 370-382; M. Van Hasselt, 
"overwegingen ten behoeve van een socialistisch cultuurbeleid," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1974): 398-409, J. Voogd, "Enkele 
stellingen over socialistische cultuurpolitiek," ibid., pp. 
410-414; A. Van der Louw, "Socialisme en opvoeding," ibid., 
pp. 466-472; even more moderate was M. Anstadt, "Cultuur-
politiek in perspectief," ibid., PP. 5~5-556. The right wing 
of the party held more liberal notions about culture and 
tended to question the need for any active cultural policy 
apart from general Subsidies, cf. A. Laan, "Over het beginsel-
program van de PvdA," ibid., pp. 587-589, and H. Schaafsma, 
"Aanzet tot een polemiek over socialistisch cultuurbeleid," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1975): 42-45. 
61CERES inspired the Neo-Marxists in the Dutch Labour 
Party, at least af ter 1970; see Huige and Reckman, op. cit., 
p. 100; CERES in turn had been inspired by (among others) 
Socialisme ou Barbarie, discussed above (see Charzat, op. cit., 
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between idealization and secularization of power. The notion 
of power also played a major role in the CERES interpretation 
of· the primary contradiction: property was defined as power 
over the means of production, rather than as formalor legal 
ownership. Hence socialism implied workers' self-management 
or workers' power over the means of production. This was the 
only solution to the primary contradiction. 
Socialism had to be distinguished from state capitalism, 
which could precede it but was of ten confused with it. In 
the Soviet Union, for instance, state capitalism was announced 
as a transitional stage but had now taken on an apparently 
permanent character. Formally the means of production were 
owned by the state, in the name of the people, but in fact 
they were controlled by a new ruling class of technocrats and 
bureaucrats. Like any ot~er rUling class these techno-
bureaucrats appropriated the surplus value produced by the 
working class and the peasantry. They used-orabused--Marxist 
theory to legitimate their rule as "dictatorship of the 
proletariat"or "people's democracy," but their interpretation 
of Marxism differed little from the technocratic scientism 
that the ruling classes of advanced capitalist countries used 
to legitimate their rule. Both ideologies defined maximum 
economic production as their main goal. 
p. 248). CERES could argue that its interpretation of Marx 
was in fact more accurate than the so-called orthodox inter-
pretations of the Old Left in the Communist or Socialist 
Party; this question cannot be decided here but will be left 
to Marx exegetes, cf. Charzat, op. cit., pp. 246-249; also 
D. Motchane, Clefs pour Ie socialisme (Paris,1973), pp. 81-82. 
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The emphasis on economie production might reveal a 19th 
century Rationalist or Positivist bias in Marx's conception 
of man and nature. Possibly psycho-analytic theory could 
correct this bias and complement Marx's historical materialism. 
A certain development of the productive forces seemed a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for socialism, given 
the relative autonomy of political and ideological forces. 
Any determinislll shou1d be rejecteu; Goeia1ism was not [-J. 
seientifie project but a "concrete utopia." 
On the other hand, economie analysis should not be 
neglected by soeialists. They could benefit from the present 
crisis of capitalism, which affected the economy as well as 
the states and the ideologies of advanced capitalist countries. 
Even bourgeois scientists admitted economie growth could have 
62 
reached natural limits in this century. Imperialism and 
state intervention could alleviate the problems, but not 
solve them. 
More specifically, in France the crisis resulted from 
the failure of the Gaullist project to modernize and centralize 
the French economy while preserving a certain independenee 
from American capital. During the early 1960s Gaullism may 
have achieved some success, but af ter 1968 its "power bloc" 
of monopolist and non-monopolist bourgeoisie and traditional 
petty bourgeoisie began to fall apart. The liberal policy 
of De Gaulle's successor~, in particular Giscard d'Estaing, 
62CERES referred here to the MIT Report Limits to growth, 
cited above; see Motchane, op. cit., pp. 74-81. 
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alienated the traditional petty bourgeoisie without winning 
63 
much support from the working class. 
The crisis provided the Left with a chance to construct 
a new power bloc or front de classes around the working class, 
including elements or fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie 
and the farmers, on the basis of an anti-capitalist platform 
This class alliance might offer some concessions to the 
national bourgeoisie concerning national independence and 
defence, but it should attack not only the monopolies, as the 
Communist Party proposed, but capitalism as such. Once in 
power, the alliance should nationalize key sectors of the 
economy under workers' control and restructure them according 
64 to a national plan. 
Workers' control implied election of workers' councils 
and worker-directors as weIl as general assemblies that would 
take the relevant decisions at the shop-floor. The hierarchy 
of positions and salaries would be reduced significantly. 
Eventually the capitalist division of labour would be 
abolished. In private enterprise, however, workers' control 
could only mean veto power; forms of co-determination or 
Gaullist-style participation could only weaken the working 
65 
class. 
63Charzat et al., op. cit., pp. 171-176; also in Répères 
38 (1976). 
64 Motchane, op. cit., pp. 216-227; Charzat, op. cit., 
pp. 162-169; also Répères 41 (1977). 
65 Motchane, op. cit., pp. 240-289; Charzat, op. cit., 
pp. 177-189. 
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The demand for workers' control and self-management (its 
logical conclusion, so to speak) could unite the working class 
and in particular bridge the gap between intellectual and 
manual workers. Qualified workers might of ten lead the way, 
but to single them out as vanguard or New Working Class 
would be a strategie mistakej af ter all, large and militant 
sections of the working class were being de-qualified in the 
process of technological change in the advanced industries. 66 
The core of the working class still consisted of manual workers 
and their numbers kept growing, at least in France. Intellec-
tual workers, i.e. scientists, engineers and teachers who 
depended on wages and contributed to the production or reali-
zation of surplus value, were proletarianized rapidly. Even 
the new petty bourgeoisie, which also depended on wages or 
salaries but consumed rather than produced part of the surplus 
value, was increasingly alienated from the system: resenting 
the centralization of power in the capitalist monopolies and 
the state, the new petty bourgeoisie might also come to support 
workers' self-management. 
The alliance of manual and intellectual workers, farmers 
and new petty bourgeois would initially accept only a reformist 
platform. Like all classes in bourgeois society the workers 
tended to adhere to bourgeois values, until a revolutionary 
66Hence CERES rejected Mallet's theory of the New Working 
Class in favour of a more orthodox (Marxist) theory of the 
working class as a (potentially) united agent of social and 
political actionj see Charzat, op. cit., p. 168; and Motchane, 
op. cit., pp. 228-239. 
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crisis showed them the.discrepancy between bourgeois values 
and bourgeois reality in a light too glaring to ignore. Hence 
Lenin was right about the reformist or Social Democratie 
consciousness of the working class, at least during non-
revolutionary periods. Yet he was wrons in his conclusion 
that revolutionary intellectuals could (and should) introduce 
socialist class consciousness into the masses from the outside. 
On the contrary, intellectuals should follow the lead of 
manual workers, or at least the politically most advanced 
section of thema The more weight carried by intellectual 
workers and new petty bourgeois, the greater the chances of 
Social Democratie or Stalinist deviation, i.e. state capitalism 
instead of socialism. 
For the time being, the reformist class alliance would 
be articulated by the two major parties of the Left, the 
Communist Party and the Socialist Party. Unification of the 
two seemed aesirable but impossible in the short run. Differ-
ences between them should be discussed serious1y but amicab1y. 
As far as CERES was concerned there were three main differences. 
First, the Communist Party favoured an anti-monopolist rather 
than an anti-capitalist c1ass alliance. Second, it conceived 
of the bourgeois state as an instrument of capitalist monopolies, 
whereas CEHES agreed with Pou1antzas's critique of that 
"instrumentalist" position. 67 Third, democratie centralism 
67Pou1antzas was quoted frequently in CERES publicat10ns; 
his analysis of the bourgeois state and socialist strategy seems 
quite similar to that of CERES, particular1y in N. Poulantzas, 
L'Etat, Ie Pouvoir, Ie Socialisme (Paris, 1978), especia11y 
pp. 11-57, 135-177, 277-295; cf. Répères 38 (1976). 
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was interpreted differently by the two groups. 
The notion of the state held by CERES differed also from 
that of Gorz or Mallet, though only marginally. All of them 
agreed on its relative autonomy, but CERES went further in 
pointing out the class conflict and contradictions inside the 
state. Owing to the conflict between bourgeoisie and new 
petty bourgeoisie, as weIl as the contradiction between ideali-
zation and secularization of power, the state could be trans-
formed rather than smashed in the transition to socialism. 
More specifically, parliamentary democracy could be reinforeed 
and complemented rather than replaced by a system of workers' 
councils and neighbourhood councils; some state power would 
be transferred to these councils. A democratie transforma-
tion of the state would require a long and difficult struggle, 
especially in a country with a centralized and authoritarian 
state such as France. However, even the French state had 
entered a crisis; petty bourgeois (professional) factions of 
the state apparatus like judges and soldiers began to question 
the dominant bourgeois ideology of the neutral, unbiased and 
responsib1e state. 68 
An e1ectora1 victory of the Left wou1d on1y mark the 
beginning of the transition towards socialism. A Leftist 
government wou1d need several years to reform the economy 
and decentra1ize the state apparatus. 'rhe deve10pment of 
popu1ar power, workers' counci1s and neighbourhood counci1s, 
68Motchane, op. cit., pp. 129-178; Charzat, op. cit., 
pp. 223-232; a1so Répères 41 (1977). 
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might take even more time. The Socialist Party ought to 
anticipate both, by preparing a programme of reforms in some 
detail and by organizing factory cells (sections/groupes 
d'enterprise) and neighbourhood groups. The party should 
operate as an "intellectuel collectif" and contribute to the 
development of a socialist culture by undermining the cultural 
hegemony of the bourgeoisie with respect to family life, 
education, urban planning and material consumption. The Old 
Left had neglected the cultural struggle; the New Left on the 
other hand tended to over-estimate it and to expect a socialist 
culture to emerge in a capitalist society. 
The Socialist Party should adopt a flexible form of 
democratie centralism. While majority decisions had to be 
accepted by all members, competing tendencies should be allowed 
to recall opportunistic party leaders. Hopefully, a revolu-
tionary minority like CERES would be able to lead the way and 
prevent new petty bourgeois factions from taking over the 
partyand "social-democratizing" it again--thus undoing the 
progress made since 1971. The class struggle had to be 
69 fought within the party as weIl as elsewhere. 
The struggle had to be waged within the Socialist Inter-
national as well. Since most so-called Socialist parties 
in Northern Europe tended to lean towards Social Democracy, 
i.e. reforming instead of fighting capitalism, the French 
Socialist Party should cooperate rather with Socialists in 
69Charzat, op. cit., pp. 196-210; Motchane, op. cit., 
pp. 186-216; Répères, 40 (1977). 
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other Mediterranean and Third World countries. Institutions 
like the European Community and NATO were dominated generally 
by American and multi-national capital and therefore hostile 
to any socialist experiments. A socialist France would have 
to break with these institutions and return to a more self-
sufficient economy; or rely on a "geographical compromise" 
with progressive regimes of the Third World like Algeria. 70 
Economie growth might slow dovm during the transition to 
socialism. A new model of growth would be developed, oriented 
towards different needs. Individuals would overcome the 
fragmentation and alienation resulting from the capitalist 
division of labour and fetishism of commodities. They would 
be free to develop themselves and become whole human beings. 
New notions of work, time and space would replace our bourgeois 
notions. Society would become rational and transparent--but 
far from perfect. Social conflicts might be internalized 
too much: "flic de lUi-même, l'homme prisonnier de sa raison 
pourrait-il trouver ailleurs que dans la folie Ie refuge que 
seuls peuvent donner ces murs que l'on a construits tout 
71 
seul?" 
4.3.4 The Frankfurt School and the Young Socialists in Germany 
While the Frankfurt School always.avoided any involvement 
with political parties or groups, it inspired many New Left 
70Charzat, op. cit., pp. 216-222; Motchane, op. cit., 
pp. 178-185; Frontière 15 (1974) advocated "la fusion du 
sentiment national et de la lutte anticapitaliste." 
71Motchane, op. cit., p. 254. 
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groups in Germany as weIl as elsewhere. Thus Claus Offe, a 
"third generation" member of the School, was quoted by 
several Young Socialists within the Social Democratie Party 
72 
of Germany. But also members of Nieuw Links within the 
Dutch Labour Party referred to the Frankfurt School, and 
73 
specifically to Jurgen Habermas. 
Jurgen Habermas, "perhaps the most original and distinguished 
of the present generation of west German philosophers," set 
out to revise, or rather reconstruct Marxism. 74 One of the 
(many) important themes that run through his work is the 
distinction between work (Arbeit) and interaction or communi-
cation. This distinction was meant to correct or expand the 
Marxist distinctions between product~ve forces and relations 
of production and between base and superstructure. Habermas 
defines 'work' as instrumental or purposive-rational (zweck-
rationale) action which applies technical rules and is 
oriented towards explicit or empirical criteria of success; 
where as 'interaction' is symbolic or communicative action 
72For instanee in N. Gansel, ed., Ueberwindet den Kapital-
ismus oder was wollen die Jungsozialisten? (Reinbek, 1971), 
p. 59; also in M. Greven, B. Guggenberger and J. Strasser, 
Krise des Staates? (Darmstadt, 1975), pp. 61-104. However, 
Offe had joined the Social Democratie Party, according to 
Interview 14; by then, the Frankfurt School had already fallen 
apart: by 1975 all "first generation" members had died or 
left Frankfurt (Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse) and "second 
generation" members also (Habermas). 
73 For instanee H. Kombrink and G. Van Ruiten, "Maatschappij-
kritiek: Onkritische kritiek op een maatschappijkritiek," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1971): 257-267; also Interview 10. 
74G• Lichtheim, From Marx to Hegel,(New York, 1971), 
p. 130. 
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which applies moral or "practical" rules and is oriented 
towaeds intersubjective agreement. The two spheres interact 
but do not determine each other. In other words, the base 
and superstructure distinguished by Marx in the 19th century 
no longer existed in the 20th. Science and technology, once 
part of the superstructure, have become productive forces, 
while also performing ideological (henee "superstructural") 
functions. State intervention, also "superstructural" by 
origin, has redirected the economy and destroyed the autonomy 
of the base, as weIl as eroded the ideology of the market--
free and equal exchange--which had dominated the superstructure 
of 19th century capitalism. Hence the Marxist theory of 
historical materialism had to be supplemented with psycholo-
~ical and anthropological as weIl as linguistic theories in 
75 
order to explain the dialectics of the two spheres. 
iVhile economie conflicts and crises continued in advanced 
capitalist societies, more or less as Marx had predicted, they 
were de-politicised and resolved or rather regulated through 
state intervention. Thus the class struggle had become latent 
and un-political. Yet political conflicts could occur in 
the sphere of interaction, in particular the socio-cultural 
subsystem which included education, art and (social) science. 
75J • Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologie' 
(Frankfurt, 1968); parts of this have been translated by 
J. Shapiro, with some essays about the German student move-
ment, in J. Habermas, Towards a Rational Society (Boston, 
1970); the theoretical ideas are further elaborated in 
J. Habermas, Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus 
(Frankfurt, 1976). 
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Though the state and its agencies tried to reduce these con-
flicts to either personal (private) or technical-administrative 
i.e., a-political problems, they could not succeed completely 
as long as people had not yet turned into robots. The student 
rnovement of the 1960s and the women's movement of the 1970s 
did re-politicise supposedly personalor private and technical-
administrative problems. To some extent they exploited 
contradictions in the dominant, partially rational ideology 
which contained universalist values such as equality but 
excluded their practical use in certain spheres or subsystems 
like family life or education. However, both movements showed 
reactionary and irrational features as weIl. A rational and 
gradualist strategy was necessary, preventing fascist reactions 
and aiming at democratisatlon, decentralisation and humanlsa-
. 76 tion of soc~ety. 
This line of thinking was developed further by Claus 
Offe, one of Habermas's students and collaborators. He 
ar6ued that capitalism had logically reached its final stage, 
late capitalism, by state intervention, organization of the 
market and institutionalization of technological progress. 
Socialisation of social relations continued without planning 
or conscious organization--the basic contradiction of capltalism--
even in an organized market economy. However, the market 
itself lost its grip on more and more sectors of the economy 
76J • Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme in Sptttkapitalismus 
(Frankfurt, 1973); idem, "Conservatism and capitalist crisis," 
New Left Review 115 (1979): 73-84, the English translation 
of an interview with the Italian journal Renascita. 
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that were taken over by the state and no longer oriented 
towards profit. These sectors, such as education, health 
care, and transport, contributed indirectly to the accumula-
tion of capital, but they also served real needs of people. 
Conflicts and disparities in these sectors took on more 
importance than class conflicts in the private sector of late 
capitalist societies. 
Whereas conflicts in the private sector could be settled 
through material concessions--e.g. wage increases, easily 
offset by price increases--conflicts in the public sector 
required political solutions. Political power was exercised 
by technocrats interested in economic growth, stability, 
international influence and mass loyalty. They did not repre-
sent the particular interests of a class but the general 
interests of all members within the structure of a capitalist 
1 . t 77 c ass soc~e y. In other words, all interests could be 
accommodated provided they were defined in non-utopian terms 
and could contribute to capitalist production; also they 
had to be organized effectively. Other interests were now 
increasingly mobilized by civic action groups, but their 
action challenged the legitimacy and stability of the system • 
. 
77This is almost a direct translation from the German: 
"Der staat verteidigt nicht die besonderen Interessen einer 
Klasse, sondern die gemeinsamen Interessen aller Mitglieder 
einer ka}italistischen Klassengessellschaft" (underlined in 
the text ; C. Offe and V. Ronge, "Thesen zur I3egrundung des 
Konzepts des 'kapitalistischen Staates' and zur material-
istischen Poli tikforschuni~'" in E. Al tvater, et al., Rahmen-
bedin~ungen und Schranken staatlichen HandeIns, Zehn Thesen 
(Frunkfurt, 1976), p. 55. 
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Eventually these actions could usher in democratization of 
the public sector and possibly a gradual transition towards 
"1" 78 soc~a ~sm. 
While Habermas and Offe might be regarded as Neo-Ivlarxists, 
some younger members of the Frankfurt School seemed to renounce 
Marxism altogether and take a Neo-Fabian position. Helge 
Pross, for instance, advocated a compromise between capitalism 
and socialism. In West Germany capitalism would not disappear 
soon and people would probably prefer it to socialism anyway--
especially to state socialism on the Soviet or East German 
model. Radical reformists should proceed cautiously, trying 
to mobilize public opinion for step-by-step increases of 
popular participation in decision-making in industry, educa-
tion, etc. Reforms had to be presented in an imaginative and 
yet practical, realistic form. Conservative forces would 
oppose even moderate reforms, but their power should not be 
over-estimated. Neo-Marxists, including Offe, tended to 
exaggerate the unity and strength of the various rUling 
oligarchies as weIl as the rigidity of capitalist societies. 
The successes of the student movement and the trade unions 
in Germany showed th at power was distributed fairly equally 
and not concentrated in the hands of a'capitalist ruling class, 
as the Marxists of ten asserted. 79 
78C • Offe, Struktur robIeme des ka italistischen Staates 
(Frankfurt, 1972 , especially PP. 7-63 and 153-168; Offe, 
"Politische Herrschaft und Klassenstrukturen," in G. Kress and 
D. Senghaas, eds., Politikwissenschaft (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 
135-164; Offe and Ronge, op. cit., pp. 54-70. 
79 H• Pross, Kapitalismum und Demokratie (Frankfurt, 1972), 
especially Pp. 11-22 and 88-124. 
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Insofar as the Young Socialists in Germany adopted ideas 
from the Frankfurt School, they preferred those of Habermas 
and affe to those of Pross. Strasser, perhaps the main 
theorist of the Young Socialists, seemed to agree with Offe's 
ideas about the capitalist state. Since the state was part 
of a capitalist social formation, it was riddcn with contra-
dictions and class conflict. Hence a reformist government, 
helped by popular pressure, could democratize the state and 
the economy. Like CERES, Strasser argued for a dual strategy 
of reforms from above and action from below (the grass roots). 
On the other hand his reform programme looked more moderate 
than that of CERES. Ruling out direct democracy in "complex 
industrial societies," Strasser conceived of economie democracy 
as representation of workers (unions), consumers and scientists 
on boards of directors or managers in large corporations. Only 
"excessive division of labour" was to be eliminated. Invest-
ments would be planned by government but approved or modified 
80 through a referendum and through workers' councils. Since 
uncontrolled economie growth was likely to become the greatest 
threat to humanity, Socialists should give priority to con-
trolling and limiting economie growth. In agreement with the 
Frankfurt School, Strasser denounced tbe achievement principle 
(Leistungsprinzip) and the competitive, aggressive individualism 
of capitalist society, and pleaded for a more cooperative and 
80J • Strasser, "Die Funktion des Staates und die JI1öglich-
keit Sozialistischer Reformpolitik im spätkapitalistischen 
System der BRD," in Greven et al., op. cit., pp. 61-104. 
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communicative way of life, more collective iiving (Wohngemein-
schaften), more creative, artisanal work, less school-centred 
d t ' 81 e uca 1.on. 
4.3.5 Neo-Fabianism in the French Socialist Party: Alain 
Touraine 
Alain Touraine, n French sociologist and member of the 
Socialist Party, began to exercise some influence on theorists 
of the Dutch Labour Party in the late 1970s. Within the French 
82 party he seemed to lean towards the Faire group around Rocard. 
Touraine agreed with Habermas that scientific and techno-
lo.::;ical knowledge had become part of the "base." Actually, 
he thought they had become the most important productive 
forces in post-industrial or "programmed" societies. He 
preferred the terms 'post-industrial' and 'programmed' to 
'late capitalist', 'socialist' or 'state capitalist', since 
the latter denoted types of development rather than sta~es. 
In other words, post-industrial societies could develop in 
more or less capitalist or socialist ways, but all would 
share certain basic characteristics. The transition had 
begun af ter the Second World War. New rulinJ classes emerged, 
consisting of technocrats and bureaucrats in control of the 
production and application of knowIedge. Access to the rUling 
81 J. Strasser, Die Zukunft der Demokratie (Reinbek, 1977), 
passim; also Strasser, "Von der Schwierigkeit, das Uebel an der 
\Ilurzel zu packen," in I\1auersberger, ed., op. cit., pp. 51-57. 
82This seems implied by Touraine's contribution to Faire 
23 (1977); he was quoted in a pUblication of the Dutch Labour 
Party, Partij, Parlement, Activisme (Deventer, 1978), pp. 49-
50; cf. Vrij Nederalnd, 16 December 1978. 
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class depended on education rather than birth or wealth. 
Decisions were taken at the level of national or international 
organizations, financial trusts, industrial corporations or 
governmental agencies, in the interest of economie growth and 
production rather than the private interests of the rUlers. 83 
Class conflicts were not about to disappear, but to change. 
Vlhile exploitation of the labour force lost importance as a 
souree of conflict, alienation or exclusion from information 
and decision-making took its place. Conflicts between workers 
and managers of an enterprise continued to erupt, but they 
were increasingly institutionalized and depoliticized. The 
working class had become defensive and reformist, if not con-
servative, while students, scientists anti professionals became 
more radical. Mallet had observed the same trend, but main-
tained a narrow Marxist perspective which made him believe in 
the revolutionary potentialof the New Working Class--which 
in reality appeared at least as moderate and reformist as the 
Old \Vorking Class. 84 
New forms of class conflict were to be expected, similar 
to the events of r'1ay 1968 in France. Though workers took an 
important part in the events, intellectuals and stuàents haà 
initiated and politicized the struggle,directing it against 
the technocrats in power. Since 1968 several social movements 
83A• Touraine, La société post-industrielle (Paris, 1969), 
pp. 7-118. 
84Touraine reviewed lVlallet's work in his review article 
"La nouvelle classe ouvrière," Sociologie du 'rravail 6 (1964): 
80-84. 
309 
had sprunl~ up in reaction to technocratic state interference 
with society. Their struggle for self-determination and 
cultural freedom deserved full support from the Left, in spite 
of certain petty bourgeois and reactionary aspects. A post-
industrial society without these creative and anti-authoritarian 
social movements would easily fall aprey to totalitarianism. 85 
The Old Left, and in particular the French Communist 
Party, tried to ignore, manipulate or even repress the new 
social movements, relying only on the state as an agent of 
progress--following the Jacobin tradition as weIl as the meta-
social, naturalist and historicist fallacies of Marxism. The 
New Left, on the other hand, and in particular its gauchist 
and Anarchist wing, tended to overestimate the role of the 
new movements and to misunderstand the state. 86 
A complex industrial society, and a fortiori a post-
industrial one, needed a strong state to give it some cohesion 
and direction. A post-industrial society produced and changed 
itself in response to environmental challenges--for instance 
the ecological disasters predicted by the MrT Report to the 
Club of Rome--but only through the activity of the state. 
Even Poulantzas's definition of the state as the "condensation 
of class relations," though more adequate than the Communist 
conception, underestimated the autonomy of the state with 
respect to the class struggle. The school system in France 
85Touraine, La société post-industrielle, pp. 119-188. 
86 T " L "'t'" " "bI R d 19741976 A. oura1ne, a SOC1e e 1nV1S1 e. egar s -
(Paris, 1977), pp. 119-121, 155-156, 181-183, etc. 
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seemed a case in point: though an essential part of the state 
apparatus, it was run by leftist intellectuals (petty bourgeois) 
and produced leftist, at times even revolutionary students 
durin; most of the 20th century. On the other hand, the 
state did show a certain bias in favour of the rUling classes, 
the more so in countries where the latter were unified and 
strong but the former were weak. An ultra-Ieftist (gauchiste) 
strategy aimed at smashing the state would be counterproductivej 
a political movement could only smash a state if it contained 
within itself the nucleus of a new state and a new ruling class, 
as the Bolshevik Party did. Invariably the new state would 
be stronger and more authoritarian than the old one. 
The French Socialist Party seemed to pursue a more sen-
sible strategy. While calling for grass roots democracy 
(democratie! la ~) and self-management (autogestion), it 
hoped to win elections and to govern rather than smash the 
state. Though essentially correct, the strategy relied 
perhaps too much on a neo-liberal interpretation of self-
management. Touraine redefined the term: 
l'autogestion nIest pas la forme 'moderne' de I' 
organisation du travailj elle ne peut être que la 
modalité nouvelle d'une lutte populaire de classe 
contre la domination économique et sociale. 87 
Generally speaking, social movements could never replace a 
rUling class, but they could check and restrain it. New 
forms of representation and democratie participation should 
be tried out in i.ndustry, uni versi ties, and local government. 
87T . oura~ne, La société invisible, p. 250. 
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However, too much decentralization of powercould result in 
the rise of corporatist or localist "micro-dictatorships." 
At any rate, the Socialist Party ought to support these 
social movements without trying to manipulate or regulate 
them. The Party's first priority was to win elections and 
to govern the country, in order to start planning social and 
economie change and solve the present crisis. 
A government of the Left should also create more collec-
tive social and cultural services and facilities. But it 
should not try to create a new culture. The cultural revolu-
tion, which many New Leftists advocated, had already started. 
Culture had been separated from morality and class, and 
turned into individual consumption of mass produced art, 
information and entertainment. Though conformist, passive 
and unequally distributed,this new mass culture allowed 
individual participants more freedom and equality than the 
folk and class cultures that had preceded it. The new social 
movements could play a creative part in this cultural revolu-
tion, provided they avoided narcissist particularism and 
reactionary naturalism--the "return to nature" or "eternal 
essence" of some regionalist and ecologist movements, for 
. t 88 ~ns ance. 
Cultural freedom, economie planning and a strong but 
democratie state could produce a relatively pleasant post-
industrial society of a "contraetual" rather than totalitarian 
88Touraine, La société post-industrielle, pp. 261-306; 
idem, La société invisible, pp. 178-181, etc. 
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nature. Conflicts would continue, hopefullYi the impossible 
dream of a unified, consensual society free from class con-
flict could only lead to totalitarian repression and violence.
89 
4.3.6 Conclusion 
Obviously, Social Democratie New Leftists did not share 
a common theory or even common goals. \Vhereas the Neo-j,larxists 
affiong them claimed to fight for socialization of the means of 
production under workers' control, forms of direct democracy 
and a proletarian "culture of struggle," Neo-Fabians aimed at 
more limited nationalization and democratization of the 
economy, direct action but no direct democracy and a more 
individualist cultural renewal. 
The different goals relate to different theoretical 
frameworks. Neo-Fabians rejected the Neo-I-1arxist (and .§.. 
fortiori any orthodox Marxist) theory of class conflict, and 
of ideology and poli tics as determined by the economie base 
of productive forces and relations of production. And yet, 
in spite of these profound differences, the two theoretical 
positions coexisted in the same political party--which was 
not about to split at the end of the period under study. 
Necessarily the two a~reed at least on some issues of strate6ic 
importance. 
They seemed to share the notion of the state as relatively 
independent of any rulin~ cluss or capitalist interest, open 
to reformist pressure and cnpable of realizin~ structural 
g9 Tournine, La soci0té invisiblc, pp. 84-85, 91-94. 
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reforms. In other words, the state rnight have shown bias and 
oligarchie tendencies but it could be democratized from inside, 
by a democratie reformist party (like the PvdA, the PS, or 
the SPD). I\loreover, there was some agreement about the kind 
of reforms needed: democratie planninf?t workers ' self-management, 
(though inter~reted differently by different theorists), 
decentralization of power, more cultural and social services, 
freedom to experiment and communicate, controlled economie 
growth and ecological equilibrium. 
4.4 The Project of the Christian New Left: Radical Pluralism 
The project of the Political Party of Radicals is diffi-
cult to reconstruct. It changed considerably from 1968, when 
the party was founded, to 1977; or rather, different theories 
and strategies gained majorities within the party at different 
times. Christian ideas and references to the Bible became 
rare in party publications, whereas I"larxist and Anarchist 
ideas became more common, though never dominant. 90 Thus 
theoretical pluralism and eclecticism prevailed in the late 
l~70s. But the label "Pluralism" se ems appropriate to describe 
the PPR project also for other, more substantial reasons. It 
suggests a conception of society as a plurality of conflicting 
and cross-cutting interests and groups, rather than as a 
totality determined by economie forces or pOlarised by a 
conflict between two classes. I"loreover, it implies a positive 
evaluation of this conception and a condemnation of efforts 
90See above, Chapter 2.5. 
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to organise economie, political or cultural monopolies. This 
type of Pluralism had also been popular among older Christian 
theorists, especially Personalists and Solidarists in the 
1930s and 1940s, and could be traeed back to medieval, 
Th 't h'l h' 91 om~s p ~ osop ~es. However, it was radicalised and 
further secularised by the New Left members of the Political 
Party of Radicals--as weIl as by some New Leftists in the PSP 
and PvdA, who also of ten came from Christian backgrounds. 
Like the earlier Pluralists, the Radical Pluralists of 
the PPR tried to reconcile individualism and cOllectivism, 
Liberalism and Socialism. They tended to reject Marxism as 
dogmatic, one-sided and incorrect, or at least outdated, but 
they would agree that capital had played a dominant and nega-
tive, oppressive and immoral role in modern society. Capital 
accumulation had resulted in oppression and exploitation of 
poor peasants in the Third World and workers in the First 
World. It had made people more aggressive, competitive, 
acquisitive and alienated. It polluted the natural environment 
and ruined the ecological balance in the world. Therefore, 
capitalism was to be replaced--but not necessarily by socialism. 
Power had to be taken away from capital, through conversion 
of corporate shares into bonds and by ~ransferring the powers 
91 See B. Zylstra, From Pluralism to Collectivism (Assen, 
1968), pp. 206-220; Personalism, Solidarism and Pluralism are 
discussed briefly in M. Fogarty, Christian Democracy in Western 
Europe (Notre Dame, 1957), pp. 17, 29, 59, etc.; for a good 
example of Pluralist ideas in a (Neo-)Thomist context see 
J. Maritain, Scholasticism and Polities (London, 1940) 
(Translated by M. Adler), especially Chapters I and IV. 
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of the shareholders to the workers--in particular the right 
to elect directors and to approve or disapprove the annual 
accounts. Thus class conflict wou1d be e1iminated: capital 
would be subordinated to labour and used to satisfy human 
needs rather than to make profits. Private property could 
~2 
survive as long as it did not entai1 power over people. 
The end of the c1ass struggle did not mean the end of 
all social conflict. Corporations would continue to compete 
for markets, even if they were controlled by the workers; 
some coordination through national and regional investment 
banks would be necessary. The stru~gle for solidarity with 
Third World nations and for a clean and ba1anced environment 
would continue, cuttin& through old class cleava~es. Feminists 
would continue to fight for the emancipation of women. Citizen 
groups would continue to fight state bureaucracies. 
Generalized self-mana,:~elOent VJould allO\'1 all these <"roups 
to salve, or at least to regu1ate their conflicts. The state 
was to allow these groups their own sphere of action instead 
of trying to re~ulate and organize everythin~ itself. State 
bureaucrats anti technocrats were of ten se en as the main enemies 
by Radical Pluralists, who considered them &.llies but not 
servants of the capitalists. Hence they agreed with Old 
Left reformists that working class parties or unions could 
use the state to reform society. On the other hand, they of ten 
92B• De Gaay Fortman and H. Thomas, De winst van een 
democratische economie (Utrecht, 1976), especially pp. 93-118; 
see a1so PPHAK 65 (August 1975) and PPRAK 73 (19 December 
1975) • 
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disapproved of the Old Lef t's reliance on the state and pre-
ferred direct action and participation at the grass roots to 
93 legislative action in many cases. 
A party like the PPR was to cooperate with action groups, 
without trying to control them; in particular it was to repre-
sent the action groups in parliament and support them through 
legislative action. Parliament had to retain supremacy: 
direct democracy was to complement but not replace parliamentary 
democracy. To carry out reforms the party would have to take 
part in coalition governments, even if these included right-
wing parties. 
Participation in government might pose a dilemma for 
Pluralist New Leftists. On the one hand they wanted to 
reduce and decentralize the power of the government to the 
benefit of civic action groups, self-managed corporations, 
neighbourhood councils and so forth. On the other hand they 
were tempted to use and even expand government power to 
restrain private corporations from exploiting people and 
polluting the environment. More specifically, they wanted to 
expand the public sector, particularly social and cultural 
services in order to create jobs and to compensate people for 
a lack of economie growth and material·consumer goods. They 
93 In a critique of Marxist notions of the state, Benthem 
van den Ber6h, a member of the PvdA, summed up the Pluralist 
position very weIl: "In the welfare state the organized 
employers and the organized working class became the ruling 
classes of the state in antagonistic cooperation with each 
other," G.Benthem van den Bergh, "The Interconnection between 
Processes of State and Class Formation," Acta Politica XI 
(1976): 289-311; cf. PPRAK 91 (5 November 1976). 
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accepted and indeed defended the reduction of economie growth--
some of them even argued for "zero growth"--by referring to 
the "limi ts to groVlth" advocated by the rUT Report to the Club 
94 
of Rome. They also referred to the need of Third World 
nations to receive part of the surplus produced in the First 
Vlorld. 
The dilemma cou1d be resolved if the government democra-
tized itself. Government agencies, and in particular social 
and cultural services should involve their clients--students, 
patients, prisoners, welfare recipients and so on--in their 
planning and decision-making process. Several ministers and 
state secretaries of the Den Uyl government had successfu11y 
initiated experiments in this direction. 
It was not on1y the government that needed democratization. 
Trade unions and political parties suffered from simi1ar 
technocratie and bureaucratie tendencies. Pluralist parties 
1ike the PPR shou1d give an examp1e and start democratizing 
themse1ves, thus anticipating the kind of society they hoped 
to build. They shou1d encourage to1erance, solidarity, acti-
vism and horizontal communication. The PPR in particu1ar was 
to act as a vanguard for the new society and culture, providing 
activists with a 10n~~-term view and idea1s that transcended 
material interests. Private problems were to be politicized 
through collective action; happiness, love and even lust were 
94The report was pub1ished in Dutch as Grenzen aan de 
~roei (Utrecht, 1971); it became a bestseller and was quoted 
in many PPr publications; e.g. De Gaay Fortman and Thomas, 
op. cit., p. 41; cf. Interviews 2 and 8. 
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·,1 ' l·t· 1· ~5 conSluorcu po 1 -lCU lSSUCS. 
The transition to the new pluralist society would be 
slowand peaceful. Violent revolution seeme0 both unlikely 
2nd undesirable, at least in Western Europe; it could be 
necessary in the Third World. On tlle other hand, the change 
in the First World mi~ht be speeded up by a few ecolo~ical 
or economic disnsters. Disasters could persuade people to 
renounce thei r dem""nàs for economic grovrth anu cOnSUli1ijtion 
in favour of more lon~-term spiritual ~oals. In that sense 
the PPR considered itself a revolutionary party; but the 
revolution i t anticipated would be é:l cul tural rather than a 
96 political or socio-economic one. 
Nei ther the PPH nor any other party were able to create 
a new culture all by themselves, but it could support the 
cultural revolution that had alreaày starteà in many spheres 
of life. The secular European culture, based on rationalisrn, 
domination of nature and the belief in scientific, technolo-
gical and economic progress seemed to be going through a crisis, 
while traditional religion failed to solve its own crisis. 
A new culture might emerge, oriented towards self-development, 
sOlidarity, creativity and communication rather than domina-
tion, exploitation and accumulation. Feminine values might 
replace masculine values, expression of feelings becoming as 
95De Gaay Fortman, Politiek op termijn, especially Chapter 
Ij see also PPRAK 64 (July 1975) ahd PPRAK 54 (September 1974), 
47 (January 1974). 
96 De Gaay Fortman, Politiek op termijn, Chapter 4; Ter 
Bort, op. cit.; Interview 8. 
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important as cognitive efforts. A variety of life styles 
would be tolerated, both "proletarian" and "elitist," homo-
sexual and heterosexual, mystical and worldly. A pluralist 
culture would suit a pluralist society.97 
The Radical Pluralist project seemed relatively unique 
and peculiarly Dutch. Some members of the French Socialist 
Party and of the German Social Democratic Party as weIl as 
many members of ecological groups or "Green Lists" shared the 
basic ideas, but did not inspire the PPR theorists. 98 One of 
the main theorists of the party mentioned only Anglo-Saxon 
sources: Galbraith, Mishan, Tawney, Schumacher, another 
referred to Illich, Roszak and Castaneda. 99 
4.5 Conclusions 
In view of the bewildering varièty of theories presented 
in this chapter it may appear misleading to maintain the title 
of the chapter in the singular form. The Ultra-leftist or 
Anarchist project of Provo or Socialisme ou Barbarie appears 
totally incompatible with the Neo-Fabian Reformism of Nieuw 
Links moderates like Van den Doel. Without denying or explaining 
98AcCording to Interview 8; the group around Michel Rocard 
and the journal Faire within the French Socialist Party resembIed 
the PPR in many ways, cf. M. Rocard, Questions à l'Etat 
socialiste (Paris, 1972); idem, "Changer les enjeux," La Nef 
52 (1973): 57-78; so did theorists of the Democratic 
Confederation of Labour (CFDT) in France, e.g. P. Rosanvallon, 
L'age de l'autogestion (Paris, 1976); within the German SPD 
Pluralists appeared rather rare, but cf. I. Fetscher, 
"Oekodiktatur oder Alternativ-Zivilisation," Neue Rundschau 
87:4 (1976): 527-541 and Interview 14. 
99Interview 8; Ter Borg, op. cito 
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away the differences between the extremes, I will argue never-
theless that they shared sufficient important elements to refer 
to them as--however heterogeneous--parts of one New Left 
project. One can only argue this at a rather hi6h level of 
abstraction; at any concrete point in time or space one would 
have to distinguish between several more or less independent 
New Left projects. 
Perhaps six common ideas can be found in all the New 
Left theories discussed above: the impact of science on 
production, the integration of the working class in late 
capitalist society, the critique of economism and determinism, 
the relative autonomy of the state and of culture, and the 
new conception of nature. These will be elaborated on below. 
(1) The impac~ of science through new technology, caused lt 
mechanization and rationalization of production. Expanded 
mass production resulted in a certain affluence for all 
members of advanced capitalist societies, but also in certain 
politican and ideological changes. Moreover, the role of 
scientists and technicians chan~ed. Even if New Leftists 
disagreed about the political irnplications of this chan~e, 
they all agreed on its importance. Autornation seerns to have 
fascinated most, thou~h not all of them, as a possible way 
to overcome alienation and exploitation of human labour. The 
orthodox ~arxism of the Old Left underestimated the role of 
science and its producers, the intellectuals or New Workers; 
hence it had to be re-interpreted, revised or even rejected 
completely--here the New Leftists <lisa,;reed aJ,ain. 
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(2) The inte~ration of the working class in late (or 
neo4capitalist society was seen as one of the consequences of 
affluence and mass consumption, thou~h it was also related to 
the electoralist and reformist strategy of Old Left working 
class parties as weIl as the economism of the Old Left in 
general. While successful in winning seats in legislatures 
and corporatist bodies--like the Socio-Economie Council in 
the Netherlands--and in winning economie concessions, the Old 
Left had failed to transform capitalism in any fundamental 
sense. Since its critique of capitalism had emphasized econ-
omie failures, its reaction to the economie success of late 
capitalism could only be resignation or attentisme, i.e. 
waiting for an economie downturnj Social Democrats tended to 
the former, while Communists usually preferred the latter. 
As a result, most workers had given up fighting capitalism 
or Ieft it to their elected representatives to fight it. 
The exact interpretation of the term 'integration' 
differed between New Left groups. Neo-Marxists stressed the 
relative superficiality of integration or saw it as limited 
to the institutional level, pointing out the continuation of 
the class struggle against capitalism at the level of the 
shop-floor. Neo-Anarchists and Pluralist or Neo-Fabian 
Reformists on the other hand conceived of integration as a 
permanent and profound change which falsified the lllarxist 
predictions of a proletarian revolution, at least in Western 
Europe. New Left strategies reflected these differences. 
Neo-Marxists hoped to mobilize at least important sections 
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of the working class (the New Working Class in I'IIallet's project) 
for the revolution or revolutionary or at least structural 
reformsj whereas Neo-Anarchists looked for another revolutionary 
agent elsewhere--the provotariat or the Third World--and 
Pluralists expected various action groups or coalitions to 
realize structural reforms; Neo-Fabian reformists relied on 
the state. 
(3) Economism and determinism were denounced by all New 
Left theorists as serious flaws of the Old Left--and especially, 
but not exclusively, of orthodox Marxism. 'Economism' could 
be interpreted either in a broad sense, as giving too much 
attention to economie issues and demands; or in a more specific 
sense, as explaining political and cultural phenomena in 
economie terms. The latter interpretation was of ten linked 
to determinism, with reference to the Marxist statement that 
the political and ideological (cultural) superstructure of a 
social formation is determined in the last instanee by its 
economie base. Neo-Marxists tended to qualify or re-interpret 
this statement, while other New Leftists rejected it out of 
hand. Some would point out the growing importance of science, 
a product of the superstructure, to economie production; 
others would refer to the increased intervention of the 
state in the economy. Another line of attack would go through 
an analysis of Soviet-Union-type socialism--considered "state 
capitalism" by many New Leftists. The Soviet economy had 
been nationalized and planned more or less according to Old 
Left principles, but obviously the expected political and 
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cul tural chan,ies ha d failed to occur: poli tical power relllained 
in the hands of a small rUling class, workers enjoyed even 
Ie ss freedom than in capitalist society and CLll ture had 
remained bourgeois, oriented towards production, work, achieve-
ment and competition. 
The proposed alternatives to economism and determinism 
varied a great deal. Neo-Marxists might ar~ue for a relative 
or conditional form of determinism while Pluralists and Neo-
Fabians rejected all determinism; Neo-Annrchists did the same, 
though thcy mi~ht lean towar~s tcchnolo~ical determinism. lOO 
llowever , all new Lcft;L:;;ts appreciatcd spontanei ty and autonomous 
:î.ction in !)oli tics. ~:;clf-determination anel self-manat,ernent 
were trwir "oEels, but to a,;reat extent also their rneans. Even 
relatively orthodox Neo-harxists in CERES nnd Socialisme ou 
Barbarie adrnitted they were pursuing a "concrete utopia" 
rather than realizing a determined and scientific project. 
All seemed to approve of direct action of groups tryin~ to 
change their social, economic or ~olitical eonditions--even 
if they did not agree about the strategic importance of such 
t · t 1 tIl 1 . 1 t· t· 101 ac lon, comparea 0 e ec ora anu e~ls a-lve ac lon. If 
100, eb· Alt· d t t 00th Provo anu oU verSlve < lon seeme 0 expec 
socio-economic as weIl aS political chall~es from automation 
vhich sU:~,~est:::. a possi bly unintended determinist argument; 
this point will be argued at more len~th in Chapter 5.2. 
101Approval of direct action as such may be consistent 
with economic deterrninisrn, as in the case of Rosa Luxembur~ 
perhaps, if one accepts the inter~retation of Geor~e Lukacs, 
in G. Lukacs , Gesclüchte und Klassenbev,iUsstsein (Neuwied, 
1968), pp. 135-143; howevcr, it 8eems to Iile that the New 
Left did not follow Luxemburg in this respect. 
+ 
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a revolution was considered possible at all, its time, place 
and outcome could not be predicted. 
(4) The theories about the relative autonomy of the 
state follow from the critique of economism in the Marxist 
sense. If the state was ever controlled directly by economie 
interests durin~ the earlier stages of capitalism, this was 
no longer the case in late capitalist societies. Neo-Marxists 
disagreed with other New Leftists about the degree of autonomy, 
but all of them criticized the "instrumentalist" notion of 
the state held by Old Left Comrnunists and in a different sense 
by Social Democrats. On the other hand hardly any New Leftist 
asserted the complete neutrality of the state vis-à-vis social 
forces or economie interests. Hence, all favoured democrati-
zation of the state, either through reforms from inside or 
through a revolution that would replace the bourgeois state 
by a more democratie proletarian state, or even abolish the 
state as such. In other words all New Left theorists criti-
cized the authoritarian or oligarchie nature of the existing 
(bourgeois or welfare) state; but Neo-Marxists and Neo-
Anarchists saw the state oligarchy or bureaucracy as part of 
a more or less unified ruling class, Establishment or power 
elite, while Pluralists and Neo-Fabians insisted on the inde-
~endence of the state oligarchy in relation to other oligar-
chies or elites in society. 
The critical attitude of the New Left with respect to 
the state distinguished it from most of the Old Left. Indeed 
the Old Left was of ten aceused of "statism" (étatisme), i.e. 
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reliance on the state as the major or only a~ent of social 
and political change; once the Old Left had conquered the 
state, whether throui;h electoral victory or bloody civil war, 
it could supposedly legislate socialism into being. There-
fore the \'lOrkers would :~o home af ter the election or war and 
return to a passive and basically a-political private life. 
Meanwhile, their parliamentary or revolutionary representa-
tives would concentrate lJower in their own hands and continue 
to exploit and oppress the workers. To prevent this, Hew 
Left groups were to encourage rank and file members as weIl 
as citizens at large to take direct action and look af ter 
their own interests. If not advocating direct democracy, 
they \'lould favour some form of workers' councils, neighbour-
hood councils, referenda or other measures to enhance popular 
participation in polities. 
As a consequence, the role of political parties was 
perceived differently by Old and New Leftists. The latter 
rejected the authoritarian and hierarchic, even militarist 
organization of Old Left parties, both Communist and (to a 
sli~htly lesser extent) Social Democratie parties. Though 
they could not agree on one specific form of organization, 
all New Left theorists emphasized aspects like flexibility, 
openness, freedom for different theoretical opinions or even 
tendencies, grass roots dernocracy and' sorne contacts (if not 
close relations or even identity) with action groups; some 
would add the right to recall delegates or party leaders, 
rotation of functions, no division of labour between leaders 
l 
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and followers or between intellectuals and workers. More than 
an instrument in the class struggle, the New Left party or 
!.sroup would anticipate the kind of society i t strove for wi thin 
. t . t' 102 J. S own organJ.za J.on. 
(5) Relative autonomy of culture or ideology follows 
also from the rejection of economic determinism. Because the 
Old Left, particularly the orthodox Marxist Left, regarded 
culture as a by-product of economic factors, it tended to 
ne~lect it as a field or object of political action. Insofar 
as it devoted any attention to culture at all, it would 
reproduce bourgeois culture or try to revive reactionary folk 
culture, instead of creatin~ a new proletarinn or critical 
culture. A ~ain there was some disa;5reement amon:, New Left 
theorists as to the degree of autonomy culture h<ld. ;/lost 
Ueo-;·Iarxists sa\': i t as purt of bour.(~cois society and thcreforc 
anothcr arena for the cluss struJgle. Other New Leftists did 
not link the cultural revolution or renewal that they fought 
for to particular economie interests; Heo-Anarchists might 
link it to the economic system but give priority to the 
cultural struggle: once the achievement principle or the 
consumer ethos had been liestroyed, capitalism would collapse 
automatically. 
BoV/ever, even Pluralists and Neo-Fabians criticized 
102This antici~ation could be partial and rather marginal 
to the mainstream of history, as in the case of Socialisme ou 
Garbarie, the Socialist Bureau or the Situationist Inter-
national; or comprehensive and crucial as in the case of the 
Kabouters who claimed to build a complete "counter-society" 
(Oranjevrijstaat) which woulli replace the existing one. 
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bourgeois aspects of the prevailing culture, though they did 
not explain them in terms of bourgeois class interests. Their 
critique differed from that of other New Leftists only in 
degree. The main criticism concerned the "productivist" or 
"materialist" obsession of bourgeois culture with economie 
growth and values related to it, like the work ethic, the 
achievement principle (Leistungsprinzip) or the need for 
rnaterial consumer goods. Neo-Harxists and Neo-Anarchists 
might go further and attack the competitive and aggressive 
individualism, the puritanical sexual ethic and positivist 
science of bourGeois society as well; they would also relate 
it to the division of labour and the expansion of capital into 
new sectors of society--"colonizing daily life," as the 
Pacifist Socialists put it. 
There was some agreement about the kind of culture New 
Left groups should strive for, though there were considerabie 
differences in emphasis. There was no doubt about the need 
for solidarity and cooperation as well as for creativity, 
inn6vation and spontaneity. A certain degree of hedonism 
seemed acceptable to all, but it was higher in the case of 
the Ultra-leftists--boundless pleasure, "jouir ~ entraves," 
was the slogan of the Situationists--t~an in that of the Neo-
Fabians, for instanee. Hacism, sexism and imperialism would 
disappear, of course. Vlomen would enjoy equal rights, but 
equally important would be the acceptance of feminine values 
like emotionality, toleranee and tenderness as equal if not 
superior to masculine, intellectual and aggressive values. 
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New forms of interaction and communication might develop. 
V!ork would become more c rea ti ve and less aliena ting, or i t 
would disappear due to automation, as many Ultra-leftists 
expected. 
(6) The conception of nature, both human or inner nature 
and the outer nature of plants, animals and minerais, seemed 
different in the Oid and the New Lefts, thou~h the difference 
Qight not be very clear or explicit. Many New Left theorists 
did fila::e i t e~qJlici t, cri ticizin.::; 1,iarx for instance, for haviné; 
lQth century hour8eois positivist or rationalist 
vieVl of n.~tture. ';lh i Ie r.lost Oid Leftists would want to control , 
conquer, dominate and exploit nature for the benefit of man, 
Reason, Progress, Equality or Socialism, New Leftists preferred 
to leave it alone, to enjoy it quietly, to communicate or 
identify with it; or at least maintain some balance between 
human needs and ecological requirements. Human nature was 
not as rational and moral as I\larx had thought, perhaps; Freud 
could improve or complement him in that respect. Free develop-
ment of all, the Old Left Marxist ideal, required emancipation 
from external as weIl as internal repression of human nature. 
Ilence even man's (and woman's) inner nature was politicized 
by the New·Left. Sexual repression was considered a major 
obstacle on the road to socialism by most Ultra-leftists, 
but even Pluralist or Neo-Fabian reformists conceived of 
ha9piness,love nnd lust as relevant political issues. 
These six main ideas may justify the continued use of 
the sin,!,uIar, \':hen discussin;s the New Left project. On the 
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othcr han<1, i t \'las not a very coherent or unélmti ~(UOuS pro j ec t, 
2S the next ch:lpter ';li11 ::;110\i. 
CHAPTER 5 
A CRI'I'ICAL EVALUATION 
Introcluction 
In the l.Jrecedin.\~ chapter the project of the Dutch Ne\\' 
Loft was reconstructccl as coherently and clearly as possible. 
'1'his chnpter will focus on thc incohcrence nncl the ambi);ui ties 
of the project. The ideas presented in Chapter Four will be 
evaluated in tcrms of consistency, clarity and plausibility 
within their socinl, political ancl historical context as 
described in Chapter 'I'wo. Occasionally they will be contrasted 
with alternatives from the past or from other countries, as 
discussed in Chapter One and Chapter Three respectively. 
The first section of this chapter deals with the Revolu-
tionary Reformist project of thc Pacifist Socialist Party. 
The main weakness of the project lay in its abstract and 
utopian character, resulting from its neglect of economie 
analysis and its incomplete self-understandincl. lts Dutch 
predecessors and, to alesser extent, its French and German 
counterparts, did better in this respect. On the other hand, 
the PSP proved fairly effective and successful in introducing 
new political issues and resurrectin~ older ones, as weIl as 
in articulating needs of new social groups. It might come 
to play an even more important role in a revolutionary crisis 
(perhaps in the 1980s?). 
33U 
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The second scction contains an evaluation of the provoca-
tive project of the Anarchist New Left and specifically Provo. 
This project seemed even more abstract and utopian than that 
of the PSP; moreover, its impaticnt idealisrn contradicted its 
technolog;ical deterlilinism, i ts revolutionary eli tisrn clashed 
with its reformist populism anc its ideas about culture were 
rather vague and subjectivist. In spite of all these serious 
flaws--which were less common among most contemporary French 
or German groups anJ amon~ older Dutch Anarchist groups--
Provo exercised considerable influence on Dutch society and 
polities. 
The third section is divided into tv/o sub-sections which 
deal with the two sub-projects of the Social Democratic New 
Left, Neo-Marxist and Neo-Fabian Reformism. Both (sub)projects 
inc ludecl re la ti ve ly sophisticél. ted economie anu lJoli tical 
[~naly3cs but incomplete sociolo>ical self-annlysis anel little 
or poor analysis of culture and ideology. Both represented 
significant political forces in the lY70s--and quite possibly 
~llso in the 1980s--and inspired SOHle of the policies of the 
Den Uyl Jovernment between 1973 and 1977. These policies 
also revealed weaknesses of the projects, specifically the 
tension between elitism and populisme 
The fourth section is devoted to the Radical Pluralist 
project of the Political Party of Radicals. lts ideas about 
self-manal;ement, the state, economic !~rowth, classes and 
cul ture SeeIlle<1 incoherent in many ways, but i ts practice mi!sht 
be more coherent than its theory. 
l 
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The concluding section presents a brief summary of the 
main ambiguities of the New Left project: the abstract and 
utopian idealism of its social and economic analysis, the 
elitist and vopulist tendencies, and the subjectivist focus 
on culture. These ambi~uities, however, can be seen not only 
as liabilities but also as assets of the project. They mi~ht 
explain the support for New Left ideas among large sections 
of the new petty bour~eoisie in the Netherlands. 
5.1 Hevolutionary Reforrnism: A Contradiction in Terms? 
Thou:.;h i ts advocates eonsidered Hevolutionary Reforrnisli1 
to be a successful synthesis of eonflietin~ but both equally 
unsuecessful tendencies, it failed to result in si~nificant 
reforms let alone in a revolution in the period under study. 
!lowever, the .~oals of Hevolutionary reformist parties like 
the Duteh PSP or the Freneh PSU were sufficiently vague and 
10n~-ranJe to escape a final evaluation. 
Like Provo, the Pacifist Socialist Party could be eriti-
cizeli. for iciealism and abstract utopianisrn as weIl as for 
ineorl1lJlcte self-unuerst:'tnding. Whilc adopting l·iarxist Céüe-
. ,ories "nel ide;ts, i t badly neulecteLi eeonoliüe anéllysis. Like 
JflCtny other Ileo-l·larxist:!,roui-Js, i t i.3ULsti tuted l-,oli tier,l 
sociology for politieal eeonomy; but even its soeio10 6 y 
rerllained schelnatie an.J superfieial. In the 1960s, economie 
L,;rowth \'las taken 1'01' .\;ranteci--thoul)1 of ten cri ticized on mora1 
or ecological ;:;:,rounds--and economie crises were no longe l' 
expected, because of state intervention, imperialism and so 
forth. The eeonomic recessions of the 1970s found the PSP 
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unprepared and unable to capitalize on them; not surprisingly, 
its electorate crumbled and its membership stagnated. Worse, 
its 1977 platform Jescribed but failed to analyse the crisis 
of cél,iJitalism. It calleJ for shorter Vlorkin::', hours, strict 
,iJrice controls and more collective services, but also for 
socialization of all means of proauct10n under workers' control, 
incoliles ~lCcording to needs, and w1 thc.:.rawal i'rom both NATO and 
EEC. Whereas the first three demands could be seen as realistic 
but not necessarily revolutionary reform proposals, the last 
three smacked of utopianism, if not surrealism, in view of 
the over\~elmin8 dependenee of the Dutch economy on forei~n 
trade--most oi' i t VIi thin the European Communi ty--and mul ti-
national capital. Perhaps these revolutionary demands were 
meant as proIJac;anda only, to raise workiniS c lass consciousness j 
in that case they may have backfired, since the P~P lost more 
than one third of its 1972 voters in the 1977 election. l 
The political sociolo~y of the PSP combined ideas from 
C. VJri;;ht IUlls, and other elite theorists, with I·iarxist or 
Neo-Harxist ideas from I/Iallet and Gorz as weIl as Krahl, 
2 I-Iandel, Baran and Sweezy. Apart from listinz names of 
participants in Bilderber~ Meetings and contacts between 
l~:;ee above, Chapter 2.2; of course, other factors may 
have contributed to the electoral defeat, such as the internal 
conflicts within the party between 1972 and 1977, and the 
"charisma" of Joop den Uyl, the Prime lHnister who headed the 
list of the Labour Party which attracted many PSP voters 
(NEC, 3 June 1977, 11 June 1977). 
2Unfortunately, the economie works of Mandel and of Haran 
nnd Sweezy were referred to but rarely discussed (or used) in 
a concrete analysis of the Dutch economy. 
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university administrations and bi~ business, PSP puLlications 
dil~ not offer i .. l concrete analy~.Ji::; 01' thc lJutCfl rulin:, cl<.lss, 
the state, social structure or political parties. 
Given their rather va,~ue anà schematic class analysis 
i t is not surprisin;~ that Pacifist Socialists [:Jeemed confused 
about their own class base. i-iany of them realized that they 
represented "proletarianised new miC:ale classe~)" or "inter-
mediate groups" or perhaps a "ne\'! \'JOrkin,·; cIDss, 11 rather thC~Xl 
the proletariat in the trcldi tion&l sonSB. 3 ];ut even if 'Chey 
justified this vlhile referrin;.; to the theories of ~,la.llet or 
Krahl, they tended to admi t the need for sUiJport i'roi'l the 
"old workin,~ c lass. " Contac ts v;ere m<:lde Vii th rather marL~inal 
groups of militant workers anel trade unionists but these could 
only reinforce the isolation of the PSP from the mainstream 
of the or\~émised \'lorkin); c lass. 4 
Unlike its French counter~art, the Parti Socialiste Unifiê, 
the Pacifist Socialist Party never tried to or~anise its members 
at the Vlork-place. It tended to lend moral an~ (occasionally) 
financiCl1 sUl-,port to strikes cmd other \1orl(in,; clas5 ;::,ction5, 
but from G Jistance. As far a::3 i ts mombers \Jcre affiliatccl 
\'lith a trc.de union, th.ey belol1.,ed lîlostly to civil serv;jnts' 
or teachers' . 5 unlons. The IJarty or .,Clni Sé~ tion étl1l.. i ts é"C ti vi ties--
3 For instancc Bovenkerk, ;jevrijdin;, 1~:i July 19(;2; 
Drrlrlderhor"'st, l{:lliika.n.l, 4 J;-lnu~Lr~/ l~)()"j; ;)llr,~ ',r'~:~) .. i' é.lnci iioo ,./,;rT\'!er~i', 
1{Lldilçaa1, JU Junc 1:)71; :1l1(; llcijcr, l~;l(lir~;i:Jl, l~ ~3c1-)tcJ\lbcr 1~)72; 
cf. Analyse en Uelcids~lan, op. cit., pp. 12-13. 
4 S L" ee elJscr, op. cit., 1='P. 27-2fl. 
5 J\ccorclin" to n11 intern:ü discussion ,t-ii"lper, On (s) 
Gen08:;en 39 (10 Au,,,ust 1979). 
-335 
its long discussions and confused debates about theory and 
strate~y, its cultural experiments, demonstrations against 
American intervention in Vietnam or the construction of nuclear 
power stations in Germany--may have attracted youn~ intellec-
tualG <lnd other rnCIllbers of the neVl ~etty bour:Jcoisie but 
probably bored, shocl<ecl or }Juzzlc,i lllanual \'lorl~ers • At best, 
thc PSP coule:. h:.J.ve becorae a reli<:,',ble ne\'! lJetty bour::;eois tilly 
of the \'lorkin, C1<:'..8S; however, this Iflodest role--at times 
utivocated by Erik Meijer--did not fit in with its iueas about 
G 
counter-lJov:ers and a culture of strui5:~le. 
The PSP was to build and consolidate counter-powers in 
the Dutch economy and polity, throuLh grass roots action as 
weIl as action in p&rliament. 'rhe notion "counter-power" was 
not defined in any precise way, but suggested a somewhat 
rncchanico.l OPl-.,osi tion to the power of the ruling clasG or 
power elite; thc latter notions ren~ined equally vague in PSP 
publications. Sometimes the }Jower elite seemed to inclu~e 
tiuthoritarian teachers and professors, military men, managers, 
I;lunicipal alderlflcn anti Socia1 Uelilocratic 1-/o1i ticians. Con-
se4uently, bitter intcrnu1 conf1icts arose about the opera-
tion::ll defini tion of these terms. Participa tion in municipal 
or néltional coali tions and .~overnments. was aclvocated by some 
creutin~ counter-poVJcrs Lut attacked by others as "sellin"s 
out to the system" or joinin~~ the power eli te. In Amsterdalil 
the conflict resu1ted in the expulsion from the party of 
Gsee ;.ieijer's artieles in Hadikaal, 17 February 1972, 
2 ilarch 1972, 13 Ayril 1972, also quoted alJove in Chapter 4.1. 
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lIuib lüethof, the Pacifist Socialist a.lderman; ironically, he 
waS one of tlle authors of the Analyse en Beleidsplan which 
7 had introduced the notion of counter-powers. 
Perhaps the parliamentary leader of the party between 
1972 and 1977, Dr. Dram van der Lek, was more consistent when 
lle defined the ;.',oéll of the PSP müucstly uS "to show where 
power lies" rather than to exercise it. 8 In other Vlords, the 
party was to act as a "collective intellectual." Even so, 
Van eer Lek assuwed i t waS able to tronscend i ts nevi petty 
bour~eois class base and articulate the interests of the 
powerless masses. As an active and conscientious Member of 
Parliament, Van der Lek represented interests of relatively 
powerless groups in many individual cases--workers who were 
laid off or fired, foreisners and other minorities who were 
discriminated a.;ainst, and so forth. However, the 10ng-
terr,l intercsts of these:,roups did not necess[}.rily correspond 
with the Pacifist Socialist ideas of Van der Lek. Moreover 
even in the short run the PSP cooperated mostly with action 
,(~roupt) where new petty bour;,eois tendeLi to be over-represcnted 
ana m~.lnual workers, forei,,;n imrni·;ra.nts, etc., 9 under-represented. 
7Socialisties Perspektief 1 and 2 (July 1972, October 1972) 
and an oral communication from Professor Ger lIarmsen on Iilay 27, 
1~7tJ. 
i,larch 1974; also ~uoted above, Chnpter 2.2. 
9This seeilled to be the case in most action:>;roups, insofar 
as they have been the subject of empirical research (surveys 
especially), sec ll. j·Jolleman, "\'1ie voeren actie," Acta Poli tica 
7 (1972): 99-111; H. Jolles, Ue poreuze demokratie (Alphen 
aan de Hi jn, 1974), Chapter S; C. Van der llaesen, Participatie 
en Dcmocratie (Arrwterli.::ull, 1974), Ch~l.ptcr 3; for Cl more eautious 
eone lusion from :,ÜIÜ lar rcs3arcl1 soe C. ;3r;_1arn, et al., Collcc tieve 
Ltetic:3 Oleppel, 19 7G) • 
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Old Left Marxists within the PSP criticised the enthusiasm 
and support for action groups amon~ New Leftists as "populism." 
Lacking a concrete class analysis, the PSP tended to support 
all kinds of "anti-authori tarian" ac tions a,l~ainst the "power 
eli te" or "capi talism" ro.ther indiscrirninately, t:ut failed 
to consoliJate the successes that were occasionally &chieved. 
Furthe~nore, many o.ctions were directed against the consequences 
rather than the roots of capita1ism. lO 
Thus the PSP had attacked o.ir pollution, industrialisation, 
nuc1ear ener~y and Dutch support for American intervention in 
Vietnam with some success--in terms of press covera~e, puGlic 
opinion chan~es and concessions 1'1'010 10ca1 or even nationa1 
authorities. Nonetheless, these actions did not result in 
the establishment of counter-iJO\'lers. Perhaps they contributed 
to cc cul tural ch~::!.n~e--thouL~jl a "cul tural reforlo" rather thcm 
,j "cul tural revolution." 
Even if the activists suffered a 
-:.lafea t, they 8a ti sfi.ed needs rOl' cornlllunicCi.tion, soli dari ty , 
,roup i Li.enti ty anel a certain crea ti vi ty é.l.mons therrise 1 ves. In 
so far as these needs were of ten repressed in late capitalist 
society, thci l' sati sfac tion coulG. indecll be ce Ie l':-ra ted as an 
':cct of liberation or elllancilJution, consistent \'Ii th the finé.l.l 
lOFor instance Aalders in ilaciikaal, 4 August lY72; 
Oe Jong in Hal:.iikaal, iS April 1973; Intervie\J 1. 
11 See above, Chapter 2.6, about the distinction between 
expressive anel instrumental action. 
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~oals of the New Left. However, to see them as first steps 
towards a "culture of stru,~:..;le" or e lements of ó:'. counter-
cul ture seemeel rather exo.g,:~ero. teel. '1'hc fo.ctionalism, verbosi ty, 
stubborn indiscipline, anel persona1 s4uabb1es that acconlpanied 
these actions within thc ~arty seehlC~ typica1 of the sut-
cul ture of the ne\'/ yetty bourc,eoisie in a c.:1.pi talist society, 
rather than of a future classless, socialist ., 12 socl.e-cy. 
One could concluele the evaluation of the PSP by callin6 
it a fairly successful initiator of social, 001itico.l and 
cultural reforms as weIl as a "socialist watchclo~" for thc 
Labour Party rather than a revolutionary force. liost of 
those \'Ihose theoretical v!or;~ inslJirerJ i t \'IOUlCl have been 
Liissatisfieel with these results; on the other himd, there lnay 
not ho.ve been uny real altcrnative. 
Ancir(; Gorz, VJho introduced the conception of "revolutionary 
reformism," specifieu four functions that a revolutionary 
reformist party had to fulfill: theoretical ö.nalysis, 
ideolo;;;ical synthesis, lJoli tical leallership anti eCiucation, 
seizin~ power and transformin~ the state. In twenty years 
(H)57-1~77) the PSP ûicl rather poorly in all four, exce~t 
~erhaps in political loadership and cducation. 1t failed to 
!Jrovi cie a "continunlly upda ted analysi:,; of the cvolution ancl 
contl'EHJictions of capi t,:J..list socicty at all i ts levels" or a 
12'1'he sub-culture and ideoloJY of the new petty bour~eoisie 
have not yet been investi,;atecl empiric8.11y; however, the 
sfJeculations of l:'oulémtz('\s anel others sound rather plausible, 
sec Poulantzas, Les classes sociales; ana Dauelelot, Establet 
and Ilalell1ort, op. ci t. 
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"hi .i~hcr conception of ra tionali ty, of ci vi li sa tion, of culture"; 
nor did it situate 10cal end immediate demands within a general 
t t l' t . t· t . l' 13 s ra egy 0 rans~ ~on 0 soc~a ~sm. 
On the othcr h:::tnd, Gorz' s cri teria may be too strict. 
;;is conception of a revolutionary reformist party scems rather 
abstract and a-historical. IIe clid not explain hov! the party 
\}a:3 to te or,:l.ni sc d ilnc[ by '.'lhOfli, v/here D.nd \'/hen. He éJ.ssumed 
that thc party leadership had achieveJ "socialist consciousness" 
CJn\.! could cducatc thc lilLl.SSCS throu:;h :-tctions for rcvolutionnry 
reforms--but whcrc \'lould the leadership come from, and hOVi aid 
it ncquirc socialist consciousncss? 
Thc party that came closest to Gorz's ideal was probably 
the Parti Socialiste Unifi6. Under the leé~dership of lüchel 
Rocard and Ser~e Uallct the party produced a fairly coherent 
theoretical analysis of Frcnch society and developed a strategy 
of transition to socialism. Durin~ the "abortive revolution" 
of 19GB it took various initiatives to radicalise the movement 
and to build counter-powers in universities and factories. 
Ilowevcr, the party remained too small and disunited to consoli-
date anJ expand these counterpowcrs so as to bc able to "seizc 
j.JOWcr anel transform the statc." B.ocarcl drew his conclu3ions 
and joined the rejuvenated Socialist Party in 1974. 14 
'l'hou,~h sli,(~htly more succcssful than the PSP in i ts 
attempt to stril<e roots in the \'lorkinis class, the PSU recrui teel 
13. Gorz, R6forme et Révolution, pp. 43-56; also in 
Lothstein, op. cit., Pi). 320-342. 
14See above, Chapter 3.1. 
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more new petty bourgeois teachers, students, civil servants 
and en.;;ineers than li1anunl workers or even c lerical workers • 15 
nallet's hope that the pnrty woulJ receive the support of 
the New WorkinJ Class proved ill-founded. Only a small frac-
tion of thc New \':orkers becarne sufficiently int8rosteci in 
::.;elf-mana,:,elllent and ncw lifo-styles to join or vote 1'01' the 
l-arty that om:)hasized these issues. /1. much l~J.r,~cr fraction 
e;~l~,resscrl SOllle concern c~l)out thc Séli~le issues OU'i:; continueö to 
voto for the 30cialist Party or even the Gaullist ~arty. These 
Ncw ',:orkers presumably desired certéein reforl.ls but not a 
revolution thClt lili,~~~ht GeiH'ive tller.l of their ~rivile~es. ;/1ore-
over, many of them \'!orked in industries ciependent on the rnani-
pulation of consumer needs for the sale of tllin~s that Ncw 
Leftists ,.:!,enernll::l diséèjJ~rovGd of: automobiles , electronic 
lG 
ahJliances, chemicais, nucleD.r power. 
'l'he PSU seeI\led more explici t anc: more effective than the 
l)~)P as él "collective intcllectual" 1'01' the workin.; clD.ss, 
particularly tllrough its contacts with the Democratic Confederu-
tion of LD.oour (CfDT), its own factory colls D.nd, aftel' 1971, 
15'1'he formol' category made U[J alJout 47;'b of the membership 
in 19G8 (R. Cayrol, "distoire et sociologie d'un parti," in 
RocarG., Le PSU, p. 39; only 13% were manual workers (ouvriers), 
14% Clcrical workers (employós). 
16See G. Adam, "Introduction à un debat SUl' la nouvelle 
c lasse ouvrière," l{evue françai se de science poli tique 22 (1972): 
509-528; H. Lan~;e, Wissenschaftlich-technische Intelli"enz 
(Colo~;ne, 1972); F. Deppe, ed., IJie neue Arbei terklasse 
(Frankfurt, 1970); these authors criticize NalIet also on 
tlleoretical Jrouncls, pointing to his imprecise if not inco-
herent definitions and his technological determinism; see 
also r'). Rolie, "Ue la nouvelle classe ouvrière à l'auto:z.estion," 
Politigue aujourd'hui 3:4 (1974): 117-123. 
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its influence on the new Socialist Party. Nonetheless, its 
theory showed simi lar flawS to those of the PSP, ancL VlaS 
cri ticized effecti vely as a va,;ue and eclectic ideo10gy of 
technical and rnana ~e rial \'JOrkers. l7 The concefJtion of the 
PSU as the collective intellectual for thc workin~ class could 
apparently justify i ts intellcctual rather than J:.Jroletarian 
base. Bowever, it could also justify (or rather cover up) 
a "socio-technocratic" JiléLDipulation of thc worlün~ class by 
intellectuals, as one of the foun~ers of thc PSU wrotc aftcr 
l() 
his dcparture fro@ tho party. 
\'Ihile the Dutch PSP may have boen less r~roductive 2.S a 
collective intellectual than the 1"rench PSU, it was more 
effective than the German SUS or thc Socialist uureau. l9 The 
Socialist Germ8.n Student Lea,;ue (SDS) consisted not predomin-
antly but exclusively of (young) intellectuals, and initiated 
a :~reiJ.t nurnber of theoreticiJ.l discussions and seminars of 
hi,~h Cjuali ty. Thus i t may have exercised considerable influence 
20 
amon', German intellectuélls but hardly any amon,;, German \'lorkers. 
17"ee AnC") rt t...J .;:) (.~ , op. cit., I)lJ. 145-1:39. 
lilpoperen uscs the term "t,ocio-tcchnocrate 11 in Cl 100se 
sense; he points out the ambi<~;ui ty of eli tism and populism, 
stru!; ;le 1'01' self-mana~emcnt but no clear class analysis, and 
n():_~lcct of the state, in the PSU projeçt (Poperen, L 'uni tè de 
lét :;auche, l-)p. 407 ff, 4]0-446. 
19 See Chztptcr 3.? about thc Socialist Germ~:m Student 
LCél,;ue (SDS) anel the SocLtlist Bureau. 
20Th" .l f " -. th' liD' V .. 1 
- lS lS élr;ueu ,)y h. 00n elmer, le cranaerunlj;cn 
~es politischcn Gewusstseins durch die studentischen Protest-
bOVle!jun,,;," Lerkur 30:3 (1976): 2G7-279; 1'01' a more syll1pathetic 
but no less cri tical view see K. H2.etun:"4, "Versuch, die Kri se 
der anti-autori tären Dewc:;un"!, wieder ZUl' Sprache zu brin,~sen, 11 
KursLluch 48 (1977): 14-44, as vleJ.l as ;.losler, op. cit., 
;.p. 233-248 especially. 
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Yet i t was a leadinL~ member of the SDS, Hans-Jurc.;en Krahl, 
i'lho developed the laost elaborate theory of the collective 
inte liectual as the "head" of the Total \'!orker (Gesamtarbei ter) • 
'l'hou;Jll plausi bIe in parts, his theory seems too abs troc tand 
too one-si(~ed. \lhile adL1ittin.; the petty-bour~eois nature of 
:~;cientific or intellectual '.'lori<, Kr'rthl ,H:;surneu th;jl; thc 
polarization bctwcen J.Jour:;coisic anll }Jrolctariat woulG 800n 
cli~linate the petty-bourJcois tendcncies an~ ide&s amon~ thc 
scientific inteIli'Jcmtsü~. 'l'hou,';h not uncri ticill of his 
or,;anizéltion, by 19G() 11e feIt it llé"cl sllec~ its 1,ctt~y'-bour,;cois 
tenjcmcie8 ;~n,.l coulu act OoJ 0 co11c:ctiv'3 intellc:ctu,:"l. U,l t.,c; 
in ~)8rlin hélu lilO~ilizc.:i 1;ro1et:J.riCLn strcet youth (EocKer) in 
violent action él~ainst thc court élnu thc 1,01icc in tlwt 
'fLat i)L.trticular <:lction élnu i ts intcri_,rctation sceli:cd to tri',~cr 
off the di sinte,r;..;. tion (extJlosion) of the SDS in 1:) Ci9 . Trans-
ceneiin,; i ts c V~,L;S limi ti:> and tal<:ill:'; on i'unc tions of a revo 1 u-
tion:lry ];)arty in <.lcdi tion to i CS ori:~inal i'unctions of an 
intcllectual del)ó.:.tin; clul), as \lell aS ~:. (rcfor'nlist) interest 
;~roup representing students in university counci1s, it strained 
its smcül and fra,~i1e or[:,anization too much to survive. 1t 
,î 1 so cXiJ.CerlJél ted i (leo10,,~ica1 and perso\1a1 tensions , whi Ie 
fai1in6 to reconcile the need for ~iscipline and sacrifice 
\Jith thc naeJ for self-dcvelopment, communication or 
21 8ee Wolff and Vindaus, op. cit., ~p. 174-192. 
22 
"Lust);ewinn. " 
221uid ., especial1y IJ. li39: "lc1'1 diskutiere i~ern in der 
Justizciebatte mi t, wenn Jiese DeLJatte mi t Lust~~e\'iinn verbunden 
The Socialist DUreó.u, the most loyal successor of the 
SDS, set i tself more modest ,;oals. It Inay have been successful 
in achievinl~ SOlae of .them, but I;i ven i ts small size anti 10\-/ 
profile, it could hartily serve as an exam~le for the Vutch 
PSP.23 Oskar Ne~t, the main theoretician of the Socialist 
Dureau, sug~esteti a modest and realistic strate~y of functional 
interest articulation and cul tural reforms. IIoHever, even 
the school reform project in which he participated suffered 
from ambii..:suities. Nei~t failed to sllovr trlC:::ct i t contradicted 
capitalisrn anti hall to admit that it llü!::;ht have serveu tlle 
interests of lilono})ol.y capi tal, \11üch ;'.1so necG.cd ÎJctter 
educated anli 1,"ore all-round \':orKers '.1i th tl1e ~,Lili t J to con-
trol themselve::;:; é~nd to coo}JeréJ.te witi1 others. Furtllerr,"ore, 
l.Jy conccntratin" on articulé:.tioL and sati:"félction of ililldc~LJte 
a'-lvocated, the ~)ocialist llureau '.'JOulu. éll,:3o run tlle risk of 
servin,,; nev! l:::etty bour,U;cois rather thml yroletarian interests ; 
especially since it was to help workers to transform their 
immediate anci lJartial or functional ~ut "false" neecis ::mc~ 
interests into "autllentic" nee(ls o.nd "co1nplete" intere:3t:3. 
Again the question should be asked: who educates the eciucators; 
ist •.• " ("1 liJ.:e to take jJart in the deho.te El.bout the jUCli-
cature,if this aebate is associated with the achievemcnt of 
[)lc~~lsure (lwJt)"); 110 r:ouLt 0. sirlli 1 ~'~r 'l.tU. tucic cou1 i.l te foun,,; 
;U:IOI1 .. , Dutclt i'ruvos ;,nu L:; Louter:..> I ,,rOl,iy~; th:LL ;;1:">0 Cll';Cu in 
él sor'levJhé.lt sir;lilé:~r \'.'é.~;Yi; ~.:.;ee CLbo\T0, CLL[J.l __ ,tc:r ~~.J. 
~, r) 
,-,.) rIlle ~-~o ei <:"1..1 i::.: t ~_', lll'-"(~ ~.). U ~_./~.~ .. ~_; IlO t i 1l. "vc:..J 1..:.1 'J t c (_~ :...: tli'r J.. ei (; ~l t 1 ~/ 
,::hen this '..'(",;;' '.:ri -'eten to jUf~'l:if:' ~, ;:IOI'e c:L.I_,OL':: L;f; cV:.lu·.-ciun 
lîere. 
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\1ho knows v/hat kind of interests are "authentic ,,?24 
While the Pacifist Socialist Party did not satisfy all 
the criteria defined by its Dutch, French and German theorists, 
it did not do much worsc than its French or German counter-
parts. To complete the evaluation, one shoulu compare it to 
silililar ;~roups in the Netherlnnus. The :~roup that resemble.j 
i t most in thc post-Har ~)eriod VlaS tl1c Poli tical Po.rty of 
;\o.dic~::.ls, which \'lill be evaluotcd bclo\'l. Be:t'ore 1~40 there 
vere several parties within the Revolutionary Socialist tradi-
tion thé-'.t invi te eomparison Vii th thc PSP: the Hevo1utionéiry 
Socialist (\'lorkers) Party, the Socia1 Democratie Party anJ 
even the Socia1 Democrntic Lca .. c:,ue of the 1:1:30s. These i;arties 
showed more consistency in their class ana1ysis--\'lhich tended 
to be dcrived direetly from Marxist theory--and recruitment, 
as \'lell as in thcir focus on revo1ution. On1y the ear1y 
30cial Democro.tie Lea::sue (SÛB) resel'Îbled the PSP insofar as 
it combinecl Harxist ana Anarchist iliens, revolutionary nnd 
reformist members, v/orkers [md intellectw:üs. Yet even the 
SDi., hecamc more hOlilo,:,cneoUf3 nftcr the spI i t of 1(3~)4. llolilo-
,eneity and consistency may be theoretical assets, but they 
can be j.iractici"Jl liabili ties in poli tics. The horao:~eneous 
;:)nl1 consistent ~:;D]j (or Socialist Lea "ue, since lO~4), Social 
lJelilocra tic P;~rty (SlJP) nnd Independent Soc inli st Party (0 Sp) 
or l(evolutionnr::i ::3ocinlist '·.'.'orl(ers Pél.rty (rC3AP) rernained 
relatively isolated, secté.1.rian and ineffective cOrHpared to 
~24c, 
,-,ce , .. lJove, Char; ter 4.1.5 aliout He.;t nnli l1i s sc11001 
rojcct. 
l 
fooo 3horta;GS, unemplOyll'Gnt <:i.n" the inc:,c ti VG "10Y8.1" ))0 si tion 
of thc Soc:i . .:::.l Dcmocratic \lorlcers l)étrt~· (~3}),\F). 25 '1'h8 Conm,unist 
:Lt i:.;:; éil'ficult tll }.,J:'c;~.ict .;lH.ct éè P':;l-' or (J PSU ',':ouLl uo 
L,ul.ilizéL.on stn.;c. ()uitc lii:e1y tl1cy 1.1oulci tG lllo.rü[Jul8.ted 
if not lic;uiclatcG by bet ter prGpareCl a.nu ;:.letter or:~&nized 
GLi 1.,e1't al lies • Even so their insistence on Vlorkers control 
é:Û1d direct democracy r,ü,:;ht encoura,,,G revo1utionary \'lorkers 
to resist bure8.ucratic !.lanipulation oy Old Left party or union 
lGiiUerS--or socio-technocratie lllanipu1ation by New Left 
activists or theorists, for that matter. 
Neither the 1960s nor the 1970s cou1d be considered 
revo1utionétry iJGriocis--wi th the possib1e exccption of ].lay-
JunG 19G8 in France. It is doubtful if even much 1ar6er anJ 
L10re consistent revolutionarY re1'orrni.st parties tllan the PSP 
or p~;u coul,.: h:,ve chan;cll tl1at. l:evcrthelcsG, ,c htr;er lJarty 
,,) i~ 
"'·.),)c"; Cl';'JJ-CC1' 1. {; ch~ ~jJ)jU! W:.1S loyal tovJ:.1.rds thc I;overn-
uent ;:.nJ (lic.. li ttle to <,lleviatc these prolJlcli1S for tlle 
workers • 
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IÜ"ht have êtYiJlied the Liual strate;c',Y lilore effecti vely. Under 
the ;:;i ven conlli tions, nei ther PSP nor l<)U v;as able to realize 
any si Gnificru1t rcforms, let alone intc~rate thcm in ti lon~-
teriil :3trate,S of tran::3i ti on to socialislJl. On the other hand, 
both lJarties ini tia te II reforms anu introciuce Cl ncw i ssues--or 
resurrected older issues, lik8 \'Jor;~ers' self-raana;ielilent anJ 
direct democracy--vhich were later taken up by lar~er Social 
])emocra tic parties or unions • lJerforrnin,u, a van~uard role--in 
the aöove-L1entioneü sen~:)e--durin,~ the 1~6Us, both parties 
seemed to lose si,;nific3nce durin,,, the 1~70s; yet even then 
tbcy reI,1Qined uscful ;:",s "wa tchc.lo,c:,s" lyin;z just outsi de the 
left :;.ate of la vieille . 26 rnaJ.son. ï.Ioreover, they contirlUed 
to satisfy the expressive needs of new petty bourGeois youth, 
',',hile =Joliticizin;~ and educatin .. ::, it. 
5.2 Thc Iiapa tient Ide::Üi sm of the All8.rchi st Ne\! Left 
If thc Pacifist Socialist project of I(evolutioncLry Heformism 
é:iJi,e:Lreu c~bstri1.ct, utopinn and inconsistent to cri tics, i t 
to tbc Ane .. I'chist projcct of Provo. Fror.l the very ~)tart Provo 
tricd to l)rovoke critics, and it succceded vcry weIl in that 
reSiJect. It \'ietS accuser.l of nihilisL1, terrorisl.1, morctl clecé\.~encc, 
L1Zi ne ss, Cl ts tr<:~c t uto iJÏélnisrn, L~-l~O 1i tical subj ec ti vism, 
eli tis];1, an,i ü1l-)utient iuealisrJl by cri tics from all poli tical 
"iirections; Liberals, 00(;i<l.1 0eIllocrats, Christian Democrats, 
'J6 
,:. "Thc Olei House" VhlS the nicknarne for the French SFIO 
[ll1U is still usecl occé.:.sionQlly vri th rcference to the ne\'[ 
PS. 
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Hevolutionary Socialists, Communists and Anarchists. It 
will be ar~ued here that most of these criticisms referred to 
real weaknesses in the project, specifical1y the impatient 
iJea1is~1, the imp1icit elitism anti the utopian Rnd subjectivist 
tendencies; but al so tha t thc Sélrne ueal:nesses also had I~osi ti ve 
L10th the Vosi ti vc and thc ne i 0<:' ti ve aspcc ts ~3i::,r2.ng 
1°roln f' tI'" , . th 1) . t 27 a unaalnen a amU1, ;U1 t;y 1n c rovo proJec . 
On the one h2.nd, Provo tricd to ffiobi1ize nnd po1iticize 
é" ruther small anc: mar:,inal section of the ûutch popu1ace for 
rcvolutionary ,,0:.l.1s, v/hile conLleldnin,~ the over\'!hclmin,~ !ilajori ty 
of thc pcople to historical irrelcvance and 0assivity. This 
revolution8ry but cli tist strate,S '-'las ()ascc:. 011 a sOlne':!he,t 
;::implistic rllaterü',list, if not tcchnolo:~ical-(ietcriünist 
uno.lysis. Tcchnol0,;ica1 innovéltion, 8.nd more s1)eci1'ic811y 
automation, \'/;::cS scen as the main source of socin.l ch,m.:;e. It 
hé' . ..:l crcCJ.ted r;laS8 ;:.~fi'luencc and mass consum>tion, \lhich 
corru~,ted thc once rcvolution2,r~' \:orkin,ç cl<:":38 ,mu turfjC i0 
i;rco j~lootJcsvoL:, a "lÜn;j.lcss li~':-J.SS of cockroéches, beetles 
( .. nl~ lauJ'bu,~s," ":Cc.Ilcn '~.slcCi) in front of their te1evision 
<") r) 
scts."UJ Yet the saIne proccss hall crcated a sl;;a11 class of 
unCi;li)loyed revolutionaries, the provotariat; i t Vlas :'t revolu-
tionary class because it did not take [Jart in }.:,roduction or 
consurnption--ayart froril consumption of ccrtain necessi ties, 
27Since this eva1uation relies on immanent criteria, 
'~ositive' and 'negativc' refer to the values and goals of 
the New Left rather than to my persona1 preferences--thouclh 
tllejr of ten coinci de. 
") () 
~uSee Chapter 2.3 aGove; footnote 118. 
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presuri1a~)ly. In thc Ion,:; run all prol;,uction \iOuld be é~utoma tod, 
vlhether thc klootj esvol;~ liked i t or not, 2d1d thus the ;rovo-
,roul.Js \';81'0 rC,ar(.i.c'~ (~s powc1'less to stol_ technolo,,;ical ch',.n ,0--
a 1'8.t1'1c1' 
On cn·,:: 0 l:;llcr i1~~n,~, hov/ever, Provo fJursued a rei'ürlliist 
tivist ilnilly'ü:s. 1t <-tucressed a v;ide aUuience t1'1rou,;il the 
I 
~)resenteli in lJiJJn;;;hlet8 anc.. Provo n1'ticles. 'l'he ',:hi te Plans 
offered imaf:;inative solutions to ur:',ent but not very [JQsic 
problorn~3 j in other VlOrl~S they would not lead to structural 
chéln:~es in Dutch society if tl1ey W8rc evor irnlJlement0u. 
education mi,;llt 1fl;3.:·ce Cé\~Ji talist society more pleasant but 
not Ier;;, c(':q .. i talist. 110viever , these issues played a central 
part in tlH} municil',tl election of 19bG in \'lhich Provo won 
2. G~S Ol t;',e l .. oj.iular votc in Ar:lsterdam. iI.ccording to a survey 
i tc'O votc:c;:~ 'Jere ~H'e(:oiünantly neH petty iJour",eois r(~ther than 
,. ". ' ]() 
Ulo onc 'cLlru 01 'Lh", l-'1'ovo c1ectüra1.:;e. Provo failed to 
2~ T • ' I·Jo eVlJencc \'[é.'S prosented to me.ke the assumption 
plo.usi bIe; even if cor;lpcti tion forces cé.èpi tnlists to invest 
in '::luton'é','ce, , [,liJ.clüncry ,;8 laLour CO~3ts rise, war or natural 
(ïiSé~st'::;rs rai;ht jlrevent full au t OIi"I::lt i on j moreover, labour 
costs lI1ClY f;).ll (luel:;o the repression of unions, for example. 
3°'l'he terln "new lJetty l)Ourl~eois" is used here in a loose 
Gense; of the 25 Provo voters in the sample (of 1513 adults) 
L 
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L1 s:·;i te of th'::; lc~ter I ~:; :::;ocio-econo;~lic l~o;:::;i tion. In fé'.c t some 
Provo~3 lloj~c,' to "tu:cn L~rounc~" even the authori ties, étt lec~st 
:-<)~)eéÜl.n,~ to the suLjc;ctive iueals anci :::>cntililents of in(iviG.ual 
31 
rulers. 
'1'0 SOliie extent these Provos were ri:.;;ht j l)\lt only Liecnuse 
tlleir hi.;hly ;,unbi:';uous project éllJpealeu to h!o different ,;rouj,::s 
for ver} ~ifferent rcnsons. Loth the provotérians cmG the ne,,/ 
petty bour,;eoi;3 may have reGented the authori tarian ,mel bureeu-
cratic Lehuviour of the Dutch rulin~ clasG Gnd its n,cnts. 
'lat the lJl'Ovot::.rian:::; ',!ere i t,j direct victim:3, crw.seG and lJeaten 
younJ mana ,er;:::; an~ senior civi1 serv&nts could hope to replace 
or join Uw rulin., cl~.LSS some üay. 'l';le fOrlllCr ';Joulcl like to 
be left 2.10ne to do their 0\.'11 thin;!,--a revolution, rnaybe, a 
ho.ppenin:;, certc:.inly--';,'rlCre2..S the latter \'l<.ntecl to be more 
invol veel in <1ecision ri1(_lkin~; and plannin~;. They mi:~~ht have 
g (32%) \'!ere senior civil servant~ profef3:::>ional[~ or managers 
15 (60~~) were junior civil servunts, sho~keepers or manual 
\'!or~-(ers, COI;\i;c:.red to 7i,S D.nd 7G~~ respec ti 'Ie ly of the 403 PvcJA 
voters in the samiJle j the c::;.te[~ories I professionals t senior 
civil SerV(lflts' and 'rno.na;erial personnel' made up ~~6 of' the 
sarllplej the c"te;ory 'I,li,lclle clas:::> sho;)kecj)crs ;mcl civil 
scrv:mts' 1.1c':.dc up L~~~ of the sample, of thc Provo electorQte 
and thc c;tc,;ory of '::';;;1;,11 ~3110;)I:ec.l')er:::;, Clil~)loyces nnd sl:illed 
'.'.'orl:erc:3' 4~;~ of thc ::";,':'lil1 ,1c, 44~) 01' thc l'rovo elcctoriite j sec 
Vall (ier :ié'()Sen, "i:icL;':;r~:; Ol) drift," j;,. 1,J0-~~()O. 
'~ 1 '··~V:,.n '1ccr l e c, 0 •• cit., i~';'. ~31, 37; ~.1::..;0 in Provo (; 
( 1 ij (;.~ ) • 
l 
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smiled é',t thc "unrcalistic" ':;'hi te Plans, tut a 1..ijJrcciatej tbe 
l,lay:t'ul style \/i th ""hich tlley raisel..J. issues thé.it concerneci 
them. At least the Provos ure\! attention to collective neeCJ.s 
&n~ cultural questions that other political ~&rties, bo~h on 
tlw LeLt an~ on the lU"llt, tendej to n8~lect. 
Tile ne'\! i-'etty lJour::,eoi:..> civil ;:;;ervants an(~ 1l1anélt~ers 
r;li.4ht dis8.1!}.;rove of thc lilorc extrerae éd1archist elelilentG in 
less alien to their own \!ay of thinking. There were elitist 
and technocratie ideéLs in Provo theory, even in the utopia of 
i~C';; uabylon or l!ew Alilsterûalil. Provo theorist j~oel van Duijn 
\Jrote 
,Joule..,: 
that an automateu and liberated society like IJew iJ&tylon 
32 
still necd 111al1é~L:,ers anel specLüists in cyternetics. 
J\nother tlleorist, i~artijn van Lindt, &Llvocated workers I se11'-
l,lan8.,_,enlent, but expecteu thé.it workers I councils woulu be 
fille;.1 with "the most Caljc.tle étnd most eûucé:lteci v[orkers" 
ra tller than vri tll tra,_:e unioni sts. JJ i,ernarc.1 ue Vries, leauer 
of the munici~é.l.l Provo lJarty, lJré.l.iseci his .. ;,roup éJ.S a "reservoir 
of capable 34 lJcolJl e • " An even lólore eX1Jlici t aq~ument for 
techllocracy \/US maue in a lJarnlJhlet élliuressin,5 the l~lJG cont;ress 
of the Association of Scientific Itesearchers (VtJO), in which 
Provo ur ;ec~ scienti sts to s~ ... ve future generations from the 
stupidity of the present ~eneration of klootjesvolk since the 
,..., " 
"<-Van iJuijn, lIet witte S"jevaar, Chapter 3. 
T.:l Van LinJt, op. cito 
34 ,. . ' 
u. De Vrles, lntervlewea in Volkskrant, 2 May 19tilJ. 
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lattor "cannot ,;overn i tse lJ:.'.";.) Thw,; the im1.Ja tient i cleali sm 
of Provo turneû into technocratie Jespotism, in tot uI contra-
Giction Hith its anti-authoritarian anarchist::,oals ana its 
materialist analysis. 
These é;!il;ü;ui ties Emci ineonsistencies (~il;. not lJrevent 
Provo from lilolJilizin/> a sizable follo\'lin;·s in i ts first yenr 
of cxistence. L,ut tl1ey lJlay have causeLi i t to uisinte,.;rate in 
its second year. The municipal elections and the workers' 
revolt of June 1966 rnarkcd the bei,inning of the end. Both 
events eXélcerbated the interrml ui vi sions wi thin Provo anc~ 
paralysed its ~ctivism. Participation in elections irritated 
thc more extrej~1C (c:.nd consi stent) anarchi sts in Provo. The 
revolt of thc construction workcrs seemed to falsify Provo 
theory about thc inte~ration of the workinu cluss into the 
jJcaceful and authori tarian klootjesvolk. 'l'hou~·;h thc \'!orkers 
:liJ. not talk about revolution and ,mr'trchy when they storrilcd 
thc huildin'"s of the "official" unions and thc ri,:;ht-win~; 
Tele ;rac:.f ne'.vsIJélper, their actions }.-rovok.ed the authori ties 
more ef'fecti vely tlwn any Provo haPtJcning had done. Provos 
hDrl been benten ul) occasionally, tut never shot at. 
On thc other hand, thc workers' revolt coulu also be 
seen as at least in part a successful outcome of Provo 
stra te,(;y. Provo actions r.1ay have inSIJired the \'Iorkers, 
eSl;ecially since they SlEl.red cornlîlon enernies : union 1.JUreau-
crats, ri;~ht-Viin,c> !nass meuia urHl the i.Jolice. Both workers 
:15 
, Provokatie of 22 October l~()LJ, "Provot[~.ricse sU,~,;esties 
voor het V\'JO con,res te Delft". 
',n,.i Provo;; r(:)L(~ 11e u ;,:ainst the state al~ i,iLl:,a tw.::;--in i tc; 
t tI t ' 't' t l' . 3 u \.)roaCle:::; scnsc--ra 181' ném D. ',<::llns - Céli)l n lsrn. 
Provo i cie~~s and L.èC tions may have inspi red many othe r 
:.',roups in the IJethcrlonllé3 as vlell as in Germany, Bel,;iulil Lmi 
Francc. Jl'À.ny lw.ppenin.;s wcre :::;hown on tclevision, wl1ich was 
tecoming a real Tn'.) ss me(liUiil in the early 19 GOs. The rüc-
::ü:-:ties i/ere years of' !,oliticr;l anc] socLll ch;.:.n"e in the 
i:ctrwr1:.nuG, wl1ich ',r;l~:' 8;q,res~;eö by Provo in a ,üstorte,-l, 
,;11:-:,i;uous Gut cffective ~3yLl;.,01ic fon:!. J\ SJllé.1.11 uut si~nifi-
tLe I.I,,::,:S i:le:H::--h:.d heen iiiolJili/.;ecl ; n:l r01i ticized t.~ "ünst thc 
') " 
ru1in , c Irt ,.,s. " I 
Cou1u Provo hO.V8 overCOlile i ts PI:1Li:,ui -cies and theoretical 
\:'3D.i:ncssec,? j, ;l~U1cc é.lt SiIÜlé.H' Anél.rchist,yollpS c<ctivc at 
other [,'L.'Ccs or tiliiCCS lü.~ht tJlrov/ some 1i ;ht on this question. 
In the Ncthcrlands, anarchist ~roups tcnded to he more con-
sistently revolutionary in thcory ano practicc tefore 1940. 
In particular the ;"ol<er~roup and the tcrrorists nround 
Kooyman in thc 1920s and 1930s could not bc accusea of 
of l-'rovo <:lctions on the construction \/orkers I 
rcv01t Vlas élSsertcl.l Ly thc ATiistcrUé.:.1J1 bur~omc,stcr as \lell as 
tjy SOliie Provo:..;, but Jlfl3 not L(~en Llemonstra te d vcr::,: c leé~rly; 
GCG P. J orion, i..'l<O.L (jue:.:, con::.>i <.térations re 1ati ves au lJhcnolllène 
?rovo (Louvé,in, n.(l.). 
37~;l:;e Chc.!~tcr ~!.1 ',.nd :::.:3; An&rchist critics of Provo 
lî;~ve oi"~e: ,; l'ou;l1t out thc[~e lJo~>i ti've effect::,; in j-urticular 
;:. ;)c Jon,,, "~TOV()::'; ;:,nu 1~,;i-outcr3," in U. l\icer <.;nu J. Joll, 
-, :" 'j"('C,"1' n T ü ',.,- ("e 1 1 'fa>"" lU'7')) .' JUl 'JCJg' J'n I, .... '''-.l,..)., 1\ I,~ ... iJ. ..... .). '~;(.j/ t~ .,~' J h., v L , lil-'. __ ,J -, __ ~ , tt 
;':;rvocts, ie Vox C,-,rol.irw, 1 "".l.y l~J'lU; ".lso LaiilLJrecht, oy. cit.; 
2n;. j~unzcl ;.~n,~ l(ot ;ers, 0;':'. cit.; !i1Ucli more negc.:.tive are Bochmer 
éJ.l1,j l~c ~~iC!ll, 0t~'. cit. 
l 
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technocrn tic eli ti sm, re fonniSlil or e lectoralism. Ilowever , 
they could ~e criticizeJ for impatient idealism and a-~olitical 
subjectivism; and, a~ aresult perh&ps, for historical irrele-
vance. Even the theoretically more Go~histicated Lea~ue of 
Arwrchist ~)ocialists cOl11bined idealisr,l anu. subjectivislll in a 
rather Geleetic way with psycho-analytic anel ~arxist theory, 
wllile ··synthesizin,;" collcctivisfil ~·.nd indiviuualism, t11e 
"lea,iershij,J princil.Jle 11 anu ineti vL.lual inelel-'enclence. None of 
these <,rouiJs reacheci an audience of 20,000 as Provo diJ in 
l~)G,). Anarchist trade unionists renchccl a li"'lr:"er audience 
throu;;h the National Labour Sec retaria t (lJAS) but only iJy 
cOJ.1IJinin;; revolutionary iJrOpa:;,ancia VIi th reforrnist action; once 
the Social Democratic I~VV had proven more successful in the 
lutter area the NAS began to tiecline. lts IjlOre consistently 
<Lnarclüst of1's11oot the HetherlanLls ~)ynliicé,.list 'l'racle Union 
3" Confeueration never counted more than 7000 rnembers. 0 
Less revo1utionary Anarchists of ten joinec. 0roductive 
~;.s}.:)ociations éUhl a,:,r;lrian colonies , SOIÏ1e of vrhich \-lere sc~t Ul) 
IJ}' tlle Association for Collective Landownership (Gei.:.) in the 
cièlr1y l~OOs. 'l'heir illlpatience vrith reformist r,oli tics ,,-,nel 
their of ten a-political anQ subjectivist experiments with 
clean livin~." cOI~lmtmism, and return to.nature remind one of 
tllt~ Provos but even more of their ;3uccessors, the Ki:lLouters. 3~ 
r) !") 
,J, 'See Cllcèl-,ter l.? c::md 1.:3 above; HarInsen anci 1;eina1Gé i., 
0l). cit., l~. 156. 
J~(, 
oee Ch:.<pter 1.3 about the G(al and 2.3 about the 
I~8 touters • 
1 
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Droppin,; all rcvolutionary rhctoric and relyin,t]; on their ovm 
vork rather than on automation in the future, the Kabouters 
ffiay ap~ear more consistent in their im~atient idealism anel 
subjectivism than the Provos. In fact they only replaced one 
inconsistency with another. 
On the one h~i.nd thc ~\.aüoutcr!3 tricd to crco.te 2. countcr-
~ocict~, Oré.l.njcvrijstaat, from scrutcil. Anyone could join, 
no selection or schoolin,~ of ne\', mombers vms considered 
necossary. 'llhou:;h the lilelobers of thc coun-cer-socicty v/ere 
sti 11 re ,;arc::ecl '.":.G provotélrians, at lco.st by Hoe 1 van Dui jn, 
they were not necessarily unemployed street youth. Yet no 
l~atter how bour~eois, petty bourGeois or proletarian thair 
bo.ck:-;round, once they ho.cl entered the beautiful Elf World of 
the Kabouters they were expected to start a new life free 
from,;reed, env:'l, competi tion and so on. \lhen ra:1ny of them 
Ldled to do so anel reproduced bour;.:,eois or petty tour,;eois 
i'.ieas end pract1ccs, incluuin;~ Ll "illili tary" coup (by the Elf 
Colonel), the founders of Oranjevrijstaat seemed surprised 
c:nd p<.:.ralysed. As in so mo.ny other vo luntary assoc iations, 
:Il);l.thy soon rei,,;neel alilon;~ the rélnk anel file \/h11e a few 
flctivists carriecl on endless debé"tes z,l)out procedures, tactics 
an,1:00.l s. 
On the other hemd, Kabouters triecl to pursue a "tVJO 
hands" Gtratesy, combinin~ the buildin~ of a counter-society 
\'Ii tri provocé1tion élnel propa:;o.nda in insti tutions of the dominant 
society. Thus they hopeel to avoid the slow atrophy of the 
older Ilroductive o.osociations v/hich had been relatively 
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insulateci froln the uOIJ1inant society. The Kc:.öouters succeeded 
only insofnr as their utoiJia :::<trol,lüed at a hi"h sl.Jeecl rather 
than slowly. Electoral 001itics lureu some leadin~ activists 
~:W{)y from \lorl<. within ürc:njevrij:.c.;té.'~lt. '.i.'hey ljroved ré.~thcr 
succ~s~l'ul é.,t tllO lilUnicii,J:.:l electiûn:..; of 1~7(), 1,éèrticuLjrly 
t!w c.; J oe toral 
1'01' UranJ evri J 3t::,-,~t. LÜ~8 t:1e vote :Cor Provo in 19 ~iu, t;1e 
:::~: ,0llter vote in 197U proll:1bly expressed discontent :;dilon ~ the 
ne\! iietty bour ~eoi::;;ie \:ith bour.,eois culture ét:1a certain 
cél;,itali::.t "exces::;;cs" (e.;s. housin,,-, shorta"e:3) rather tllan c, 
serious intention to es-cablish a nev: society. lJei ther Provo 
nol' ~::Li,outer'G aclücveu a i.:;reat Geel! in illurücil:.:.al i-oli tics, 
Luc they contriLutcd to cultural chéln.;e ana politicization of 
CL fraction of the Dutcl1 nCVl lJetty bour0 eoisie. 
Th<.; l.rerll1an countervart of Provo, ~ulJversi ve 1\l<. tion, 
:..;url-!~-Lsseu i t in tlleoretic,ü sophistic&tion out also in his-
toric~~l irrelevnnce. It slJoweci :.:;ildilur theorcticc,l weul<.ne::;scG, 
techrlOlo,;ical ueterminislll witl1 restJect to autonation COIIlLüned 
with a rather superficial and iaealist analysis of thc inte-, 
,ration of the Gerrll;:m \'lOrkin<.;> class in "oq;anised ca}Ji talisr,1," 
[IS well as a sorne'\'Ihat rnessianic h01:.:.e f9r liberation by 'l'hir,-l 
',Jor16 rcvolutionary filovements. Likc Provo, Subversive Aktion 
tril!d to provol·~e tlle iueolo'Jica1 anu relJressive state UjJt;-'élratus 
in orJer to raise the yolitical consciousness of at least a 
frc.tction of the }Jopulacc. Unlikc Provo, the Gerrno.n~roui) 
refrairltJci frolil el,~ctoral or reformist action anc:l sho'lieij no 
1 
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interest in municijJéÜ l:.,oli tics. '1'his (theoretic.:üly \'Iell 
justified) abstentionism may have saved i t from inteié,ration 
into thc "Systeli1" out i t (lid not >rcvcnt i t from disinte ,:ra tin,:,~ 
ratjidly. IsoluteJ froJf1 Loth tlle l~erli1:tn vlorkin,; class anû the 
new petty bour,!~ooisie, Subvcrsive J..i~tion \'I<";.S i;,;norcd k;y tlle 
filélSS liledin and precluLleu f1'oIfl e;~ertin:; Z:.ny icieoloi:~ical ini'lu-
cnce--e)~cept indiroctly, throu:~h tile ~~ocLilist GerIilan ~jtudent 
40 
Lea"ue. 
The French New Left Anarchists uiffered considerably 
Erom the Dutcll or thc Germans. Both the Situutionists and 
thG Socialiurne ou l.;a1'barie L~roup uevelopcd a coherent theory, 
closer to Olu Left r·larxism in Ii1any viélyS, and rnana.:.:;ed to 
survive as n ~roup 
, 41 for lIluctl 10n',er perlous. Insofar as 
they were concerneu with theoretica1 innovation, they seem to 
11: ,ve been ~iui te successful. Thcir pré:1ctice, on the other 
hanJ, \'JC:.S ra thcr limi teet. '1'hou,,;h Loth of thcn fflé:üntained 
sorne ties \"!i th the \'lorkin!; clc.ss, their base secms to have 
4U", '\. t ") 1 l' -'- c' , ' \1 t" tI- ('~ '1' . ,)ce C!l~::'~ cr <.J. Cl. ;ou(.. ûuuverSlve 1./:. lon anc, -110 ,)OC1.:::.<. 1:'>1: 
Gcrtïlan Student LC2c.,jue; of cour:;e o.ny com~)arison bet\'feen Provo 
.... :11d Suhversi ve }\ktion reill<..,ins inco1i1i)lcte \"!i thout téLiün·~ into 
nccount tbc .:iiffcrent social 2..nd l-,oli tic<..ü circulnstélnces, 
e.,;. thc more libcral 001itical culturc nnd thc more open 
t:.n\..l ~leccntr().nize,-i poli tic,':l :.:>ystem in ~thc IJetllcrl<;..nus '.:hich 
ul10wed na\'l ~oliticul ,rou0s easy nccess to re0resentntion 
é.'.n:1 even j)o\Jer, particular1:y at the leve 1 of tl1e--re la ti 'Ie ly 
(,u tonoli1ous--munici r.:n1i tie s. 
41 Soc io1i :::;i.le ou J3c,rbaric \'1'-_,':.:, !-,ubli shcu froln 1 ~4U to 10 C5, 
its of1';::;hoot Inforlllntions (et) Corresponó.encc Ouvrièrcs continued 
into thc lSl7()s; tbc ~)i tUL~tionist Int8rnation~11 \'1;:t~3 founueu in 
1'JS7 ;mJ. dL3é"PPCi'1.rcd in lSl70 (f3ee Chaj'Jtar 3.1 é;lbove). 
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Since thair thcory insisted on the revolutionr.lry role of the 
prolet8.ria t \'!i thout any 11 leninist 11 interferencc from l:rofezsional 
revolutiol1arics or intcllectuals, i t limi ted thcir o\m ~r~ctice 
to theoretical c1arificatiol1 nnd the nn~lysis of the <.lctions 
of others. The Si tUé~tionL:;ts éllso initL~tc~ cultur~:l c:~:.,eri-
Illenté.> and provocCltion of cu1turnl :-J.utj)oriti,.!:~, t"ut rClll;~inc''': 
" 42 anu \llth'-,ood rcc,~;on. ';:hen thcy ,).üne<i :l 3ut:.;t:\ntLll fOl1oVlin" 
éHl1on,-ó the Frenc;) nCo,i petty bour.;eoisie ciurin :mü ~~fter thc 
cvent::; of jj:~j: :mJ Junc 19,;::, thcy,rew uncD.;";~' :~i1'': LC,~8.n to 
dissol vc their--[;.l v:ays sor:lc'lllv'!.t unstable--ol~,;niz:_tion; thcj 
sistency, but ['lsO ~~ \.'e:,dzne;:;s in ::';i tu:\ tioni ~ t tllcory: i t 
~l'l:ll fr(~ction of) thc 
" . " 4_~ 
ll0 \J • el,:; t ~ i 0 II r ; ~ U l ~ l C • 
1.ionCJ--for SOidC 10n ~-tCrIli i-.leal, a ..,l'oletari:,n l'evolution? 
'1'11e ~ituctionL.,;t cthic of "cnjOj 1ife \;i tLout rcstl"ictions" 
coulû not entc.~i1 a revo1utionélry discipline of sclf-;.;acrificc. 
42'1'I1ei1' i11i tL.;,l concern \';i til c;:1--'er1l.1ental ~ct, ".;;i tuation:.;;11 
é:lld urlJan p1annin,., SOCl,lCÜ difficu1 t to rcconc110 \11 tI. J.cnan,~;j 
for :: tota1 l'evolution ~:,nu thc reco • .>ni tion tlll.l.t a nc\; cul ture 
can not cmcr~e in u capitalist und ~~cctaculnr society. 
43Situationists occasiona11y refcrreti to their ~roletarian 
or IIJéclass0" lJO.ck,;.round to counter cri ticislil of the1r t-etty 
Lour,,.;cois character; thc latter seeJaeJ unucniaulc, ho· .. :evcr, 








The contratiiction can Le sOlvea, however, if one could ex~ect 
these artists and intellectuals to benefit si~nific&ntly from. 
the revolution they auvocateu. rl'heir total revolution would 
do away with the wage system, the division of labour, the 
state, and hence also with bureaucratic or technocratic power: 
Lut it lIli"ht l~reserve un,l indeed exp:),n l ";' "lo"ocratic" l.Jovler. 
In otl1er v/orti:::>, i t Il1i;)1t enlléU1cc thc lJo:::;ition of urtist:::; anr.l 
intcllectuals who \!üulc.i help lJeol~le to "cre~Lte situations, " 
to e;~l)ress thelilselves, to educate ther,1selves anC. to control 
tl18ir o\'rn life. Liberutec1 from exploi tation cy caI.Ji talists 
tiley v;:.mteQ--Llut IdOst of them, lacl:in,,; talent &nc; e:qJerience 
to eX~iress theli1selves, i,:i,.:,ht not k.nov; what tl'ley wanted. 
LO,oerats, i.e. lilélnil'ulators of ver,J;:ü ('lnC;. intellectual skilIs, 
coulu e<csily ~:,c4uire l-,o\ier over the less talenteti or less 
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e):perienced lllasse~3. 
The Socialisme ou UarLJuric .'.:,roul.J devoted le::;s :'..tten::ion 
rcsul t, :seems to have exercised less influence ardonc~ the Freneh 
4'1'1 l' t tl ,1 i' . t ' . th' l' <:tijO, o.ó.,lze 0 -1e renucr 'or J.n -roûucJ.n,s . J.S nco ogJ.srn, 
'10 ,;ocrél.t' (frolil (;ree];: lo,;,os = l.mrd, reason, iJrincil-;le, ~cnc.: 
::rc:.to:,; = 1'o\;er) but i t seerns to convcy better the political 
i'otcntial of intcllectua1s en';H:"ed in sociolo . .,Y, Ijsycholo;~y 
~nd other humanities and arts, journ~lism, socia1 work or 
teaching than Gouldner's 'New elnss' of humanist intellectu3.ls 
or Sch01sky's 'Sinn~roduzcnten' or thc un-trnnslutab1e Dutch 
term 'nieuwe vrij~estelden' introduceû by Daalder; these three 
~'~.uthors refer 1110re or less 'Co the Saf,lG ~roup but ,:;i ve different 
connotations to their terLls; cf. j\. c;ouldner, "The Ne\-.' C la ss 
Project," '1'11cor:/ anci ~ocioty G:2 rtll:1 6:3 (197G): 153-204, 
J43-3::,j9; H. Schelsky, Dio Arheit tun die Anderen (OplaGen, 
1975), l~)assir.l; 11. Do.aldcr, Olie cit., 1--11. 02-G3. 
ncw ljetty bour,~eoi sie . lts influenee vms j,Jrobably lilore in..:lireet, 
til rou, ;11 f1 fei'i--hut imrorto.nt--tlleorists of C:t:l{E~) in lJ;:.,rtieular, 
anel of the PSU. 
j\. compari son bet\'lecn Dutch, Ccrrnc'.l1 i:all! French New UI tra-
,üffcr(~nt soeLj,l, i~olicical anti cul tur;,~l con'",i ti ons in thc 
tllrce eountrict3. Even })rovo lIli"llt havc t)cen foreec. to t,u,:e 
;, more consistently rcvolutionélry StéU1Ci had the l'juy l,lovclilent 
of l~\)~~ occurrecl in tile Netilerlanus insteau of in Fré~nce. 
ilO\leVC r, in vic\'! of tll(:; non-rcvo 1 u tionary thou,h chan,.>in:~ 
~;i tu;~tion ill thc Iietherlancis of the mici-sixties, i t se ems 
likely tllé~t i~rovo used the opportuni ties thé~t ';/ere avail<J.blc 
~uite sucecssfully. I t con tri Lutcd 1;0 cul tur~.ü é.~.ncl 100 li tici'~l 
ch~:n,e, the li beraliza tion a.nu de jJi I Llriz2. tion of LJutch society 
(".n,,< th2 l~oli ticiza tion ,(net r:J.dicalization of a sri1::J.II fraction 
of thc Uutch new lJctty bour,eoisie--future 10Jocrats, lJerha~s. 
Li!;:c its count(~r;'Jrtrt:3 elscwherc, it früleu to usher in i:, 
r,-;volution or to Luild é'~ rcv,)lutiolli.lry purty or countcr-
;3ociCCj. 
~ .:1 'l'l'lC Sociéc1 Dcmocrc,tic Nev! Lert: 'l':'.kin, :.3r:lic ll ~)tcr,;s 
,,'i tllouti~nC)','ofin, ,-[here You /,ro "oin, 
~4 :) _ .. ~l~:~ é:,Lüve, Ch::',jJter ~-) ,1; SocLüisme ou i~i',rLctrie c,-tnnot 
U2 evaluato,l here in any U.21,)t11 Lecé).usc of the lac;.;: of ernlJiricc:ll 
or even sj,Jeculi.,tive stu\ües ubout tlüs ,.:,roulJ; cf. HOi/á,rÛ, 
Ti1C : inrxL~J!, 1,0 ,:.tC;",', 1)1J. 2v2-J01, i~llcl :lÏs intc:rvic\/ VIi th C~~~torL~uii:). 
1 
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of Revolutionary Heformism; on the other hand, their final 
goals were even rj,ore ambL;uous ana vél;ue than those of the 
Eevolutionary hef'ormists. In view of the differences between 
the IJeo-~orxist nn~ the Neo-Fabian Social Demoerats, thc two 
SUb-lJroj8CtS wi11 te (jv::duat8d separate1y. 
5.3.1 Neo-l·:al'xif3t n~i'orrnisr;,: Small Steps on the HOD.d to 
Santia ,o? 
IJeo-j·larxist Heforrilism WélS aUvocéi.ted by left wine; members 
of Sociul Democratic parties in the Netherlands, France and 
Germsny around 1970. It derived theoretical inspiration from 
Old Left l'Iarxism as weIl as New Left Annrchism ana Revolutionary 
Socialism, but turned also to the practical reformist project 
initiated in Chile by the Marxist government of Salvador 
Allende. Henee it received a severe shock in 1973, when the 
Chi1ean experiment with Harxist Heformism was cut short by a 
46 b100dy coup. 
The Chi1ean coup had been preceded by an economie crisis. 
Therefore, some j'larxists and Neo-I·larxists wondered i1' a 
prograll1me of economie reforms might have solved the crisis 
and possib1y prevented the coup. The question remained open--
it cou1d not be answered in economie terms but required also 
8 socio10i,;iea1 and poli tical analysis of class relations and 
47 power struetures. 
The economie analysis deve10ped by the Neo-Harxist Heformists 
46For instanee in Fronti~re l~ (1974), and in J. Van 
Minnen, "Chili, 11 Socialisme en democratie (1974): 536-543. 




Dutch l\Jeo-Ihrxif.;t~:; ITui ,;8 ,:~,.nö i\eckll1:ll1 pointecl to thc l.i0l)l~ndence of 
thc Dutch cconomy on mul ti-rv:.. tiona I capi t;'.l, the inc reasinJ, 
export of capital and the concentration of capital. 48 However, 
thc solutions they su~~osted seemed less realistic, RB they faile~ 
to analyse the ]Jos;:;i Ll1e economie con::;e quences as we 11 a3 the 
sociolo~ic&l conditions thut their strategy cnt~iled. Even if 
the LnLour Party nnd thc trade unions were willin~ to introduce 
tJ:v; su:!;.=;ested ;'-lcasures--na tionalisa tion of bémks émd key inc..us-
tries, plétrln5.n"-,, of inv,~stliwn ts él.nel procluction throu...;h contracts , 
1'.,ori<:l:rè:;' sl:lf-I!1;·ni1~el~1ent--they rni).:;ht lJe unable to carry tl1err: out 
!Iic::>ty retrei:~t ol' tll<~ "Dutch" f!lul tinn"Lional:s. 49 
notice thc neec; for pol i tic'i.l :,O\'1e1' é~nu c la~;s stru6gle. They 
hopecl for ;: ;II'O;lri ~:lli:tncl? of \'.'ork01's, intelJeetunlé3, farmers 
anel small lJusinesslllen; or, c=ct the level of party polities, Ei 
Left Front of ths Labour Party, the Communist Party, the 
Pacifist Socialist Party, the Poli tical Party of Hadicals, 
8.nd possitly also Democrats'G6. However, the Neo-Harxists 
failed to é1nalyse the differences in class base anel iueology 
between these parties • They assurned too ea.si ly that the rank 
anti filo of these 0arties would like to cooperate even if 
411,. , rlul~e anu Heckman, op. cit., pp.-37-66; see also above, 
Chélpter 4.:3. 1. 
4'1 
. See ;bove, Chopter 1.1 and 2.1; 33% of Dutch irnports 
C::llllC from GerllJany or thc USA in 1977, 35% of Dutch exports 
',:ent to those countrics (St~ltistisch Z;:J,kboek, 1978 (The 
1;0~ue, 197::}) , ij. 17(3). 
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the leadership cherished doubts. In the lon~ run, Buch a 
Left Front seems quite feasible in the Netherlands, if the 
. 50 polarisntion between Left and Right contlnues. The class 
base of all five parties may become more similar, at least in 
terms of membcrship; even the Communist Party could be taken 
over by new petty bourgeois elements and turn to "Eurocommunism." 
~hilc the Left Front mi~ht enjoy the electoral support from 
the (majority of thc) working class, its reformist policies 
might serve nel'! petty bour::.;eois nnd slJecifica11y "lo;ocratic" 
_. . ~l ln"terest::.>. 
The Neo-rlarxists ,-,ere not unaware of the fact that fevler 
and fewer manual vlOrkers participa ted in acti vi ties nnd 
meetin~s of the Labour Party aftel' 1~60. Yet they aid not 
offer nny concrete solutions to this problem. Somehow they 
seemed to expect improvement to resu1t from a "cultural 
struggle" or Cl "re-emergin:~ cul ture of workers and of S2 stru:;gle. " 
This notion was elabornted by the (pre~dominantly Neo-Marxist) 
'-
Workin,~ Party for a Socialist Broadcasting Systern. Some of 
its members or sympathizers produced concrete examp1es of 
the "culture of workers and of strus;le," usually aocumentaries 
50 Accordin_; to n lJullic opinion poll the fi ve rarties cou1d 
h3ve won 50.~~ of thc popul~r vote nnd 7G out of 150 seats in 
pClrlinrnent in 1~7::J Omc, l~ February 1979); however, the 
polarisation betl,'J'ccm Left anel Hic;ht is (was) a complex phenomenon 
th:~t neeJ not lCé.lit to ,;;reater uni ty among the left parties 
(see :11so C. ,Iid~cndon), Ontzuilin;" politiserin,; en restauratie 
in NGderland (,'iepj)el, 1979), anel Lijphart, op. cit., pp. 206 ff). 
51 This possibility will be further discussed below. 
52 . llul;-,e anel Hecklilé.Jl1, op. cit., p. 9b (In Dutch: "de 
opnieuw opkomende arbeiders-, en strijdkultuur"). 
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or dramatised descriptions of workin_> class families, rni[;rant 
Vior!<ers and Third '.:orld people, their everyday life anti their 
troubles. '1'his information seemed to interest new petty bour-
.~eois youth i ;noru.nt of these troubles, but i t tended to bore 
the workers; the latter generally preferreu the escapist 
. 53 
entertainment produced by the bourgeois mass medJ.a. 
'I'he Neo-;·larxist attempt to resurrect or rejuvenate a 
workin~; class culture that died decades ago seemed naive and 
idealistic, if not reactionary--even if one agrees with the 
Neo-Marxists about the relative autonomy of culture and 
ideolo~y with respect to the economie base of society. A 
more realistic anll lnore consistently reformist strate~y 
would prolJably start with the escapist fantasies that appeal 
to workers--and many others--and gradually deflect or trans-
form then,. Throui~h a cri tical analysis of the dominant 
culture, one could finu and exploit contradictions within the 
latte I' , for instanee iJetween hedonism and the vrork ethic, 
between competitive individualism and the growing need for 
cooperation, between nationalism and "corporate" interna-
t ' I' 54 J.ona J.sm. 
53According to a survey, 26% of Labour voters watched 
mostly the Socialist programmes , whereas 41;; preferred the 
popular shov,,~:; and American series of the "'l'lWS" and 9% the 
Liberal "AVHO" (A. Kloos, "Op zoek naar verleden tijd," in 
W. Gortzal<, ed., De Hooie Familie (Amsterdam, 1976), pp. 59-67. 
54Thc5e contradictions are analysed in some detail in 
D. fiell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York, 
1976); R. lJarnet and H. düller, Global Heach (New York, 1974), 
especially Chapters 3-5; J. Ilabermas, Le.ki timationsprobleme im 
Spätj-capi tali smus, pp. lOG-128; K. ]:le los, "Developments in 
J\dvanced Capi talist ldeolo:~,y," Canadian Journalof Poli tical 
Scicnce X: 4 (1978): ;329-~3 Cl; sec also Ne;,t' s work, quoted 
above (Ch&~ter 4.1.5). 
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Cultural reforms can be co-opted by the rUling class, 
r l1;,e economic orpoli tical reforms. If one can use and trans-
form economic and poli tical insti tutions :~radually, step-by-
step, one should be able to use and transform culture in a 
similar way. Oddly enough the Neo-Marxist reformists failed 
to do so, at least in the 1970s, in spite of their interest 
and expertise in cultural matters. Even the German Young 
Socialists, who had appropriated the sophisticated cultural 
cri tique of the Frankfurt School, failed to ,"0 beyond modest 
cul tur;:ü innovations li1(8 dCly-care centres for forei:~n workers , 
or parks ana pcaestrian streets to repluce parkin~ lots and 
55 
urban freeways. A!;ain one could explain this lack of 
cultural innovativeness in terms of the Nco-Marxist class 
base--lackin(l; a cul turnl tradi tion of i ts ovm, the new petty-
bour<,~eoisie had to borrow from older proletarian tradi tions 
or from new bourgeois culture. Thou~h plausible in part, this 
explanation seems too simple and reductionist; it neglects 
the relative autonomy of culture, particularly of "popular-
democratic" traditions and of the counter-culture of the 
1960s. Another explanation will be suggested below. 5G 
The IJutch Neo-i'larxists followed to some extent the example 
of thc Frunch~roujJ CEHJ.:::3 (!Lc_n~re ei' Etulies, de Hecherches ct 
o'Education ;;)ocü1..listcC:i) wllich operé~tei \'!itc,i;; u.:e L,'ral1c11 
5br 1. t .. t· ~ 11 n C!i[il.J -er v; LélCLlU lntroducc<l the no lon of popular-
aen:ocratic interj.;(;)llation" in a cri tique of Poulantzas' s 
rcduction of' i deolo,~,Y to classes, in E. Lac lélU, Poli tics élnd 
Ideolo;;;;,: in ;,10rxist 'l'hcory (London, 1977), pp. BI ff. 
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·7 Socialist Party.;:) 'rhe project of CEHES seemed theoretically 
more elaborate and sophisticated and practically slightly 
more effective than ~hat of the Dutch Neo-Marxists within the 
Partij ~ de Arbeid. 
Unlike most other New Left :!,roups CERES produced a 
rather elaborate analysis of the French economy and class 
structure. Concerned about the ,;ro\'lin;,;; dependence of the 
French economy on multinational or forei~n capital, it pro-
posed an industrial pOlicy that v."ould make France more se1f-
~ufficient. Key industries should be nationulized and co-
ordinated by the state, but rnana,~ed by their workers. Thoui.~h 
CERES seerned a\Jare of the conflict that mi,l,ht arise tjet\leen 
the need for central planning and the ciemand 1'or worlzers' 
self-management, its solution rernained rather va,;ue. In 
the first place, oelf-managing corporations were to ne~otiate 
contracts wi th central ~);overnment a,\~encies to meet certain 
production tar~~ets. In the second place, workers would not 
elect a majority of directors until af ter a transition period--
presumably an education and trainini.? perio<l, needed to stallliJ 
out "corporate egoism" in the minus of workers. \'Ihile this 
solution mi,-.>ht prevent sorne of the ine4Uétli ties resul tin,::, 
from the Yu.\so~lavian model of a self-managin:~, market econordy, 
onc suspecto th"t i t could lead to consiLicrable m:.inipuüJ.tiol: 
the plans Ol' contr,ccts anti eUuCél.te tlle . 513 VlO [' i~ ers. 
57Alc)ut ('1.'j)1,'C' '''''' '1'ov" ) J-Jll...l .... J 0v ....... L.tJ (" 
r:n J() I' • J • l' - , 1 J\.CCOl'ulrl,> co ;501dO crl ,':;lC;j, -CJ]C 
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'1'his suspicion is reinforeed by the class analysis 
presented by.CEHES. Admittedly its analysis seemed more 
precise and aecur<.tte th,lll tlwt of li10::;t other New Le1't ,.~rou!-Js, 
especiully with res~ect to the workin~ cluss. Unfortunately 
it treateu the "intermediate categories" or "newand old 
petty bour;,~eoisie" in a rather cavalier fashion. Like 
Poulantzas, CERES's theorists insisted on the primary import-
nnce of the aivision of labour, but they also referred to 
power over thc meuns of production nnd the souree of income. 
No doubt these criteria werc intcrrelated; but they did not 
5~ 
'lui te coincL.e, D.:":; c ril;ic s J l::VC 3hO\111. Pooplc may perforrn 
lilnnu,d lal)our './hi 10 ~lori vin, '; their incoDlc from sur;)lus value 
f.Jrociuced 'rJy othcrs, or thoy may cn,~a,~e in intellectual labour 
but contributc to the iJroduction of surplus value, and so on. 
Dependin3 on the criteria onc choose8, the new petty bourgeoisie 
may form a sma11 minority or a1most u majority of the French 
councils were also manipulated by an emerging rulin~ c1ass 
of technocrats and bureaucrats: see A. Meister, O~ va 
l'autogestion youJoslave? (Paris, 1970, especia11y pp. 214-
224, 341 ff; slightly less critical is G. Hunnius, "Workers' 
Self-I,1anagement in Yugoslavia," in G. Hunnius, G.Garson and 
J. Case, eds., Workers' Control (New York, 1973), pp. 268-
321. 
59 See 1\. IIunt, ed., op. cit., especial1y the contri-
butions from i-Ia11, lIunt and lIirst; also Lac1au, op. cit., 
pp. 11-115; G. 1\oss, "ilarxism and the New lYIiddle Classes: 
French Critiques," Theory and Society 5:2 (1978): 163-190; 
E.O. \'lr i f;ht, tIC lass Boundaries in Advanced Capi talist 
Societies," Hevi Left Heview 98 (1976): 3-41; Baudelot, et 
al., op. cito and Lindsey, op. cito provide more "orthodox" 
ar~umcnts to focus on the extractibn of surplus value as 
the crucial eriterion--sec also below, Chapter 6. 
lJU people. 
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Granted the question of class boundaries in late capitalist 
societies is complicated and difficult; it is also very 
important, the more so because these boundaries may cut 
through the Socialist Party in ~rance and its Uutch and German 
counterparts. CEHES a~peared to be aware of this when it 
warned that the new petty bour~eoisie was tryin~ to take over 
thc Sociali~,t It failed to point out, however, 
th~t of all factions and tendcncies in the ~arty, CERES had 
the ;;reatest proportion of ncw petty bour~eois members by 
1 t cl f · . 1-.' 02 a mos· any e lnl~lon. Hence the group could have justified 
its assumed van~uard role within the party only with Leninist 
ari~uments alJout the need for revolutionary intellectuals 
introducing socialist consciousness into the working class 
from the outside. Since CERES had rejected this type of 
argument--with good reason--it was eaught in a serious contra-
60Aecordin~ to J3audelot et al., the petty bour~eoisie 
made up 17'}j 0 f the French popula ti on around 1970, whi le the 
new petty bourgeoisie, rou~hly correspondin~ to the fractions 
11 and 111 in their study, comprised two thirds of this, i.e. 
12% or so; on the other hand, i'Jri!;ht classified about 70% of 
the American population as "new petty bourl~eois," using 
Poulantzas's criteria, which \'Iould correspond to roughly 45% 
in the case of France; cf. Ysmal, op. cito 
GI ln H6pères 43 (1077) for instD.nee; also Interview Ilo 
62AccOrding to a survey held in 1973, 44.2% of the CERES 
de le,;;a te s at a party congress wc re en,~ineers or "cadres," 
i.e. senior employees and civil servants, 1~.7% were teachers 
or academies, 12% students and 0.9% manual workers (Cayrol, 
"Les militants du Parti Socialiste,"); when CERES held a 
survey among its ovm members in 1974, the results were similar: 
23~; en.1ineers and "cadres," 24% teachers and academies, 17% 
students, G% professionD.ls and 21~;; workers , technicians Gmd 
employees (Charzat, op. ei t., p. 2G4). 
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diction. lts own theory allowed for class alliances between 
thc proletariat and the new petty bourgeoisie--and for 
proletarianisation and radicalisation of the latter--but 
not for new petty bourjeois van~uards on thc road to socialism. 
Hi th CEHES leadin,\1 the way, the French Socialist Party would 
probably be walking another road, leading towards "socio-
63 technocracy" or "lo,lsocracy" rather than socialist dcmocracy. 
tERES's political sociology, its theory of the state 
and the power structure, seems more abstract and Ie ss elaborate 
thnn its economic analysis. The conccption of the state as 
the expression of class relations and a "battlefield of the 
clo.ss strui~;lc" could tJe considered a L~ood starting point for 
a concrete, historicalor sociolojical analysis of the French 
state apparatus, political parties, government agencies and 
so forth. Unfortunately, CEl{l::S thcorists aid not undertake 
this analysis in the period under study, beyond a few schematic 
comments on the bourgeois and petty bourgeois class base of 
64 the Gaullist party. They failed to show the possibilities 
63 0n the "socio-technocratic" leanings of CEl\ES, see 
Poperen, L'unit~ de la ~auche, pp. 430-446; to me the term 
"socio-technoc ra tic" seems somewha t mi sleadin'.::; because of 
its connotations of social engineering and "human relations" 
manadement in capitalist societies, whereas CERES leaders 
were probably not interested in profit~ as much as in power 
and their manipulation of people would probably be much more 
subtIe than that of thc Harvard School of Business Adminis-
tr:ltion. 
64ln Répares 38 (1~7b); cf. Motchane, op. cit., 
pp. 166 ff; Poulantzas, L'Etat, Ie Pouvoir, Ie Socialisme, 
cxpressed similar ideas in a more elaborate and sophisticated 
but no less abstract way--however, ti critique of Poulantzas's 
work would go beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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o.nd structur~ü con:3traints of the c la ss str~.(:gle Vii thin the 
state, the limits of the concessions it could make to popular 
or proletario.n demands without losing its bourgeois base. 
Yet this would be indispensable information for any structural 
reformist who hopes to transform and democratise the state 
from inside, without revolution. 
A~uin, such an uno.lysis would be difficult o.nd complicated. 
Nonetheless, i t coulci be expected from members 01~ CERES, who 
were ~enerally well-educated and talented intellectuals with 
considerable experience in the French civil service. If 
these Lraduates of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (the 
elite school of public administration in France) could not 
analyse the French state apparatus, who coulu? Of course, a 
1lI,:üicious critic mi,;ht sU:~,est thc .. t they werc too close to 
the state to see throu::,h i tand ; .1~Ü}·0e i t vlith a critical 
C,r;. 1 erhé1 1;s thc dernocratisation of the state i'lOuld actually 
reillforce the .fjosi tion 01' these youn;.; civil ::;erv'.tnts anu atle 
10,~ocrats; formal authori ty mi);ht oe replaced by informal 
or elected authori ty, for \Jhich lo;;ocrats are tetter pre-
pared than old-fashioned bureaucrats. The rhetorical talents 
of many CERES leaders would no doubt help them to ~et elected 
to those new positions of authority. Decentralisation of 
authority would 0.150 result in more elected authorities in 
the l;rovinces and open u.fj more career possibilities for youn ci 
05 intellectuals there. 
65Cf • Charzat, op. cit., pp. 41-42. 
370 
The spherc of culture and ideology Vlas not neglected by 
CERES, but treated in a rather ambiguous and eclectic fashion. 
It borrowed Ultra-leftist and anarchist ideas from Socialisme 
ou iJarbarie and Vlilhelm Heich, but tried o.lso to use or 
manipulate nationalist ideas of a qui te different ori~~~in. GG 
This alJi-leal to petty bour"eois or bour"eois nationalism could 
te justi1~ie(j strate;:;ically--to é.'VOili <J.nothèr "Chileun" 
bloodbath , CEEES hoped to \1in sU~lJort amon~ iY2tty bour,'.eois 
an~i even bour,_~80is elell1ents in case of é1. conl'lict Letv/een ;) 
more or less sociü.list France nn~ a ca~italist Euro~ean 
. G7 Cor.I~.1Unity or United State:;;; of Amerlca. lIo\i8ver, it is 
difficul t to see how such a reali stic stra "Ce,~y Illid,h t leau to 
:;;;omewhat utol..Jian i_:,oals like a new cul ture, a new kind of 
6" family life, a new concelJtion of time and space. u These 
utopian ideas might be grauually c.liscarded by CEHES if the 
~roup were to acyuire political power; they i-lrobably helped 
to mobilise and recrui t !:lany students ;.:tnd other new petty 
Lour::;eois elelilents--pos:;;;ibly also a few \liorl.;:crs--after the 
"cultural revolution" of lYGB. 
The combi na. tion of reali SIn anJ. utoiJia.ni SlIl coul J. be 
considereu ü. vieakness in the project of CEJ~ES; l.>ut i t Lii.y 
also expLün i ts n. ttra.c ti vene;.:;;;) in the cyo;..> of youn,; inte 11(:;c-
GC 
ChDrzat, OlJ. ci t., lJP. ~~4~, 243. 
G73ee l,'rontière 15 (lY74); j;~l)ères 41 (lY77) j Lc I'londe, 
2:? j,jnrch 197H; lwfore 1973 thC:3C nfltion;dii3t tcndencies 1::>(;'';I!,.;d 
,;oaker v:ithin CEllr:;::.;, cf. lIotchéLne, 01-'. cit., Ijl). 174-1,;5. 
bi] 
Chc.rzaL, 0i'. cit., iil). ;2:33-23,;. 
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tuals. Like i ts jJutcl1 rcnd Germc.n counterpcTts, CEHES began 
to .'1,o.in ini'luence af'ter 1970, Vlhen many other New Lei't ,,,,roups 
sta,~nated or declined. Old Left Socialist Or Communist ,~roups 
could not offer a viable alternative to people who rejected 
economism, productivisrn, "statisrn," bour:~eois culture and 
Cold War. lience these people had no choice but to enter Social 
Democratic or,;;a,nisations which tolerated C.~roups like CEHES 
and offered a real chance of winnin:~ power. 'l'he Revolutionary 
Socialist'~rou!js of the 01d or New Left cliu not offer this 
chance, \,hereas the French CommuÎüst Party 
tolerate "Ikv! Leftism" ilithin its own r&nks. 
would not 
In Ce rrnc,ny thc nUlliber of fJew Left ol-,tions was even smaller. 
i\.fter 1970, thc E;ctra-Parliwnent2ry OPIJO;;;i tion anc.l tlle 
Socialist Ccrméen Student Leai;ue (SDS) disctppeared, the Communist 
Party absorbed some of their members but none of their ideas 
and failed to ~~row into an alternative to the Socia1 Democratic 
Party (SPD); henco the latter retained a monopoly over the 
organised Left and attracted many New Leftish youth. The 
Neo-Marxists within the SPD never exercised as much influence 
as CERES within the Parti Socialiste, but their project showed 
similar weaknesses and strong points. lts theory of the 
state seemed more s~ecific and concrete than that of CERES; 
but its theorists lacked the experience of the latter within 
the state npparatus. Even within the Social Democratie Party, 
the German l'ieo-:~arxists remained an' isolé:'ted :jrou~, cau;J,ht 
i)et\'leen an ,,:,~, ;ressi ve i1.nd (orünant ri ;ht \'fin,; arounci the 
Cl.~;ncellor :,e:L:ut Schc~iQt, é,nc o;ro\l:in; llarxist Old Left, 
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both of ,'[hich continued the Colü \'iar wi tI! a vi '~our unknown 
either in francc or the Netherlanas by 1970. 69 
Ilonetheless,even thc Neo-l'lo.rxist Youn: Socialist", within 
the SPD surpa5scd their Marxist or Neo-Mnrxist predeeessors 
f t ' ] Cl ') . 1(") , . i'l . l'i' t' 70 O' ne _J cUs ;.!.Dn ju(:j 1n 2n uence ano e ee 1 venes;;:;. 
Thc Sé:lllC c;,n l,e ,,~,iu élhout t!lC iJuteh ;:.rvl Freneh [~eo-l,l(lrxi~3t 
;30ei.::l iJcr:\ocr:~ts. Thus CEHJ':S ,,:eemeci to feel some syrnp.:,thy 
for tl1'3 (ir: uellC j~cvo.L utionnai re 'dlüeh opc ra teL! "'ri thin the Freneh 
nvoid its futc--u troak with thc Soeial Democratie party, 
f 11 L • dil' 71 o owed 0y rap1 cee 1ne. Similarly, the Uuteh Neo-
I-larxists mi.~;ht have learned from the history of the Soeial 
Democratie Centre wi thin the Labour Party l::1.nd the Independent 
Socialist::> \'Ii thin the Soeial Democratie \v'orkers Party of the 
1930S. 72 
Yet some of these older left win~ ~roups had enjoyed 
substé:mtial :,:;uPi;,ort vii thi n thci r Soeia 1 IJemoera tic party tut 
lost i t ',':hen they left the p'-'\.rty to founcl a neVl one. 'l'here-
fore, l;8.;,~ty lea::.ers eou1G 8.fford to ignore the I·lar.xist 1eft 
C9 See ;-; t:,ovc, Ch:t~)tel~ 3.2 and 4.:3.4; Interview 14. 
70T1,e Ja eter, a150 buseG r;l;:ünly on Youn~ Soeialists, were 
expe 11ed in 1931 und i'oundeû then thc Soe iu1i st Vlorkers ' P:Lrty 
\'lhieh Vlon only 0.2~é of the vote in 1932; see R.N. I-1unt, German 
Soeial Uemoeraey 1918-1933 (Chiea~o, 1970), pp. 230-240; see 
also 11. Dreehsler, Uie Sozia1istisehe Arbeiter artei Deutseh-
lands (SAPD) (Meisenheim an der Cran, 1905 • 
71Sec "L'erreur du }Jivertisme," HépGres 43 (1977). 
72See above Chaptcr 1.4 and 2.4. 
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win~ in their parties, knowin~ that the masses woula remain 
loyal to their reformist parties. This was probably no 
longer certain af ter 1960. At least, large numbers of new 
~etty bour~eois and even son~ proletarian voters showed some 
willinsness to switch su~port from Social Democracy to new 
left win" parties--like thc PSP anu PP1{ in the l~etherlands, 
the PSU and even the Trotskyite parties in france, possibly 
tile "Green Li3ts" in 0erm'.tny.73 Bence é:l Neo:"'l,iarxist left 
\lin~ of a Social Democratie })arty miJ,ht hold a stronGer 
L)ar~:,é.l.inin::; posi tion than a l,iarxist Old Left~rou~ VIi thin the 
same party, as thc former tends to appeal more to new petty 
bour6eois elements anel the latter more to the proletarian 
74 
mnsses ~lich tend to remain loyal to one party. 
The relati ve success of the Neo-i·larxist Hcfonnist project 
could be attributed not only to its class base but also to its 
ideolo~~ical or theoretical fralilework. '1'he latter did not 
dCjlart as raJically from the dor.linant iucolo;"y VIi thin ~oci;:ü 
])clIlocr:l.tic ~[1.rties aftcr 19(50 as uia the "orthodox" J;!arxisrn 
of the Old Left 3rou~s. Neo-l'larxist Social Democrats agreed 
\dth ri ~t wing Social Democrats at least on reformism, 
parliamentary democracy, and anti-comrnunism to sorne extent. 
lIoi'lever, the a~~reement should not be exa,;gera ted. ExternGl 
73 "Green Li sts" (Ecologists) emer;~ed in the late 1970s 
ClDCi won 5~'~ of thc vote in the LGndta,; (provincial Parliament ) 
of Bremen in 1979; they attracted sup~ort from left win~ 
members of the SPD and former leaders of the Socialist German 
Student Lea3ue (SDS) like Uutschke, as weIl as from conserva-
tives (Der Spie~el, 23 October 1979). 
74 As fJe;·;t ar;;ued, see above, Chapter 4.1.5. 
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factors played an important role, especially the relatively 
peaceful co-existenco between the ~reat powers of the world, 
the economie prosperity, the new mass media perhaps--which 
mi,,;ht devote sorne attention to internal party conflicts and 
thus harm a party imaJe--and so on. 
Hence the strate~y of CERES and its Dutch and (to a 
lesser extent) German counterparts proved successful, at 
least in terms of the.;roup' s survival. None of these (~roups 
had yet captured their party by 1977, but CEHES had exercised 
considerable influenco on the new Socialist Party's platform 
nnd the Dutch ~roup nround Hockman practically vetoed another 
coalition of Social lJemocrats and Christian Democrats. 75 
Their new petty-bourgeois base and the resultin~ ambiguities 
of theory and practice may have helped rather than hindered 
th cm in aCCjuirin,~ and maintaininc~ posi tions of influence. 
liowever, thc oppositc may happen once the Neo-lilarxists 
win power in their parties aS weIl as in their countries. If 
they are successful in carryin3 out structural reforms, they 
f:1é'.y be ousted from power by more proletarian leaders, \lOrl<ers' 
counci 1 members for instemce; on the other hand, if they main-
t;:ün their posi ti ons , i t means thcy may have manipula ted the 
1:10rkin:.; class and established 8. "lo::"ocracy" instcad of a 
. ( . f· .. t tl,. 1 ) 76 socialist soc~ety as they ao ~nea ~ 11emse vos . Alter-
7L)C',~, , d~,". ,_;l~:.~,~/tGr' L1.3.:3 é .. lJoVG, for irlstLi11CC; SOCi(11isr~1 \'l:J,.S 
uc~fined ;,S \1orkers' ljovwr O.vcr tllo meuns of ijrOduction anci 
;cjclf-m~m;.1.gcment 01' society. 
:375 
nati ve 1:,', they may fu.i 1 to do ei thcr ancl end Ui-> in Santia,~o-
de Chile 1973 af ter all. 
5.3.2 Heo-FabiD.n I{eforrllisl,l: Srr,n11 Stel-'s to Save i{ome? 
\)uintus Fabius !,iaximus Verrucosus, dictator and consul 
in the Second punic War (219-201 U.C.), is 3aid to have saved 
dOliIe by élVoic:.in:., J~lajor Latt1es ,.<.nd exhaustin ~ his enemy, 
1, ,. 1 77 iannl02, • Fabinns and Neo-Fabians pursuea a simi1ar strate~y 
in thcir "vlar" ü.',ainst Cé\ . .t-,i ta1ism; !Jut i t is 1C3t.; c1eLtr v/hat 
tllcy v/ere tryin ~ to save. 
Un1ike the more r8.ûicü.1 and uto.f..iian New Leftists to the 
Left of them, Neo-FabiLtns had their feet ~lanted firm1y on 
the ,~round of econor;lic ana1ysis. Tinber;.::,en, re,~arded ElS the 
Ne\'/ r.Iarx by some Neo-Fabians, hopeel to return to a scientific 
socia1ism by uSin:;. welfare economics. Ilowever, the scientific 
status of welfare econohlics has been questioned, even by other 
C' '1' t 78 ...,OC1<:.~ lS S. Furthermore, welfare economics tended to se~arate 
~istriLution from allocntion and production, while sugGestin~ 
refOrïllS in the former rather than in the latter. It aimed for 
an optimal distri l.Jution of cormnoLii ties or incomes, wi th 
rcsiJect to incli vi dual neads. I t took these neeels for I~ro.ntec:, 
nssuhling individuals to be rationo.1, independent and self-
conscious enou~h to express their neeels in the demand for 
commodities; or in case of collective neeels, in l-'01itica1 
77 See 'I'. Dorey anel Ü. Dud1ey, Home A$ainst Cartha,~e 
(London, 1971), ~p. 54-38. 
78/\. lIeert je , "'l'inber~!,en en de lJetekenis van de we1vaarts-
econorüe voor het soci:üisJile," Socia1isJile en Democratie (19C5): 
E~ 5~J<»1 . 
demancls. These assurn}.itions were Cjuestioned not only by 
Marxist but also by liberal economists. 79 
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Acceptin._~ the assulflptions, one can still diöagree wi th 
the conc lusions of the Neo-Fabian an8.1ysis. 'l'he IJeo-Fabians' 
fIlélin '-luarrels vii th CalJi talism concerned i ts ne~lect of 
external effects and collective needs, the rise of monopolies 
anel the unequal distribution of income based on talent nnd 
lJo\'lcr rather than cffort. vlhether it is }.JoGsitJle to settlc 
these quarrels vri thout clestroyin.; c;:-q;i t,:lism remains to be 
seen . 
. )y insiGtin~., on the importance of collective needs, Neo-
Fabians distin;~uished themselves from older and more inclivi-
\)0 
dualist welfare economists. u Yet their notion of collective 
needs remained indiviGualistic, psycholoc;ical rather than 
socioloi~ical; in other vlords, they were seen as neeels of abstract 
cate ~ories of individuals rather than needs of real social 
~rou~s or collectives. As far as they used the term 'classes' 
;lt all, they de1'ineu thern also in abstract terInS as cate;ories 
°l 
with certain income or status or power. u The only reul 
79 J. Hoebroel<, "De armoede van de vleIvaartstheorie ," 
Parado,,,;,ma VI:4 (1975):' 3-46; cf. H. Albert, "Social Science 
and ;·îoral Phi losophy," in g. lJun.~e, cd., The Cri tical 
Approach to Science and Philosophy (Glencoe, 111., 1964), 
pp. 335-409. 
80 Van den Doel, Demokratie en welvaartstheorie, especially 
Chélpters 11 and 111; see also above, Chapter 4.3.2. 
81 For él more elaborate critique of this a~proach, 
v:hich enjoys also some populari ty among sociolo!;ists, see 
F. Parkin , C lass Inequali ty and Poli tical Order (st. Al bcms, 
1972), pp. 17 ff. 
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collectives they referred to were the nation anel the local 
comr:luni ty, v/hich had needs, presumably, for collecti ve goods 
like defence. They diJ not consider the possibility that 
collecti ve needs might be manipula teu or defined by a rulinr~ 
class or elite--their Qssumptions rulee this out. Yet they 
could not explain very \'/ell why collective needs had been 
ne~lected so of ten by democratie zovernments representins 
ration<.ü incliviciuals. g2 
For similar reasom; the continuin,:' inequali ty of vleal th 
end income distribution re4uired an explanation. Neo-F~bians 
re jee teel the conserva ti ve ar,,~ument thi.: t <., complex anc harmonious 
society needed differenti&l rewards to maintain a certain 
equilibrium; or more concretely, that eapitalism eould not 
. . . 83 
survive without an une4uo.l income ulstrlbutlon. The only 
',,,,-),'; in,; janitor or ViéÜ tress shoulu earn as li1UCh étS a h;:trd 
workin~ Shell exeeutive or professor. Tinber~en proposed a 
"t<:.lent tax" on the latter, v/hieh \'lOuld not cli sturb the latour 
lilDrket n.s rnueh i':'S clireet ineome reuistribution--like a maxirnulll-
.. ') 1'\ 
OLVan den Doe 1 fllentioned a "lack of eomrnunica ti on " as 
a possible explanation but failed to elaborate on this; could 
it result from the social strueture? Other Neo-Fabians like 
Ten Cate turned to edueation as the root of most evil--if 
irrational and ideologieal, eonservative or Christian--and 
the;;:cte\'laY to ct better society--if enli~,;htened, rational é:~nd 
cri tienl (see Ten Cate, IIInleidin;.:,," in Gregoor et al., Ol). 
cit., PP. 7-lG); this form of idealism has been Criticized 
effeetively by others, e.,s. ;,larx anel Engels, op. cito 
SJ"". ft' l' t . t' d d' t" ' 
.I.IllS une lona lS ar,;umen lS summe up an crl lelZeü. 
4ui te weIl by j.l. Tumin, Soeial Stratification (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., 1967). 
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In S0ito of its scientific undor~innin~ this pro~osal 
Ii' a Dutch ,;overnmont were to ili1I.;lement 
i t, most talenteel professionals an0 scientists woulû probalJly 
fleo to other Europeo.n countries or North Americé3. wl1ile 
others, particularly engineers and managers in the ~rivate 
sector, mi.;ht triple their expense accounts and find other 
loopholes to avoiti the hi~her taxes. Af ter all, talent is a 
social va1ue, defined by society (or its rulin~ class). Dy 
punishin,~ i t \tri th hi,;her taxes a society vlould contradict 
it::> O\'m val ues. Furthen,lore, talent tends to correlate wi th 
l..Jowor. As Ion,., as the talented eli te did not share 'l'iIlberGen' s 
c.,(J.1i tari<tll ideé..'.l';;, i t coul,-; proL)ably prevent thelil froIIl bein;., 
I~eo-F;,l:,Lln..j rcco,',llized t1l3.t pOWOI' \:élS also ciistributed 
uneqw.::.lly in ])Lltch society. In the economic sphere monopolies 
had aCljuir8Q too [,mCll j,Jowcr; they S1'loulo be nationalizecl or 
at least I'e:~,ulatecl by the :.~overnment. In the t:)ast the Dutch 
I~overnrnent hau of ten failed to intervene on behalf of the 
less powerful and less wealthy sections of the population; 
presurnably because of irrational "pillarized" votin~:, patterns, 
laci<: of information and Old Loft do;;,ma. This exp1anation 
sounds rather parochia1, i.~noring the fact that similar (if 
not ::,reator) inequali ties existed in countries wi thout 
84.'10re technical i;roblems such as the measurement of 
effort and talent coulu probab1y be s01ved more easilYi see 
Tin'uer:.~8n, Income di stri bution , PIJ. 121-12(3, 148. 
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pillo.rized votin,'; po.tterns and vii th even fev,Ter Old Left dot~mas, 
likc Great Britain, Canada or the U.S.A. U5 Voters in these 
countries were offered a clear choice between two major 
parties--the Neo-Fabian ideal. 
The Den Uyl ~overnment of 1973-1977 heedcd the advice 
of the Neo-Fabians and announced a more equa1 distribution 
DG 
of income, pO\'ler and kno\dclige as i ts main,oal. It seems 
to hD.ve been moliernte1y succes::;ful VIi th resjJect to income, 
87 but r;luch less so wi th reslJect to power and knowleeli1e. It 
r.lo.na,,;ed to contr01 prices, profi ts anel w!1J,es to some extent 
unti1 1976. IU sin:'; unemployment and risin;s costs of socinl 
security caused some discontent among trade unionists and 
employers--thus perhaps reinforein,; the Neo-Fabian belief in 
the neutrali ty of the ,;overnment vis a vis both. The Neo-
fabian solution to the economie problems--expansion of the 
PUl)lic service and stric t vJa(~e control s--was unpopular \'li th 
hoth. 
"5 
,) See Parkin, op. cit., PiJ. lCJ3-12i:3j cf. Tinber:.;en, 
1n(;01l1e UistrilJution, P1J. 11-27. 
:~GThe Prime Minister, Den Uyl, showed symVr;.thy for Neo-
L~L!il1n iueo.s, e.g. in Socialisme en Democratie (1970): S55-
5C3, ,:',.nd more reeently in lIo.ai ,se Post, 21 11ay 1977 j Van den 
Uoe 1 ex[:',.:_" ;ero. ted, ho\':ever, '.'lhen he cal led Den Uyl "the only 
re::Ü (Nco-Fabian) Nev! Leftist" amon(~ the PvdA leaders (Haa;se 
Post, 9 October 1~7l))j even outsiue thc PvdA, Neo-Fabio.n iCle3.s 
founa some support araon:~ Der.10ero.ts I GG anel Christian lJemocrats. 
87(, ,- l' , ' trI')' t 1 'ct' I" '", t' "d oee l{. \.Cl,:,le, e cl.., nOOU _,0 el ln '.rlslû 1 
(,~ronin>en, 1976). I,jore positive, hut Gtill sclf- critical, 
1:;. V~èn Thi jn, "liet kabi net Den Uyl: oordelen over oorde len, " 
Civis ;·Iuncii 2 (1977): 4:-3-47, r-ènCl B. De GaQ~r Fortmeen, "',,'e 
he: lcn veel .,;l'cil-:t :.,1 i~ het \'/cini" 11 ii:i,~., .... jp. 56-Gl; 
] ~o :;ortzak, cd., :)e kleine sta1Jjen Vé.tl1 het kabinet ]Jen 
~. 
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The hostility of thc trade unions appe&rcd, to the Neo-
FaLli8.ns, short-sL',hteG. i1' not irrationale Pcrhaps they 
underestimated the alienation frotn, Dnd distrust of the state 
feIt by many workers. Af ter all, manual workers seemed to 
tenefit less from many social and cultural public services 
"0 
than other (Lour,:>eois or iJetty-bour:',eois) classes. ü' \'!hy 
should thcy accept the Neo-Fabian stratei~Y? It vlould f-roLJél.uly 
Lenefit the nC\'1 petty-tJour,.;eoisie more than any other cL.s;:;. 
'l'llc cxpansion of thc pulJlic service \/ould creu.tc I"ore joG:.:; 
for new petty-bourgeois bureaucrats or logocrats. Democruti-
zation of the service v/ould c::~llow the 10VIer anel widule echelon;:; 
more power; deillocratization of lJrivt:"te corlJorations vlould h;:~ve 
a similar effect. Even the cultural pOlicies of the Neo-
F'al)üms tended to favour u)warll mobili ty of working class 
chilcircn and participation of Vlorkers in bour "eoi;:; or petty-
LJour,;eois culture rather than elilanci.0ation of the workini', 
clftSS as a whole. It could not uo 11111Ch else,Jiven the 
individualist assUll1ptions of the Neo-Fabi2.ns i.md their 
implici t or explicit intention to Llé.Ünt<.:tin tlle social di vi-
sion of l<.:tbour. 
The class interest of the Neo-Fabians is not as obvious 
['tS that of most other Ncw Left,;roups,. partly because they 
;Jcctncd to cri ticize everyonc else, Gmd in lJé1.rticulLl.r the 
SGAccordins to a study of the 30cial and Culturan Planning 
Office, 28% of all ~overnment expenditures on housing anll 23% 
of thoC:ie on education benefi tted the 10j; of the population 
\1i th the hi ~J\est incorne, whereas ;:5';;:, and 2L) respecti ve ly 
t,encfitted thc 50~,~ with the low incomes (Profijt van de over-
heL~ ('fhe Ilague, 1~77), IJ!). 100-101). 
10Qocrntic tendencies of "populists" and "activists" (Plural-
ists and Neo-I,larxists or Neo-Anarchists, in our terlilinolo;5Y). 
'I'hou[~h very influential wi thin the PvdA, they did not consti-
tute a formalor informal faction. 89 The1r influence may have 
si,run.:; fror,1 the func tion they fulfi lle<1 in brid;~in:~ the .;~aIJ 
between NicU'.v Links radicals--Pluralists and Neo-;'larxists--
<lnd olGer moc.ier~tte members of the prl.rty. Their ideolo';y did 
not differ much from the only sli:.:;htly more technocratie and 
90 bureaucréltic reformisrn of the latter. 
In the lUGOs, Neo-fabianism, mixed with Neo-~arxism, had 
contri 'outed to the renevJ8.1 and radicalization of the PvdA. 
In the 1970s, the tv.JO types of reformism :~radually.~rew a{.Jé;;.rt, 
\'!hile Neo-Fabians took more powerful but also more conservo.-
ti ve posi ti ons VIi thin the party. ;Jhi le they had encourJ,;ed 
mili témt trJde unions c.nd action in the 19GOs, they 
started to caution and criticize them in the 1970s. Caught 
Letv/een the liberal ri;ht-win,; and the Pluralist e.nu Neo-
j,IDrxist left-win,~( s) of the party, their r,osi tion became 
somewhat uncomfortable. 
"9 
" Appo.rently, older Neo-fabian members of Nieuw Links held 
a fei'l meetin;s over a dinner table at Steenwijk; yet this 
"~)teem'lijk Group" seerned too small é'.md heteroc~eneous to exercise 
much influence, accordin3 to Interview~ 4 and 5; Interviewee 4 
estim2ted that 20~!, of Lo.bour Party members supported fJeo-Fabian 
ide.::ts, but m':-ly have been too modest here; cf. lJrants anel Van 
Praar" op. cito 
90ThUS one of the moaerates, Vondeling, could critic1se 
the early (mostly Neo-Fabian) Nieuw Links for its lack of new 
id8as (Vondelin,'" op. cit., lJp. 1137 ff); an innocent illustra-
tion of the technocratie tendency of Nieuw Linl<s \'las providecl 
by lJr. Ger Klein, one of i ts foundin:; members and between 1973 
and 1977 staatssecretaris (junior minister) of Education: 
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'rhe f1uctuating posi tion of Neo-Fabians in the PvdA 
ffinkes a cOlillJarison \Vi th other ,;;roups hazaràous. One is re-
mindcd 01' Stenhuis , \',ho hoped to renew and raciica1ize the 
SDAP in the 1920s but entied up, af ter a quick excursion into 
vnrious rndical ~arties, us a member of the fascist Nationa1 
Front in 1940; thc cOI~pe.rison vrou1d be very unfair, of course. 
A [ilOre approlJriatc coml:arison mi!:.;ht he made between Oeo-
FC.bicms in the 1970s and "P1ë.n Socia1ists" in the 1930s, 
im:;pircd by De dan. Unfortuno.tc1y, j)e dan also t)eCE~nIC a 
'l\inLer :,en Vlé",S one of 
In the 1930s he lleli~ed to (h~lift the P1&n for Latour, 
Lut only al'ter 1945 were some of his prOlJosals realized. The 
l'cal test i~or i~co-Fabianism may come in tIlC 19:':;Os, if t;he PvdA 
cE-..n a.;;:un forli, a L;overnment, but \'Ii thout cJ.ependin,~ on Chri stio.n 
J)ell10c ra tic 91 suyport. 
even lilore problems. The Dutch Neo-Fabians rarely referred 
to foreii~n exalilples anci seemcci to urEn; more on An;,lo-Sa;~on 
theorie:.:.; thun on Frcnch or GUI'Iflan one:.>. lnsoL ... r liS tllcy 
follo\ffiG thc inslJiration of Touraine, thcy di~ so consistently 
L~.nd effecti vely. PcrhalJs they v/ere rno):'e cri tica1 of social 
"1 l'J~lntcd to Vlork in thc same v/ay as I l'Jorked in the lau ••• 
solvin,; technical problems collectivaly, in a practical Vlay" 
(Gortzal-;:, De kleine stappen van het kabinet Den Uyl, p. (2). 
91 See Collen, op. ci t., ~p. 83-158 about Stenhuis ; P. Dodge, 
;Ie"ond I,I8.rxism: The 1'8.i til and \:orks of Hendril-;: cie Jlan (The 
Ilague, 196G , Chapter 7; as far as I knovl, no Heo-Fabian 
joined a (neo-)fascist ~roulJ in the 1970s. 
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moverilents and action i,roups than the 1'rench sociolo"ist; v;hile 
1'0uraine vrorried about rnanipulation of these [:,roups by l-loli ti-
cal parties, the Dutch Neo-Fatians were more concerned atout 
~2 the converse. However, both approved of a strong--but 
democratic--state anel disapproved of "rJopulism" or anarchism. 
rlci thcr of thCll1 ;1ll~11ys(:)d tht: social lJasc of these n.ction ~roul..Js 
anJ l.lOVelilents 1110re tlmn sUjJcrfieially. Touraine aclmi tted 
réi.ther casually tllat n1(i.ny of' theln showeci petty-bour,:;;eois or 
re:Jctionary tcnli·encie~3, Gut rClilaincci hopcful thé:..t these \"loulci 
not prevail over Illore pro;~rcssive tendencies. At any rate, 
hc diJ not ovcrestimate thc ilili...Jortanee of the :~roups: at 
lest, they \Jould eontribute to eultural frcedom anJ to flexi-
1 i li ty on the si de of the inevi t:ible ne\1 rulin,,, e lass of 
tcehnocra ts anu burc;luera ts. ûuteh Nco-Fabians ui d not c;.i s-
euss the cmer)~enee of a new rulin:~ c lass ; at least not as 
frankly (or eynically) as Touraine did. 
Touraine's eomments on the "eultural revolution" of the 
1960s seemed &lso more realistie or eynical than the ruther 
idealist and subjcctivist notions of the Dutch Nco-Fabio.ns. 
He pointecl out the ambivalent eharacter of this rcvolution 
th.:} t replaceu tradi tional elass-basec.: culture by é."'.. new, a-
moral Iî1o.ss culture of individual frecdom anJ po.ssive consump-
tion; even so, he basically approved of it. IIc elid not link 
i t to the ne\'! rulin;; el0.33, \·!hieh n;i:;I1t conceivably manipulnte 
thc ne\! culture for i ts O\':n purposes--perhaps throu,~h the 
Chupter 4.3.5 nnd 4.3.2. 
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2.;;ency of "lo,";ocrats," the new socio-cul turecl specialists . 
lJutch Ileo-Fé~bi<::Lns showed some ambivalcnce ê,0oUt these special-
ists, often~uilty of "populism," ClemaJ;o:1.Y anu J.larxist aGitation 
in their eyes, ~nd yet indispensable. Like other IJevl Leftists 
they c,dvoca ted inc~i vi dual self -e;~ï)rc ssion, c rea ti vi ty, cornr.lUni-
cation , etc., the values t2,u,~;ht anel practiced by 10,~ocr.s:.ts. 
Even more than Neo-llC'-rxists, they hopcd to ch&n,~e society 
throu,11 cducc..tion, "re levant" art an<l cul tural cX1Jcriments. 
Culture was seen ~s Cl. product of free subjects rathcr thnn 
as 8.n intersubjectivc social process conditioneJ by--thou~h 
1 t · 1 t . th t t . . f 93 rC.n lve y au onomous Wl respec O--soclo-economlcorces. 
One is ternpted to conclude that IJeo-Fabian reforws may 
:~l ter but not .s:.bolish capi taliSII1 in the Netherlands • Incom8, 
]<:nm'lleci:.;e and power may be redistributed but only \'li thin narroVl 
limi ts--as Ion,; as the bour:.;coisic and new petty bour.;eoisie 
can m~üntain most of their pri vilcges. The rcforms r.ny he lp 
to alleviate thc consequences of an economic or ecolo.~ical 
crisis in the 1930s; but alternatively, they muy usher in a 
r:criou of intensifieci class stru:<~lc ~]_nd rupression if the 
orr;élnizc iJ \'10 rkin,~ c la;;s offers stron:: re sistance • In tlie 
lattcr case thc Neo-Fabians in power would have to face 2 
c:i ffi cul t choice: re::3i.'ll rmu/or silie VIi th the '.lorkers, or 
recul" to more authoritarian nnd repressive mcasures. Thus 
their';overnmcnt m~:cy lei.lu the \'lUy to revolution or ne':! forms 
93 IIo,'rever, L,y 197':3 even Ileo-FalJÏ8.ns expresse' .. (louL~s 
,.:out the "cul turC'Ll r(~v .. )lution" t:l"v l.,tu su1-,>ortcè. in t;le 
lJGl)<;, c.,..,. :~. TroLl;', ";;cvolutie en restauratie," ~:iociolo.dischc 
Cic...:.:> XXVI: (; (1979): 40:::-469. 
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of fusci::.;t rel:Jression--ro.thcr rCiJulsive u.ntcrnc.tives 1'or IIeo-
Fabians. Dut even Fabius seems to h8ve s3.ved Home for the 
benefit of others, who eventually destroyed thc aristocratie 
repuLJlic which 11e 1'ou,:;ht for. 94 
Conclusion 
Loth Social Democratie Ncv/ Left projeets ::.;uffcrcd frorn 
';:cakncs:..:;c::.;, cjJccil'icully u certain ten:..:;ion Letvrcen IjOl-,ulist 
defl1~lnl~S for dcmoeratisation .::mei more impliei t eli tist tenden-
cics. 'l'hou.;11 ciffercnt in lTlcmy resi,cct::.;, both IJeo-.1arxists 
~mu lJeo-FalJians :..:;eclilcd to ::..;hurc a new ilCt ty lJouré;eoi s ba.C !ç_ 
.round, villich coulJ. eZ1Jlain thcir relatively l.Jeaeeful eo-
cxistenec \'Iithin one SociéJ..l JJemocro.tie !-Jarty. 
They tiiffered in their ap~roach to other classes. 20th 
cLpproaehes irnljlied some forlil of nW.nipulation of the Vlorking 
clas::.;, but tlle fJeo-l·larxist "lo,~ocr;;tie" approach seeliled more 
tolerant and flexible than the technO-LJureaucratie one of the 
iJeo-Fo.Lians v/hich eould leac1 to a form of fascisfil. Benee 
[rOII1 :.!. democratie <J.nd [,jevJ Lcft I-,oint of vicw thc treo-l.Iarxist 
api-Jroaeh Vlould oe preferabIe, even if it mi~ht also result 
in rCi-Jrcssion--frorn a difi'erent side: o.s in Chilc, 1973. 
Thc ~:;oeial Democratic reformist strate,~y eo.n never be "eoup-
1)1'001', ";i ven i ts insi stence on non-violent and lei~al means 
::md i ts refusal to "SIll3.sh the state." However, thi s liabi li ty 
cao also be se en as ao asset, especially in relatively pee_ee-
ful and le"alistic societies as the Dutch onc \',here revolutiono.ry 
vrojects could never moLilise Inuch support. 
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Sce Dorey é.:.nd j)uc.,ley, 0.:). ci t., lJP. 54 ff. 
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5.4 Hauical Pluralisl,}: Sma.ll Ste).;s In All Different Directions 
11adical Pluralisrn emer,~ed as the dominant i)roject wi thin 
the Political Party of Radicals af ter 1970. In view of its 
eclectic ori:CJin, i t could not be expected to show l,îUCh coherence 
or consistency. ~Iovlever, Pluralist jJractice may have achieved 
more coherence thon Pluralist theory. 
'I'he mc..in weaknes[:; of Eadical Pluralism lay in the tension 
bet~een professed populism and implicit elitism. Joth terms 
are uscd here in él loose sense. POl~ulism refers to thc 
Pluralist cri ti(jue of ~1.uthori tarL',n )Jurcaucréèts éènd tcchnocrcl.ts 
and to the ideo.l of self'-man<J.::~cment <J.nd direct democrc,cy, 
'.:i thout tl1e socialist insistence on e;{t.lrol;rie,tion of thc 
oour:;eoisie an<l c..boli tion of classes. ~5 It ir:l)lies or~>osi tion 
to all sorts of elites--not only the rulin~ clo.ss in the ;Iarxist 
:::iensc, but o.lso oli:;archies in tré~c.ie unions , leftist parties 
o.uthoritarian teachers in schools, chauvinist men at home and 
so on: everyonc \lho holcls pO\ler in same form !:Jut \'lho Joes not 
:':;OOLI to tJe &ccount~'.ble 1'01' i t (the latter clause is cruciéJ.l, 
,:;.s i t uistin);uishcs i_Opuli::3111 éLnel specificall;)' Hadic:."l Plur:J.lisli1 
from anétrchi sm) • 
InsoÏélr él[] Réldicn.l Pluré~lists ShOVIGG any interest in 
classes ,.~nd cla:.:;s conflicts, their élna1ysis ref.'l~d descril.;tivc 
nnd superficinl. They ohserved conflicts everyvdlcre, but no 
fun ... ;;~lIicnt:').l contrac1.ictions. The r(~lation betv:een workers 
:Jh 
:JpOljUlisf:1 is cicfineu rather loosely by most author~~; ;..>ee 
G. Ionescu and G. Gellner, eds., Populism (London, 1~70); and 
Laclau, op. cit., Chapter 4 (the aefinition used here \'louln 
l:robaLly f8.11 und.er his "third defini tion"). 
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cmcl co.pi tCtli str; Vlas se en CtS one of "Ctnta~onistic coopera tion" 
rather than CtS a fundamental conflict that affects other areas 
, ~6 
such as moral values or child-rearin3 pro.ct1ces. of society, 
From 0. superficial analysis of society Pluralists derived 
a rather superficial strate ~y of "aeJ:locratis::üion." j;y 
convertin:., sll::lres into Lonu~~, they ilopeo to tJ.bolish the 
uomination éln~ exploi tation of Vlorkers IJy eéliJÏ tLüists anu to 
lay thc founê.:.::.tion for self-manct:;efÎlent. 'l'hus they c:,ssur.led 
th~,t Cé:;JÏ talists vlOu1d re1inc;uisll l)ower \'rithout serious 
stru,; ~le; and, even more unlike1y, th~t they woula not be 
re~ 1"ced by C'~ n8V,' eli te of equ3.lly )o'.'lerful mO.n3.,,;ers \';ho 
r.ü';ht turn :::;e11'-mé~na';ernent into ahollo\'1 sham. 
Po\wr \ms to be reaistributed equally, but not by D.ny 
:.~,rticular a~ent. PreferaL)ly, ])0'"er1ess .'~rouIJs v:ere to acc:uire 
control over their si tw~tion tl1rou ,h ,,,~irect ;:'ction ',ii th SU;l·iort 
frOL: t:w ,.:;t,·L;.:. On the oth..;c '.'.nl., tliO ;Jt:..tc itsc1f h,.'.L.. 
.. 1J.'é~' ~''; toa ;.1Uch 1 •. 0\/131"; iî it ',Tere ·co lend sUl'ljort to 1;0\'/er1ess 
i:'lurali st Heforilli sts tric ei. to sol ve theji lCJiiI.1o. üy cullin,_, 
:[or c:'emoc rLd;izé:.tion of the sta tc, as \JC 11 as for i ts eXi)(j·nsion. 
If taken seriously, this strCtte.:;y 11ÎÏ.,ht e&sily result in 
élnélrchJ' • 
A radical democratization of the state in a pluralist 
:30cicty \'loulcl allo\'l any interestirouP or clo.ss to pursue i ts 
~() 
1\S shown by :i. l':ohn, CL.i.s:.:; and Conformity (IIomev:ood, 
111., 19G9); sec o.lso \!. Gottschaleh, et al., Sozialisations-
forschunj;'\ (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 71-192:"--
o\'m interest \"li thout re,:Jl.rG for others. 'l'he state, v:hich 
3 "0 uU 
assured a certain unity and res~ect for basic rules in bour-
i..;eois society--or any other class-uominated society--vIOUld be 
too v/eal: anu fru.~~nlonteu to perform tha t function in a pluralist 
societ:y. All sorts of action \'lould be taken by dissatisfied 
',roups ::i.gainst other_,;roups that appeél.reu more povlerful or 
f th · . 1 ':)7 en orco elI' wll • 
Pluralist Heforlllists vlOuld uisapprove of this outcorne. 
They \lould insist on SOTi1C consensus anu soliu~,ri ty base~ on 
Insofar as these uid not yet exist, thoy 
intenc:.ed to create and spreau therl1. In rjarticul<:tr, thc pp~{ 
defined itself as a van~uard party with a Ion; term vision, 
',:hich \'lOulcl transcenci and inte,jrate the short term interests 
of }jarticular :!,roups or classes. It viOulc:. ilillJue other ~,roups 
\üth neH ideals and a sense of cornmunity, throu~h a "soft" 
or cul tural revo lution. ~:;ince e:~,oi sIn, lila teriali sm [i.nri COTólfje-
l;itivcncs::::; \lere widcslJrcad in tbc "acljuisitive societj'" of 
thc l::Jc)üs or 1::J7üs, thc cultural rcvolution vlould have to 
itsclf, ccrtainly involvin; "total Hlun. 11 Cultu.rc \'lUS not 
conceived as é.1.n epil-'henomenon of econo(nic or 1"101i tic al forces, 
Lut aS <-1-n autonoIllouS anl~ vrobably dominant force in society. 
lience the :~roups thélt created and llistri buted a new cul ture 
97'1'his critique folIovIs that of I~. Trom!), "Socialisme, 
or,l,anisatie en clemocratie It; he refers to "interest-group 
liLerc.lism" nl1li "neo-populism" rather thcm 'pluralist reforl:1-
i sm • • 
r.1Î c;ht COffiO to dorün<,.tc <)ocic~t:/ J in .:1 subtIe c:.nd non-violent 
j)lur;,li~:;t reforl:,:3 coulu tllu:3 resul t in the cr;lCl',',encc of 
& ne',: eli CC--i. 10"ocl~c~tic one. In l:lCt, Pluralist Heformisr:; 
i:,üu:c ;colsic iml r:lorc p,,-rticulrlrly D.Tiloni~ col1ege-educatccl 
e~~loyees in social unu culturul sectors of the state or 
i_rivatc entcri;risc. Pluralist i{cforr;!ism could be perceived 
as a threat by technocrQtic or bureaucratic factions of thc 
nC\'1 pctt:/ bourr:;coisic which l~referred perhaps to exercise 
power \ü thout bein;; accountable to consti tuencies of \'{Qrl~ers, 
consumers, nei ;)'lbours, etc.; whereas 10:.:;ocra ts were used to 
,;i vin~; accounts in "dialo(';ues" wi th consti tuents who a.sked 
ther.l c;uestions. 
IIo\'levcr, even rileL1Lers of the bureaucratic or technocratic 
ne\! l~ctty-L'our;eoisic ':.'oula not 10~3c much 1'O\"1er in a trélnsi ti on 
to i,luralisi,'. Pluré':.list Heformist,s did not intend to élboli~:3h 
9U , .. , . , Tna terr., I 'Cütull 'Carlan' 1:12.y sceL1 e:{[~':,~crated nere, but 
he:;::; tcen w::;od f'rC(lu..::;ntl~l to cri ticize tl1c Lev! Left in ".;enercü, 
8.;. by ~3. 1,~u,.,seniJer;-"er, I'!ohin treibt die l:Jrotestbe\1c~~ung? 
(Freibur:.; iill~reis:~o.u, 1975), pp. ?L1-27, 59-02, 67, 90; his 
~\ r,r,ulIlcnt ~i ffe r~) fron the one ;: bovc; ho\'Jcvc l' J i t seem~'3 inap-
:-ropric:.te to Lè.nj ly thL:; eri ticis;n ;'..lso to tlle I\eo-l·larxist or 
l]co-J\nn,rcnL::;t !Je',! Left J é'.S i t a ttachcLi 1I101'e ili1porté'ncc to 
Horl~8rs' councils 2.n(l economic f":,O\/er; of course the cri ticism 
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thc state or the division of lohour--whether ~ocial or technical. 
Thc convcrsion of shc.res into bonds \'tould àcrrive the share-
hol,ier;:) anll renticl's, but not thc L1ané'.'crs of their pO\'lcr. 
'ra meünt.::.in ~JOVler, ln~.n'::-L"cr") c'.nel technocr, tic c:~ ertr..; \'!oulc: 
to thc lJublic scrvicc--c~ntl sp8cificCllly to thc sociul ccnci. 
cultu1'al sectol', thc lO,.~ocrcl.tic stron,;holli of thc Plur[list 
i~cforl.1i~~ts. On tllc other hanu, these 1'c 1'0 rl:1:.; lili',ht contrL"utc 
to inclustrial pC:''ccc bct'\:ccn li111no."cl,lcnt anc. \'lor;~crs, if thc 
',:orkcrs Herc to bccomc pcr:3uaciec. th:.,t thc mé.mc.,~emcnt Vlas nov: 
rcs1)onsiolc to them. 
In s~ite of its incohercnce, thc Pluralist strate~y has 
a certain plllusiLility. If the Pluralist expcctations of 
ccolo,;ical disastcrs cor.1C true, <mu if thc Nco-Ilarxist or 
l;arxist l-Jrojects to rnoLilizG thc vlorkin; class fail, Pluralist 
rcforLis '-Llone may savc l)utch society frara coIL.J.l_,sc--or Erom 
Cc much lilore brutal tot;üJ. tariani sm or "eco-fusci Sin. " '1'hc 
(c lnss) stru,~~lc ovcr ma tcrial rCi30urces vlould ï.Jrobably turn 
tJittcr ;~n(: violcnt unless a "cultural rcvolution" dcflccteci 
tcttcntion to less material concerns. 
In 19 7(), PPR thcorist Ter Ilor.; asserted that the cul tural 
lo;.:;(.::~ [~lr.;;j.rlirl ~ ii~ 0[J.(; r~(.; ~ .. r"~;~ sul t,;re: ç;.:~ ;..;.rJ. C;>i~~[L(;:-~o;.'.::rJ.r;[~ 0f 
cconol;lic forccs. '1'11i:.:; criticis[., ·,lv.::;' r:lso vo:i.cr;c... 1"J ,;n J'J 
"rti :3ts whcn thc PP1: l'lini ;jtcr of C uI tur8 ; ... n l "; l:(;c ['(,:;;. tiuj J 
su;'..',ested art h&d to be "socL'11.'· rclcvé:\l1t" in orJer to 'lu~Llir'y 
[or subsidies (Cha~ter 2.5 a00vc). 
J91 
~îoIi,:,lé.crlt:;· couiet :;c consicicrcc( lA universal vaIue, sh::,rcd 
:,y 1,10~';t rcli, ,ion:::; [;nd ,.,ililosoplücS of thc \,/orlG. ';,ri thout [t 
n.:; li;:,Ïou!3 or 1,0 ti tic(Á.l con tC.:t Ol' re re 1'CIICC :~roul.J, hOi'levl; r, 
i t tends to tOCOillO Ollli)t:/ rhctoric. ',ii thin one church, nn tion 
',ii th otlier COLli/Ion vé.~l\lcs. Thus ChristL.tns C,Tl iJI'nctice soli-
:lari ty--or 11 lovo their nei c,:;hbours "--bccausc they arc 8.11 
\"lO l11 c. ~~~::.:./: 'uein"..3." Even \'li thin 
, n:tion, clll.Tch or c:"~;:;;.:;, soli(;é:~rit::' ie; cüfficult to rnaintt:ün, 
Self-clevelopr:jcmt ("ze lfontplooiin:;" in ])utch) or 8clf-
rcnli SCè tion ;:;CCfil~3 an Ci ,UC~ 11y vc.,;uc nnd even more rncanin, ;le ss 
99 ' Ter Gor~, oJ. cito 
100(. n (" '1'1 c, t 
,-,cc L',. •• l.;élum, , 1C 0J'8 em 
L. ~syhc\'!, ~ocicty: In~titutions 
1~)71), ;;1. Vl-~2; more extreLlc is 
Communit:/ (ChicClCO, 19uC). 
of Solidurities (n.p., n.d.); 
Rnti Aetivity (Glenview, 111., 
S. De GI'azia, Thc Political 
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idenl. Nev! L8ft theorists never üefined the "self" that \'I~~~s 
to he (levcl0i~C(;, ]Jut a:jsur;:ecl iIrl)jlici tl~/ or exrlici tly th;:.t i t 
vould Ge sociuble, harmonious and constructive rather than 
anti-social, D<_;;-;ressi ve or sado-m[~sochistic. These assur:1p-
tions Go not seem ;articularly plausible. Even if most anti-
social and saJistic bchaviour could Le attributed to alienatin~ 
~nd ropressivc social structures rcther than to human nature, 
it.Joes not follo';! that ciiffcrent socic'cl structures \':OulCl 
autoDatically produce different behaviour; unless onc assunes 
th:lt "human nCl.ture is basically ,.,ood." 'l'his c.ssumption \,[;·s 
not mauc lJy Pluralists anC. (most) other Ile\1 Leftis-cs v/ho 
r~:;.rely used the notion of a fi::eu cmei constant hUl'-lan n::.ture. 
Un the other hand, ti'lcy rejectccl socinl determinism é\nu dia 
:' s;~urnc th2 t mD.n (<:md cs~)ecially \'lor.1[in) could ch(}.n,.;e Clnc 
tr[~nSCencl lüs (her) environucnt anel emé:..ncipJ.'te him (her) sclf 
from rCl.,ressi vc soc ietic iJ. Uotl1 c::tcrnol (lnd in te rn;::<.l i scu 
rel~rcsié;ion ':!ould be climinatcrl. in the proc'3ss of self-Gevelop:ient. 
110\! this \res to h~:'l)pen, Plur0.lists ü~ilecl to [~r~ell out. 'l'hcir 
éjU)lJorters tendcd to "llevelop themselvcs" throu,h.,roup 
:i ~::,cussion~~, )sycilO-c:~nc~lysi s, rnedi tc~ tion, yo jl, se~:, uru,.~s, 
:~rt encL other morc or less aesthetic .'-nel heCtonistic :.cti'Ji tie:::: 
t:I,:",i to ril:J.flual 1.!or;~crs. Perhc'l';s thc: lé.:.ttcr haG. Leen rel.:rcssed 
:~n(. ;.:.licn~~'tcd to sucl1 :.Hl e;~tcnt thélt thcy couLi not develoj;, 
; ut onl J' rc~.'rouucc thclil:Jclvc:J, throu)1 sport;:;;, ulcohol, ;:)c;~, 
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, 1 . . , 1 ". h' ?lUl 
'Ce CV1G10n élllU OCCel:.310na 11.:> -CS. 
'fhe third value, crcutivity, coul~ ~e seen elS an aspect 
Lecoi,le crc<~tivc, ,,;ivcn 
s:d llG. Only :..;oc1:;l COllstr:ünt::.; had prcven-cc(j, t;,e lilajori ty 
.jucstionablc él:.3::'';Ufd 1Jtion. Furtherrnore, crcQtivity Vlas 0.,~sur.1e;l 
to bc tJoc1:1.1 ~ln,: constructi vc, CHFl c l'e;èti ve croo::s, torturers 
rarely ldade cx.1Jlici t, let 0.lone lIl~~,J.c l-llausiblc .102 
All three vulues that Hadical Pluralists cherished 
soeLlcc:. )r:J.thor vél,;ue anc. er.l i)ty. Tbey \'Jere based on optimistic 
and uni;rovon assurnptions alJout llurnan nature and culture. It 
seer,is unlikoly tl1C1 t a l'lur;llist culture of tilis kind,couh, ever 
unify lt lJluro.list :Jocioty. This '\'.'0111J 'oe (lif1'icul t enou",h 
un,~or nOrIilal cirCuldst0.nCC~3, but prncticall:/ iriivossitjle i1' l;he 
l'lurlilist c;~l-lect<:l.tions of ccolo~ical or military disasters 
cOlae true. Durin,; Ol" af tor such ~iSLl,sters lJcol'le I,Üi~ht 
I'l'"cticc solidi:,ri ty, solf-dcvolopllicnt and crcé,lti vi ty in Ge 
more destructive and aggressive \'lay than Pluralists Vlould 
101 See H. Michielse, Kultuur als instrument van de heer-
sende macht (Groningen, 1973), pp. 58 ff; from a different, 
psychological rather than political perspective, H. Duijker, 
"De ideologie van de zelfontplooiing," Pedagogische Studien 
53 (1976): 358-373, and in~, 2 April, 1977. 
102see S. Rozemond, "Politiek ex.pressionisme," Socialisme 
en Democratie (1970): 110-117, anJ "Linkse si:~natuur," 
Socialisme en Democratie (1971): 370-379. 
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c..ppreciate: the solidé,ri ty of;8..n~s 8..nd Hi: .. r bands, the self-
developf,lOnt of hunters anu vrarriors, thc creativity of ro~)bers, 
Ilonetheless lL1.diccü Plurc.lisr.'j i:ü:~ht plc,y ~-, unifyin,.; role, 
'.ti thin the neVl l--,etty lJour,,;eoL,;ie. 
l;h,~ 10,;ocr:ltic r'~,ction, tlic :-1O\'.' uctt~ i,our,coi:,üc idÏ.;ht )ursuc 
re,é,r~:ed D,S )rofcssionalooals for 10,;ocrats 1,,-1"10 toach, 
;_:.n~ll:/sc, crecLt;e, r,lcdi t2.te, ciSCUGG ;~1l1cl uovclo::" tlleir facul tics 
:~ll the tilde. The un:L t:/ of the ne',,' rctty cO~lr,eoisie anel 
:::>l;ccifically of thc 10;ocrD,tic fc:,ction id"ht toe 1')[,~sc(1 not 
on1y on cornmon v"lues, but 8.180 on COlilmOn e;(l;crience--tl:e 
Liany y'ec,rs i:-l school anc:' colle:;e, conference:::;, clubs, l:.;<::rtics--
[i,nJ 001l)1,IOn intcrests relélted to i b3 rolo in thc E;ocic,l (,~i vision 
of lé~Lour, o.ncl Sl,)(:)cific;,nly thc [Jroccss of (rc-) procluctioL of 
It is proLclhly a 1003C kiwi of uni ty, corr'ijarcd to 
-clie ldore form:l1izcu ,-ü1r,~ or,..;anizcu uni ty of tllC r)our~eoi:3ie 
C lC~;';3 or.,;aniza tion::;, thc neH petty bour.;eoisic tended "co 
of ten in aireet action or pressure 2roun~ theffies relevant 
to its interests: 
llolicy. L;'..vin ~ ,;encrally 3cLtisfiea most of their Ïli1mediclte , 
r.lc'.terirü neeels , ne 'V.' l)etty bour~~(~ois peol.Jle of ten sou,;ht 
syr;1:::olic issue;::; to e;:ljreS3 ther:1::;elves, to experience solidéeri ty 
and to improve the Cjlw_li ty of life in lO~j ,.!,ener8.l. 
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Pluralist culture and society, if ever realized, would 
l)leL'~se the ne'.l petty-bour"eoi sie r.1ore t118,n nny other c lass. 
It coulu onl~r h~J,ve uIlivcr~~cl a>~,eal if everyone joined tJ-1.at 
c lD,i3S--:_;ossi b l~' once ~Ü 1 lîj(~nu8.1 lé:~Lour \'lC',S é,utOnlate Cl. Never-
t:1Cle~~s, other c}:1;'-jSe8 r.li,)1t L,encfit fror:l }..llurD,list rei'orPls 
to sorne extent. 
in t})e Lien Uyl',overnraent ~_~n~l in loc.::--,l ;overnr:;ents tenc.C(l to 
:,oliticiz<?,cion :_'_11(; r:-,dic::-~liz~_~tion Ol' :1. l~jr;e fraction of thc 
I:2o-,\n{~rchist <--l,t'eal of tllC UI tré:~-left and Hcvolutionarjr 
C!L~ Left 2.nc: r:i,ht. Lence tl1e:i G~::i tche\.i their 3Ul-'iJOrt frolll 
to the l'Pli. ;:}nd (a li ttle later) t110 Pv~!.A. 
J ,,' 
_(j,J 'oc-t 01' -1-1--:-.,-''"> l' ""-'lle'" "/"re 'ro"'l' r,e' "'elJ ']'-' '-'''!'''r'''Oll' c 
.1. ... IJ 1".,1GlJ\"": uw.::>.\....,; l ...... ClL.:> \, _ c.ü 0JI~.J __ , 
(; ., ~"Oi.le él.C [;i vi sts \101"e actin,c.: 8. ),ünst direct frustr,:.. tions 
CilL<SCJ. t,y ;::tir ljol1ution or sex discrirnination \'/hi1e others 
joincG them out of syn0uthy (soli~urity), mor2.l indi 0 n2tion, 
lon()liness, IJOr()clOla, o.nd GO on. 
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been Ie ss succcssi'ui. 1Jo lJélrtics com;Jar:lble to tbe lJutcl1 PPH 
c~.,ri1C into bein,,, thcre. 1l0\leVer, the "lloco.rdiens" in the PSU, 
',lho followed :i.ocard into the PS in 1~74, came close in many 
cOllcern allout ~ir.lilar iS:3ues, sucL as ecolo "y, cul tural 
wor;~ers' councils, nei~hhourhoo:~ COlilfilÏ ttccf3, etc.; like tbc 
LJutcll Pluralists, they tenJ.ed to Qistrw3t COi,;lflunists. 104 1.n 
',;ermany, Pluralist Heformism founci smi1e inclividual supporters 
but no or;;anisc.tion of a formalor even informii.l né:ture until 
"1- 1("77 105 
'.l.l·cer J • 
Even in the Ilotherhlncis, tl1e PPl~ Vl~:"8 vrobaLly unL1ue. 
TllC Lea~ue of CiirL:;tian Socialists of the 19108 anc;. the 
Cllristian l)el.10Cra tic Union of tbe l~::Wc;, or the ;:li j ,je 1::e re 1 J 
;1"ou1 ,rcsembleLl them in SO;'iIC \'lélys--conC8rnec. wi tl1 culture, 
Cl1ri stL:u1, ,:tS VJe 11 as 
f:).5 Conc lusion 
10" 
ve ry sfl1é],ll. v 
tfle fir::..it lJlacc, they lackcu. a serious anC. concrete élnalysis 
of L~tc Cé1.iÜ tcnisra in thc l.ctherlé'.nds (or Fr':'.l1ce or ':.rest 
10l1-s8e ,~'.t\ove, Chc'J.",ter :3 .1. 
1058ee alJove, Chapter 3.2; i.,.fter 1977 the "Green Lists" 
L;c ,c.n to or;;n,nise I~adic;~,l Plur,'}.nists, as \'lell c,s others. 
lOG"ee '-'1-ovc· eh" -1-r,>r 1 1", ~..) . <...~.) , ('l....)\..t'::" .'-'. 
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Gcrm~ny) of thc 1960s nnd 1970s. Insofar 2S New Lcft theorists 
~ai~ any uttcntion to socio-economie questions, they tended 
to f~ül b['~cl: on Old Loft or libcral econornics emu to su<~;;est 
rc.ther utorüan solutions. ThoU2h thcy offered useful insights 
into ehnnJes in the class strueture, their cluss analysis 
to thcir o\m soei':;.l ])élse. 
In the socond place, the project contained at best an 
incomplete and schematic theory of the state. lts political 
strate ,y consisted of i_Opulo.r--if not populist--mobilis,2tion 
for direet actions as weIl as for elections, but included 
vurious forms of subtie (or Ie ss subtie) elitist manipulntion. 
1,,11 i Ie Ct ttackin,: technocra tic anel bureo.uc rD.tic eli tes, Ne' . .' 
Lcft ;roups of ten seemed to stimulate the emer~ence of new 
"lo,:·;ocré.~ tic" e li tes--sociolo;~is ts, teachers, journali sts, 
soci~~l ,'[orkers aneL other intellectuals -,;ho could r.'lanirjulate 
th8 jlo])il~serj I,le,sses. Evidence ai-lout the social jJD.se of llE~\'l 
Leftorou1::s \"<:"-8 rCLtl18r scarce llurin'J thc [jeriod of this inveG-
ti,~ .. tion, [Jut i t sU;,':e sts thé.t t; the:/ ton,:leè to ;:;e c1ominat/~ i: 
,,:/ I..emi,ors of tl1e nev! l.,;etty bOtlr;;eoL.:;ie, '.:hi Ic thcir leauer::> 
Here of ten 10,ocrc~.ts. Perhaps the informal or semi-fOrfi1éèl, 
un;'~rchi!.Jtic ~ll1d dcccntr::o..J.ised structur'~ of most 11e\l Left 
,~roul-)s sui teu nev! 1)e tty bour;-;cois mer.1ter;; better than l)ro le-
t'lri~~ns, who \;'ere used to formal hier2.rchy o.nel collecti ve 
'isci~)line. 'l'llus a cert;;:dn tcn::-;ion existej hetween tho 
i ,enoc r2. tic ecllci l::Or uli st éèS"~i ration:cc: ano the eli ti st tenGencic s 
of ;;lOst iJevr Left .~:rouI)s. 
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In the third lJh'-ce, the New Left lent consider2_ble er:1:Jh2~sis 
to cul ture but 1'.:-:. i led to produc 0 more than v<'_:.:,ue, subj ec ti vi st 
SoliJurity, self-revelopment 
culture, :.-'ut rarel J 
02.~ counter-culture '.<Ï,-l cider"c ,-lur:i..n ~ tbc El(,()s C:.ll(~ 1970".3, 
society '\ihic~1 could ;.:e Geen us aûaptation rü-thcr than SU~jvcr-
SiOil of ca~italism. No'.': Lc1'tists (;enerü-lly ne"lecteG or 
Thesc éU;:'!jii;ui ties can Lie se en <:tG liac)ili tic,::;, i:Jut é~lso 
Perha~s the former have 
the poor economic anéllj'sis of the r.;CVJ Left Wé.LS of ten linke'i 
to ct i)l~LusiLle cri ticjue of thc econoriÜS!ll élnCl Giélterialism of 
tllC ülu Left. Thc Ikv! Lef t's er,ilJhaGis.on Jche relative auto-
nOLIJ' of the Gté:_te eOlilpenL>uted to SOlîle extent for the Olei 
Lcrt' s nC,lect é;nu <.io,;r,1,~tic "inL>truIilentalist" conception of 
tllc st«te. Thc Ik,/ Lel't's critic;ue of the state, hO\leVer 
c...;/;ciall~/ 0talinism--~'-[h.~ OJcl Left ~joci~_~l lJeldOcracy. The 
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C:UeÜ strate;;y helped to lilObilise lar:sc ;;rou1--'s \lho feIt alienated 
and ne,_~lectcû b::,: thc Oh~ Lcft. Thc Ik~~'1 Lei't ideas and experi-
IJlcnts in thc sl-,herc 01' culture fille(l a lar,c.~e>~élp left Ly thc 
Oll~ Left mû_instreaL1. All thet3e elc!lwnts of the IJc\'! Left 
l:,roject way have contributecl to \lhat could be considerecl i ts 
main achicvcli1ent: the l)oli tisation ;!.n(~ ré.cdicn1is'ttion of éè 
sUl)stantia1 fr2ction of thc ne';1 yctty bour.;:;eoisic. 
','i thout tite ar,1hi ;ui tics r'lentioncc; aGove, the NCH Left 
jJrojcct r;li,·;llt lt;',ve fé\.ileJ. Lo at-cl'é.l.ct any SUdJort from tlü:..; 
class that usecl to aclhere to libcra1 or conservutivc (con-
fcs:Jiono.l) idco10.:;ic;:; llefore 1900. It vlould have rel~lé.inc.j a 
lTiélr ;inal ancl el:)her,1Cral vroject, similar to !u1rtrchisrd or 
1~cvo1utionary Socic~liGj,l af ter 19~~0. ',!hy the I~e'" Lcft attrfLctccl 
a ne".[ lJctty bour.:;eois followin:!; is iinother c:;ucstion; <.~ tcnta-
ti ve answer \li 11 be ;:>i ven in thc next chapter. 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: TO\'iARDS A TENTA'rIVE EXPLANATION 
It woulà be tempting to sum up the conclusion of this 
study in one sentence: the New Left project can be explalned 
as the first attempt of the new petty bourgeoisie to organize 
itself politically and to develop its own ideology. However, 
this statement would say too much and too little at the same 
time; hence most of the remaining pages of this chapter are 
filled with qualifications. 
In the first place, the term "New Lef til requires some 
qualification. At first sight its meaning seemed unambiguous, 
at least in the Netherlands where both outsiders and insiders 
agreed on the whole that it referred to groups like Provo, 
Nieuw Links (IINew Lef til) in the Labour Party, the Political 
Party of Radicals and (less unambiguously) the Pacifist 
Socialist Party. These groups shared a few basic ideas, 
which were used to define the New Left ideology: Dutch 
society needed a fundamental democratisation, culminating in 
self-management in all sectors of society; this change was to 
be effected from below and from above, i.e. through direct 
action at the grass roots as weIl as through elections and 
legislation; but structural change would be insufficient 
without a cultural revolution, in which values like individual 
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competition, the work ethic and the concern with economie 
growth would be replaced by self-realisation, creativity, 
solidarity and similar values. 
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These ideas could be seen as characteristics of the Dutch 
New Left, but they were not rea11y new, as Chapter One showed. 
Many groups that belonged to the Old Left in the chronological 
sense--having been established long before 1960, our arbitrary 
cut-off point--adhered to simi1ar ideis. Especial1y the 
older Revolutionary Socialist and Anarchist groups strove 
also for workers' self-management and fundamental democrati-
sation through direct action and electora1 action, even if 
they gave priority to direct action and conceived of electora1 
action usua11y only as a form of agitation. Social Democrats 
anà Christian Leftists attached more importance to elections 
and of ten neglected direct action. Both the Christian Leftists 
and the Anarchists, but to alesser ex tent also the Social 
Democrats and the Revolutionary Socialists aimed at cultural 
change. The first two came closer to the New Left conception 
of a new culture than the last two who lent more emphasis to 
class consciousness, sacrifice and discipline than to indivi-
dual development and creativity. 
Thus most New Left ideas could be.traced back to Old 
Left groups, especially the marginal and radical ones like 
the Social Democratie League, the Communist Workers Party, 
the League of Christian Socialists and its offshoots, the 
League of Religious Anarchist Communists and the League of 
Anarchist Socialists. By 1960 these Old Left groups had 
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ceased to exist, however, while their ideas had lost their 
appeal to the working class altogether. The ideas survived 
to some extent among a few intellectuals who came together in 
1957 to found the Pacifist Socialist Party. 
The Pacifist Socialist Party cou1d be seen as a bridge 
between the Old and the New Left--or as a battlefield. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s,01d and New Left tendencies 
and factions fought with each other--and of ten a1so among 
themselves--but by 1977 it looked as if the 01d Left had been 
wiped out; disagreements remaine~ however, between New Left 
tendencies. The majority of the party seemed to pursue a 
revo1utionary reformist strategy of deve10ping "counter-powers" 
in the economic and political sphere,and a "culture of 
strug~le" in the sphere of culture. On the who1e this strategy 
fai1ed, at least in the period under study,which was not a 
revo1utionary period. Yet the party proved successfu1 in 
another way, insofar as it mobi1ised and p01iticised a signi-
ficant fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie--teachers, socia1 
workers, students and others--around issues neglected by 
other parties: protest against nuc1ear armament, foreign 
wars and air pollution, as we11 as demands for democratisation 
of corporations, universities and communities. 
To some extent the Pacifist Socialist New Left had been 
inspired by Provo, the young Neo-Anarchists who tried to 
provoke the authorities in Amsterdam between 1965 and 1967. 
This sma11 and margina1 group had addressed itse1f to simi1ar 
issues and a similar audience--probab1y even more petty 
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bourgeois thon that of the PSP, which still included some 
proletarian elements. lts playful and symbolic or expressive 
actions marked, in asense, the end of the consociational era 
in Dutch polities. The religious pillars started to crumble, 
the party system began to break up in two camps, Left and 
Right; coalitions became more and more difficult to make and 
to maintain. Cultural traditions disintegrated, a more liberal 
and individualistic mass culture seemed to replace the tradi-
tional sub-cultures based on religion and class. Of course, 
Provo did not cause these changes, but it articulated them at 
least for a section of the new petty bourgeoisie, specifically 
the logocrats. 
Logocrats have been defined here as members of the new 
petty bourgeoisie who engaged in social and cultural work, in 
education, mass media, research centres, neighbourhood centres, 
etc., while exercising influence or power through the use of 
reason and words (logos). In Marxist terms, their function 
is to produce and reproduce ideology. Thus they tend to 
serve the interests of the bourgeoisie, but in a rather 
indirect and ambivalent way, maintaining a relative indepen-
denee from the bourgeoisie and even from the state which 
usually supports them financially. Like other sections of 
the new petty bourgeoisie,the logocrats had generally remained 
loyal to the bourgeoisie and the state until the 1960s; in 
Poulantzian (or Gramscian) terms, they were integrated in 
the power bloc dominated by the monopolist and multinational 
bourgeoisie. They played a minor role, however, until their 
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numbers increased significantly due to the expansion of the 
mass media and higher education as weIl as the establishment 
of new social work agencies and cultural centres in the 1960s. 
Their greater numbers and importance may have made them aware 
of their own interests, which did not coincide completely 
with those of the bourgeoisie. While economically satisfied, 
they probably feIt deprived of political power and cultural 
freedom and identity. 
Through Provo, its successor Oranje Vrijstaat--the 
Kabouter 1I1ovement--and other groups, logocrats ac quired some 
political power (or at least: influence) and cultural freedom, 
as weIl as a certain identity. However, these Neo-Anarchist 
groups suffered from serious weaknesses and could not last. 
Hence the logocrats moved on to more stabIe and stronger 
organisations, the PSP but also the Political Party of Radicals 
and the Labour Party (PvdA). By 1970, they had captured 
important positions within all three. 
Between 1960 and 1970,the Dutch Labour Party changed 
from a relatively solid and united Old Left mass party into 
a fragile and divided collection of informal Old and New Left 
groups, factions and tendencies; towards the end of the 1970s, 
it became again more homogeneous, though still divided. It 
seemed to retain a mostly working-class electorate but to 
lose most of its proletarian membership and cadre, whereas 
new petty bourgeois members began to dominate party meetings 
and congresses. The group Nieuw Links (New Left) enjoyed 
considerable support among these new petty bourgeois members; 
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many leaders of the group were logocrats. Af ter 1970 the group 
feIl apart into two tendencies, which were called "Neo-Marxists 
and "Neo-Fabians" here. The former strove for an alliance 
with the organised working class, whereas the latter seemed 
to seek an intermediate position between capital and labour. 
In fact, both projects showed elitist as weIl as populist 
tendencies, but the Neo-Marxists may have articulated more 
purely logocratic interests, whereas the Neo-Fabians displayed 
more sympathy for the state and its technocratie or bureau-
cratie elite. Together the two tendencies controlled the 
Labour Party in the late 1970s, which represented at that 
time active new petty bourgeois elements as weIl as passive 
proletarians. The economie crisis, social and political 
polarisation, and depillarisation may have brought the two 
classes together. 
No such class alliance existed within the Political 
Party of Radicals, founded in l~68 by new petty bourgeois 
members of the Catholic Party and the Anti-Revolutionary 
Party, but boycotted by most Catholic and Protestant trade 
unionists. In the 1970s the party developed CL purely New 
Left project, which was described as "Radical Pluralism" in 
Chapter 4.4 above. The project suffered from many ambiguities 
and seemed to lose its appeal to (probably new petty bourgeois) 
voters towards the end of the 1~70s. The tension between 
elitism and populism, the idealistic approach to economie and 
social change, and the vague, subjectivist conception of 
culture which characterised most New Left projects, were 
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particularly striking in this case. 
The ambiguities of the New Left project become intelli-
gible in the light of the new petty bourgeois class base of 
most New Left groups. The "new petty :ourgeoisie" has been 
defined in different ways by different I·larxist "schools," but 
the term has been used here rather loosely. It refers to 
employees, civil servants and intellectuals who provide 
services of different kinds--advice, scientific information, 
entertainment, etc.--in "exchange" for a salary or subsidy 
from the state or a private corporation. They do not own 
their means of production, generally, nor do they produce 
value in the Marxist sense--their salary is somehow paid 
out of the surplus produced by the working class. They 
resembIe the "old" or traditional petty bourgeoisie of 
artisans and shopkeepers only in so far as they enjoy some 
autonomy in their work sphere and some independence vis-à-vis 
the bourgeoisie; but they do not produce or realise value, 
nor do they compete on a market like the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie. They also differ wi th respect to poli tical 
behaviour and ideology: the New Left enjoyed very little 
support among shopkeepers and artisans, as far as we know. 
Marxists who re gard the old and the new petty bourgeoisie as 
factions or strata of one class seem to underestimate these 
differences. l 
lBoth Poulantzas and the more "orthodox" Baudelot, 
Establet and Malemort seem to conceive of the petty bourgeoisie 
as a single class (see Poulantzas, Les classes sociales and 
"The New Petty Bourgeoisie," in Hunt, op. ci t., PP. 113--124; 
1 
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If this definition of the new petty bourgeoisie sounds 
vague, it may reflect the real situation of this class, which 
seemed far from cle~r-cut in the period under study. It had 
grown considerably, due to the expansion of mass education 
and mass media, of the state apparatus in general and--perhaps 
more basically--the increasing application of science and 
technology to production and the concentration and centrali-
sation of capital. 2 As it grew, it lost some of the privileges 
and contacts with the bourgeoisie that it had enjoyed before, 
and came to resembIe the working class in some ways--hence 
it was occasionally conceived as a "New Working Class," or 
as the "head" of the Collective Worker (Gesamtarbeiter). 
Nonetheless its position remained ambivalent, economically 
as weIl as politically and ideolo~ically. When class 
struggles intensified in the lYGOs over wa,~es and workin<-: 
conditions, only smdll sections of the new r;etty bourgeoisie 
may have supported the workers in their struggle aGainst 
Raudelot, et al., op. cit.); cf. the criti~ues by WriGht, 
op. cit.)and Lindsey, op. cit.; hoV/ever, the critics tend to 
define avray the ne\'! yctty bour ,coisL; c'.l tC,ctheT [.y re'.ucin ~ 
i t to "conl;l'é,.~ictory 10cD.tions" wi th reslJect to CD.pi tal and 
labour or to an "ideological class" respectively. Though 
Lindsey's term refers to almost the same group as the one 
used here, his conception seems toa narrow and functionalistic 
for me; if the function of the "ideological class" is only 
"to represent andprotect these interests of the capitalist 
class" and "ta ensure that this exploitative relationship 
(between capital and labour) is maintained and reproduced" 
(op. cit., pp. 21, 22 respectively) it could never rebel 
against the bourgeoisie and the state. 
2These processes are described and analysed in depth 
by Poulantzas, Les classes sociales, and--in a more "orthodox" 
and thorough way--in E. Mandel, Der Spatkapitalismus (Frankfurt, 
1972). 
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employers and the state. On the other hand, the new petty 
bourgeoisie did not show much enthusiasm for employers' 
demands for cuts in the public sector and lower taxes either, 
as it depended mostlyon the public sector. 
The ambivalent class position of the new petty bourgeoisie 
could explain many of the ambiguities of the New Left project, 
as was suggested in Chapter Five above. Because of its 
relative distance from the production process and its relative 
independence from the market economy, the new petty bourgeoisie 
showed little interest in economic analysis and denounced Old 
Left theories as too "economistic" or too "materialistic." 
It did not suffer much from economic exploitation nor from 
political oppression--even if it perhaps felt deprived of 
political power--hence it could also reject the determinism 
of the Old Left and expect to change society through the 
forces of will and reason rather than social or economic 
forces (of production). It tended to question Old Left 
Marxist ideas about classes, without fully accepting the 
bourgeois or traditional petty bourgeois ideology of a class-
less affluent and free society; but it conceived of classes 
in terms of power and pri vilege, rather than ownership or 
control over the means of production •. Thus members of the 
new petty bourgeoisie of ten regarded their immediate superiors, 
college professors, senior civil servants, senior officers 
and the like, as "the ruling class" (or "the power elite," 
"the Establishment" etc.). On the other hand, they usually 
overlooked the differences between their own class position 
and that of the working class, while trying to identify 
themselves with the "New Working Class,1I the "Collective 
Worker," the "people." 
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Vague populist ideas also characterised New Left theories 
of the state and strategies to democratise the state and 
bourgeois society. Like Old Left Anarchists and--to alesser 
extent--Revolutionary Socialists, most New Leftists considered 
the state an authoritarian monster; perhaps because both 
witnessed a significant expansion of state power and growing 
state intervention in society, the modernisation reforms of 
the Liberal governments towards the end of the 19th century 
and the consolidation of the "welfare state" by coalitions 
of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats af ter \'lorld \'lar 
Two. In both cases the state intervened on behalf of capital 
rather than labour, even if it tried to reconcile both and 
improve the conditions of the working c1ass to some extent. 
Around 1900, the working c1ass faced a re1atively weak state 
which i t could still hope to smash--for;~etting for the moment 
its own weakness as a class--but by 1960 the state appeared 
too strong and big, even in the eyes of the Neo-Anarchists 
who tried to provoke it without much revolutionary hope. By 
th at time, the working class seemed to have been integrated in 
society and to have accepted the state, at least grudgingly. 
The new petty bourgeoisie, however, had not gone through the 
proletarian experience of strugg1es and compromises with the 
bourgeois state. When faced with authoritarian state inter-
vention, for instance in the sphere of higher education, the 
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new petty bourgeoisie could revert to older Anarchist or Revolu-
tionary Socialist examples of direct action against the state 
and hopes or plans for self-management. At the same time, 
it would not dream of smashing the state on which it depended 
for its livelihood. Hence a dunl strategy of direct action 
combincd with electoral or legislative action"within the 
\'/hilc thc neVl petty bour;;eoisie tcnded to confront the 
GourLcoisie an~ the state with populist idcas and direct 
action, it showeè. somewhat elitist tendencies with reslJect 
to the workin,',:!, class. Most of i ts plans for workers • self-
management and workers' culture assumed or implied an important 
role for new petty bourgeois managers, technocrats, artists, 
teachers~ sociolo6ists and other logocrats, as was shown 
above in Chapter Five. Furthermore, the direct actions for 
which \'[orkers were mobilised were not only of ten led by new 
petty bourgeois logocrats, they also satisfied the needs for 
sOlidarity, creativity and self-expression which the latter 
seemed to feel more urgently than the former. 
Soliebrity, self- evelopment, anti creativity were the 
core values of the new culture or counter-culture which the 
1'le,,' Left presented ss an al ternati ve to the dominant culture 
of individual achievement, competition,economic growth and 
Hork. Ta same extent the new culture could be considered a 
new petty bourgeois su -culture, and more specifically a 
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logocratic sub-culture. Logocrats had a professional interest 
in self-development and creativity; they also needed sOlidarity 
in their relations with clients, audiences or students. Unlike 
the workers in factories or offices, the new petty bourgeois 
intellectuals and civil servants were expected to develop 
their faculties freely rather than discipline them. They 
were socialised differently, as Kohn and others have shown: 
workers emphusized external discipline and conformity, whereas 
intellectuals gave priority to internal discipline and self-
expression. 3 Possibly also due to its distance from the 
production process, the new petty bourgeoisie could afford 
to "communicate" with nature rather than dominate it. For 
the same reason it tended to ignore or underestimate the 
objective and material conditions of cultural activities, 
and to overestimate the subjective aspects of culture. 
At this point, a second qualification is called for. 
The New Left project should not be reduced to a new petty 
bourgeois ideology; nor should one assume that the new petty 
bour:~eoisie as a whole approved of the New Left. Empirical 
evidence is scarce and not always reliable in this area, but 
it suggests that only a minority, though a substantial one, 
of the Dutch new petty bourgeoisie lent active or passive 
support to New Left groups in the period under study. For 
instance, only 26.8% of the intellectual workers in a sample 
of the 1971 National Election Study expressed preference 
3 See KOhn, op. cit.; Gottschalch, op. cit., pp. 71-192. 
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for a New Leftish party--PSP, PPR or PvdA, whereas 26.8% 
preferred a Christian Democratie party and 16.7% the Dutch 
4 Liberal Party. 
Though there is little evidence on this point, it seems 
likely that support for the New Left was higher among logo-
cratic members of the new petty bourgeoisie than among techno-
crats and bureaucrats. The technocrats were closer to the 
production process and to the bourgeoisie, hence probably 
Ie ss idealistic and less anti-capitalistic than the logocrats 
and more inclined to support right wing parties; while bureau-
crats identified probably more wi th the state VJhich they may 
have seen as a neutral arbitrator in the class struggle. 
Bowever, one's political preferenee does not depend only on 
onels socio-economie position, but also on the relation to 
other classes and on poli tic al as weIl as reli;~ious or cul tural 
factors. 
A few comparative comments on the New Left in France 
and Germany, made in Chapter Three, help to understand the 
Dutch New Left in its social, political and cultural context. 
In all three countries new petty bourgeois elements--and 
especially logocrats--seem to have initiated and led most 
New Left groups, pursuing basically similar goals. Yet there 
were important differences. The French new petty bourgeoisie 
4National Election Study (Nationaal Verkiezingsohderzoek) 
1971; the information has been provided by the Steinmetz 
Archives in Amsterdam; in 1971 the New Left did' not yet 
control the Labour Party completely, hence the latter can 
be considered "New Leftish" rather than "New Leftist." 
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seemed to lean more towards the vlorkin u c 12S8, which main-
tained more lI1ilit2.nt anu i·iarxisG ic,er,s anel habits than the 
:)utch vlOrking class--as indicated Ly Communist votes, strike 
5 days, pcrhaps church attendance. Hence an alliance between 
the working class anel the ne\'! petty bourgeoisie--or at least 
an important fraction of it--seemed feasible in France, 
provided thc lat ter accepted at least some of the aims and 
habits of the former. Thus the French New Left used more 
1-larxist terms and appeared more secular or materialistic 
than the Dutch New Left. On the political level, the Old 
and the New Left forged an uneasy anel fragile alliance in 
France which resulted in a Common Platform of the Socialist 
Party and the Communist Part~ but not in an electoral majority. 
Both parties remained in the opposition and failed to exercise 
any significant influence on the powerful executive branch 
of the French political system. In this context, the anti-
electoralism and even anti-parliamentarism of some New Left 
broups--the New Ultra-Ieft--becomes comprehensible. The 
events of May and June 1968 showed the possibilities--but 
also the limits--of direct, extra-parliamentary action in 
France. 
The German new petty bourgeoisie,. on the other hand, 
seemed to lean more towards the bourgeoisie, which may have 
5See Kendall, op. cit., for figures on Communist votes 
and strike days; church attendance among Catholics was weekly 
amon~ 17% of the French (adult) popu1ation in 1975, 21% in 
1971; but among 41% of the Dutch in 1971 and 33% in 1975, 
according to r,1aetin, op. ci t., p. 153, and J. 'rhurlings, "De 
Ontzuiling in Nederland," Sociolo&3ische Gids 26:6 (1979): 
470-492. 
414 
been stronger in the Federal Hepublic than in France or the 
Netherlands. As the German working class also seemed to 
accept bourgeois i de,as about the Co ld War, capi tali sm and 
economic growth, the New Left remained a relatively marginal 
and isolated movement in Germany. It could fall back on a 
rich tradition of Marxist thought but may have alienated 
rather than attracted workers wi th I'larxist or Neo-Marxist 
terms and symbols which were identified with the Enemy during 
the Nazi era and the Cold War--which could be regarded as a 
ci vi 1 war between East and West Germany. lJioreover, the 
polarised party system and the 5% electoral threshhold made 
it difficult for New Left groups to compete with the Social 
Democratic Party for seats in parliament. 
Compared to France an~ Germany, the Netherlands had a 
fairly open political system. Political parties allowed 
interest groups a relatively easy access and if they did not, 
new parties would enter the system and win a few seats, perhaps 
even participate in a coali tion ,!;overnment. v/hen new interest 
groups--belonging to the new petty bourgeoisie but also to 
other classes--tried to articulate new issues in the 1960s and 
1970s, they gave rise at first to new parties like the PSP, 
Provo, PPR, Democrats'66 and the Farmers' Party. In a later 
sta~e, they won aeeess to older and larger parties like the 
Labour Party or the Liberal Party perhaps; most of the new 
parties declinca subse4uently. Some of the interest groups 
were new, for instance the student movement, the conseripted 
soldiers union, thc eeolo;~ical ~;roups anel to some extent the 
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feminist groups; some Vlere ad-hoc groups organised around a 
single issue such as the ... lar in Vietnam or in Angola; others 
were older groups which found new issues, like the trade 
unions and farmers which turned to more political issues 
af ter 1960. Many of these issues could be seen as consequences 
of growing intervention of the state in society, as weIl as 
of economie growth and concentration or centralisation of 
capital. 
The causes and consequences of state intervention in 
late capitalist societies have been analysed sufficiently by 
New Left theoreticians like Claus Offe, whose iCleas were 
discussed briefly above in Chapter four. Of course the 
reaction to state intervention could take different forms, 
ranging from a right wing conservative defense of free enter-
prise, to anarchist or revolutionary socialist attempts to 
organise "counter-powers" or workers' councils; moderate New 
Leftists and left wing liberals adopted an intermediate posi-
tion, accepting state intervention but trying to reconcile 
it with grass roots democracy. One could expect the ri~ht 
win:, conservative reaction to come from the traditional vetty 
bour~~eoisie--incluclini~ the farrners--and the other tvro fro;,1 the 
lO"ocr::.tic é.liel tecLno-l:ureéJ.ucré,tic factions of the ne\'! jJetty 
lour,~eoi sie respecti vc ly. Ilowever , thi s interpreta tion vlould 
be too schematic. The resistance against state intervention 
mi~ht also rally members of different classes, traditional 
and petty bourgeoisie as weIl as workers, perhaps' even factions 
of the bourgeoisie, in "popular democratie" or populist 
t ' G ac 10nS. 
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Furthermorc the poli tical process was complicatcd by the 
decline of the Confessional parties in the Netherlands--and 
by a similar ciecline of the Christiun Democratie iJarty and 
other partieu of the Centrc in Francc. A~ain, one could try 
to rcduce thi~ to a chun~e in cl~ss relations; to be precise, 
the relative Gecline of the traditional ~etty bour~eoisie 
v!hich consti tutec.. the LEtckLone of these i-lo.rties, and the 
suLseyuent erosion of the power bloc which united this class 
\'li th the bour3eoisie. Ho doubt this played an important role. 
Yet one should not neglect other factors, cultural rather 
than political. r.lembership of and participation in religious 
organisations declined ~enerally during the 1960s and 1970s 
in the Netherlands, across class lines. This process of de-
pillarisation could be seen as part of a wider and longer 
process of secularisation and rationalisation of Dutch and 
more generally of Western culture. 
The New Left project itself could be interpreted as a 
result of this secularisation process; perhaps the penultimate 
step. The first step could be traeed back to pre-historie 
times, but in a more conventional sense probably to the late 
Uiddle A~es and the Heformation. At that time the religious 
uni ty of the !<in~~doli1s of Europe, the arts, öciences and the 
estates of feudal society under the cultural hegemony of the 
GThe term "iJopular democratie" has been borrowed from 
Laclau, op. cit., Chapters 3 and 4; similar are,urnents were 
made by Habermas and Touraine (see Chapter 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 
above respectively). 
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Catholic Church, began to crack. Some people began to question 
the God-biven nature of the world and the state and dared to 
search for laws, both in nature and in the state, that could 
be manipulated by man. They did not abandon the idea of God, 
but secularised and rationalised Him into a mere Creator or 
a Maintainer of Laws. The final goals in life and the social 
order remained sacred and unquestioned, but within the limits 
of the law, individuals enjoyed freedom to pursue their ends 
in different ways. The interpretation of the laws could be 
discussed in public. The public consisted of scientists, 
lawyers and other men (rarely women) who had received a 
solid education; in principle, all men were considered 
capable of rational discussion. 7 
A second step was taken during the Enlightenment, or its 
aftermath, the first part of the 19th century. People began 
to question the existence of God and the timelessness of 
bath the cosmie and the naturalorder. Nature and society 
had evolved over time, they discovered; hence they could be 
chun8ed by man, within or without laws. Different ends could 
be pursued by different people, nations and classes. Rational 
discussion became difficult, the public broke up in hostile 
camps or parties. Yet within these parties, everyone agreed 
on basic principles. Certain basic principles were not 
questioned, some order was still assumed. Religion became a 
7The term "secularisation" is used here in a loose, 
philosophical sense; cf. D. Wilson, Religion in Secular Society 
(London, 1966), especially Chapter 111; R. Bellah, "Heligious 
Evolution," American Socio1ogica1 Review 29:3 (1964): 358-
J 74. 
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private affair, whi1e a form of humanism was generally accepted: 
man shou1d develop his faculties, work and produce to increase 
his wealth; man was still a sacred unity. 
The third step was (or iS) taken in the 20th century. 
The boundaries between sacred and secular, public and private, 
social and natural, be:'~an to fade. [.l,::m was no lon!~er considered 
a unity, but an unstable collection of drives, forces, habits. 
Basic values of personal development, work and production, 
and reason, \'lere no lon~~er taken for ,::;ranted. l'Ian iü,zht be 
alienated from himself, even his "self" mi[~~ht be or should 
be chem.;ed. Action became an end in itself. The end resu1t, 
i~)2rhaps the fin"l step, woulc: clissol'F~ ;;.11 unit:, aI'. Á ;::;tal,ilit.'i 
into 0. clynêllüc ch&o:::; of pure lilovelilent vii thout 2nc~ or ,.,oal; 
Jüiü li DIn or nothin,:,ness. 
Tlle Nevl Loft could be seen as a consequcnce of the third 
step. At every step, politics tended to follow science. 
Science shows possibilities, whereas politics invo1ves a 
choice. The third step was initiated, one might ar~ue, by 
psychology, particularly psycho-analysis, while sociolo~y 
and political economy--but also biology--had contributed to 
the second step. New Left politics mixed psycho-analytic 
ideas with sociolo~ical and political ideas, aiming for a 
psychological as weIl as a social and political change. Many 
theorists referred to Marx and Freud. Since man (and even 
more so woman) had 1nternalised poli tical repression, he could 
only attain freedom by chan~ing himself, liberating repressed 
drives or desires and expressing himself freely. Persona1 
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problems were defined as political issues; "happiness is now 
a political issue," as a New Leftish psychiatrist exclaimed. 8 
Even direct political action could help people to satisfy 
repressed needs and desires on the spot, as it were. RoeI 
van Duijn, a prominent member of several New Left groups, 
summed up very eloquently the philosophy of his movernent as 
"the socialism of the erect penis ••• rather than of the 
clenched fist."~ 
The hedonism or narcissism of the New Left could not be 
expressed more succinctly. Hedonism, the search for immediate 
pleasure, was not typical of the New Left alone, however. 
It seems a characteristic of the individualistic mass culture 
that emerged in advanced capitalist societies af ter 1~60, 
v/hich socioloiSists like rrouraine described. 10 Liberated 
from religious or socio-political traditions and conventions, 
the mass of (mostly young) relatively well-paid workers, 
businessmen and intellectuals began to devote more time and 
money to the pleasures of life--food, alcohol, sex, sports, 
drugs, entertainment, travel. Though leisure time increased, 
participation in religious and politican activities seemed 
to decline. 
Vlhether this mass culture was really as liberal and 
8 J. VJeijel, "De derde revolutie," Socialisme en Derllocratie 
(1968): 1-21. 
9E • Van Duijn, Schuldbekentenis van een ambassadeur 
(Amsterdam, 1970), p. 26. 
10 See above, Chapter 4.3.5; cf. Bell, op. cit., C. Lasch, 
The Culture of Narcissism (New York, 1978). 
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individualistic as its producers proclaimed is another question. 
As the private sphere was gradually penetrated by publicity, 
politicised by action groups, regulated by the state and 
reformed by psycholoGi sts, psychia tri sts, social vlorkers 
and other lOJocrats, individual freedom and individualism 
lost much meanin:;. Perhaps "dividualism" vlould characterise 
the new culture more accurately than "individualism": the 
individual was only trying to develop himself or to realise 
himself but did not exist as such; he existed in a fragmented, 
alienated form. ll 
Insofar as the new mass culture was produced by logocrats, 
it is not surprising that it reflected some of their ideolo6ical 
tendencies. On the other hand, lo~ocrats did not only follow 
their ovm inspiration but also the--relatively autonomous--
lOi~ic of cul tural deve lopment. They ac ted as vanguard , one 
might say, of the secularisation process which they could 
not control. In fact, many of them may have come from religious 
backsrounds but liberated themselves from it--often more 
radically than most "secular" intellectuals v/ho had taken 
the second but not the third step. Thus the New Left ideas 
transcended the class boundaries of the new petty bourgeoisie 
and permeated the mass culture of the 1960s and 1970s. To 
some extent, the mass culture became the dominant culture of 
llCf. J. Habermas, Zur Rekonstruktion, Chapter 4 especially; 
in some way the analysis above follows Adorno and Horkheimer 
rather than Habermas, who criticised the latter; see also 
T.W. Adorno, Minima moralia (Frankfurt, 1964). 
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ndV2nced ca0italist socicties; in a supcrficial sense: it 
,jic.l not repL-'ce bour;;eois cul ture, [Jut h';~S superimposcd upon 
i t, cl:::, i t \'/01'0. It ];,ckccJ thc cohcrencc nnd strcn ;th of n 
domin~,nt culture irnl-,osed Ly ;t dominant c lilss, hO':lcver. 
The prcccdin:; spccuL:üions have qtlé11ified thc olJenin ~ 
ncw ~ctty bour~coisie to or~anise itself politically and to 
leve lop i ts O'I'in i (lcology--provi deu one Ddds tha t (1) the Ne' .. ; 
Lcft '.las not rcally ncvJ; (2) thc nCVl petty bourgeoisie ,las 
not ~ cle~rly Cefined class in thc lUGOs and lY70s, nor did 
a majority of it adopt New Left ideas, but probably only a 
,..;i '~.nificant rünori ty; (3) Hew Left ideas r.1ay have articula ted 
in te re ,~t3 0 fother c Ll~~,:;C~; alGo, cStieci;-; lly nt thc 1,)oli tical 
leve 1 (pot-'uléJ.r-(jernocr'~1 tic stru;;;gle for self-r;lanaöemnet, 
a"ain.:;t th'2 state) f.lnd the cul tural level, where they mcrged 
into a wilier [,laSS culture. 
'fhe IJ e \'1 Left is not quite dead, one mi,;ht conclude, even 
in lY80. It Tnay live for quite a while in different forms, 
the ideolo;:;y of (a fraction of) the new petty bourgeoisie, as 
})opular-delilocratic resistance against state intervention or 
as elements of the new mass culture. 
APPENDIX I 
LIST OF DUTCH ADBREVIATIONS 
AJC Arb,,:iders Jeus;;d Centrale: \vorkers Youth Centre, youth 
organization of the SDAP from 1918-to 1958. 
ARP ~-Revolutionaire Partij: Anti-Revolutionary Party, 
founded in 1879 by Abraham Kuyper, to counter the 
secular spirit of the French Revolution and to mobilize 
the Cal vini st "small people" (kleine luyden); merge d 
in 1975-1976 wi th KVP and CIru in the Christian Democratie 
Appeal. 
DAS Cond van Anarcho-Socialisten: League of Anarchist-
Socialists, before 1931 called Dond YQ!l Religieuze 
Anarcho-Communisten (League of Reli~ious Anarchist 
Communists); broke away in 1920 from the BCS, dissolved 
in 1940. 
DCS jJond van Christen Socialisten: LeaGue of Christian 
SOëTalists, founded in 1907 by leftist Anti-l{evolution-
aries; disintegrated in 1921. 
CDA Christen-Democratisch Appel: Christian Democratie 
Appeal, federation of ARP, CHU and KVP established in 
1975-1976. 
CDU Christen-Democratische Unie: Christian Democratie 
Union, leftist Protestant party founded in 1926, 
merged with SDAP into PvdJ\. in 1946. 
CIlU Christelijk Historische Unie: Christian Historical 
Union, founded in 1908, moderate Protestant ~arty, 
merged with ARP and KVP into CDA (1975-1976). 
CNV Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond: Christian National 
Trade Union Confederation (Centre), Protestant orsani-
zation close to AHP; af ter 1976 accepting conservative 
Catholic unions. 
CPN Communistische Partij Nederland: Communist Party of 
the Netherlands, name adopted by the SDP in 1919. 




DS'70 Democratische Socialisten'70: Democratie Socialists 
1970, rightist offshoot of PvdA, founded in 1970. 
EVC Eenheidsvakcentrale: Unity Trade Union Centre, founded 
by Communists and other leftists in 1945, split in 
1948 and 1958, dissolved in 1964. 
FNV Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweaing: Federation (of 
the) Dutch Trade Union [.lovement, formed in 1975 by 
NW and NKV. 
GGD Cemeenschappelijk Grondbezit: Common Landownership 
federation of abrarian productive associations--later 
includin,.~ industrial cooperatives as well--founded by 
Van Eeden and other Anarchists in 1901, dissolved 
in 1940. 
KAPN Kommunistische Arbeiders Partij Nederland: Communist 
\'lorkers Party of the Netherlanûs, broke aV/ay from CPB 
in L921, led by Gorter; close to German KAPD; dissolved 
in 1932. 
lCVP Katholieke Volkspartij: Catholic People's Party--called 
Catholic State Party before 1940, usually referred to 
as 'Catholic Party' in the text; merged with ARP and 
CEU into CDA in 1975-1976. 
NAS Nationaal Arbeids Secretariaat: National Labour 
Secretariat, founded in 1893 by members of the SDB, 
particularly Cornelissen, with syndicalist oreintation; 
split in 1923, dissolved in 1940. 
NKV Nederlands Katholiek Vakverbond: Confederation of 
Dutch Catholic Trade Unions, 1964-75; cnlled Katholiekc 
Arhcidersbevlc kin"~; (C:ltholic 1}orl:ers:)verner,t) 194()-,l'l 
ind nooLl;.:.;~atholielcwcrklieclcn Verl.Jond (Roman Catholic 
\'Jorldngman t s Confederatiorv hefore 1940; merged wi th 
NW into FNV in 1975. 
IJ;:;V Nederlands Syndicalistisch Vakverbond: Dutch Syndicalist 
'l'rade Union Confederation, split from NAS in 1923 when 
the latter decideJ to adhere to the Red 'l'rade Union 
International; dissolved in 1940. 
nvv Nederlands Verbond ~ Vakvereniéingen: Dutch (Con)-
federation of Trade Unions, founded in 1905 by Social 
Democrats, merged with NKV into FNV in 1975. 
OSP Onafhankelijke Socialistische Partij: Independent 
Socialist Party, broke away from the SDAP in 1932, 












Onafhankelijk Verbond ~ Dedrijfsorganizaties: 
Independent (Con)federation of Industrial Organizations, 
trade union centre th at split from EVC in 1948, in 
opposition to Communist control; more or less syndical-
ist orientation. 
Proletarisch Links: Proletarian Left, faction in PSP, 
since its expulsion in 1971 a party, affiliated with 
the Fourth International (Trotskyite), later named 
International Communist League (Internationale Kommunis-
~~). 
Politieke Portij Eadikalen: Political Party of Radicals, 
founded by radical members of KVP and ARP in 1968. 
Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij: Pacifist Socialist 
Party, founded in 1957 by former members of the PvdA 
and others. 
Partij ~ ~ Arbeid: Labour Party, resulting from a 
merger of SDAP, CDU, VDD and a small Catholic group 
in 1946; Social Democratie orientation. 
Hevolutionair Socialistische Arbeiders Partij: 
Revolutionary Socialist \'lorkers Party, resulting from 
a mer~er between OSP and RSP in 1935; dissolved in 1940, 
but partly resurrected as Spartaeist Lea~ue in the 
resistance--the league still existed in 1977, though 
most members might have joined the PvdA, PSP or other 
parties af ter 1945. 
Revolutionair Socialistische Partij: Revolutionary 
Socialist Party, split from CPH in 1927 led by Sneevliet, 
merged with OSP in 1935 into RSAP. 
Revolutionair Socialistisch Verbond: Revolutionary 
Socialist Association (Confederation), broke away 
from SDAP during World \lar I, led by Henriette Roland 
Holst, joined the SDP in 19l6--not to be confused 
with the Religious Socialist Association (Religieus 
Socialistisch Verbond) existincl in the same periode 
Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiders. Partij: Social 
Democratie Workers Party, founded in 1894 by moderate 
SDB members, merged with CDU, VDB and others into PvdA 
in 1946. 
Sociaal-Democratische Bond: Social Democratie League, 
founded as a national organization in 1882; split in 
1894 and changed name into SB, Socialistenbond (Socialist 
League) which merged into SDAP in 1899 af ter most 








Sociaal-Democratisch Centrum: Social Democratic Centre, 
study [;roup and faction of r.1arxists in the Pvd1\., set 
up in 1946 and revived in 1~55, dissolved in 1959. 
Sociaal-Democratische Partij: Social Democratic Party, 
broke a\'l8.y from the SDAP in 1909, renamed CPN in 1919. 
Socialistische Werkers Partij: Socialist Workers Party, 
hroke away from the CPN in 1958-59; dissolved in 1965. 
Televisie ~ Hadio Omroep Stichtin.;,: Television and 
Radio Ilroadcastin8 Foundation, first major broadcastin:'; 
system not affiliated with one of the Dutch ~illars or 
parties, proclaimed political neutrality but tended to 
be conservative. 
Vereni;::;in:;; ~ Arbeiders Radio Amateurs: Association 
of 1.-,'orkers Hadio Amateurs, Soc iali st broarJ,castin ': 
system affili2ted with SDAP and later (more loosely) 
Pvd!\ • 
Vri jzinni ,;c l)e[;,oc1',-,1;i [;Ch(3 :',on ,,: Li ter;:'.l De;;loc re. tic 
Lea~uc lcfti:3t LiLeral }'arty that r;lcr.jed \;ith ;3DicP ~L!1C:: 
others into ~.)vdi\. in 194G; many raemters joined the VVD 
later, or D'GG. 
Voll~spartij ~ Vrijheid ~ Democratie: People' s 
Party for Freellom and Deli10CrD.cy, of ten refcrred to as 
the Liberals, founded in 1948; many leftist Liberals 
went to D'66 in 19G6. 
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